Discussion Paper: Canadian Light Armoured Cavalry Concepts

by Colonel C.W. Hunt - October 1st, 2024

Reading Time: 40 min

Since the 2023 Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) Board, there has been much discussion within the RCAC, and in late September 2023, the Canadian Army Doctrine Centre published Doctrine Note 23-01 The Armoured Regiment in Battle which is “a ‘stand-alone’ document until a full rewrite of The Canadian Armoured Regiment in Battle (ARIB) is completed.”¹ Doctrine Note 23-01 outlines “the majority of what will be chapters one and two of the ARIB and will inform the remaining chapters.”² The Doctrine Note provides much needed clarity on terminology, role, characteristics, fundamentals of employment, tasks, and structures for armoured cavalry overall. This discussion paper will build on Doctrine Note 23-01 to provide additional context and considerations specific to Light Armoured Cavalry (LAC), propose some refinements to concepts for consideration in upcoming drafts of the broader ARIB doctrine manual, as well as propose some complementary projects to support broader RCAC Modernization work.

Doctrinal Basis for Light Armoured Cavalry

Doctrine Note 23-01 provides clear definitions for heavy, medium, and light armour forces that reflect recent discussion within the RCAC. Doctrine Note 23-01 defines “the role of armoured cavalry: to find, shape and defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of firepower and mobility.”³ Canadian Light Armoured Cavalry fits within this role and the new Doctrine Note defines it as: “A force that predominantly consists of light AFVs and prioritizes rapid strategic mobility over firepower, protection, and tactical mobility to fight in the land operating domain against any enemy. Note: A light armour force offers an economy of force to find, shape, and defeat the enemy in the deep manoeuvre area, flanks, and rear area”.⁴

This definition closely aligns with allied definitions for cavalry. The United States (US) Army states that all:

“Cavalry squadrons conduct operations through close contact with enemy forces and civilian populations. They maintain contact with the enemy to fight for information while preserving their own freedom to maneuver. Squadrons shape the battlefield for the commander so they can close with and destroy the enemy through maneuver and superior firepower at a time and place of their choosing.”⁵

The US Marine Corps (USMC) has a similar definition for its Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) battalions stating:

“The LAR battalion performs combined arms reconnaissance and security missions in support of the Ground Combat Element. Its mission is to conduct reconnaissance, security and economy of force operations, and, within its capabilities, limited offensive or defensive operations that exploit the unit’s mobility and firepower… The fundamental role of the LAR battalion in the Marine Division is to shape the battlespace. The LAR battalion performs this by conducting reconnaissance, security, and other operations.”⁶

Regarding economy of force operations, the USMC states:

“The LAR battalion, by its role, can perform economy of force missions. The flexible capabilities of the LAR battalion allow the Ground Combat Element commander the ability to retain combat power of other tactical units for engagement where he/she desires.”⁷

The British Army has similar views with respect to the definition and roles of its Light Cavalry units:

“Light Cavalry should be considered as a combined arms ground manoeuvre unit that is optimised and configured for persistent reconnaissance and security tactical activities in complex terrain and can conduct human terrain reconnaissance (HTR). Light Cavalry has strategic mobility. It offers a formation commander the ability to rapidly deploy a force at reach typically operating at an economy of force in the deep or covering force area. It provides time and space to the formation commander to develop a position of advantage. It is able to develop a situation, sense and fight for information, destroy enemy recce, fix enemy lead elements, and seize, retain and exploit the initiative. However, recce by stealth is preferred due to its limited protection.”⁸

These allied definitions reinforce the intellectual foundation for the Doctrine Note 23-01 definition for Canadian Light Armoured Cavalry. LAC should be considered as a combined arms ground manoeuvre element that is optimized and configured for reconnaissance, security, and economy of force tasks that enable a commander to shape the battle space to develop a position of advantage and preserve combat power. The economy of resources offered by LAC over medium and heavy armoured cavalry forces is acknowledged in Doctrine Note 23-01 as it is a significant driver in policy decisions at strategic levels, as well as force composition and mission employment at operational and tactical levels. At a strategic level, LAC vehicles can be >80% cheaper than medium or heavy AFVs.⁹ At an operational level, LAC has significantly reduced sustainment requirements compared to medium or heavy armoured cavalry. At a tactical level, LAC provides commanders with good economy of force options for reconnaissance and security tasks that would otherwise draw higher value assets from higher priority tasks or mean accepting additional risks on flanks and in rear areas.

Because LAC is more likely to be employed on the flanks and/or rear areas in high threat operational environments, its optimal tasks typically require more dispersion. While security tasks are not typically viewed as glamourous within the Army, they remain necessary. In an age of threat from deep fires and Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS), it remains even more important to find and defeat enemy Special Operating Forces (SOF) and deep recce elements in rear areas to protect vital command and control (C2) nodes, enablers, and combat service support (CSS). In addition, these assets are no longer safe in fixed installations when the enemy possesses deep fires capabilities, thus force protection elements must be more mobile. LAC can fulfil force protection mission tasks for high value formation enablers particularly when structured with integral Assault Sections and other combat support (i.e. Counter UAS, mortars, UAS and loitering munitions). While LAC could be deployed as a regiment for expeditionary deployments in support of light formations or for stability and peace support operations, it may also see deployments at sub-unit level to reinforce a medium armoured cavalry regiment or as part of a light battalion group, similar to how UK light cavalry squadrons have been employed in recent years.¹⁰

Figure 1 – Armoured Battlefield Tasks¹¹

The integration of combat support elements at LAC Sqn and below levels is an important enabler for LAC’s tactical flexibility. Indeed, RCAC Light Armoured Squadrons in Light Armoured Regiments in the 1970s were organized with 3 x Scout Troops, 1 x Assault Troop, and 1 x Mortar Troop, which allowed for flexible tactical groupings within each Sqn depending on their tasks at hand.¹² Assault Sections integral to LAC elements could conduct dismounted tasks to enhance the mobility and security of LAC elements. Assault sections should not be considered infantry or pioneers, they should be a distinct capability tailored to support cavalry manoeuvre and security, similar to US Army cavalry scouts,¹³ US Marine Corps (USMC) Light Armoured Reconnaissance (LAR) Scouts, or British Army Light Cavalry Support Troopers. Drawing from USMC LAR doctrine,¹⁴ Assault Sections should be trained and organized for employment in support of LAC Troops and should be thought of as complementary elements of a

combined arms team at the lowest level, with the LAC Troop and Assault Section each dependent on the other for security, mobility, and firepower. Assault Sections should normally avoid decisive, close engagement with enemy infantry. Assault Sections should perform a wide range of tasks, including the following:

• Providing local security for LAC Troops.
• Establishing and maintaining observations posts (OPs).
• Conducting dismounted reconnaissance of close terrain that cannot be bypassed (defile, blind corner, and other held-up drills).
• Providing dismounted security at danger areas.
• Performing obstacle reconnaissance, such as locating and marking bypasses for follow on forces.
• Performing limited countermobility tasks (abatis, etc.).
• Conducting bridge/ford/route/area reconnaissance and evaluation.
• Controlling General Purpose Uncrewed Aerial Systems (GPUAS) and loitering munitions.
• Point destruction of AFVs with hand-held Anti-Armour Weapons (AAWs) and anti-armour ambushes.
• Force protection of Electronic Warfare (EW), Counter-Battery, Air Defence, and other enablers, as well HQs, C2 nodes, CSS, and vital points.

Equipping Light Armoured Cavalry

Doctrine Note 23-01 defines LAC as described earlier in this paper including that it “predominantly consists of light AFVs.”¹⁵ Doctrine Note 23-01 then defines Light AFVs as:

“A wheeled vehicle with a cannon or direct fire weapons systems designed to defeat a similar threat at ranges beyond 2000 metres, and integral protection designed to defend against a similarly equipped threat.”¹⁶

This definition is too aspirational and rigid as it doesn’t reflect current CAF inventory or even currently programed weapon projects. The definition would apply to the current LAV fleet but would exclude any vehicle armed with less than a 25mm autocannon. Nor does the definition account for how a mix of weapon systems at troop level may provide a more flexible and economical approach to achieving that desired capability. Instead, the recommended more flexible definition for light AFVs should be amended to:

“Tracked or wheeled vehicles with direct fire weapons designed to defeat lightly armoured targets at ranges up to 2000m, some capability to defeat heavier targets at longer ranges, and integral protection designed to at a minimum protect the crew from small arms fire.”

The definition above can then be applied to a variety of vehicles and weapons (Heavy Machinegun [HMG], Automatic Grenade Launcher [AGL], etc.) that could be employed by LAC, and also distinguishes them from unprotected direct fire vehicles fielded by the infantry. In an infantry-centric Army, LAC will more likely be embraced if it fills a complementary distinct role and capability compared to infantry DFS and doesn’t compete directly with it. In a Canadian Army context, a Protected Mobility (PM) framework could look more like:

Figure 2 – Canadian Protected Mobility Framework?¹⁷

Within this force employment framework, RCAC LAC would be equipped with Heavy and/or Medium PM vehicles as light AFVs. Heavy PMs would offer protection from HMG direct fire, while Medium PM would offer protection from MMG direct fire. Light Utility Vehicle (LUV) utility variants would also be in RCAC support roles. Light PM and Light tactical mobility vehicles would equip light infantry direct fire platoons emphasizing mobility over protection. This concept aligns with the 3 RCR DFS platoon trial in 2022 where MRZRs were armed with either TOW, .50 cal, or GMG 40 mm and were transported by C-130 and CH-47 Chinook, and even air-dropped by C-130 to provide airborne and air assault elements with integral DFS. Until Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) upgrade and LUV projects are fielded, interim use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) utility vehicles (UTVs) and other surrogate training vehicles in RCAC ARes units should continue for force generation. Scalability between LUV and TAPV based LAC Sqns is required not only to provide more flexibility to meet operational requirements for a wider variety of potential deployments, but those potential outputs then also provide a valid business case for projects for TAPV upgrades and for sufficient Tier 1 or 2 LUV allocations to RCAC units.

Figure 3 – 3 RCR Lightfighter Lethality Enhancement Effort¹⁸

LAC equipped with light AFVs are not air-droppable or transportable by CH-47D Chinook, but they can be air-landed by C-17, or even C-130 in the case of Medium PMs/LUV. Light AFVs offer mobile protection unavailable to infantry DFS but must be equipped with similar firepower at a minimum to offer real value to the light combined arms team, as well as deliver their fundamental role as armoured cavalry. Therefore, LAC elements should be equipped with a mix of .50cal HMG, 40mm AGL, and ATGM capability in the near term, until a light direct fire study identifies a future optimum mix of direct fire capability that could include LW 30mm autocannon or other systems. Ideally, these systems are mounted in Remote Weapons Stations (RWS); however, given resource constraints, it may be necessary to mount some weapons on pedestal or cupola mounts, particularly for lower risk missions and training.

The mix of weapons systems is necessary at LAC troop level, with exact composition varying depending on mission requirements. While it is acknowledged previous studies have identified the 40mm grenade having better armour penetration capability than .50cal HMG, 40mm AGL also has low muzzle velocity and extremely low hit probability at longer ranges or against moving targets. Lessons- learned from DFS platoons as well as US Army light cavalry and other allies light cavalry forces are instructive here. The .50cal HMG equipped vehicles have a higher probability of hitting targets and can fix and immobilize them, then fire from 40mm AGL can be used to destroy those targets. ATGM is used for heavy targets or fortifications when required.

Drawing upon lessons- learned from the 3 RZR RCR DFS trial, RCAC should pursue a trial fitting pedestal mounts for .50cal to TAPV that are Fitted-For-Not-With (FFNW) RWS, so those TAPVs can be effectively employed by LAC Sqns in the ARes, alongside the TAPVs equipped with RWS 40mm AGL. Following a successful trial, a minor project should be pursued to procure additional .50 cal HMGs to kit out remaining TAPV FFNW. Future TAPV RWS upgrades should allow a modular approach and the ability to equip .50 cal HMG or 40mm GMG as the primary weapon, as well as the ability to mount an ATGM if operationally required, or to outfit an alternative light direct fire weapon, such as LW 30mm, if the Army goes that route. LUV should include similar capabilities to mount RWS for deployment and high readiness training stocks, and cupola mounts for more general training.

Force Generation of Light Armoured Cavalry

Based on a 4:1 Trained Effective Strength or 5:1 Parade Strength to Operational Output ratio RCAC ARes units can produce approximately 14 Armoured Cav Tps, 14 Assault Sections, and 14 Echelon Sections based on new RCAC mission task outputs and trained effective strengths across RCAC ARes units as of January 2024. This pool of outputs could be used to form a force generation pool of approximately three LAC Sqns for operational deployments; however, that same pool of outputs will also be needed to reinforce Reg F heavy and medium armoured cavalry sqns to sustain international commitments over the long-term. If the RCAC was properly reconstituted to near establishment, this pool would be expanded up to 24 Armd Cav Tps, 24 Aslt Sections, and 24 Echelon Sections, or the equivalent of 6 LAC Sqns. It should be noted that the remaining 2/3 of force generating ARes mission element armd cav sqns are still conducting IT (RQ Trooper, PCFs, RQ MCpl, and sometimes RQ Sgt and WO), annual foundation collective training, and on stand-by to contribute elements to Territorial Battalion Groups for domestic operations. It takes an expeditionary operational output of 6 Sqns to constantly sustain a one Sqn roto (or 4 Armd Cav Tps, 4 Aslt Sections, and 4 Echelon Sections) every six months through a three-year managed readiness cycle. The math suggests that any LAC deployment, much like any heavy or medium armd cav sustained deployment will require a One Army Team effort with a mix of Reg and Res elements.

Figure 4 – ARes Field Force Capacity for Force Generation¹⁹

Figure 5 – RCAC ARes Force Generation and Operational Outputs²⁰

Conclusion

As previously mentioned, the value of LAC is not only the strategic mobility, but its resource economy compared to medium and heavy elements. Yet under a common RCAC armoured cavalry training framework that is horizontally and vertically integrated, LAC elements provide a cost-effective way to maintain the depth of armoured cavalry crews necessary to sustain the concurrency of operations, especially if those become combat operations and reinforcements and replacements are required.

Doctrine Note 23-01 provides much needed clarity on the fundamentals of armoured cavalry concepts. This discussion paper focused in on some additional considerations specific to Light Armoured Cavalry to generate discussion, inform upcoming drafts of the broader Armoured Regiment in Battle doctrine manual, and propose some complementary projects to quickly field relevant LAC capabilities. Much work remains ahead, and input from across the RCAC and Army will be needed in order to push RCAC modernization forward and ensure that future RCAC light armoured cavalry elements provide credible, relevant capabilities for Canadian Army task forces deployed on operations.

Figure 6 – RCAC 2035 – Likely Use Case & Reg F / ARes Integration²¹

About the Author: Col Christopher W. Hunt has served in the Canadian Army for over 30 years with the first half of his career in the Regular Force and the second half in the Army Reserve. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in both Tank and Recce squadrons, and at unit and formation levels. Col Hunt served on Operation KINETIC Roto 0 in Kosovo, TF 1-06 in Afghanistan, and several domestic operations. Col Hunt commanded The King’s Own Calgary Regiment (RCAC) from 2016 to 2019. He has a Master of Arts in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. He is currently Commander 41 Canadian Brigade Group and the Deputy Director Armour (Reserve).

End Notes

1. Canadian Army Doctrine Note 23-01, The Armoured Regiment in Battle, 25 September 2023, p, 6. https://acims.mil.ca/sp/cadl/_layouts/15/DocIdRedir.aspx?ID=6MMKRDZDSXKK-13873826-842
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p.7
4. Ibid.
5. United States Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96) Cavalry Squadron, May 2016, p. 1-7. ATP 3-20.96 Working Edit.pdf (army.mil)
6. United States Marine Corps, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, MCTP 3-10D, Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 4 April 2018, p 1-1. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCTP%203-10D.pdf?ver=2019-10-31-093151-710
7. Ibid, 1-2.
8. Queen’s Dragoon Guards, Light Cav Capability, Brief for HQ 7 Infantry Brigade, 29 October 2018. DDIR ARES - Home (mil.ca)
9. The original LAVUP project per unit costs were approximately $2 million each. LAV 6.0 Light Armoured Vehicle (globalsecurity.org). Joint Tactical Light Vehicles (JTLV) have a per unit costs under $400,000. Oshkosh Defense’s Hybrid JLTV May Offer the Army Some Advantages — For A Price (forbes.com) Roshel Senator APCs donated to Ukraine had a per unit cost of around $450,000. Canada announces it will donate 200 armoured vehicles to Ukraine | CBC News
10. Op CABRIT ~ Royal Yeomanry Reserves to Join US 2nd Cavalry | Joint Forces News (joint-forces.com); The Welsh Cavalry prepare for peacekeeping mission in Mali | The British Army (mod.uk)
11. 2023 RCAC Board – Working Group 2 – One Corps Structure presentation. https://acims.mil.ca/org/ECBRC-RCACS/Corps_HQ/DDIRARES/_layouts/15/DocIdRedir.aspx?ID=RCACS-1071955766-2
12. Canadian Forces Headquarters, CFP 305(2), Armour, Volume 2, Light Armoured Regiment, February 1972.
13. ATP 3-20.96 (FM 3-20.96) Cavalry Squadron, May 2016, p. 1-3.
14. MCTP 3-10D, Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 4 April 2018, p 2-3.
15. Doctrine Note 23-01, p. 7.
16. Ibid, p.6.
17. Slide by Author based on a UK concept by Nicholas Drummond (@nicholadrummond) posted at 5:48 a.m. on Sat, May 27, 2023: The British Army’s Protected Mobility Pipeline (PMP) programme will see 14 platforms merged into 5. Three PM platforms (light, medium, & heavy) will replace Foxhound, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky, Foxhound, and Panther. This will streamline through-life support. https://t.co/Tx3LMjMdi9 (https://x.com/nicholadrummond/status/1662425654418178048?t=7h7sl1k_hzONlZiYiw3OhA&s=03). The adapted Canadian Protected Mobility concept slide can be found at: https://acims.mil.ca/org/ECBRC-RCACS/Corps_HQ/DDIRARES/_layouts/15/DocIdRedir.aspx?ID=RCACS-1071955766-5
18. 3 RCR Light Fighter Lethality Enhancement Effort - Final.pdf (mil.ca)
19. 2023 RCAC Board – Working Group 2 – One Corps Structure presentation, updated in January 2024 with personnel data from MCS.
20. 2023 RCAC Board – Working Group 2 – One Corps Structure presentation.
21. Ibid.