Federal Court Decision Summaries 48A, 2024
In the case summaries, the term “judicial review” is used. This refers to the courts’ review of administrative decisions made by government officials, including positions taken by the Information and Privacy Commissioners of Canada.
Access to Information Act
Federal Court of Appeals
1. Beniey v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
Citation: 2024 FCA 11
Link: Beniey v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
Date of decision:
Provisions of the Access to information Act: Sections 19, and 25, subsection 41(1), and section 44.1
- Section 19 – Personal Information
- Section 25 – Severability
- Subsection 41(1) – Review by Federal Court – complainant
- Section 44.1 – De novo review
Provision of the Privacy Act: Paragraph 3(j)
- Paragraph 3(j) – Exception for officers or employees of government institutions
Operational takeaways
- Jurisprudence establishes that the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act (ATIA) must be read together, and when done, it affords a greater protection to personal information. Subsection 19(1) must be applied broadly, and paragraph 3(j) must be interpreted narrowly.
- The exception in paragraph 3(j) covers information directly related to general characteristics of positions of officers or employees of government institutions including titles, duties, salary range, responsibilities or opinion and views given in the course of their employment. It does not extend to characteristics of the individuals themselves such as physical or personal features, even if captured in the workplace and in uniform.
- Unlike attendance logs, images captured in the workplace reveal employee-specific characteristics and there is no sufficient link between all the personal characteristics that could be revealed by the images of the officers and the general characteristics of their positions or duties.
Summary
The Federal Appeal Court found that the lower court erred in its interpretation of subsection 19(1) of the ATIA. They determined that all Canada Border Services Agency (Agency) officers appearing on the videotapes are entitled to the same protection under the personal information exemptions. The Court also determined that the Agency correctly applied section 25 of the ATIA concerning severing exempted information from disclosure. The Court furthermore held that the ATIA and the Privacy Act must be interpreted harmoniously.
Issues
- Whether the Federal Court erred in its interpretation of subsection 19(1) of the ATIA and the definition of “personal information” under the Privacy Act, particularly the scope of the exception in paragraph 3(j).
- Whether the Agency fulfilled its duty under section 25 and properly severed exempted information and disclosed the remainder of the video information to the Appellant.
Facts
Régis Beniey, was involved in a workplace incident on , at the Queenston Bridge border crossing. Following this, the Agency initiated an internal investigation, and Mr. Beniey filed a grievance.
On , Mr. Beniey submitted an access to information request seeking reports and surveillance video recordings related to the incident. The Agency responded in by providing some reports and seven video recordings, some of which were redacted or altered. and Mr. Beniey was dissatisfied and filed a complaint with the Information Commissioner, alleging incomplete disclosure and technical issues with the videos. The Commissioner dismissed the complaint but required the Agency to correct the video issues, which the Agency did by .
Following receipt of the Information Commissioner’s report, Mr. Beniey applied to the Federal Court for a review under subsection 41(1) of the ATIA. The Court decided that the videotapes containing images of government employees in uniform and on duty are not exempt under subsection 19(1) of the ATIA and must be disclosed to and Mr. Beniey. The Court did not address section 25 of the ATIA, as it deemed it unnecessary given the disclosure ruling. The Federal Court applied the correct standard of review and focused on the specific videotapes identified by the Appellant.
Decision
The main appeal was dismissed with costs.
The cross-appeal was allowed. The Federal Court’s judgment was set aside.
Reasons
Whether the Federal Court erred in its interpretation of subsection 19(1) of the ATIA and the definition of “personal information” under the Privacy Act, particularly the scope of the exception in paragraph 3(j).
The cross-appeal analysis was on the interpretation of subsection 19(1) of the ATIA and paragraph 3(j) of the Privacy Act. The Federal Court of Appeal concluded that all of the officers appearing on videotapes are equally protected under these provisions. As such, the scope of paragraph 3(j) is limited to general job-related information, excluding personal details like physical appearance.
Whether the Agency fulfilled its duty under section 25 and properly severed exempted information and disclosed the remainder of the video information to the Appellant.
The Court also found that the Agency fulfilled its mandatory duty under section 25 by severing personal information before disclosing videotapes, although the subsection 19(1) exception was erroneously applied.
Federal Court of Canada
1. Preventous Collaborative Health v. Canada (Health)
Citation: 2024 FC 1214
Link: Preventous Collaborative Health v. Canada (Health)
Date of decision:
Provisions of the Access to information Act: Section 13, subsection 19(1), paragraph 20(1)(b), and sections 27 and 44
- Section 13 – Information obtained in confidence
- Subsection 19(1) – Personal Information
- Paragraph 20(1)(b) – Third party information, financial, commercial, scientific or technical information
- Section 27 – Notice to third parties
- Section 44 – Disclosure of third party information, application for review
Operational takeaways
For paragraph 20(1)(b) to apply, information must be supplied to a government institution by the third party. Consultations undertaken prior to a potential disclosure should consider the source of the information and whether there are any reasonable expectations of confidentiality, other than under paragraph 20(1)(b).
Summary
- Paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act (ATIA) did not apply to Audit Reports of the Preventous Collaborative Health, Provital Health and Copeman Healthcare Centre (the Healthcare providers) provided by Alberta Health (AH) to Health Canada because the information was not supplied to a government institution by a third party.
Issues
- Can HC release the Audit Reports notwithstanding the exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA?
- As a matter of law, are the Audit Reports in the possession of HC?
- As a matter of constitutional law, can the Federal Government release documents that belong to the Province of Alberta?
Facts
AH conducted an audit of Preventous Collaborative Health, Provital Health and Copeman Healthcare Centre (the Healthcare providers) and sent the Audit Reports to Health Canada (HC). HC received a request under the ATIA for the Audit Reports.
Health Canada assessed which records triggered an obligation to give notice in accordance with section 27 of the ATIA and provided the Healthcare providers with the opportunity to make written representations regarding the disclosure of the Audit Reports on more than one occasion. The Healthcare providers objected to the disclosure of the Audit Reports in their entirety. HC notified the Healthcare providers that it would be releasing a redacted version of the Audit Reports, with certain information exempted from disclosure pursuant to subsection 19(1) of the ATIA (personal information) and paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA (confidential commercial, scientific and technical information). The Healthcare providers brought an application to the Federal Court under section 44 of the ATIA, objecting to HC’s decision.
Decision
The Court dismissed the Application and authorized the release of the Audit Reports with HC’s already made redactions with respect to personal information pursuant to subsection 19(1) and to remove the redactions made under paragraph 20(1)(b).
Reasons
Can HC release the Audit Reports or are they exempted pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b) ATIA?
The Court concluded that paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA did not apply to the Audit Reports. The test for the application of paragraph 20(1)(b) in American Iron & Metal Company Inc. v. Saint John Port Authority, 2023 FC 1267, includes the requirement that the information is supplied to a government institution by the third party. The Healthcare providers argued that even though the audit was conducted by AH and that AH provided them to HC, its content was based on information the Healthcare providers provided, and that not seeing them as third parties was an artificial distinction. The Court rejected equating AH with the Healthcare providers and found that they, as third parties did not supply the information to HC.
Even though that conclusion was dispositive of the Healthcare providers argument on this section, the Court further addressed whether there was a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. The Healthcare providers argued that paragraph 20(1)(b) creates an exemption for the entire Audit Report based on the operation of the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act (AHCIA), which in their opinion created a legitimate expectation of confidentiality of the results of the audit. The Court found that they were misconstruing the application of the AHCIA, which is not about making audit or compliance reports confidential. Additionally, HC consulted AH on the issue of confidentiality of the Audit Reports and AH did not request them to be treated in a confidential manner.
The Healthcare providers also relied on Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2007 FCA 272, to argue that the Audit Reports must be confidential. The Court found that the nature of this case was fundamentally different for several reasons, including that AH consulted and volunteered the audit report, the audit report was done to ensure the Healthcare providers’ compliance with their legal obligations, the Alberta legislation does not create a requirement of confidentiality for audits, and the Healthcare providers are not considered the third party for the purposes of the paragraph 20(1)(b) test.
HC used an online report to prove that most of the information disputed by the Healthcare providers was already publicly available. The Court agreed that there were not any grounds to the Healthcare providers’ allegations of confidentiality in the Audit Reports. The Court also found that redactions made by HC to financial information should be removed as paragraph 20(1)(b) does not apply.
The Healthcare providers argued that because the application of the provincial legislation creates a legitimate expectation of confidentiality, it is in public interest to uphold it. The Court held that this argument is based on a misconstrued reading of the legislation and is oblivious to the strong public interest for obtaining access to information.
As a matter of law, are the Audit Reports in the possession of HC?
The Court held that HC was in legal possession of the Audit Reports and as such, had control over them. There was no dispute between the parties that HC was in possession of the reports. The Healthcare providers argued that HC never had legal authority over the Audit Reports and that mere possession does not constitute control.
The Court found that the Healthcare providers did not discharge their onus to establish that AH engaged in an illegal act to voluntarily disclosure the Audit Reports to HC. The case the Healthcare providers relied on also supports the proposition that control is given a broad and liberal interpretation as seen in Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25. First, there was nothing sensitive about the information found in the Audit Reports. Moreover, physical possession of documents matter, and that there is no dispute that HC was in possession of the reports when AH disclosed them voluntarily. Second, the audits were performed to ensure compliance with the health care legislation. The Court was satisfied that the record was obtained or generated lawfully on HC’s behalf and that their actions were consistent with a reasonable and lawful exercise of their departmental powers, duties or functions.
Since paragraph 20(1)(b) did not apply, the Court found it unnecessary to consider section 25 and subsection 20(6) of the ATIA.
As a matter of constitutional law, can the Federal Government release documents that belong to the Province of Alberta?
The Court held that the release of the Audit Reports by HC was not ultra vires.
The Healthcare providers argued that it was unconstitutional for HC to release the Audit Reports, as it is a matter that is solely within provincial jurisdiction. The Court held that the constitutional challenge made by the Healthcare providers does not concern the ATIA or Canada Health Act but the release of the Report by AH to HC. The Healthcare providers’ potential recourse should probably be aimed towards AH and not HC. Additionally, section 13 of the ATIA explicitly contemplates the possibility of a federal government institution being in control of information obtained through the government of a province or institution thereof, and HC did not seek to compel AH to do anything as the Reports were voluntarily given.
2. Clowater v. Canada (Industry)
Citation: 2024 FC 916
Link: Clowater v. Canada (Industry)
Date of decision:
Provisions of the Access to Information Act: Paragraphs 20(1)(b), (c) and (d) and sections 25 and 41
- Paragraph 20(1)(b) – Financial, commercial, scientific or technical information
- Paragraph 20(1)(c) – Disclosure could result in material financial loss or gain, or prejudice the competitive position of a third party
- Paragraph 20(1)(d) – Disclosure could interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third party
- Section 25 – Severability
- Section 41– Review by Federal Court where access refused
Operational takeaways
- This case deals with a request for contribution agreement that has a standard confidentiality clause, confirming that the Access to Information (ATIA) continues to apply.
- A contractual term that subjects an agreement to the ATIA also inherently exempts from disclosure certain third-party information, as provided in subsection 20(1) of the ATIA. The usual rules for subsection 20(1) apply.
- Labour relations negotiations are clearly contractual negotiations and fall within paragraph 20(1)(d) of the ATIA, but evidence of a reasonable expectation of probable harm must be established to invoke the exemption.
Summary
This is an application pursuant to section 41 of the ATIA for a review of ISED’s decision to refuse to disclose information in a Contribution Agreement between ISED and Ford Motor Company (Ford) for a $102M non-repayable contribution that was publicly announced by the Trudeau government. The Contribution Agreement had a standard confidentiality clause that acknowledged it was subject to the ATIA. While the Federal Court agreed that some redactions pursuant to paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c) of the ATIA were justified, it found that other information in the Agreement must be disclosed.
Issues
- Whether any portion of the Disputed Information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA;
- Whether any portion of the Disputed Information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(c) of the ATIA;
- Whether any portion of the Disputed Information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(d) of the ATIA; and
- If any of the Disputed Information is exempt from disclosure, whether there is an obligation to sever non-exempt information under section 25 of the ATIA.
Facts
Through the Automative Innovation Fund (AIF), ISED concluded a Contribution Agreement with Ford. The Contribution Agreement contained a confidentiality clause that included a mention that it was subject to the ATIA.
After the Trudeau government announced that it was giving $102M to Ford, Ms. Clowater submitted a request to ISED pursuant to the ATIA seeking disclosure of the “funding agreements between the Government of Canada and Ford/Ford Company of Canada from the Automotive Innovation Fund since ”.
ISED released a redacted version of the Contribution Agreement to Ms. Clowater. Ms. Clowater complained to OIC. While ISED released some additional information, it continued to redact information that belonged to Ford. OIC issued its final report recommending further disclosure, while accepting the legitimacy of some redactions.
ISED did not accept the OIC’s recommendations and refused to disclose most of the recommended information to Ms. Clowater.
Ms. Clowater made an application to Federal Court asking the Court to order the release of the redacted information that the OIC had recommended be released, implicitly accepting the fact that some of the information has been properly redacted.
Decision
Only a portion of the redacted information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c) of the ATIA; the balance of the redacted information must be disclosed by ISED to Ms. Clowater. The redactions pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(d) were not properly made, and additional information must be disclosed after the Court applied section 25 (severance).
Reasons
A contractual term that subjects an agreement to the ATIA also inherently exempts from disclosure certain third-party information, as provided in subsection 20(1) of the ATIA.
The evidence established that the criteria for paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA were met for some of the disputed information. There were other portions of the disputed information, however, where ISED had not demonstrated that the exemption applied.
In relation to certain articles, the Court was not satisfied that there was the requisite evidence to explain how a reader can make the asserted inferences (as set such that it results in harm to Ford). Simply stating that an inference can be drawn, without further explanation, is not sufficient. As such, the Federal Court was not satisfied that Ford demonstrated a probable expectation of material harm as required by paragraph 20(1)(c) of the ATIA.
3. Canada (Public Services and Procurement) v. Canada (Information Commissioner)
Citation: 2024 FC 918
Link: Canada (Public Services and Procurement) v. Canada (Information Commissioner)
Date of decision:
Provisions of the Access to information Act: Subsection 2(1), 4(1), 41(2), 44.1
- Subsection 2(1) – Purpose of the Act
- Subsection 4(1) – Right of access
- Subsection 41(2) – Review by Federal Court - government institution
- Section 44.1 – De novo review
Operational takeaways
The same two-step test used to determine whether requested records in a ministerial office are under the control of a government institution can also be applied to assess control of third-party records.
Summary
The central issue in this request for access to information under the Access to Information Act (ATIA) is whether the records are “under the control” of Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC). PSPC advised the requester that it did not have physical possession of the records. These records are in the possession of Brookfield Global Integrated Services Inc. (BGIS), a private sector corporation that PSPC contracted to manage federal government properties for which the federal institution is responsible. The records relate to a subcontract between BGIS and another party to do work at a PSPC-owned building. The application was dismissed because the records at issue were found to be “under the control” of PSPC and the federal institution was ordered to take steps to obtain the requested records and process them in accordance with the ATIA.
Facts
The requester, a former Health Canada employee who became ill and retired, requested nine records reports related to the building. PSPC did not physically possess the records; they were held by a private contractor (BGIS) managing federal properties on PSPC’s behalf. The background involves a legal dispute where the Information Commissioner of Canada ordered the Minister responsible for PSPC to retrieve certain records related to a subcontract for work at a federal building (Health Protection Building) so they could be provided to the access to information requester, Marilyn Miller, under the ATIA. The central issue in this ATIA subsection 41(2) application is whether these records are “under the control” of PSPC, obligating the federal institution to comply with the access request.
The nine requested documents are below as described in the Request, with numbers added by the parties during this litigation for ease of reference:
PSPC Documents Related to this Contract Being Approved
IAR [Investment Analysis Review] [#1] Statement of Requirement [#2]BID DOCUMENTS
Addendum 1.pdf, uploaded Date [#3] Addendum 2.pdf, uploaded Date [#4]RFP DOCUMENTS
Attachment No. 7-Designated Substance Report 1.pdf, Uploaded [#5]
Attachment No. 8-Designated Substance Report 2.pdf, Uploaded [#6]
Section B Scope of Work [#7]DST Consulting Engineers Inc. Completed Stipulated Bid Document Appendix F Supplementary Conditions [#8]
DST Consulting Engineers Inc. SUBMITTED FINAL CONTRACT REPORT Final Investigate & Report (I&R) including lab analysis reports, photos, diagrams [#9]
Issues
- Whether PSPC had control of the records at issue under subsection 4(1) of the ATIA; and
- Should the Court also order PSPC to retrieve a record (#9) from BGIS?
Decision
- The Court dismissed PSPC’s application seeking a declaration that it is not required to comply with the Information Commissioner’s order.
- The Court ordered PSPC to:
- request certain documents #3 to #8 in the access to information requester’s request from BGIS;
- seek information and assistance from BGIS regarding a certain document #9 in the access to information requester’s request and request a copy if necessary;
- process and further respond to the requester’s access request in accordance with the ATIA; and
- Pay costs to the access to information requester in the amount of $6,000 all-inclusive and no costs ordered as between PSPC and the Information Commissioner.
Reasons
Whether PSPC had control of the records at issue under subsection 4(1) of the ATIA and should the Court also order PSPC to retrieve a record (#9) from BGIS?
The Court applied the Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence) (“National Defence”) two-step test for determining whether requested records held within a ministerial office was “under the control” of its related “government institution” under subsection 4(1) of the ATIA. In National Defence, the Supreme Court of Canada held that where the records requested are not in the physical possession of the government institution, the inquiry proceeds in two steps: (1) whether the record relates to a departmental matter and (2) consider all relevant factors to determine whether the government institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy of the record upon request. In the current case, the court found that documents #3 to #8 and #9 of the requester’s access to information request relate to PSPC departmental matters and are under federal institution’s control through its contract with BGIS. PSPC has a reasonable expectation and legal right to obtain these documents from BGIS. The Court ordered PSPC to request BGIS to provide these documents and assist in identifying and retrieving the final contract report (#9) if it is not already held by PSPC. The analysis emphasizes PSPC’s contractual obligations and statutory responsibilities under the ATIA to obtain and disclose these records.
Privacy Act
Federal Court of Appeal
1. Kandasamy v. Canada (Attorney General)
Citation: 2024 FCA 181
Link: Kandasamy v. Canada (Attorney General)
Date of decision:
Provisions of the Privacy Act: Sections 16, 18, 21, 22 and subsection 46(1)
- Section 16 – Where access is refused
- Section 18 – Governor in Council may designate exempt banks
- Section 21 – International affairs and defence
- Section 22 – Law enforcement and investigation
Operational takeaways
- Confidentiality orders enable the Federal Court to meet its obligations under subsection 46(1) of the Privacy Act by allowing the Court to verify whether the information exists, whether exemptions apply, and whether discretion was properly exercised.
Summary
The Confidentiality orders pursuant to subsection 46(1) of the Privacy Act allow the Federal Court and the Federal Appeal Court to determine whether or not information exists, whether or not the exemptions being claimed by the government institution are applicable and, if necessary, to review the exercise of the government institution’s discretion not to disclose the information.
Issue
- Were the decisions of Public Safety and CSIS reasonable?
Facts
Mr. Kandasamy made requests to Public Safety and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for access to personal information concerning him included in these institutions’ personal information banks. Public Safety disclosed some records and neither confirmed nor denied other requested records exist. It added that, if they exist, such records could reasonably be exempt from disclosure under section 21 of the Privacy Act. CSIS advised that one of the personal information banks identified by Mr. Kandasamy did not exist, that it found no personal information concerning Mr. Kandasamy in some of the banks, and that it neither confirmed nor denied that some of the requested records exist in the remaining banks. It added that, if they exist, such records either would be exempt or could reasonably be exempt from disclosure under sections 18, 21 and/or 22 of the Privacy Act.
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner found Mr. Kandasamy’s complaints ill-founded. Mr. Kandasamy applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the decisions of Public Safety and CSIS. The Federal Court concluded that the institutions had reasonably applied the provisions on which they relied and that it was reasonable, and in respect of certain records legally required, for the institutions to neither confirm nor deny that some records exist.
Decision
The appeals were dismissed with costs to the Attorney General of Canada. The Federal Court correctly identified the applicable standard as that of reasonableness and applied that standard properly.
Reasons
Mr. Kandasamy raised no arguments as to the unreasonableness of the decisions of the institutions. His submissions focus on three elements: (1) his belief that he is under constant surveillance and subject to torture; (2) the need for legislative reform in the areas of access to information and privacy; and (3) a concern with the Federal Court’s orders that some materials filed by the Attorney General be kept confidential, sealed, and not accessible by him.
It is not the Court’s role to determine whether Mr. Kandasamy is under surveillance, subject to torture, or to amend legislation. To alleviate Mr. Kandasamy’s third concern, the Court explained that it is common for the Federal Court to make confidentiality orders because of subsection 46(1) of the Privacy Act, which requires the Federal Court to take every reasonable precaution to avoid disclosure of (a) information that a government institution is authorized to refuse to disclose; and of (b) confirmation as to whether such information exists. Confidentiality orders allow the Federal Court to comply with its statutory obligation of precaution. They enable determinations of whether or not the information exists and the exemptions being claimed by the government institution are applicable. If necessary, they allow Courts to review the exercise of the government institution’s discretion not to disclose the information. In other words, these orders assist the Federal Court, and on appeal this Court, in determining whether the government institution complied with the law.
Federal Court of Canada
1. Ali v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship)
Citation: 2024 FC 63
Link: Ali v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship)
Date of decision:
Provisions of the Access to information Act: Subsections 10(2), 19(1) and sections 41, 44.1
- Subsection 10(2) – Where access is refused
- Subsection 19(1) – Personal Information
- Section 41 – Review by the Federal Court
- Section 44.1 – Third party may apply for review
Provision of the Privacy Act: Section 3
- Section 3 – Definitions
Operational takeaways
- Paragraph 19(2)(a) of the ATIA requires proper authorization before disclosing personal information. A court order that provides access to certain personal information does not confer a general right to all information held by the institution.
Summary
The Federal Court dismissed an application brought by Mr. Ali for access to information relating to his minor child held by Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). The Court found that IRCC correctly applied the exemptions under the ATIA, specifically subsections 10(2) and 19(1), to refuse the request without confirming the existence of the records because the information was personal to the minor child. Furthermore, Mr. Ali did not have sole authority to request the information as he failed to provide consent from both parents or a valid court order granting such authority. Consequently, the Court upheld IRCC’s decision to withhold the information and declined to award costs.
Issue
- Did IRCC properly invoke subsections 10(2) and 19(1) of the ATIA to refuse access to information, without confirming its existence, as the information was personal information of the minor child?
Facts
Zulfiqar Ali made an access to information request to IRCC on , seeking medical and immigration records relating to his minor child. IRCC required additional consent to release the minor child’s information, specifically consent from both parents, or a valid court order granting custody rights. Mr. Ali provided a court order that allowed him to receive medical reports from the child’s doctor, but it did not authorize access to IRCC-held information. Due to the lack of proper consent or a court order confirming a custody agreement that permitted Mr. Ali to obtain the requested record, IRCC refused to confirm or deny the existence of the records, citing the protection of the minor child’s personal information. The application by Zulfiqar Ali was made to the Court following a report by the Office of the Information Commissioner on a complaint relating to IRCC’s decision to neither confirm nor deny the existence of information requested.
Decision
- The application for judicial review was dismissed.
- No costs were awarded to IRCC, considering Mr. Ali’s self-represented status and the nature of the case.
Reasons
The Court conducted a de novo review of the IRCC's decision to neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records concerning the minor child. It found that IRCC properly invoked subsections 10(2) and 19(1) of the ATIA, which protect personal information unless the individual consents to its disclosure. Mr. Ali did not have sole authority to request the information as per subsection 19(2). The Court concluded that the refusal to disclose was appropriate and that the mandatory exemption for personal information was correctly applied. The Court also clarified that the existing Court Order did not entitle the Mr. Ali to all information about the minor child held by IRCC. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
2. Matas v. Canada (Global Affairs)
Citation: 2024 FC 88
Link: Matas v. Canada (Global Affairs)
Date of decision:
Provisions of the Access to Information Act: Subsections 19(1) and (2), and section 25
- Subsection 19(1) – Personal information
- Subsection 19(2) – Where disclosure authorized
- Section 25 - Severability
Provisions of the Privacy Act: Paragraphs 3(j) and 3(l) and subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i)
- Paragraph 3(j) – Exception for officers or employees of government institutions
- Paragraph 3(l) – Exception for discretionary benefits
- Subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i) – Where disclosure outweighs the invasion of privacy
Operational takeaways
- The fact that the requester may already know individuals, does not diminish their privacy rights. Under the ATIA and the Privacy Act, information already known to a requester remains protected personal information, and privacy protections prevail unless a statutory exception clearly applies.
- A record containing personal information about identifiable individuals cannot be disclosed to a requester when none of the exceptions found in subsection 19(2) apply.
- Disclosure could not proceed under paragraph 19(2)(a) because obtaining consent from all individuals referenced in the investigation reports was neither feasible nor reasonable, and no evidence showed that any individual had publicly disclosed or consented to disclosure of their personal information.
- The information was not publicly available, access by internal employees through an intranet does not constitute public availability, and no evidence demonstrated that details of the investigations had been made public.
- The conditions for disclosure under section 8 of the Privacy Act were not met. In particular, subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i) did not apply because the public interest did not outweigh the significant privacy intrusion disclosure would entail. The protection of individual privacy prevails over the right of access to information, as privacy is a fundamental value in modern, democratic states.
- The Court concluded that the institution had considered whether any part of the record that did not contain any such personal information could be severed and had properly refused to make the said severance among the records, in accordance with section 25 of the ATIA.
Summary
This is an application for judicial review under subsection 41(1) and section 44.1 of the Access to Information Act (ATIA) brought by a retired public servant who sought disclosure of three Global Affairs Canada (GAC) investigation reports relating to misconduct by local staff at the Canadian Embassy in Dakar. The Court conducted a de novo review and held that the requested records contained personal information that must not be disclosed under subsection 19(1) of the ATIA. The Court also found that none of the exceptions in subsection 19(2) applied, and that severing the records under section 25 of the ATIA was not feasible without revealing personal information.
Issues
- What is the standard of review applicable to issues raised in an application for review under the ATIA?
- Is the information requested subject to the personal information provisions in subsection 19(1) of the ATIA?
- Whether GAC reasonably exercised its discretion under subsection 19(2) of the ATIA.
- Whether GAC erred in refusing to sever the records required under section 25 of the ATIA.
Facts
Ms. Matas requested a 2018 inspection/investigation report relating to fraud and the dismissal of three local Embassy employees in Dakar. GAC withheld the records under subsection 19(1) of the ATIA, claiming they contained personal information about identifiable individuals.
The Office of the Information Commissioner found Ms. Matas’s complaint not well-founded, concluding the records contained personal information and no subsection 19(2) exception applied.
Ms. Matas sought judicial review, arguing that the refusal was unjustified, that GAC improperly exercised discretion under subsection 19(2), and that severance was possible under section 25. She also claimed personal harm (housing, health, disability leave) arising from circumstances of her posting in Dakar.
GAC responded that the investigation reports were saturated with personal information of identifiable individuals, including details that could reveal who was investigated given the small workplace and the nature of the allegations.
Decision
The Court dismissed the application for judicial review. The Court concluded that GAC was obliged to refuse disclosure of the investigation reports which contain personal information of individuals within the meaning of section 3 of the Privacy Act and are not covered by the exemptions set out in subsections 3(j) and 3(l) of the Privacy Act. GAC exercised its discretion appropriately since the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) of the ATIA did not exist in this case and could not justify the disclosure of the personal information in question. GAC met its obligation to consider whether any part of the record that did not contain any such personal information could be severed and properly refused to make the said severance among the records, in accordance with section 25 of the ATIA.
Reasons
What is the standard of review applicable to issues raised in an application for review under the ATIA?
Pursuant to section 44.1 of the ATIA, the Federal Court hears and determines applications under subsection 41(1) of the ATIA as if they were new matters (de novo review), where the Court “steps into the shoes” of the initial decision maker and determines the matter on its own. Therefore, this application must be treated as a new proceeding, allowing the parties to present new evidence and the Court to hear new arguments, to make its own findings and to order any corrective measures.
In a trial de novo, the Court is not reviewing a decision of the federal institution in and of itself, but it is determining for itself whether the exemptions from disclosure provided for in section 19 of the ATIA are applicable. However, section 44.1 provides for the Court to simply ask what decision it would have made.
Subsection 19(1) of the ATIA creates a prohibition on the disclosure of “personal information” within the meaning of section 3 of the Privacy Act. However, subsection 19(2) of the ATIA permits the disclosure of personal information on a discretionary basis in the cases set out in paragraphs (a) to (c). Discretionary decisions of administrative decision makers are to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.
In this case, the Court proceeded with a de novo analysis to determine whether the information requested was subject to the personal information provisions in subsection 19(1) of the ATIA to refuse to disclose the information, and consequently, to analyze whether the discretionary decision of GAC not to permit the disclosure of information in accordance with subsection 19(2) of the ATIA was reasonable.
Is the information requested subject to the personal information provisions in subsection 19(1) of the ATIA?
Three of the records (Exhibits D to F of GAC), cannot be disclosed without disclosing personal information on identifiable individuals, specifically information relating to the employment history of the individual (paragraph 3(b) of the Privacy Act) or the views or opinions of another individual about the individual (paragraph 3(g) of the Privacy Act). The investigation reports contain specific information, such as the names of the individuals under investigation and those who were part of the investigations, their functions, their responsibilities, their roles, their employment history and other information, that could identify the individuals.
The Court concluded that the records in question did indeed contain personal information about identifiable individuals which, under subsection 19(1) of the ATIA, must not be disclosed by GAC.
The Court agreed with GAC that the reports requested are not of the same nature as those that would be found in a job description and are not a direct function of the position or duties of the job. Rather, the reports refer to highly personal characteristics, such as employment history and the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and do not focus on the general nature of the employee’s position or functions. Therefore, they do not fall within the exception in paragraph 3(j) of the Privacy Act.
With regard to Ms. Matas’s allegation that her name was cited in the investigation reports, the Court could, with GAC’s consent, confirm for Ms. Matas that her name did not appear in the records at issue.
The Court concluded that GAC was obliged to refuse disclosure of the investigation reports which contain personal information of individuals within the meaning of section 3 of the Privacy Act and were not covered by the exemptions set out in paragraphs 3(j) and 3(l) of the Privacy Act, since the information was subject to subsection 19(1) of the ATIA.
Whether GAC reasonably exercised its discretion under subsection 19(2) of the ATIA.
As long as one or more of the exceptions set out in subsection 8(2) of the Privacy Act apply, subsection 19(2) of the ATIA allows the government institution to disclose records containing personal information in the exercise of its discretionary power.
With respect to subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i) of the Privacy Act, there is no reason to believe in this case that the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy of all the individuals involved that could result from the disclosure. Not only would disclosure not clearly outweigh any invasion of privacy, but it would not outweigh at all. The protection of individual privacy prevails over the right of access to information, as privacy is a fundamental value in modern, democratic states.
The Court was of the opinion that GAC exercised its discretion appropriately since the circumstances set out in subsection 19(2) of the ATIA did not exist in this case and could not justify the disclosure of the personal information in question.
Whether GAC erred in refusing to sever the records required under section 25 of the ATIA.
The Court agreed with GAC that severance was not possible without leaving only disconnected snippets of unintelligible information. Also, the fact that there were a limited number of people who held limited positions at the Canadian Embassy in Dakar at the time of the investigations would mean that severance was not possible without the risk of identifying the people concerned and disclosing their personal information.
The Court concluded that GAC met its obligation to consider whether any part of the record that did not contain any such personal information could be severed and properly refused to make the said severance among the records, in accordance with section 25 of the ATIA.
3. Mitchell v. Canada (Indigenous Services)
Citation: 2024 FC 1248
Link: Mitchell v. Canada (Indigenous Services)
Date of decision:
Provision of the Privacy Act: Paragraph 8(2)(a)
- Paragraph 8(2)(a) – disclosure of information for the purpose for which it was obtained or compiled or for a use consistent with that purpose
Other provisions: Subsections 2(a), 43(a) and sections 46, 48, 50 of the Indian Act; subsections 4(1), 4(2), 11(1), 11(2) of the Indian Estates Regulations
Operational takeaways
- Disclosure of estate information to potential beneficiaries is consistent with paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act because the information was collected for the purpose of administering the estate. Providing the accounting to the Deceased’s children aligns with that purpose, rendering the refusal to disclose unreasonable.
Summary
The information was obtained to administer the Estate, and the Deceased’s children, as potential beneficiaries, requested that information. Accordingly, it appears that such disclosure is permissible pursuant to paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act.
Issues
- Indigenous Service Canada (ISC) attributes a negligible value to an on-reserve property in the context of the administration of an estate for an intestate, status Indian, who is ordinarily an on-reserve resident. Is this practice reasonable?
- In the Decision of the Estate Administrator it was determined that an accounting of the Estate to the Deceased’s children is not required. Is this reasonable?
Facts
The Deceased’s Estate included interests in several parcels of land in the Okanagan Indian Reserve No. 1. ISC declared the Deceased’s Will void and sent a letter to the Deceased’s children advising that because the Deceased died intestate, the sole heir to the Estate was the Deceased’s spouse, pursuant to the Indian Act. ISC appointed an Estate Administrator who advised the Deceased’s children that it is ISC’s practice to consider the value of on-reserve land that is not subject to a registered lease as negligible and that they were only able to divulge information regarding the estate to the Deceased’s spouse.
The Deceased’s children made an application for judicial review of the Estate Administrator’s decision not to provide them with an accounting of the Estate.
Decisions
The Court granted the application. ISC’s practice of attributing a negligible value to on-reserve property was not reasonable. The decision of the Estate Administrator not to provide the Deceased’s children with an accounting of the Estate was also unreasonable. The Court remitted the matter back to ISC to reconsider the value of the on-reserve assets and to provide an accounting of the Estate to the Deceased’s children.
Reasons
ISC attributes a negligible value to an on-reserve property in the context of the administration of an estate for an intestate, status Indian, who is ordinarily an on-reserve resident. Is this practice reasonable?
The Court held that ISC’s “practice” to attribute no or negligible value to on-reserve lands that are not subject to a registered lease is not reasonable. This practice fails to consider modern techniques that are available to capitalize on the value of reserve lands.
As a result, the conclusion reached by the Estate Administrator that the Deceased’s Estate was worth less than $75,000 was not reasonable. It was not clear how the Estate Administrator determined the value of the Estate. ISC argued that their estate administrators cannot have the on-reserve estate lands appraised because they cannot spend public moneys. The Court held that there is nothing in the Indian Act or the Indian Estates Regulations that would prevent ISC estate administrators from taking steps to recover reasonable expenses incurred as part of the administration of an intestate estate.
In the Decision of the Estate Administrator it was determined that an accounting of the Estate to the Deceased’s children is not required. Is this reasonable?
The Court held that the Estate Administrator’s refusal to provide an accounting of the Deceased’s Estate to the Deceased’s children was unreasonable.
The Court agreed with the Deceased’s children that the duty to account applies not only to persons who are entitled to benefit from an estate, but also to those persons who may not be so entitled. There is nothing in the Indian Act, Indian Estates Regulations, or ISC Decedent Estates Procedures Manual that appears to prohibit the Estate Administrator from providing an accounting of the Estate to all potential heirs and beneficiaries, which would be consistent with the general duty of an estate administrator to account.
The Court disagreed with ISC’s assertion that privacy interests prevented the Estate Administrator from disclosing information, including estate accounts, to persons who are not heirs or beneficiaries. Paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act permits disclosure of information for the purpose for which it was obtained or compiled or for a use consistent with that purpose. The information was obtained to administer the Estate and the Deceased’s children, as potential beneficiaries, are requesting that information. Accordingly, it appears that such disclosure is permissible.
Supreme Court of Canada
1. R. v. Bykovets
Citation: 2024 SCC 6
Link: R. v. Bykovets
Date of decision:
Other legislative provision: Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom
Operational takeaways
- The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision is consistent with the Government of Canada’s position that an Internet Protocol (IP) address can be considered personal information.
- Note that the nature and scope of the protections conferred by the Privacy Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (Charter) are different.
Summary
Section 8 of the Charter protects IP addresses. An IP address links an Internet user to their online activity. Accordingly, it attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy. As a result, a request by the police for an IP address is a search under section 8 of the Charter.
Issues
- Whether reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to an IP address.
- Whether a request by state to third party for IP address constitutes a search.
Facts
During an investigation into fraudulent online purchases from a liquor store, police contacted the third-party processing company that managed the store’s online sales and obtained the IP addresses used for the purchases. Police then obtained a production order compelling the Internet service provider (ISP) to disclose the name and address of the customer for each IP address. Police used this subscriber information to seek and execute search warrants. Mr. Bykovets was arrested. He challenged the request by police to obtain the IP addresses from the processing company, alleging it violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.
Decision (Majority of the Court)
A request by the state for an IP address is a search under section 8 of the Charter. The appeal should be allowed and a new trial ordered.