Evaluation of the Canadian Cadet Organizations (CCO)

February 2013

1258-103-2 (CRS)

Reviewed by CRS in accordance with the Access to Information Act (AIA). Information UNCLASSIFIED.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Results in Brief

An evaluation of the CCO, comprising the Cadet and Junior Canadian Ranger (JCR) Programs, was conducted between April 2011 and July 2012. The evaluation was undertaken to examine the relevance and performance of the CCO, the results of which will serve as a baseline for the next evaluation in five years’ time. The evaluation also covered the grant program for the national headquarters offices of the Cadet Leagues. The clients for the evaluation are the Deputy Minister (DM), the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and senior CCO program managers. Recommendations resulting from the evaluation will be used to inform management decisions related to program delivery, resource allocation and the renewal of grant funding to the Cadet Leagues.

Background

The Cadet Program is the largest federally sponsored youth development program in Canada. It is made up of the Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, Royal Canadian Army Cadets and Royal Canadian Air Cadets. The JCR Program is a structured youth development program operating in remote and isolated communities, which promotes traditional cultures and lifestyles.

Both programs are under the control and supervision of the Department of National Defence (DND), although cadets and JCRs are not members of the Canadian Forces (CF). The Department’s support to the Cadet and JCR Programs includes personnel, logistical and administrative assistance. The delivery of the Cadet Program is a partnership between the DND and the Navy League of Canada, the Army Cadet League of Canada, and the Air Cadet League of Canada. DND/CF provides grant funding to the Cadet Leagues to support the running of their national offices. In the case of the JCR Program, the Department depends on communities to support and enrich program at the local level.

Programs are open to all youth aged 12 to 18 in Canada. Today, there are approximately 52,000 cadets in 1,114 cadet corps and squadrons scattered across the country, along with around 3,700 JCRs in 133 remote and isolated communities.

Methodology

The evaluation used multiple lines of evidence to ensure the reliability of reported results. It incorporated the following qualitative and quantitative methods:

• document review;
• interviews;
• surveys;
• site visits; and
• administrative and financial data review.

Findings and Recommendations

Findings – Relevance

Findings #1-3 (Cadet and JCR Programs). There is evidence of continued need for the JCR Program. It provides a structured youth program in remote and isolated communities, which often have few youth programs and a growing youth demographic. There was less evidence of continued need for the Cadet Program. There has been a decline in youth participation over the past two decades, although the fact that more than 50,000 Canadian youth today are cadets nevertheless signifies a degree of need. The evaluation found that, while youth development is an area of federal interest, delivering youth programs is neither a core role nor responsibility of the federal government. The JCR Program and, to a lesser extent, the Cadet Program, are contributing to Government of Canada priorities, including helping at-risk youth, and improving the socio-economic status of Canada’s aboriginal peoples. However, the actual delivery of youth programs is not clearly linked to DND/CF’s strategic objectives and priorities.

Recommendation

1. Cadet and JCR Programs. If the DND continues to run the Cadet and JCR Programs, program aims, objectives and participant outcomes should be geared towards helping the Department meet its objective of promoting awareness, understanding, and appreciation of the history, proficiency, and values of the Canadian military.

OPI: D Cdts and JCR

Findings – Performance (Effectiveness)

Performance was reviewed in terms of the achievement of participant (youth) outcomes, Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC) officers having the appropriate knowledge and skills to deliver the Cadet Program, and the effectiveness of command and support. The evaluation also sought to establish if there were any unintended outcomes of the Cadet and JCR Programs.

Finding #4 (Cadet Program). The Cadet Program is somewhat effective at achieving its outcomes. Cadets reported improvements in most outcome areas; however, adults running the program at the community level do not believe the program is particularly effective. Parents of cadets believe that participation in Cadets has at least some positive benefits for their children. The program is most effective at developing leadership and citizenship in youth.

Finding #5 (JCR Program). JCRs reported improvements in most of the intended outcome areas, with variability by community type (First Nations or Métis, Inuit and non-aboriginal). JCR patrol leaders believe the program is highly successful in almost every outcome area. Overall, the JCR Program seems to be having a positive impact on youth and their communities.

Finding #6 (Cadet Program). Evidence as to whether CIC officers have the appropriate knowledge and skills to deliver the Cadet Program is mixed. Results should be better considering the resources and effort expended.

Finding #7 (Cadet and JCR Programs). Within the CF organizational structure, the CCO are best positioned under the VCDS.

Findings #8-10 (Cadet Program). The organizational structure of the Cadet Program does not provide for effective national control of the program. There is too much emphasis on command and control of cadet corps and squadrons. Corps and squadrons face a myriad of challenges and obstacles to running the program in their communities, particularly due to the high administrative burden and restrictive rules and polices. There are significant issues in the partnership between DND/CF and the Cadet Leagues. Roles and responsibilities of partners are not clearly defined and partners have different visions of the program. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

Finding #11 (JCR Program). Command and control of the JCR Program is perceived to be effective at the national and regional levels. However, differing levels of community support to patrols and unequal access to enhanced training opportunities (namely summer training camps), mean that JCRs in some parts of the country are benefitting from a more diverse program than others.

Finding #12 (Cadet and JCR Programs). There is no measurement of youth outcomes for the Cadet Program. Existing performance measures for the Cadet Program are too general and lack supporting benchmarks. There is no performance measurement within the JCR Program.

Finding #13 (Cadet and JCR Programs). There was evidence to suggest that the Cadet and JCR Programs have had some positive, unintended outcomes. While not an objective of either program, some cadets and JCRs do end up joining the CF. The Cadet Program plays a role in developing senior CF leaders. Running the Cadet Program also helps the CF to promote a positive self-image and generate support for the military, while cadet corps and squadrons allow the CF to maintain a presence in communities across the country. Furthermore, a significant proportion of Canada’s airline pilots were formerly air cadets.

Findings – Performance (Resource Utilization)

Overall Finding – Cadet Program #14. There are concerns regarding the efficiency of the delivery of the Cadet Program. DND spends almost $4,800 per year on each cadet. The costs of running the program are 40 percent higher than 20 years ago, even though there are 15 percent fewer cadets today than in 1992. The Department is spending significantly more on its Cadet Program than allied countries. Management and administration consumes a greater share of resources than other similar programs. Unlike other Canadian youth programs and allied cadet programs, the Canadian Cadet Program relies less on volunteers and more on paid staff. Today, 60 percent of all program expenditures are on labour. There are a multitude of advanced training opportunities available to cadets, particularly through the summer training program. However, the cost of advanced training, along with management and administration costs, is squeezing local corps/squadron funding. The proportion of expenditures directly supporting community corps and squadrons, and thereby benefitting all youth in the program, is just 14.5 percent. Despite the significant resources spent on the Cadet Program and the extensive advanced training opportunities, the program is only somewhat effective at achieving its youth outcomes, and retaining youth in the program is a major challenge.

Overall Finding – JCR Program #15. The DND spends around $3,000 per year on each JCR, however, the program is achieving positive change for youth in remote and isolated communities. Management and administration costs are high and the proportion of program expenditures that directly supports JCR patrols at the community level is too low. There are a reasonable set of enhanced training activities offered to JCRs, but parameters are imprecise and access to opportunities is uneven.

Overall Finding – Grant Program for the National Offices of the Cadet Leagues

The national offices of the Cadet Leagues are performing relevant and important support functions and the grant program represents good value for money.

Recommendations

2. General Recommendation – Cadet Program. The Cadet Program should be fundamentally re-engineered in accordance with the following principles:

1. Re-focus efforts and resources towards intended program recipients (the cadets) at the community level: The majority of program expenditures should be in direct support of community-based programming. The remainder of expenditures should go to management/administration and a rationalized advanced training program.
2. Reduce the administrative overhead: Decrease and minimize expenditures on management and administration. Cut the administrative burden by reducing the number and complexity of rules, policies and procedures governing the program, and by reducing the size of, or eliminating, the regional and/or national offices.
3. Rationalize the advanced training program: Summer advanced training courses should be predominantly two weeks in length. Overhead costs for running summer training must be reduced, thereby increasing the number of youth who can attend. Nationally and regionally directed advanced training activities that benefit only a small proportion of the cadet population should be kept to a minimum.
4. Simplify governance structure and command and support: DND, as the program funder, should give consideration to the following:
   1. assuming full responsibility for the program through the establishment of a clear program mandate;
   2. examining the possibility of distributing of funds directly to program delivery agents (those delivering the program to cadets); and
   3. examining the partnership between DND and the Cadet Leagues through a review of the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), including the respective roles and responsibilities of DND and the Cadet Leagues for delivering the program.Continued funding of support agents should be dependent upon the result of the re-engineering of the service delivery model.
5. Increase reliance on volunteerism: Volunteers should be engaged at all levels of the program, particularly the community level, to enhance program delivery.
6. The Cadet Program may wish to consider adopting an alternative delivery model, which involves the establishment of a non-governmental, not-for-profit organization to administer the program.^[1]

OPI: D Cdts and JCR

3. General Recommendation – JCR Program. It is recommended that the DND continue to deliver the JCR Program in accordance with the following principles:

1. Efforts and resources are focused at the community level (JCR patrols): The majority of program expenditures should be in direct support of JCR patrols.
2. Funding is aligned to need: DND support to JCR patrols must recognize that the JCR Program operates in very diverse communities, with different realities and needs. Some communities should receive supplementary funding, eligibility for which can be determined by a set of criteria. For example, supplementary funding may be provided to a community where the cost of gas or food is higher than the average for remote and isolated communities, or where extra staff support is necessary because volunteerism is not customary in the community.
3. Enhanced training parameters are clearly defined: Parameters should specify an absolute number and maximum proportion of JCRs who can participate in enhanced training each year. Parameters should also promote equal access to enhanced training opportunities regardless of where JCRs live or the size of the patrol they belong to.
4. Administration, policies, rules and regulations are minimized and optimized (ensuring a safe program that does not stifle delivery).

OPI: D Cdts and JCR

Note: Please refer to Annex A—Management Action Plan for the management response to the Chief Review Services (CRS) recommendations.

1.0 Introduction

This report presents the results of the evaluation of the Cadet and JCR Programs, together known as the CCO and linked to Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) 4.2.1.0 - Cadets. The evaluation includes the grant program for the national headquarters offices of the Cadet Leagues, the results of which are presented in Annex D. CRS conducted the evaluation between April 2011 and July 2012. The purpose was to evaluate the relevance and performance of the programs, the results of which will serve as a baseline for the next evaluation in five years’ time. The clients for this evaluation are the DM, the CDS, the VCDS and senior CCO program managers. Recommendations resulting from the evaluation will be used to inform management decisions related to program delivery, resource allocation and the renewal of grant funding to the Cadet Leagues.

While the CCO expenditures do not represent a significant proportion of the DND’s overall annual spending, the Cadet Program has a long-standing history in the Department. Senior CF leadership, program staff, and Cadet League partners are all passionate supporters of the program.

The Cadet Program had not been evaluated by CRS since fiscal year (FY) 1993/94,² and prior to that in 1984. A number of the findings of the previous 1993/94 evaluation were found to still be valid almost 20 years later. An organizational review of the Cadet Program was undertaken by Price Waterhouse Coopers in 1999. The grant program for the national headquarters offices of the Cadet Leagues was last evaluated in 2008, as a prerequisite for the renewal of funding. The JCR Program, as a relatively new program, had not yet been subject to an evaluation. The CCO have never been audited by the CRS internal audit function.

1.1 Profile of the Cadet and JCR Programs

1.1.1 Background

The Cadet Program is the largest federally sponsored youth development program in Canada. It is made up of the Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, Royal Canadian Army Cadets and Royal Canadian Air Cadets. The Department’s involvement officially began during the Second World War, although cadet organizations have existed in Canada since the mid-1800s. In contrast, the JCR Program is a relatively new program. Established in 1996, it is a structured youth development program tailored to remote and isolated communities, which promotes traditional cultures and lifestyles. Many, but by no means all, communities that have a JCR Program are aboriginal. Both programs are under the control and supervision of the DND, although cadets and JCRs are not members of the CF.

The Department’s support to the Cadet and JCR Programs includes personnel (principally CIC officers in the case of the Cadet Program and Canadian Rangers for the JCR Program), logistical and administrative assistance. The delivery of the Cadet Program is a partnership between the DND and the three Cadet Leagues: the Navy League of Canada, the Army Cadet League of Canada, and the Air Cadet League of Canada. In the case of the JCR Program, DND depends on communities to support and enrich the program at the local level.

Programs are open to all youth aged 12 to 18 in Canada. Today, there are approximately 52,000 cadets in 1,114 cadet corps and squadrons scattered across the country, along with around 3,700 JCRs in 133 remote and isolated communities.³

1.1.2 Objectives of the Program

The founding aims of the Cadet Program are to develop the attributes of leadership and citizenship; to promote physical fitness; and to stimulate an interest in the activities of the CF. Over the past decade, several participant (youth) outcomes for the program have been developed, namely, emotional and physical well-being, social competence, cognitive competence, proactive citizenship, and understanding the CF.

The objectives of the JCR Program are to impart Canadian Rangers skills, traditional skills, and life skills. Participant (youth) outcomes are identified as being competent living on the land; being of value to the community; and being confident with others and making healthy choices. However, the JCR Program is inherently altruistic, with youth, remote and isolated communities, and local traditional culture and heritage, all directly benefitting from the program.

Command and support, and knowledgeable and skilled CIC officers (who predominantly administer the Cadet Program) were also identified as objectives of the CCO in the logic model.

The logic model for the Cadet and JCR Programs can be found in Annex B.

1.1.3 Delivery Approach

1.1.3.1 Cadet Program Delivery Approach

There are four main components of the Cadet Program: Corps/Squadron Program,⁴ Cadet Summer Training Centre (CSTC) program, Regionally Directed Activities (RDA), and Nationally Directed Activities (NDA).

The foundational component is the Corps/Squadron Program, which is delivered in communities from September to June. It allows youth to develop knowledge and skills in a variety of subject areas related to a specific element (sea, army or air), and introduces cadets to specialized activities. The corps/squadron program comprises both mandatory and complementary activities, as well as an optional program.

The second key component is the CSTC program, which runs in July and August. It allows a selected group of cadets to develop advanced knowledge and skills in specialized activities and produces instructors/leaders from the cadet population to assist in running the program. Five hundred air cadets are given the opportunity to gain their power or glider pilot licences each year. Summer training is held at 20 CSTCs and five Regional Gliding Schools across the country.

Other opportunities for advanced training take the form of RDAs and NDAs, which aim to augment the corps/squadron and CSTC programs and maintain youth’s interest in Cadets. RDAs are organized and conducted under the supervision of Regional Cadet Support Units (RCSU), while NDAs are administered by national headquarters.

The Cadet Program has a considerable amount of command and support at the national and regional levels. There is a national headquarters, D Cdts and JCR, and six RCSUs.⁵ The RCSUs provide leadership, administration and support services to local cadet corps and squadrons within their region. There are many other cadet-related entities at the regional level in addition to the RCSUs. Two regions have Cadet Detachments (an additional layer between the RCSU and corps/squadrons). Five of the six regions have their own Regional Cadet Instructor Schools (RCIS) for training military personnel involved in the program. There are Regional Cadet Sailing Schools, Regional Cadet Land Training Schools, and Regional Gliding Schools. Although not part of the CF, there are also Sailing, Expedition and Gliding Centres scattered across the country, where cadet training takes place.

Command and control of the Cadet Program is somewhat complex. The VCDS, through the D Cdts & JCR, exercises overall administrative control of the CCO. The VCDS is responsible for developing, establishing and monitoring program standards, policies and training as well as for allocating resources. At the regional level, Area/Regional Commanders, through the RCSU commanding officers (CO), are responsible for managing and operating the program in their region. Although the Area/Regional Commanders report to the VCDS on cadet matters, they are actually accountable to their Environmental Chiefs. At the local level, each cadet corps/squadron is headed by a CO who is supported by other members of the CF (predominantly CIC officers), plus civilian instructors and volunteers.

A key aspect of the DND’s support to the Cadet Program is the provision of personnel. The management and administration of the program is primarily carried out by members of the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service (COATS). COATS is a CF Reserve Force sub-component, which includes CIC officers, general service officers and general service non-commissioned members. CIC officers are by far the largest group working in the Cadet Program. As of March 2011, there were almost 8,000 COATS personnel on strength, including 7,500 CIC officers.⁶ The program is also supported by other CF personnel, including Regular Force members and other types of Reservists, and by civilian personnel (public servants, civilian instructors and volunteers).

The Cadet Program is supported by the Navy League of Canada, the Army Cadet League of Canada, and the Air Cadet League of Canada, which are not-for-profit volunteer organizations. The Leagues have national headquarters offices, provincial/regional/ divisional offices, as well as local level presence. DND provides grant funding to support the running of the national offices. Under the current agreement, each league receives $418,000 per year, which is used to defray the costs of insurance protection for cadets, civilian volunteers and local League members, assist in travel expenses, office administration expenses, and the costs for security screening of volunteers and league personnel.

The Cadet Leagues, via their National Offices, are responsible for the following activities in the Cadet Program:

• making recommendations on the formation, organization and disbandment of cadet corps/squadrons;
• assisting in the promotion of the Cadet Program and attracting League members, officers and cadets to corps/squadrons;
• ensuring accommodations, training material and appropriate support are available through provincial and local League entities for cadet training that is above the CF’s level of support;
• providing recruitment and supervision for corps/squadron local sponsoring bodies; and
• maintaining a centralized screening database for volunteers across the country to ensure that volunteers have an Enhanced Reliability Screening consistent with those working with youth.

Roles and responsibilities of the DND and the Cadet Leagues for delivering the program are established in the 2005 MOU.

1.1.3.2 JCR Program Delivery Approach

The JCR Program is directed by D Cdts & JCR and supported regionally by five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPG).⁷ As is the case in the Cadet Program, the Area/Regional Commanders, through the CRPG COs, are responsible for the day-to-day delivery of the program. Although the Area/Regional Commanders report to the VCDS on JCR matters, in the chain of command they are accountable to their Environmental Chiefs.

At the local level, JCRs are organized into units called JCR patrols. In order to have a JCR patrol, a community must first have an adult Canadian Ranger Patrol, because Canadian Rangers have the primary responsibility for running the program. A JCR patrol leader heads the patrol, and is assisted by other Canadian Rangers from the Patrol. Each JCR patrol is supposed to be supported by an Adult Committee, which is made up of volunteer members of the community.

The JCR Program has two main components: the community program, running from September to June, and an enhanced summer training program. There is a very limited set of enhanced training activities organized at the regional and national levels.

The JCR community program is developed in partnership with the Adult Committee. There is no prescribed curriculum; communities have the freedom to decide what knowledge and skills their young people will learn.⁸ There are, however, three core skill areas that the program should address: Canadian Ranger skills, traditional skills and life skills. Canadian Ranger skills include first aid, navigation, safe vehicle operation and safe firearms handling. JCR patrols venture periodically out on the land to practice their ranger skills. Traditional skills teaching varies greatly from community to community. It may include traditional ways to live and survive on the land (shelter building, hunting, fishing, etc.) or traditional arts and crafts, music, language and dance. As part of life skills teaching, all JCR patrols are expected to provide “Prevention of Harassment and Abuse through Successful Education” (PHASE) training. PHASE teaches young people to recognize different forms of harassment and abuse, and inappropriate forms of discipline. Aside from PHASE, other life skills that JCRs learn range from awareness and prevention of bullying, drug, alcohol and substance abuse, to nutrition and public speaking.

Selected JCRs have the opportunity to travel outside their communities to attend Enhanced Training Sessions, which are held during July and August. They include a variety of training and activities and give JCRs the opportunity to apply skills learned during the year.

1.1.4 Program Resources

Between 2008 and 2011, DND/CF spending on the Cadet and JCR Programs averaged $249.4 million per year.⁹ The vast majority of expenditures were on the Cadet Program ($238.9 million per year), with less than 5 percent spent on the JCR Program ($10.5 million per year). Recently released data for FY 2011/12 put the combined costs of the programs at $274.1 million.

2.0 Methodology

The evaluation scope and methodology were established in an evaluation work plan developed during the planning phase (April to October 2011). The work plan was designed to align with the Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation (April 2009).

The evaluation was conducted at the request of the D Cdts & JCR and its priority rating was high. While spending on the CCO does not represent a significant proportion of the overall budget, the Department comes under considerable scrutiny for running the Cadet Program, especially from League partners and parents. The results of the evaluation, the first in almost 20 years, are likely to be of considerable interest to stakeholders. For this reason, a comprehensive methodology was developed. The following sections describe the evaluation objective, scope, issues and questions, data collection methods, and the limitations of the evaluation.

2.1 Evaluation Objective

The objective of the evaluation was to examine the relevance and performance of the DND/CF Cadet and JCR Programs and to analyze the potential realignment of the CCO within the CF.

2.2 Evaluation Issues and Questions

The evaluation of the Cadet and JCR Programs examined issues related to relevance and performance (see Annex C for the complete evaluation matrix, which also includes specific indicators and methodologies for each evaluation question).

2.3 Data Collection Methods

The evaluation of the Cadet and JCR Programs included the use of multiple lines of evidence and complementary research methods as a means to help ensure the reliability of information and data collected. The following methods were used to gather qualitative and quantitative data:

• document review;
• interviews;
• surveys;
• site visits; and
• administrative and financial data review.

Each of these methods is described in more detail in the following sections.

2.3.1 Document Review

A comprehensive document review was conducted to assess the relevance of the Cadet and JCR Programs. Documents reviewed included foundational program documents and federal and departmental accountability documents. General research was also conducted on youth development and the need for youth programs.

Program-related documents such as Cadet Administration and Training Orders (CATO) and JCR Administration and Training Orders, Program Planning Guidances, and the MOU between the DND/CF and the Cadet Leagues on roles and responsibilities, were examined to gain a general understanding of the CCO and to help assess performance. No program evaluations or reviews had been conducted in the past decade; however, the comprehensive CRS Cadet Program evaluation of 1993/94 was useful to understanding the Cadet Program and in benchmarking.

Documentation on allied cadet programs and other Canadian youth programs contributed to various aspects of the evaluation.

2.3.2 Interviews

Stakeholder interviews were an important source of information. They yielded qualitative data from those directly or indirectly involved in the Cadet and JCR Programs, including Cadet League partners. A total of 75 interviews were conducted. Interviews were held with national and regional-level DND/CF staff, as well with CF senior leaders and other relevant departmental staff. Regional-level interviewees comprised Regional/Area Commanders, RCSU staff (RCSU commanders, officers in charge of RCIS, Land Training Schools and Air Operations, and detachment commanders), and CRPG commanders. Representatives from all three Cadet League National Offices were interviewed, as were 23 Cadet League Provincial/Divisional offices (ten declined to participate). In addition, three youth program “experts”—academics with in-depth knowledge of youth programming and/or youth development—were interviewed. Two academics were based in Canada, the other in the United States.

Table 1 shows the number of interviewees by group and by program. Almost all interviews were conducted in person and/or by telephone. Interview guides were developed for each interview group and interview questions were designed to align with the evaluation questions identified in the evaluation matrix (see Annex C). Interview responses were summarized according to a specific methodology.

Table 1. Number of Interviewees by Group and Program. This table shows the total number of interviewees by group and the number who answered for the Cadet Program and/or JCR Program. Note that the totals do not tally, because some interviewees responded for both programs.

Legend:

N/A – Not Applicable

In addition to interviews conducted as part of the main evaluation, CRS held separate interviews on the grant funding component with the Executive Directors of the Cadet Leagues and with senior D Cdts & JCR staff (six in total).

2.3.3 Surveys

Three surveys were administered for each of the programs. Surveys ensured that the opinions and input of those working at different levels of the programs were included in the evaluation, particularly those running the programs in communities. Survey findings would also support the results of other lines of evidence (i.e., stakeholder interviews).

The surveys conducted included the Corps/Squadron Commanding Officer (CO)Survey and JCR Patrol Leader Survey (intended for those managing the programs at the community level), Cadet and JCR Program Staff Surveys (intended for military personnel ¹⁰ working directly or indirectly in support of the programs at all levels), and Cadet/JCR Participant Surveys (completed by cadets and JCRs who had completed at least six months in the program).

The youth-directed participant surveys were reviewed by DND’s Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Social Science Research Review Board to ensure conformance with current professional practices and ethical standards. A sampling methodology was employed for the participant surveys. All JCR surveys and the Cadet Participant Survey were pre-tested, the results of which were used to enhance survey design and approach. All surveys were conducted over a two-month period between February and April 2012. The approach taken (on-line and/or mailed-out survey packages) varied from survey to survey. Facilitating JCR survey completion in remote and isolated communities was particularly challenging, and required a tailored approach for each JCR patrol, working in close cooperation with the respective CRPG.

Table 2 shows the survey response rates. The response rate was highest among national and regional level program staff—just over 70 percent among Cadet Program staff, and at or near 100 percent among JCR Program staff. Forty-three percent of corps/squadron COs completed a survey, as did one-third of JCR patrol leaders. Responses to the participant surveys were low, with the proportion of the total Cadet and JCR population surveyed standing at only 0.7 percent and 6 percent, respectively.

Table 2. Responses to the CRS Evaluation Surveys. This table shows the number of responses and the response rate for each of the six CRS evaluation surveys.

Legend:

N/A – Not Available

In addition to the surveys administered by CRS, the 2012 Ipsos Reid Corporation’s “Public Awareness and Perceptions of the Cadet Program” surveys contributed to various aspects of the evaluation. Ispos Reid surveyed cadets, general population youth, parents of cadets, general population parents, general population adults, and community leaders.

2.3.4 Site Visits

Site visits were made to sea, army and air cadet summer training camps and to a JCR summer training camp in order to help the evaluators to better understand the programs.

Three visits to communities with a JCR patrol were undertaken: one to Blanc Sablon, Quebec (a non-aboriginal community), one to Tulit’a, Northwest Territories (Dene First Nations community), and the other to Pangnirtung, Nunavut (Inuit community). Site visits were determined in conjunction with the CRPGs. The purpose of the visits was to gain a better understanding of how the JCR Program worked at the grassroots level and of the challenges faced by remote and isolated communities, as well as to gather information on the impact of the program from the community’s perspective. During each site visit, CRS evaluators talked informally or formally with members of the community, including leaders/mayors, parents, teachers, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), program staff, and JCRs. A community focus group was held in two of the three site visits.

2.3.5 Administrative and financial data review

The chief source of administrative and financial data was the D Cdts & JCR Youth Programs Statistics Report. This very detailed report on training and financial statistics is published for each fiscal year; the FY 2011/12 report became available towards the end of the conduct phase of the evaluation.

A comparative analysis of costs with Scouts Canada and the Canadian 4-H Program was performed, with data being obtained from a literature search. An analysis of costs compared to allied cadet programs was also conducted. The evaluation team received data (via a set template) from programs in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2.4 Limitations

The evaluation methodology was designed to provide multiple lines of evidence in support of evaluation findings. The data and information were collected to respond to the evaluation questions and issues. As with all evaluations, there are limitations that should be considered.

The evaluation assesses the impact of the Cadet and JCR Programs on youth. It is inherently difficult to distinguish changes due to the natural development of youth (maturation) from those resulting from participation in youth programs. Parental guidance, the school system and participation in other extra-curricular activities or youth programs may also contribute to the positive development of cadets or JCRs.

The principal means to assess the impact of the Cadet and JCR Programs on youth was a survey, a method which relies on self-reported data. Issues of intentional misreporting (whether it be from good or bad intentions), recall bias, or misunderstanding of survey questions, may affect the accuracy of results.

The number of responses to the participant (youth) surveys was low. It decreases further when taking the subset of those who had completed at least two years in the program, and when disaggregating by element (Sea, Army, Air in the case of cadets) or by community type (First Nations or Métis, Inuit, non-aboriginal in the case of JCRs). To counter this, overall assessment of the impact of programs also considered the views of parents and those running the programs at the community level.

The Cadet Program is delivered in partnership with the three Cadet Leagues, yet evaluating the effectiveness of Leagues (which are separate, non-profit organizations) was not within the mandate of the evaluation. However, the opinions of DND/CF corps/squadron staff regarding the effectiveness of League support were solicited.

Limitations related to resource usage can be found in Section 3.3 Performance (Resource Utilization).

3.0 Evaluation Findings

3.1 Relevance

The following section examines the extent to which the Cadet and JCR Programs address a demonstrable need, are appropriate to the federal government role, and are aligned with DND/CF priorities.

3.1.1 Continued Need for the Cadet and JCR Programs

Finding #1: There is evidence of continued need for the JCR Program. It provides a structured youth program in remote and isolated communities, which often have few youth programs and a growing youth demographic. There was less evidence of continued need for the Cadet Program. There has been a decline in youth participation over the past two decades, although the fact that more than 50,000 Canadian youth today are cadets signifies a degree of need.

The findings in this section are based on document review, interviews with youth program experts, and the results of the JCR PL Survey and 2012 Ipsos Reid surveys.

The evidence for a continued need for the JCR Program is demonstrated via a lack of youth programs in remote and isolated communities. JCR patrol leaders reported few programs operating in their communities, with one-third of those in the Far North indicating that the JCR Program was the only youth program in existence.¹¹ The RCMP has also acknowledged a distinct lack of youth self-development and self-esteem building programs like the Cadet and JCR Programs in northern communities. In fact, the RCMP’s “V” Division (Nunavut) is now partnering with cadet and JCR units, so as to promote regular interaction with community youth.¹² Further evidence of a continued for the JCR Program, at least in aboriginal communities, is rapid population growth and very youthful age structures. Around half of the aboriginal population is under 25 years of age and the aboriginal population will continue to be youthful in the future.¹³

In terms of the Cadet Program, recently released survey results did not suggest a continued need for the program. Almost half of general population parents and community leaders surveyed felt that there were a lot of other programs in Canada that help young people develop the same kind of skills as the Cadet Program.¹⁴ One of the youth program experts consulted as part of the evaluation felt strongly that there was a need for the Cadet Program, as it creates a sense of Canadian identity and brings awareness as to what it means to be Canadian. Developing a positive Canadian identity was regarded as especially important for immigrant youth and Canadian-born children of immigrants. However, the trend of charging annual joining fees may exclude those children who have the most to benefit from the program, including ethnic/visible minority youth (who tend to be over-represented in lower socio-economic groups) and youth in general from less privileged backgrounds. The decrease in the proportion of Canadian youth who participate in the Cadet Program over the past 20 years (from 2.3 percent in 1992 to 1.8 percent in 2011) suggests diminished interest in the program.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the fact that more than 50,000 Canadian youth today are cadets signifies a degree of need for the program.

Foundational documents for the CCO do not articulate a rationale for the Cadet or JCR Programs.

3.1.2 Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

Finding #2. While youth development is an area of federal interest, delivering youth programs is neither a core role nor responsibility of the federal government.

The findings in this section are based on documents reviewed for the evaluation and stakeholder interviews.

Delivering the Cadet and JCR youth development programs is unrelated to the primary role and key responsibilities of the DND/CF, as laid out in the National Defence Act, the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) and annual Departmental Reports on Plans and Priorities. According to the CFDS, the DND’s primary responsibility is to provide defence for Canada and Canadians, and its key roles are to defend Canada, to defend North America, and to contribute to international peace and security.

DND is not mandated the run the Cadet and JCR Programs; rather, Section 46 of the Act states that “the Minister may authorize the formation of the cadet organizations under the control and supervision of the Canadian Forces.” The Act does not mention that administering the CCO is either a DND role or responsibility.

Only some DND/CF and Cadet League interviewees specifically assessed the validity of the federal government’s involvement in youth development. Based on their own understanding of the role and responsibilities of the federal government, interviewees believed it was appropriate for the federal government to be running the Cadet and JCR Programs. They felt that promoting good citizenship among youth and developing future leaders for Canada was a role and responsibility of the federal government. Youth program experts, on the other hand, regarded youth development as a shared responsibility among all the different levels of government and non-governmental organizations (which was also echoed by some DND/CF interviewees). DND/CF staff were unable to link running the Cadet and JCR Programs to DND’s primary roles and responsibilities.

Youth development is, however, an area of interest to the federal government. There are departments, notably Heritage Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC), that fund components of youth programs through grants and contributions, which are undertaken to help meet departmental mandates. In addition, the federal government is directly involved in provincial-type service provision to aboriginal Canadians, through AANDC and Health Canada programs.

3.1.3 Alignment with Government Priorities and DND/CF Strategic Objectives

Finding #3. The JCR Program and, to a lesser extent, the Cadet Program, are contributing to federal government priorities. However, delivering youth development programs is not clearly linked to DND’s strategic objectives and priorities.

The findings in this section are based on documents reviewed for the evaluation.

The evaluation found evidence to suggest that the Cadet and JCR Programs are contributing to the federal government’s priority of preventing crime, including helping at-risk youth avoid gangs and criminal activity.¹⁶ The JCR Program also contributes to the following federal priority areas: “Concerted action to address the barriers to social and economic participation that many Aboriginal Canadians face,”¹⁷ and “Equipping First Nations people with the skills and opportunities needed to fully participate in the economy.”¹⁸ In addition, the JCR Program is contributing to the federal priority of defending and exercising Arctic sovereignty by enabling continuity of the Canadian Rangers movement.¹⁹

The Cadet and JCR Programs are not linked to the strategic objectives (or “operational priorities”) as described in the Defence Priorities 2011-2014 and the Departmental Directive 2011-2016. The lack of a linkage to DND/CF’s strategic objectives is a long-standing issue, having been highlighted in the 1993/94 CRS Evaluation of the Cadet Program.²⁰

In the PAA, the Cadet and JCR Programs are listed under activity area “Canadian Identity,” which is linked to the strategic outcome “Care and Support to the Canadian Forces and Contribution to Canadian Society.” However, there does not appear to be a strong linkage between CCO aims and outcomes and the expected results of programs linked to “Canadian Identity.” In the case of the Cadet Program, only one of the three aims and one of the five participant outcomes (interest in the activities of the CF/understanding of the CF) appear to strengthen “Canadian Identity”. Similarly, for the JCR Program, only one of the three objectives and participant outcomes (Canadian Ranger skills) seems to be contributing to building “Canadian Identity.”

3.2 Performance (Effectiveness)

The following section provides the findings with respect to whether the Cadet and JCR Programs are achieving their intended results. As the Cadet Program has not been evaluated in recent years, and the JCR Program has never been evaluated, the results will serve as a baseline for the next evaluation in five years’ time.

As per the logic model, this section will assess four areas: Achievement of participant outcomes—Cadet Program; Achievement of participant outcomes—JCR Program; CIC officers having appropriate knowledge and skills; and Effectiveness of command and support. It will also discuss unintended outcomes.

3.2.1 Achievement of Participant Outcomes

3.2.1.1 To what extent is the Cadet Program leading to improvements in cadets’: (a) Emotional and physical well-being; (b) Social competence; (c) Cognitive competence; (d) Proactive citizenship; (e) Understanding of the CF; and (f) Leadership ability?

Finding #4. The Cadet Program is somewhat effective at achieving its outcomes. Cadets reported improvements in most outcome areas; however, adults running the program at the community level do not believe the program is particularly effective. Parents of cadets believe that participation in Cadets has at least some positive benefits for their children. The program is most effective at developing leadership and citizenship in youth.

The findings in this section are based on results of the Cadet Participant Survey (cadets who had completed at least two years in the program), Corps/Squadron CO Survey, Cadet Program Staff Survey, and the 2012 Ipsos Reid surveys. The Cadet Program’s impact on youth was measured in terms of the achievement of the five defined participant outcomes. Although not a participant outcome, leadership ability was a sixth area assessed, as it is one of the founding aims of the Cadet Program.

Findings suggest that the Cadet Program is somewhat effective at achieving four of its five participant outcomes. It seems to be more effective at developing good citizenship in youth, and is ineffective at promoting physical well-being. The program is most effective at developing leadership, which is not a participant outcome. Army cadets reported gaining the greatest benefits; however, parents of sea cadets and sea cadet corps personnel responded the most favourably in terms of program effectiveness.

For emotional and physical well-being, the results are mixed. While a large proportion of cadets reported improvements in emotional well-being, including self-esteem and confidence, only small proportions of corps/squadron personnel and cadet parents felt the program was effective in this area. However, almost half of parents thought their children were more confident because of the program. In terms of promoting physical well-being in youth, the Cadet Program was found to be ineffective. Only 42 percent of cadets responded favourably to questions related to physical well-being. Corps/squadron personnel judged promoting physical fitness as the least effective of all outcome areas and only a small proportion of cadet parents thought their children were more physically fit because of the program. These findings are consistent with the findings of the CRS evaluation of 1993/94, suggesting a long-standing deficiency in achieving physical fitness in youth, one the program’s founding aims.²¹

In terms of social competencies, a significant proportion of cadets reported improvements, with very positive results recorded in areas such as meeting people who look or sound different, working on a team, and taking responsibility for one’s actions. Many cadet parents thought that Cadets helps youth develop social skills they would otherwise not develop. According to corps/squadron personnel, development of social competencies in youth was one of the more effective program areas. Nevertheless, only 54 percent thought the program was effective in this outcome area.

A significant proportion of cadets reported improvements in cognitive competencies (problem solving, decision-making and attitude to learning), particularly Army cadets. Many cadet parents also thought the program allows youth to acquire problem solving and creative thinking skills they would otherwise not develop. However, less than half of corps/squadron personnel assessed the program as effective in this outcome area.

There was insufficient data from youth to determine if cadets were more proactive citizens because of their involvement in the program. In the opinion of corps/squadron personnel, development of good citizenship in youth was the second most effective outcome area, with 60 percent believing it to be effective. However, only a small proportion of cadet parents thought their children were more involved in the community because of the program.

A large proportion of cadets reported improvements in their awareness and understanding of the CF, particularly army cadets and less so sea cadets. Parents and corps/squadron personnel, on the other hand, did not assess the program as effective in this outcome area. Only 35 percent of personnel at army cadet corps assessed the program as effective at creating an awareness of, and stimulating an interest in, CF sea/land/air activities.

The Cadet Program was found to be most effective at developing leadership in youth, which is not, in fact, a participant outcome. Eighty-seven percent of cadets said they felt “more of a leader” because of the program. Significant proportions of cadet parents and corps/squadron personnel felt the program was effective at leadership development.

The fact that corps/squadron personnel did not assess the program as overly effective in achieving its intended youth outcomes was viewed with concern. The analysis of comments submitted on program effectiveness gives some indication as to reasons why.

One-fifth of corps/squadron personnel who submitted comments, particularly those at army corps, believe there is a lack of military emphasis in the program, including few opportunities for cadets to interact with the CF. Thirty percent of those at army corps felt that the “army” has been taken out of army cadets and/or that Cadets is too much like Scouts. Examples given include the banning of wearing uniforms on expeditions and of activities like laser-tag, out of fears they appear overtly “army” or aggressive. The tendency to downplay the CF/military association was attributed to fears that the program will be perceived to be creating child soldiers or trying to recruit youth into the military. Personnel highlighted a need to foster greater interaction with the CF, particularly with affiliated units.²²

Corps/squadron personnel, particularly those at sea corps, were equally dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the updated cadet training programs.²³ The new programs are seen as not challenging enough or being too much like school or too classroom-based. Others are frustrated with the new approach to cadets being promoted in rank (now attendance-based as opposed to merit-based), which they believe provides no incentive for cadets to be better leaders and seniors or to strive for excellence. Others find the new programs onerous to deliver (administratively or otherwise).

A number of corps/squadron personnel expressed a need for better coverage of physical fitness in the training programs or greater support (including from their RCSU) for multi-corps/squadron physical training activities and sports competitions.²⁴ A few personnel mentioned that food served to cadets is unhealthy, including individual meal packs and/or food at summer camps (13 percent of cadets also mentioned poor quality or unhealthy food as being something they disliked about summer camp²⁵). Others mentioned that some CIC officers are not physically fit and are not setting good examples to cadets.

3.2.1.2 To what extent is the JCR Program leading to improvements in JCRs’: (a) Competence at living on the land; (b) Value to their community; and (c) Confidence with others and ability to make healthy choices?

Finding #5. JCRs reported improvements in most of the intended outcome areas, with variability by community type. JCR patrol leaders believe the program is highly successful in almost every outcome area. Overall, the JCR Program seems to be having a positive impact on youth and their communities.

The findings in this section are based on CRS evaluation surveys of JCRs (JCRs who had completed at least two years in the program) and JCR patrol leaders, as well as community visits. The JCR Program’s impact on youth was measured in terms of the achievement of the three defined participant outcomes, and results were analyzed by community type (First Nations or Métis, Inuit and non-aboriginal).²⁶

Competence at living on the land encompasses technical knowledge and land skills, such as safe use of vehicles (all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), snowmobiles, boats, etc.), considering the weather, knowledge of emergencies, and basic first aid. Three–quarters of non-aboriginal JCRs reported gaining competencies at living on the land, as did a significant proportion of First Nation and Métis JCRs. However, Inuit JCRs are not seeing as much of an improvement in competence at living on the land. For example, only 40 percent of Inuit youth who had completed at least two years in the program indicated they knew how to apply basic first aid.

As JCRs live in very diverse communities, it was difficult both to define and measure “value to the community.” Furthermore, all aspects of the program contribute to this outcome area. Survey results showed that the program is greatly increasing the participation of non-aboriginal and First Nation and Métis JCRs in their communities. The program also seems to be successful at improving youth’s community/traditional land skills. However, less than half of aboriginal youth reported they had seen improvements in their understanding of language and culture or had developed skills in traditional arts and crafts as a result of the program.

Confidence was measured in terms of self-confidence, and confidence speaking to others or a group, in decision making, and about the future. Healthy choices were assessed as greater physical activity, positive lifestyle choices, solving conflict or problems without violence or fighting, saying “no” to things known to be wrong, staying out of trouble, and staying in school. According to survey results, aboriginal JCRs saw the best improvements in terms of confidence and making healthy choices. Three-quarters reported feeling both better about themselves and more confident about the future because of their involvement in the program. Survey results showed that the program is helping a large proportion of Inuit youth make healthy choices. For example, almost 90 percent of Inuit youth reported that being a JCR has helped them stay out of trouble and almost 80 percent spend more time doing sports or exercising. Significant proportions of First Nation and Métis JCRs also reported improvements in healthy decision-making. As much as 94 percent of aboriginal JCRs said the program was helping them to stay in school, which is significant given the high rates of non-completion of high school among aboriginal youth.²⁷ A large proportion of non-aboriginal JCRs also said the program has helped them to better say “no” to things they know are wrong, stay out of trouble, and stay in school.

The impact of the JCR Program on healthy life choices was not unexpected. The very fact of being in the program may have a positive influence youth’s behaviour, as JCRs are expected to adhere to a code of conduct and set examples for their peers in the community. JCRs must also attend school. Delinquent behaviour can have negative repercussions in terms of participation in the program, which is all the more significant given the lack of youth programs available in many remote and isolated communities.

In terms of the opinion of those managing the program in communities, large proportions of JCR patrol leaders across the board thought that the program was successful in achieving all or almost all of its outcomes for youth. At least 70 percent of patrol leaders thought the program was successful in achieving all its outcomes except developing skills in traditional arts and crafts. In terms of the impact on communities, patrol leaders mostly spoke about the participation of JCRs in community events or the assistance the patrol gives to the community, and how the program is making the community see youth in a more positive light. All patrol leaders thought the JCR Program was the right type of program for young people living in remote and isolated areas.

During site visits, members of the community spoke very favourably of the program and of its positive impact on young people. Participation in the program was said to increase youth’s self-confidence and self-esteem, instil responsibility, keep youth out of trouble, and teach valuable skills (including traditional and community skills they would not otherwise learn). During one community visit, RCMP officers made a direct link between the existence of the JCR Program and a lower crime rate compared to neighbouring communities without the program.

3.2.2 Do CIC officers have the appropriate knowledge and skills to deliver the Cadet Program?

Finding #6. Evidence as to whether CIC officers have the appropriate knowledge and skills to deliver the Cadet Program is mixed. Results should be better considering the resources and effort expended.

The findings in this section are based on document review and the results of the Corps/Squadron CO Survey, Cadet Program Staff Survey, Cadet Participant Survey, and the 2012 Ipsos Reid surveys.

The Cadet Program places an important emphasis on the training of CIC officers and invests a considerable amount of resources into training each year.²⁸ Across the country, there is a large amount of infrastructure in place. National headquarters sets policies, generates training materials and is responsible for delivering distributed learning courses. Five of the six regions have their own RCIS, which are responsible for the majority of CIC officer training within the region. In addition, CSTCs, Sailing Centres, Expedition Centres and Gliding Centers all conduct specialized CIC training at the regional level.

Considering the resources invested, the results for CIC officers having appropriate knowledge and skills should be robust. However, survey results showed that the training of new CIC officers is not especially effective and opportunities for professional development are uneven.

In terms of officers who had joined the CIC within the past three years, three-quarters believed they had received about the right amount of training, while the remainder thought there was too little. Thirty-seven percent felt they had been trained too late. Less than half thought that training fully covered the role of the Cadet Leagues, while only 55 percent reported that administering the program was covered in full. Just over 60 percent felt they had been fully trained on their role as CF officers and working with youth/youth development. In terms of overall satisfaction with training, 46 percent of new CIC officers indicated they were satisfied, while a further one-third was somewhat satisfied.

Corps/squadron COs were generally dissatisfied with the training and preparedness of officers new to the CIC who had joined their corps/squadron. Only one-quarter of COs indicated that, overall, they were satisfied with the training and preparedness of new CIC officers, while a further 45 percent were somewhat satisfied. There was considerable regional variation in satisfaction with training and preparedness. COs based in Atlantic and Eastern regions were the most satisfied, while those in Pacific and especially Northern region were significantly less satisfied overall. Only one-third of COs agreed that new CIC officers had arrived adequately trained/prepared to assume their roles as youth mentors/leaders, while 25 percent or less of COs thought that officers had arrived adequately trained/prepared both to implement and administer the Cadet Program and assume their roles as CF officers. When asked about their own preparation for assuming the role as CO of the corps/squadron, less than 40 percent of COs indicated they had felt adequately prepared.

There were mixed views regarding continuous learning opportunities. Two-thirds of CIC officers working at corps/squadrons felt there were sufficient opportunities for continuous learning, yet only 55 percent of regional CIC officers and 47 percent of those at D Cdts & JCR thought the same way. The CIC Training Organization itself believes there are few self-development resources available to CIC officers.²⁹ Among those who were discontent with continuous learning opportunities, many commented on the lack of continuous learning beyond mandatory “rank” courses and CO level, as well as a lack of opportunities to refresh their knowledge and skills. The 1993/94 CRS evaluation also found periodic refresher training to be lacking.³⁰

Nationally based CIC officers and, to a lesser extent, those based in the regions, reported receiving regular feedback on their performance. All CIC officers at D Cdts & JCR, and almost 80 percent of those at the regional level, had received a personnel evaluation report in the past 12 months. Although CIC officers at corps/squadrons were given less feedback on their performance, three-quarters said they had received mentoring, on-the-job-coaching and guidance to develop their competencies.

Cadets responded positively to questions about the quality of leaders and instructors (who are predominantly CIC officers). Three-quarters of cadets who had completed at least one year in the program thought that leaders and instructors cared about them, 80 percent thought they could be trusted, and 68 percent thought they treated all cadets fairly. Almost 80 percent of cadets reported that the program was well organized.

3.2.3 Is the command and support of the Cadet and JCR Programs effective?

3.2.3.1 CCO: Positioning within the CF

Finding #7. Within the CF organizational structure, the CCO are best positioned under the VCDS.

The findings in this section are based on stakeholder interviews.

The evaluation assessed the positioning of the CCO in the CF in light of the 2011 CF Report on Transformation’s recommendation# 18: “Decentralize cadet oversight to the three primary environments, and consolidate this with the Reserve management function.”

There was little support for decentralizing the CCO to the three primary environments (Navy, Army and Air). Most DND/CF interviewees (39 out of 46) were not in favour, several markedly so. Of note, all but one of the senior CF leaders interviewed were opposed to the move (the other could not tell what the impact would be), with the three environmental chiefs expressly against taking over the programs. Several major disadvantages were raised, including the potential fragmentation of the program (which was perceived as counter to recent efforts to introduce common programming), inequities across the environments, greater inefficiencies, and “militarization” of the programs. The consensus was that the VCDS was the best place for the CCO, and that it offers some unique advantages for overseeing the youth programs. As a central entity, the VCDS is perceived as independent of the commands and the military side of the Department. The VCDS is also seen as being close to the Minister, which is helpful in dealing with the attention from parents and the general public that the Cadet Program, in particular, generates.

3.2.3.2 Cadet Program: Organizational structure

Finding #8. The organizational structure of the Cadet Program does not provide for effective national control of the program.

The findings in this section are based on stakeholder interviews.

There was evidence to suggest that organizational structure is problematic in the Cadet Program. Command and control has long been a challenge, with the CRS evaluation of 1993/94 concluding that “overall responsibility or accountability for the Cadet Program is not apparent.”³¹

Most national-level staff interviewed (8 out of 10) thought that organizational structure was an issue for the Cadet Program today, or that at least some aspects were problematic. Many interviewees (5 out of 10) were of the opinion that the current structure gives D Cdts & JCR no real command or control over what happens at the regional level, because RCSU COs are accountable to their Area/Regional Commanders, not D Cdts & JCR. There were perceptions that the regions have “free reign” over the program and are able to emphasize different aspects of the program. Many national-level staff (5 out of 10) also mentioned inconsistencies in the structuring of the RCSUs, for example in terms of how they are staffed.

Among regional-level staff, opinions were more mixed. Overall, most regional interviewees (15 out of 20) did not believe command and control was a concern. Some regional staff (6 out of 20) believed there is more standardization in organizational structure than in the past. They spoke positively of the regional support they are able to leverage under the current organizational structure, which makes area/regional commanders responsible for the day-to-day running of the program. In contrast, a few regional staff (4 out of 20) thought that the current structure is confusing and that it is sometimes unclear where authorities/responsibilities reside between D Cdts & JCR and the Area/Regional Commanders. Some regional interviewees (6 out of 20) also mentioned inconsistencies in staffing and structuring of RCSUs (for example, two RCSUs still have cadet detachments, while the others have eliminated them).

3.2.3.3 Cadet Program: Command and support of cadet corps/squadrons

Finding #9. There is too much emphasis on command and control of cadet corps and squadrons. Corps and squadrons face a myriad of challenges and obstacles to running the program in their communities, particularly due to the high administrative burden and restrictive rules and polices.

The findings in this section are based on interviews with Cadet Program staff and Cadet Leagues, the results of the Cadet Program Staff Survey and Corps/Squadron CO Survey, and on document and administrative data review.

The administrative burden is a long-standing problem in the Cadet Program. The CRS evaluation of 1993/94 found a significant administrative load being imposed on corps and squadrons,³² and a high administrative burden was a recurring theme in interviews and surveys conducted 20 years later. Today, corps and squadrons regard the administrative burden as among the three most significant challenges they face. Administrative burden/bureaucracy was the most frequently cited aspect of the Cadet Program that could be improved according to corps/squadron COs. The administrative burden was also flagged by some Cadet League interviewees (10 out of 26).

In 2006, a national information management system, Fortress, automated the administration of the Cadet Program.³³ Although one of Fortress’ aims was to reduce the administrative burden, survey data suggests that the opposite is true, at least for corps and squadrons. More than 40 percent of corps/squadron COs disagreed or somewhat disagreed that Fortress had reduced the administrative burden. Of the many COs who provided comments on Fortress, one-quarter indicated it had actually increased their administrative workload. There are also a number of accessibility and usability problems related to the system. Rather than being a tool to make running the program easier for community personnel, it seems to be a system designed to enforce national policies.

Related to the administrative burden is the issue of restrictive rules, policies and procedures, which are seen as a hindrance to running the program at the corps and squadrons. CATOs are intimidating both in number and size. As of April 2012, there were 135 CATOs contained in four volumes, comprising 886 bilingual pages, plus pages contained in 230 annexes and 141 appendices. These are supplemented by instructions and procedures developed and promulgated by the RCSUs. Forty-five percent of local-level personnel indicated that restrictive/cumbersome rules, polices and procedures was among the five most significant challenges the corps/squadron was facing. Many Cadet League interviewees (13 out of 26) reported that rules and policies, particularly those regarding the supervision, feeding and transportation of cadets, made it difficult (and sometimes more costly) to run the program in communities.

The reasons given for the high administrative burden and restrictive rules, polices and procedures all pointed to federal government preoccupations with mitigating risk and ensuring accountability and transparency. In terms of how the administrative burden could be reduced, the most frequently cited response by national and regional staff was that it could not be reduced or that it would be difficult to reduce because it was a “necessary evil” (8 of 22 interviewees). Cadet Leagues felt that the large national headquarters and regional support units, which are run by full-time staff, are over-managing the program, and both facilitate and exacerbate the administrative burden.

Another challenge to running the program in communities is a shortage of CIC officers. Two different analyses of staffing data both found that 72 percent of corps and squadrons had less than the number of military staff working as was authorized, particularly those in Northern and Prairie regions. While the shortfall is largely being offset by the employment of civilian instructors, this is only a partial solution as civilian instructors do not have the same training and, arguably, commitment, as CIC officers. The lack of CIC officers at corps and squadrons is likely exacerbated by the lengthy CIC enrolment process. Around half of corps and squadrons identified length of time to complete CIC enrolment as being among the most significant challenges they faced, with reports of the enrolment process lasting 18-24 months and of candidates becoming frustrated and giving up on the process. An onerous CIC enrolment process is of particular concern given that some communities, particularly those in rural areas, may have only a limited pool of potential candidates from which to draw to begin with.

The local Cadet Leagues, which comprise members of the Sponsoring Committee or Branch, as well as other members of the League working at the local level, are responsible for supporting corps and squadrons to run the program. According to the 2005 MOU, the Leagues have the primary responsibility in areas such as attracting cadets and CIC officers to the corps/squadron and finding training premises. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

The challenges and obstacles to running the Cadet Program at the local level translate into a large workload and inadequate compensation. Heavy and/or unreasonable workload for staff was among the five most significant challenges faced by the corps/squadron, according to COs (cited by 46 percent). Ninety-three percent of corps/squadron COs reported that they work much more than their annual allocation of 35 days per year, while 80 percent thought that other CIC officers at the corps/squadron work much more than their annual allocation of 25 days per year. Less than one-third of COs and less than 40 percent of other corps/squadron CIC officers believe their pay is appropriate, compared to 80 percent of those working at the regional and national levels.

3.2.3.4 Cadet Program: DND partnership with the Cadet Leagues³⁴

Finding #10. There are significant issues in the partnership between DND/CF and the Cadet Leagues. Roles and responsibilities of partners are not clearly defined and partners have fundamentally different visions of the Cadet Program. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

The findings in this section are based on interviews with program staff and Cadet Leagues, and the results of the Corps/Squadron CO Survey.

Although there were pockets of good working relations between DND/CF and the Cadet Leagues at some levels of the program, evidence suggested that, overall, there are significant issues in the partnership. The CRS evaluation of 1993/94 also highlighted a number of challenges in the DND/CF and Cadet League partnership,³⁵ many of which are still valid.

Many DND/CF interviewees (17 of 30) said they found working with League partners challenging, including all interviewees at D Cdts & JCR. Some interviewees (12 of 30) attributed this to roles and responsibilities not being well understood and/or respected, or an overall lack of comprehension of the partnership. DND/CF staff in one region mentioned instances where a league provincial branch had initiated activities for cadets over and above what was offered in the program. This had created confusion and friction with regards to how such activities fit in with the established program and over roles and responsibilities of partners more generally.³⁶ Some interviewees (8 of 30) also felt that the current structure of the Leagues, which they perceive as fractured and not aligned with how DND is set up to deliver the program, makes the partnership problematic. Two RCSU commanders highlighted the challenges of maintaining working relations with as many as twelve regional-level League presidents.

In terms of the views of the Cadet League personnel, many interviewees (18 out of 26) spoke of effective partnerships existing at the regional and local levels of the program. However, some interviewees (11 out of 26) highlighted problems with the partnership, particularly with regards to relations with national headquarters. This was attributed to poor communication and/or collaboration on the part of D Cdts & JCR, as well as to feelings that DND does not consider or value the input of League members.

After interviewing representatives from both sides of the partnership, it is apparent that partners have a fundamentally different vision of the program. DND staff believe there is one Cadet Program with three options (Sea, Army and Air). The Cadet Leagues, on the other hand, see three distinct Sea, Army and Air Cadet Programs.³⁷ This is problematic as DND has moved to harmonize aspects of the program and introduce more common training over the past few years in an effort to gain efficiencies. With a couple of exceptions, the Leagues are firmly opposed to “purple corps”, which are multi-element cadet units established in communities or areas that previously struggled to run corps and squadrons separately.³⁸

As per the 2005 MOU between DND and the Cadet Leagues, at the community level, Leagues have the primary responsibility in areas such as attracting youth to the program, finding local sponsors, recruiting and screening members of the community to deliver the program, and media coverage. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ These included attracting new cadets to the corps/squadron, recruiting volunteers, ensuring good media coverage of cadet activities and events, and, in particular, attracting CIC to the corps/squadron. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ This echoes the findings of the CRS evaluation two decades ago, which determined that League responsibilities of recruiting CIC officers and cadets were being accomplished by current CIC officers.³⁹

Historically, the Cadet Program has been free of charge, with the expectation that corps and squadrons will conduct fundraising in the community to support the running of cadet activities and training. There is, however, a growing trend, particularly among Air Cadet League Provincial Committees, of charging parents annual joining fees and/or imposing fundraising commitments.⁴⁰ ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

3.2.3.5 JCR Program: Command and Support

Finding #11. Command and control of the JCR program is perceived to be effective at the national and regional levels. However, differing levels of community support to patrols and unequal access to enhanced training opportunities (namely summer training camps) mean that JCRs in some parts of the country are benefitting from a more diverse program than others.

The findings in this section are based on interviews with national- and regional-level program staff, administrative data review and the results of the JCR Program Staff Survey and JCR PL Survey. JCR patrols from Quebec are not discussed in the analysis due to insufficient survey response rates.

Although the command and control of the JCR Program works in the same way as the Cadet Program, there is no corresponding level of dissatisfaction. Regional- and national-level staff believed that the current organizational structure is generally effective. A few interviewees (3 of 11) felt the command and control was somewhat awkward, but in no case was it identified as a major concern. Differences in the organizational structure of the CRPGs, and in how they are run, were also not seen as problematic by program staff. Overall, interviewees felt the current organizational establishment was conducive to delivering the program.

Unlike the Cadet Program, which relies on the support of the Leagues to run the community program, the JCR Program receives support directly from the community. An Adult Committee, the local Canadian Ranger Patrol, and the Band/Municipal Council are all expected to support JCR activities and training. While at the aggregate level survey results suggested that JCR patrols are receiving the necessary community support, there was variability in the level of support by geographical area and aboriginal status. For example, 100 percent of patrols in Newfoundland and Labrador and 93 percent of those in British Columbia and the Prairie provinces had supporting Adult Committees, compared to 40 to 50 percent of patrols in northern Ontario and the Far North. In terms of support from the local Canadian Ranger Patrol, 30 percent of aboriginal patrols reported they receive little or no support compared to 17 percent of non-aboriginal patrols. Less than half of aboriginal patrols reported they had the equipment they needed to run JCR training, compared to two-thirds of non-aboriginal patrols.

Not surprisingly, the level of community support correlates with vitality of patrols. Aboriginal patrols overall, and patrols in northern Ontario and the Far North in particular, meet less frequently and teach fewer ranger skills. Patrol Leaders reported taking fewer trips out on the land, participating in fewer community-related events, and conducting less PHASE training with their JCRs compared to patrols elsewhere. For example, 20 percent of JCRs in patrols in northern Ontario and 16 percent of those in the Far North reported meeting only once every 2-3 or 4-5 months, compared to just 4 percent of patrols in Newfoundland and Labrador and none in British Columbia and the Prairie provinces.

Analysis of data on participation in enhanced training programs (predominantly summer training camps) found that JCRs in some parts of the country have far greater opportunities to participate than others. Proportionally, more than twice as many JCRs from Newfoundland and Labrador attended enhanced training over the past five years than JCRs from the Far North. While access to enhanced training has been increasing steadily for JCRs from the Far North, recent data suggests that discrepancies remain. In 2010, 20 percent of JCRs from the Far North attended enhanced training, compared to 29 percent of JCRs from Newfoundland and Labrador.

Differences in the intensity and variety of JCR activities, coupled with unequal access to summer camp, suggests the existence of a “two-tiered” program, with JCRs in Newfoundland and Labrador, British Columbia and the Prairie provinces benefitting from a more diverse program than JCRs in northern Ontario and the Far North. This is important because improvements are being seen among JCRs from these areas even with this lower level of programming. There exists the potential for even greater improvements in youth outcomes, particularly among Inuit JCRs.

3.2.3.6 CCO: Performance measurement

Finding #12. There is no measurement of youth outcomes for the Cadet Program. Existing performance measures for the Cadet Program lack specificity and supporting benchmarks. There is no performance measurement within the JCR Program.

The findings in this section are based on administrative data review, document review, and stakeholder interviews.

While there exists a Cadet Program mandate and logic model which identifies program activities, outputs and outcomes, the evaluation found no evidence of measurement of program and/or participant outcomes. The extensive evaluation and validation activities undertaken in the Cadet Program are focused on measuring the completion and/or quality of training activities as opposed to the impact of the program on youth participants.

D Cdts & JCR collects a vast amount of data on the Cadet Program each year, which gets published annually in the voluminous Youth Programs Statistics Report.⁴¹ While the report includes a section on “performance management,” included measures are not linked to the logic model and lack the specificity and supporting benchmarks to adequately track and monitor program performance. For example, unit costs (such as cost per cadet, cost per training day) are currently being tracked with breakdowns provided by region, yet, there are no established benchmarks to determine whether the costs reported are reasonable, fall within projected targets, or whether the regional differences in the costs of delivery fall within acceptable limits. There was also no evidence from Cadet Program staff to suggest that data is being used in decision making.

The evaluation found no evidence of systematic performance measurement in the JCR Program.

3.2.4 Have there been any unintended outcomes of the Cadet and JCR Programs?

Finding #13. There was evidence to suggest that the Cadet and JCR Programs have had some positive unintended outcomes.

The findings in this section are based on stakeholder interviews, administrative data review and surveys carried out as part of the evaluation.

The evaluation determined that the Cadet and JCR Programs have resulted in some positive unintended outcomes. Survey results showed that some cadets and JCRs do end up joining the CF. While not an objective of either program, this is certainly beneficial to the DND/CF. Overall, 7 percent of those enrolling in the CF between January 2011 and February 2012 had been cadets.⁴² It was also estimated that 6 percent of Canadian Rangers enrolled as of April 2012 had been JCRs, with the proportion varying greatly across the country. In the Far North, 13 percent of CRs were formerly JCRs, while 7 percent of CRs in QC had been JCRs (in other provinces, 2 percent or less were formerly JCRs).⁴³

According to data from the Air Cadet League of Canada, it is estimated that 28 percent of the flying, technical and administrative members serving in the Royal Canadian Air Force today had some form of air cadet training. In addition, the failure rate among ex-air cadets joining the CF is almost zero.⁴⁴

There was evidence to suggest that the Cadet Program is helping to develop senior leaders for the CF. According to a survey carried out in March 2012, 40 percent of CF general and flag officers had been in Cadets. Of these, 20 percent had spent more than four years in the program.

Interviews with program staff provided further evidence of additional benefit the Cadet Program brings to the DND/CF. Interviewees suggested cadet corps and squadrons help the CF the maintain a presence across Canada, and that the Cadet Program helps to show the CF in a positive light and generates support for the military. Cadet League personnel also believed that the Cadet Program promotes a positive image of the CF in communities throughout the country and it is a way to “connect with Canadians.” This was echoed by the 1993/94 CRS evaluation, which found that “in a number of cases, and especially in remote locations, the Cadet Program represents the only military contact for the local community, and can provide a positive link to DND and the CF.” It also stated that “one of the most significant aspects of the Cadet Program from a departmental and Forces perspective is that of an image enhancer.”⁴⁵

The Cadet Program may also be having an impact on attracting the next generation of airline pilots. Transport Canada and the Airline Pilots Association have estimated that one out of every five private pilots at the present time is an ex-air cadet and 67 percent of the commercial/airline pilots flying today received their start in air cadets.⁴⁶

3.3 Performance (Resource Utilization)

A revised Treasury Board Evaluation Policy, which came into effect in April 2009, defines “efficiency” to be maximizing the outputs produced with a fixed level of inputs or minimizing the inputs used to produce a fixed level of outputs (paraphrase); whereas economy is defined to be “minimizing the use of resources … to achieve expected outcomes.”⁴⁷ Therefore, for the purposes of the Evaluation Policy, these elements of performance are demonstrated under the following circumstances:

• outputs are produced at minimum cost (efficiency); and
• outcomes are produced at minimum cost (economy/cost effectiveness).

The cost of achieving the Cadet and JCR Program outcomes is analyzed in terms of “efficiency” (maximizing the outputs produced with a fixed level of inputs or minimizing the inputs used to produce a fixed level of outputs) and “economy” (minimizing the use of resources to achieve expected outcomes).⁴⁸

The following are limitations and notes with respect to the analysis of resource usage:

• Total costs of the youth programs were determined by taking the costs as reported by program staff (referred to as “direct costs”) and reconciling with the costs attributed to PAA 4.2.1.0 (difference in excess of program costs is referred to as “indirect costs”). Since the accuracy/consistency of PAA dates back to FY 2008/09, the total costs could only be evaluated over three years (FY 2008/09 to FY 2010/11).
• Direct costs were leveraged to supplement the analysis as they were available for a five-year period.
• Due to concerns with the accuracy of the cadet population for FY 2006/07, this year was excluded for the purposes of assessing trends in the direct cost per cadet.
• Costs of running the program incurred by the Cadet Leagues are excluded (aside from the DND’s grant funding to the League national offices).

Overall Finding for Resource Utilization – Cadet Program #14. There are concerns regarding the efficiency of the delivery of the Cadet Program. DND spends almost $4,800 per year on each cadet. The costs of running the program are 40 percent higher than 20 years ago, even though there are 15 percent fewer cadets today than in 1992. The Department is spending significantly more on its Cadet Program than allied countries. Management and administration consumes a greater share of resources than other similar programs. Unlike other Canadian youth programs and allied cadet programs, the Canadian Cadet Program relies less on volunteers and more on paid staff. Today, 60 percent of all program expenditures are on labour. There are a multitude of advanced training opportunities available to cadets, particularly through the summer training program. However, the cost of advanced training, along with management and administration costs, is squeezing local corps/squadron funding. The proportion of expenditures directly supporting community corps and squadrons, and thereby benefitting all youth in the program, is just 14.5 percent. Despite the significant resources spent on the Cadet Program and the extensive advanced training opportunities, the program is only somewhat effective at achieving its youth outcomes, and retaining youth in the program is a major challenge.

Overall Finding for Resource Utilization – JCR Program #15. DND spends around $3,000 per year on each JCR; however, the program is achieving positive change for youth in remote and isolated communities. Management and administration costs are high and the proportion of program expenditures that directly supports JCR Patrols at the community level is too low. There are a reasonable set of advanced training activities offered to JCRs, but parameters are imprecise and do not promote equal access to enhanced training opportunities.

3.3.1 Cost of the Cadet and JCR Programs

Finding #16. The Cadet Program is costly to deliver. Costs have risen by 40 percent in the past 20 years. The Department is spending considerably more on its Cadet Program than its allies are spending on theirs.

Between 2008 and 2011, DND/CF spending on the Cadet and JCR Programs has averaged $249.4 million per year. The vast majority of expenditures were on the Cadet Program ($238.9 million per year), with less than 5 percent spent on the JCR Program ($10.5 million per year). Program expenditures include direct costs as reported by program staff, as well as other indirect costs related to employee benefits, Regular Force pay, and infrastructure and support as reported in the PAA 4.2.1.0. Indirect costs were a significant proportion of total costs, representing, on average, $42.9 million per year (17 percent of the total). Recently released data for 2011/12 put the combined costs of the programs at $274.1 million, an increase of 8.9 percent from the previous year, largely due to rising indirect costs.

Between 2008 and 2011, program costs translated into an annual average expenditure of $4,774 per cadet and $3,046 per JCR.

The cost of running the Cadet Program has increased significantly over the past 20 years. In 1993, the cost per cadet was $2,484 ($3,379 in 2010 dollars), indicating that costs have risen by over 40 percent, after fully adjusting for inflation.⁴⁹ This represents an average increase of around 2.4 percent per year in excess of inflation.

It is important to note that there are additional expenditures on the Cadet Program above and beyond what DND spends. The Cadet Leagues provide financial support to the Cadet Program, through the Sponsoring Committees at the local level, to the League national offices. For example, the Air Cadet League of Canada owns glider and tow planes used by cadets, and pays for their maintenance and insurance. Factoring in League financial support, the total cost of running the Cadet Program is likely to be well in excess of $5,000 per cadet each year.

Canada is spending significantly more on its Cadet Program compared to four allied countries: Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On a per cadet basis, the publicly funded (federal) cost of the Canadian program was between 1.6 and 15.3 times greater than allied cadet programs (when comparing the program as a whole and specific elements). Comparing costs on a per capita basis, Canada is also spending more (in some cases considerably more) than its allies, with one exception. Of note, the least costly allied cadet program operates not within the military, but as a separate entity with funding from the government. The cost of running its sea cadet program was 11 times lower than Canada’s, and the cost of its air cadet program was 15 times lower.⁵⁰ Cost differentials between the Canadian and allied cadet programs have existed for many years. The 1993/94 CRS Evaluation found that Canadian Cadet Program support costs exceeded programs in allied countries by more than a factor of two.⁵¹

3.3.2 Cadet and JCR Program Management and Administration costs

Finding #17. Management and administration costs are high in the Cadet and JCR Programs, and are considerable compared to other youth programs.

The cost of management and administration, which encompasses expenditures on command and support and adult training, is high for both programs.

Between 2006 and 2011, national and regional level management and administration costs accounted for, on average, one-third of total Cadet Program expenditures, and 43 percent of total JCR Program expenditures. However, expenditures are likely to be higher than reported, because management and administration costs related to running the summer training programs are not included. These costs are attributed to Advanced or Enhanced Training and charged to “Youth Training.” Also excluded are costs related to managing and administering the program at corps and squadrons. Given that there is a high administrative burden (at least in the Cadet Program – see Finding #9), there are unknown management and administration costs incurred at the local level.

The cost of managing and administering the Cadet Program has increased by an average of 4.4 percent per year over the past five years, while the cost for the JCR Program increased by an average of 3.5 percent per year.

Managing and administering the Cadet Program is expensive compared to other youth programs in Canada. Costs were found to be three times higher than those of Scouts Canada and the 4-H Program, both of which have similar youth development aims to the Cadet Program.⁵²

Over the past two decades, management of the Cadet Program has been “professionalized,” which has likely been a driver of costs. For example, the national headquarters now houses a Research and Evaluation Cell, comprising three full-time staff dedicated to the evaluation and validation of cadet training. There is also extensive evaluation and validation of CIC officer training, with the program pursuing the National Quality Institute’s Progressive Excellence Program for the Public Sector for the CIC training organization.⁵³ While evaluation and validation are worthwhile initiatives, efforts seem disproportional to the nature and aims of Cadet Program. At its core, Cadets is a community-based youth program run by members of the community who are being paid a few days per month.

3.3.3 Staffing in the Cadet Program

Finding #18. Staffing is a major driver of the overall cost of the Cadet Program. There has been a fundamental shift in staffing over the past 20 years to a greater number of full-time staff. In allied cadet programs and other youth programs in Canada, labour costs are much lower, because they have fewer full-time staff and rely more on volunteers.

The biggest driver of costs in the Cadet Program is staffing. More than 60 percent of all program expenditures are on labour (pay and benefits), which amounted to $147.8 million in 2010/11. National and regional labour costs alone accounted for close to one-quarter of all program expenditures.⁵⁴

When comparing the staffing of the Cadet Program today with 20 years ago, it is apparent there has been a fundamental shift in both the number and type of staffing at the national and regional levels. This is likely to have contributed to the 40 percent increase in the costs of running the program since the early 1990s. Table 3 compares the staffing today with that of 20 years ago. In 1993, there was a smaller number of national and regional level staff who were mostly part-time. Since then, staffing has grown exponentially and by an average of 159 percent. Overall, the number has almost tripled. In fact, there are almost as many full-time national and regional level staff today as there were entire staff in 1993.

Table 3. Comparison of National and Regional Cadet Program Staffing 1993 and 2012. This table shows the number of staff in the Cadet Program at the national and regional levels, specifically, the total for 1993 and 2012, the number of full-time staff for 2012, and the percentage change between 1993 and 2012.

Legend:

N/A – Not Applicable

It should also be noted that the CRS evaluation of 1993/94 did not identify any problems with the national and regional offices having part-time staff, and the program was generally achieving its aims. On the contrary, it highlighted that the number of full-time personnel at the national and regional levels had started to grow at a significant and unsustainable rate. It further questioned the value-added of the regional headquarters, as there was a sense they had become too bureaucratic and required restructuring or elimination altogether.⁵⁵

The staffing levels in the Cadet Program also appear high when compared to allied programs. After adjusting to an estimated full-time equivalent, the total ratio of paid staff to Canadian cadets is 1:23, compared to 1:104 and 1:151 in the case of two allied programs. This means that Canada’s program has between four and six times the number of full-time staff per cadet as the allied programs.⁵⁶

Compared to other Canadian youth programs, the Cadet Program has significantly more paid staff and fewer volunteers per youth. In Scouts, there is one paid employee for every 258 youth, yet there is one paid employee for every five youth in Cadets. Similarly, there is one volunteer for every three youth in the Scouts and 4H programs, but only one volunteer per every 15 youth in Cadets.

3.3.4 Advanced Training Expenditures and Trends in the Cadet Program

Finding #19. A large proportion of Cadet Program expenditures goes to a very comprehensive advanced training program, particularly the summer program. Parameters authorizing participation in advanced training require better definition. The variety of advanced training activities has increased significantly over the past two decades and a greater proportion of cadets attend advanced training today than historically. Canadian cadets attend summer training for longer than cadets in allied countries. Cadet summer training costs exceed those of other Canadian youth programs.

The Cadet Program offers a very comprehensive of advanced training program. Advanced training comprises the summer program, including the summer flying program, as well as national and international activities run by D Cdts & JCR.

Between 2006 and 2011, an average 43 percent of all Cadet Program expenditures went to advanced training. The cost of the advanced training program in 2010/11 was $81.2 million. More than 19,000 cadets completed advanced training in 2010/11, or 38 percent of the cadet population (43 percent if including Staff Cadets).⁵⁷

Attending an advanced summer training program has always been an integral part of the cadet experience. In 2010, 18,210 cadets completed between two and 10 weeks of training at a CSTC, at a cost $4,216 per cadet.⁵⁸ Of these, 524 were cadets who obtained their Transport Canada glider or power pilot’s licences, at an estimated average cost of $13,000 per cadet (excluding transportation costs).⁵⁹ A large number of cadets also attend summer training as “Staff Cadets.” Staff Cadets assist either in the direct training of cadets or in the overall running of the camp. Despite the name, Staff Cadets are not considered employees (even though they are paid), but are regarded as being on advanced training. As well as covering all expenses, the DND pays Staff Cadets an “Advanced Training Allocation” of $70 to $93 per day, depending on rank.⁶⁰ The cost of pay to 2,206 Staff Cadets in 2010 amounted to $7.8 million.

In terms of the national and international advanced training program, 1,204 cadets completed one of 14 available activities in 2010/11 (2.4 percent of the cadet population). The total cost was $4.4 million. As examples, 15 cadets took part in a national tall ships regatta at a cost of almost $20,000 each, 14 cadets went on an international expedition costing almost $11,000 each, and 414 cadets completed an exchange program for a total cost of $1.2 million.

Cadets attend advanced training programs free of charge. Not only does DND cover the cost of transportation, meals, lodging and training, it actually pays cadets a daily stipend. The “Cadet Training Allocation” of $10 per day, not to exceed $60 per week and up to a maximum of $360, is akin to an incidentals payment. Its purpose is to cover personal expenses “to reduce the potential for personal hardship or social barriers.”⁶¹ The cost of Cadet Training Allocation payments amounted to $3.5 million in 2010/11.

Historically, the Cadet Program has been authorized to provide summer training to approximately one-third of the cadet population.⁶² The parameters were last revised in 2005. At present, a maximum of 25,807 cadets are authorized each year to participate in advanced training, with allocation to each element based on their share of their overall cadet population.⁶³ One of the major problems with the current parameters is that they are not linked to the number of cadets in the program in any given year; rather they seem to be based on the theoretical maximum number of cadets authorized to be in the program (70,000). There would need to be around 70,000 cadets in the program (18,000 more than the current population) for participation in summer training to be equivalent to historically authorized one-third of the cadet population. In fact, using the official population of cadets for 2010/11, 44 percent of cadets were, in theory, authorized to attend summer training (almost 50 percent if Staff Cadets are included). Another concern with the existing parameters is that no mention is made of the length of summer training, even though programs can last anywhere from two to 10 weeks. Finally, parameters also do not set any authorized maximums for the very expensive summer glider and power pilot programs.

Over the past 20 years, the variety of advanced training opportunities for cadets has grown considerably. In 1993, advanced training comprised the summer training program (including glider and power flying) and exchange opportunities.⁶⁴ There were no advanced training activities like tall ships sailing, expeditions or Advanced Aviation Technology courses.

As well as offering more diverse advanced training opportunities than in the past, the proportion of cadets attending advanced training has also increased over the past two decades. According to the CRS evaluation of 1993/94, 31 percent of cadets completed summer training in 1993, with the average for 1978 to 1993 estimated at 30 percent.⁶⁵ In 2010/11, however, 36 percent of cadets completed summer training (38 percent if including other advanced national and international training activities).⁶⁶ Although around the same number of cadets obtained a glider or power pilot’s licence in 2010 (524) as in 1993 (538),⁶⁷ there were considerably fewer cadets in 2010 than in 1993.

A closer examination of cadets completing summer training reveals that proportion has remained steady at 37 percent over the past 4 years,⁶⁸ which again exceeds the historically authorized maximum of one-third. Furthermore, completion is also uneven across the elements, with 41 percent of sea cadets and 38 percent of air cadets completing summer training between 2007 and 2011, compared to only one-third of army cadets.

The evaluation found that Canadian cadets attend summer training for longer than cadets in allied countries. In allied cadet programs, the length of summer training was typically reported to be in the one- to two-week range. In Canada, however, cadet summer training programs last up to 10 weeks. In 2010, 36 percent of Canadian cadet summer training programs were 2 weeks in length, 40 percent lasted 3 weeks, and one-quarter were 5 to 10 weeks in length (although most in this category were 6 weeks long).⁶⁹ In addition, in allied countries, parents of cadets are expected to pay for all, or at least part of, the cost for attending summer camp.

The cost of summer training in the Cadet Program also exceeds that of Scouts Canada. Advanced training costs in the Cadet Program, measured in cost per training day, were between 1.8 and 13 times greater than those for the Scout program.

3.3.5 Enhanced Training Expenditures in the JCR Program

Finding #20. A limited set of enhanced training opportunities are available to JCRs, but access is uneven. The parameters authorizing participation in enhanced training require more precision.

The JCR Program offers a number of enhanced training opportunities for youth. In addition to a summer training program, there are limited opportunities for JCRs to participate in regional or national competitions like biathlons, exchanges and national events like Canada Day. Enhanced training is an important aspect of the program, as it gives JCRs the chance to travel outside their remote and isolated communities and meet youth from different backgrounds and cultures. For some, going to a summer camp can mean seeing things like trees or horses for the first time.

Between 2006 and 2011, an average of one-third of program expenditures went to enhanced training. The total cost of the enhanced training program in 2010/11 was $3.6 million. The vast majority of expenditures went to the summer camps. Nationally and regionally organized activities accounted for 12 percent of all enhanced training expenditures.⁷⁰

Over the past five years, the proportion of JCRs attending enhanced training has fluctuated between 18 and 26 percent.⁷¹ In 2010, 24 percent of all JCRs participated in an enhanced training activity (mainly summer training programs), at a cost of $4,456 per JCR. Access to enhanced training varies greatly depending on where a JCR lives, with JCRs in the Far North having the lowest chances of attending enhanced training. Less than one percent of JCRs attended an enhanced summer training camp in the capacity of Staff JCR in 2010.⁷²

The established parameters for participation in enhanced summer training are vague. Currently, six JCRs per patrol are permitted to attend basic summer camp and two JCRs per patrol are permitted to attend advanced summer camp.⁷³ Although camps are specified as being seven days in duration, there is no set absolute number of JCRs, nor maximum proportion of JCRs, who can attend summer camp in a given year. The latter is significant, because recently released 2011/12 data shows that the proportion of JCRs from Newfoundland and Labrador, British Columbia and the Prairie provinces who completed enhanced training in 2011 rose to 37-38 percent, which is similar to proportions found in the Cadet Program.⁷⁴ Parameters also do not take account of the size of patrols, meaning that JCRs at larger patrols have a lower chance of attending a summer camp than those at smaller patrols. According to D Cdts & JCR, the CRPGs are supposed to try to level the playing field among larger and smaller patrols in terms of access to summer camp, but no data was available to corroborate this.

3.3.6 Local Training Expenditures in the Cadet Program

Finding #21. Only a small proportion of program expenditures directly supports community corps and squadron training, which is the sole aspect of the program that all cadets participate in. Furthermore, communities have the primary responsibility for funding the optional program, which is crucial to attracting and retaining cadets.

Given the amount of resources spent on management and administration and advanced training, the proportion of expenditures going to cadet training at the community level is small. Between 2006 and 2011, on average, just under one-quarter of program expenditures were spent on local training. However, the use of the term “local” is misleading, as some of what is categorized as local training is not delivered in communities and does not benefit all cadets in the program.

According to DCdts & JCR, there are three types of “local” training:

1. cadet corps and squadron training;
2. training conducted at sail centres, expedition centres and gliding centres; and
3. RDAs (organized by the RCSUs).

Only the corps/squadron training benefits 100 percent of cadets in the program. Although around 120,000 cadets participated in centre-based training or RDAs in 2010/11 (which is more than double the number of cadets in the program), not all cadets participated in these activities, while some participated multiple times.⁷⁵ In fact, there is significant variation regionally in participation in “local” training outside of corps and squadrons. For example, no air cadets in the Northern region trained at an air gliding centre in 2010/11, while half from the Pacific region did so. In comparison, more air cadets trained at a gliding centre from the Eastern region than there were actual air cadets (meaning some cadets received training more than once). There is even greater diversity regarding participation in RDA “local” training. For example, less than 60 percent of army cadets in the Prairie and Northern regions took part in a RDA in 2010/11, but the proportion for the Eastern region was 382 percent.

The actual proportion of expenditures directly supporting community corps and squadrons, and thereby benefitting all youth in the program, is just 14.5 percent.⁷⁶

In addition, DND provides only limited funding for the optional program at the community level. Optional activities include various types of trips, movie and social nights, the Duke of Edinburgh program, and running competitive teams like biathlon and marksmanship. They are considered vital to cadet attraction and retention. Funding for optional programming is supposed to come primarily from corps/squadron fundraising activities, sponsoring committee financing, Cadet League financing, parents’ committee fundraising or donations and/or other community-based donors. DND provides a “local support allocation”, which reimburses eligible expenses of up to a maximum of $600 per corps/squadron and $15 per cadet per year.⁷⁷ In 2010/11, 0.6 percent of all expenditures on the Cadet Program (direct and indirect costs) went to supporting the optional program in communities.

3.3.7 Youth Participation Trends and Patterns in the Cadet Program

Finding #22. Proportionally, fewer Canadian youth are in Cadets than 20 years ago. The annual turnover rate is 50 percent and the average cadet spends less than two years in the program. Rather than being tied to expenditures, retention challenges seem inherent in out-of-school programs involving teenagers.

Today, there are around 13,000 fewer cadets than there were 20 years ago. The proportion of Canadian youth in Cadets has declined from 2.3 percent in 1992 to 1.8 percent in 2011.⁷⁸ Between 2007/08 and 2010/11, 36 percent of corps and squadrons had on average 30 cadets (the minimum acceptable number), while 25 percent had fewer than 30 cadets at all times.⁷⁹ Retaining cadets is a major challenge. Between 2007/08 and 2010/11, there was a 50 percent turnover rate.⁸⁰ Recently published data on the length of time a cadet stays in the program put average membership duration at 1.7 years.⁸¹ Corps and squadron staff reported that attracting and retaining cadets were the most significant challenges facing the program at the local level.⁸²

Maintaining cadets’ interest in the program is one of the two aims of the advanced training activities at the regional and national levels. However, the $17.8 million of additional funding per year beginning in 1998, some of which was allocated for advanced training activities like international exchanges and music competitions, has had no effect on retention. This was despite assurances at the time that the additional funding would “generate an increased interest in cadet enrolment and help improve attrition” and “help to achieve an increase in the cadet movement to 70,000.”⁸³

Survey results also contradict the widely held belief that the summer training camps are crucial to cadet retention. When asked why they were likely to remain in the program, only 5 percent of cadets (and 9 percent of cadet parents) said it was because of summer training/camps.⁸⁴ Furthermore, cadets rated summer training as important, but not as important as local training.⁸⁵ This echoes survey findings cited in the CRS evaluation of 1993/94, which showed that the majority of cadets would remain in the program even if there were no summer camps.⁸⁶

Cadet program staff in allied countries also reported challenges with retention. One country’s experience over the past 30 years was that retention had hovered at around 50 percent and had not been influenced by the injection of additional resources. Retention is also a challenge for other youth programs in Canada. In 2012, the retention rate for Scouts Canada was reported at less than 50 percent on average, which is a rate similar to that for the Cadet Program.⁸⁷ Available research suggests that after-school programs struggle to keep teenagers interested and involved, with participation typically plummeting at 15 or 16 years old.⁸⁸ As opposed to being tied to expenditures, retention challenges seem inherent in programs involving teenagers.

4.0 General Recommendations

4.1 Cadet Program

4.2 JCR Program

Annex A—Management Action Plan

Relevance – Cadet and JCR Programs

Management Action

The Government of Canada has a vested interest in the Cadet and JCR Programs as world-class youth development programs. The Government of Canada fully supports these programs and the positive impact that they have on Canadian youth and their local communities.

DND and the CF have built strong connections with Canadians through the Cadet and JCR Programs by providing a presence in many local communities across the country. Consequently, many Canadian citizens recognize the CF as a positive national institution that promotes Canadian identity through the youth programs it delivers.

The DND and the CF strive to ensure that the Cadet and JCR Programs are viable, relevant, effective, and efficient. The findings and recommendations detailed in the CRS Evaluation of the CCO have identified a requirement to strengthen the alignment of the Cadet and JCR Programs with government priorities and to improve procedural and administrative effectiveness. Consequently, D Cdts and JCR will work with Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) staff to identify opportunities for referencing the roles and missions of the CCO in future Government of Canada and DND strategic-level policy documents. D Cdts and JCR will also review program documents to ensure that they accurately reflect the positive benefits accrued to the DND and the CF by running the Cadet and JCR Programs. Finally, D Cdts and JCR will revisit Cadet and JCR training curricula to ensure that there is sufficient focus on promoting knowledge and appreciation of, and interaction with, the CF, so as to help the CF meet its Canadian Identity strategic outcome of promoting awareness, understanding, and appreciation of the history, proficiency, and values of the Canadian military.

OPI: D Cdts and JCR

Target Date: January 2018 (resources, milestones, taskings, and support requirements will be delineated in the D Cdts & JCR Renewal Plan, which will be developed by 31 March 2013)

Performance – Cadet Program

Management Action

Although a number of observations regarding the Cadet Program mandate, outline, and curricula (recently modernized through the Cadet Program Update) can be found in the findings, any action taken as a result of this recommendation will focus on the management and delivery of the Cadet Program. While the Cadet Program Update is in the final stages of implementation, changes to the curriculum have not had the opportunity to take hold or be fully understood by stakeholders; therefore, the curriculum will not be subject to another fundamental re-engineering review process as recommended for the Cadet Program as a whole, but it will be the focus of a constant improvement initiative as it is progressively evaluated and validated.

D Cdts and JCR, in consultation with the Navy, Army Cadet and Air Cadet Leagues, will take the following measures:

1. Confirm the funds that are currently expended in support of the corps/squadron component of the Cadet Program, and in concert with recommendation 2a, strive to direct at least 50 percent of program expenditures in direct support of the corps/squadron program (the central component of the Cadet Program). If the 50 percent target is not achievable, then a subsequent review will justify why it was unattainable.
2. Complete a comprehensive review of Cadet Program rules, policies and procedures, and RCSU/D Cdts and JCR organizations to ensure the challenges and obstacles to running corps/squadrons are kept to a minimum, and apply the output of this review to ensure that the most effective and appropriate structure is in place to support the delivery of the Cadet Program, while striving to ensure that management and administration costs are reduced and minimized (by offsetting overhead staff expenditures with increased reliance on volunteerism and reduced administration and bureaucracy).
3. Confirm the Cadet Program expenditures that are currently directed toward “advanced training” components, and in concert with recommendation 2.c, identify an optimal level of effort, resources and expenditures that should be allocated to the basic and advanced-level courses within the CSTC program (as an integral extension to the corps/squadron program) and to RDAs and NDAs (which augment the corps/squadron program), with the aim of maximizing the training benefits to the greatest proportion of the cadet population, and promulgating this optimal level through a fixed proportion of the overall Cadet Program budget.
4. Complete a review of the governance structure to determine the impact on DND’s assuming full responsibility for the command, control, support and funding of the Cadet Program, and apply the outcomes of that review to ensure that all delivery agents and associated funding directly supports Cadet Program outcomes. D Cdts and JCR will present options for an optimal command, control and support structure for the Cadet Program by July 2013 (for implementation commencing in 2014).
5. Complete a review of volunteerism within the Cadet Program and apply the outcomes of that review to optimize the reliance on volunteers where it will positively impact on program delivery.
6. Consider alternative delivery models to administer the Cadet Program as part of the governance structure review specified in 2d and recommend options by July 2013.

OPI: D Cdts and JCR

Target Date: January 2018 (resources, milestones, taskings, and support requirements will be delineated in the D Cdts & JCR Renewal Plan), unless otherwise noted.

Performance – JCR Program

Management Action

D Cdts and JCR will continue to conduct the JCR Program while remaining flexible and will address the unique needs which surround providing support and operating in isolated communities.

D Cdts and JCR will take the following measures:

1. Confirm the expenditures that are currently directed toward community programming and strive to direct at least 50 percent of program funding in direct support of the local JCR Patrol program. If the 50 percent target is not achievable, then a subsequent review will justify why it was unattainable.
2. Continue to incorporate the required flexibility in the funding model related to conducting business in remote and isolated communities, ensuring that funding is better aligned to needs across diverse communities.
3. Conduct a review of Enhanced Training Session programming, and apply the outcomes of that review to optimize participation of JCRs in enhanced training while maintaining flexibility to address the unique programme needs.
4. Ensure that policies and administration process continue to be the most effective and appropriate procedures to support the delivery of the JCR Program.

OPI: D Cdts and JCR

Target Date: January 2018 (resources, milestones, taskings, and support requirements will be delineated in the D Cdts & JCR Renewal Plan), unless otherwise noted.

Annex B—Logic Model for the Cadet and JCR Programs

Figure 1. Logic Model for the Cadet and JCR Programs. The logic model shows four main activities, leading to outputs and outcomes, and to the ultimate outcome of supporting the development of youth in Canada.

Annex C—Evaluation Matrix

Table 4. Evaluation Matrix — Relevance. This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the relevancy of the Cadet and JCR Programs.

Table 5. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Effectiveness). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the performance (in terms of effectiveness) of the Cadet and JCR Programs.

Table 6. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Resource Utilization). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the performance (in terms of resource utilization) of the Cadet and JCR Programs.

Annex D—Evaluation of the Grant Program for theNational Offices of the Cadet Leagues

As per the Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation (2009), CRS conducted a review of the Grant Program for the National Offices of the Cadet Leagues. Since the Leagues play an integral role in the delivery of the Cadet Program, the results of the evaluation of the Grant Program are included as part of the larger Cadet Program Evaluation.

This annex summarizes the evaluation information on the relevance and performance of the Grant Program to the National Offices of the Cadet Leagues of Canada (Grant Program). The evaluation examined program relevance and performance for the period 1 April 2009 to 31 July 2012 and is intended to inform management decisions related to the Grant Program.

Program Profile

Description

The Cadet Leagues of Canada (Navy League of Canada, Army Cadet League, and Air Cadet League) are federally incorporated, not-for-profit volunteer organizations that provide assistance and support in the delivery of the Cadet Program. Each League has a National Office that provides a single point of contact for provincial/regional counterparts and sponsoring bodies of local cadet corps/squadrons.

Section 1.1.3.1 of the main evaluation report provides more details on the Leagues’ involvement in the Cadet Program. The Grant Program provides funding to each of the three National Offices of the Cadet Leagues in order to support corporate/administrative activities such as coordinating insurance coverage, coordinating volunteer screening activities, and recruiting volunteers to support the Cadet Program.

Key Outcomes

As a result of the actions of the Grant Program, the following outcomes are expected:

• Immediate Outcomes
  1. financial protection (insurance) provided for volunteers and cadets;
  2. assurances that cadets will have safe volunteers; and
  3. volunteers in place to assist the program.
• Intermediate Outcomes
  1. the Cadet Program is enriched, and expenditures are reduced, through the provision of a volunteer base; and
  2. cadets and volunteers are provided a safe environment.

Stakeholders

Stakeholders include D Cdts & JCR, Cadet League National Office staff, and Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services) staff who are involved in the preparation of the renewal of the Grant Program.

Resources

DND has supported the Cadet League National Offices since 1971. The current grant agreement expires on 31 March, 2014, and pays a maximum of $2,090,000 to each League over a five-year period. The yearly breakdown of grant funding can be found in Table 7.

Table 7. Grant Funding for each Cadet League National Office – 2009/10 to 2013/14. This table shows the amount of grant money (in Canadian dollars) given to each Cadet League National Office between 2009/10 to 2013/14 and the total over the five-year period.

Methodology

Multiple lines of evidence were used during the evaluation to assess the identified outcomes, including:

• document review;
• key informant interviews (comprising the Executive Directors of the National Offices and three senior staff from D Cdts & JCR); and
• administrative and financial data review (annual/financial reports, particularly the Performance Measurement narratives for FYs 2009/10 to 2011/12).

Resu lts

Relevance

Continuing Need for the Grant Program

Finding 23. There is a continued need for the support functions carried out by the Cadet League National Offices.

The National Offices are performing relevant and important functions in support of the Cadet Program. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

• coordinating insurance for cadets and volunteer members;
• coordinating volunteer screening activities;
• attracting volunteer league members and cadets;
• providing a civilian interface;
• public relations;
• serving as a single, national point of contact for D Cdts & JCR on league activities; and
• supporting provincial and territorial league bodies.

Interviewees agreed there was a continued need for the activities that are being accomplished through the Grant Program. Interviewees were of the view that, without the Grant Program, at least one of the National Offices might cease to exist, along with its support functions. By necessity, leadership of the civilian partner would devolve to the provincial/regional offices, provided they would be willing to assume this role.

Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

Finding 24. The Grant Program aligns to federal roles and responsibilities by reducing the Government of Canada’s exposure to legal risk.

Under the premise of the existing structure of the Cadet Program, the Cadet Leagues assume the responsibility for insuring volunteers and cadets, thereby reducing the risk of litigation against the Government of Canada. This is a critical role and responsibility which the federal government must ensure in the delivery of the Cadet Program.

Alignment with Government Priorities

Evaluation findings regarding the alignment of the Grant Program with government priorities are provided in Section 3.1.3 of the main report and apply to the Grant Program as well. In addition, and particular to the Grant Program, the indemnification of the Crown through the use of the Leagues is key objective and ties into ongoing federal risk management strategy and management accountabilities.

Performance

Performance – Effectiveness

Finding 25. The Cadet League National Offices are meeting the desired outcome of providing sufficient insurance coverage for cadets, volunteers, real property and assets.

The National Offices administer the insurance programs on behalf of the national and provincial leagues and the corps/squadron sponsoring committees. Given that cadets, corps/squadron sponsoring committee members, sponsors, and volunteer league members are civilian, there is a risk to the Government of Canada from potential liability and legal action. The resulting costs and court-ordered indemnity represent a real and immediate risk for the Government of Canada. Therefore, the leagues have assumed responsibility to protect all volunteer members and cadets against risk by contracting and administering sufficient insurance coverage. The leagues administer Accident and General Liability programs.

Interviewees felt that the insurance coverage was adequate, as it is regularly reviewed and adjusted for inflation, other needs and circumstances. When needs change, the National Offices take a proactive approach with their respective brokers to ensure coverage remains adequate. National Offices also regularly obtain quotes from different brokers to ensure they are getting the best price.

Annual reports submitted during the current Grant period demonstrate 100 percent compliance with the requirement to provide proof of sufficient insurance coverage for cadets, volunteers, real property and assets.

Finding 26. The Cadet League National Offices oversee a comprehensive screening program for volunteers, thereby helping to ensure the safety of cadets.

A comprehensive screening program is in place for volunteers, which includes the following requirements: Police records check; Vulnerable Sectors Screening or Child Abuse Registry check; Local background check; Probationary period, including interviews and evaluations; Central repository for tracking volunteers working with cadets; and Photo ID for screened members.

Annual reports contain demonstrated proof of volunteer screening (100 percent of volunteers were screened before any contact with cadets was allowed). Since the more robust screening program was instituted in 2005, Leagues find they are dealing with fewer incidents.

Recently the Cadet Leagues have also implemented an education program for cadets to help them identify problem scenarios. Volunteer registration and screening handbooks have been reviewed and updated. A joint working group was established with participants from the 3 Leagues and D Cdts & JCR to ensure screening and tolerance policies were consistent with the new CATO. The Leagues are exploring the implementation of a secure national registration and screening card for volunteers.

Finding 27. It is unclear if the Cadet Leagues are meeting their volunteer membership targets.

The Cadet League National Offices are responsible for recruiting volunteer league members to support the program at all levels. In terms of volunteer membership, the Leagues have established targets (to maintain numbers at 3,306 – Navy League, 2,000 – Army Cadet League, and 5,770 – Air Cadet League). However, whether the targets are being met is unclear, as volunteers who cease to be active are not removed from the total number of volunteers reported at the end of the year.

Performance – Resource Utilization

Finding 28. Overall, the $1.25 million per year grant funding to the Cadet League National Offices represents good value for money in terms of the support functions provided.

On average, the current grant agreement pays $1.25 million per year to the Cadet League National Offices. This represents 0.5 percent of the total cost of the Cadet Program. Considering the benefits the DND/CF receives as a result, particularly insurance protection and comprehensive screening for volunteers, this seems to represent good value for money.

Other Findings

Finding 29. Although a performance measurement strategy exists, two of three Cadet League National Offices do not systematically use performance measures.

In 2009, a performance measurement strategy was approved for implementation by the Cadet Leagues National Offices. Other than the Army Cadet League, which includes these measures as part of its annual report, there is little evidence that these measures are being collected and analysed on a regular basis by the other two National Offices. In addition, some of the established measures in the performance measurement strategy are of questionable value.

Recommendation for the Grant Program

No specific recommendations for the Grant Program have been formulated. Recommendation 2 in the main report calls for a fundamental re-engineering of the Cadet Program, which includes an examination of the partnership with the Cadet Leagues.

Should the fundamental re-engineering of the Cadet Program result in maintaining the partnership with the Cadet Leagues, the following recommendation is made with regard to the Grant Program:

• review and revise the performance measurement strategy; and
• revise the Performance Measurement Template, completed as part of the Recipient’s Annual Report, to include updated performance measures.

OPI: D Cdts & JCR, as part of the MAP Response to Recommendation 2.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Footnote 1 An example alternative delivery model is that used for military family support services/programs. Military Family Resources Centres are established as third-party, not-for-profit organizations, operating with paid staff and volunteers, including volunteer elected committees.

Footnote 2 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995) (note evaluation fieldwork was carried out during 1993/94).

Footnote 3 Youth Programs Statistics Report 2011/12, Tables 1-02, 1-03 and 11-02.

Footnote 4 Sea and army cadets units are called “corps” and air cadet units are “squadrons.”

Footnote 5 The RCSUs cover Atlantic, Central, Eastern, Prairie, Pacific, and Northern regions. RCSU Northern will close in FY 2012/13 as part of cost savings implemented from the Strategic Review exercise.

Footnote 6 Youth Programs Statistics Report 2010/11, Table 3-01.

Footnote 7 1 CRPG covers the Far North (Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut), 2 CRPG covers Quebec, 3 CRPG covers Ontario, 4 CRPG covers British Columbia and the Prairie provinces, and 5 CRPG covers Newfoundland and Labrador.

Footnote 8 Giving communities the power to decide program content is important given the legacy of the residential school system.

Footnote 9 This includes the grant funding to the Cadet Leagues, which amounts to approximately $1.25 million per year.

Footnote 10 To keep the sample size manageable, program staff surveys were restricted to military staff working in support of the Cadet Program, including COATS and non-COATS Reserve Force members, Canadian Rangers, and members of the Regular Force. They were not intended for civilian instructors or persons volunteering for the Cadet or JCR Programs.

Footnote 11 CRS Evaluation Survey of JCR Patrol Leaders, April 2012.

Footnote 12 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Departmental Performance Report 2010-11.

Footnote 13 Steffler, J. (2008). Aboriginal Peoples – A Young Population for Years to Come.

Footnote 14 2012 Ipsos Reid Public Awareness and Perceptions of the Cadet Program Final Report.

Footnote 15 See discussion under Finding #22 in Section 3.3.7 Youth Participation Trends and Patterns in the Cadet Program.

Footnote 16 2011 Speech from the Throne.

Footnote 17 Ibid.

Footnote 18 2012 Budget Plan.

Footnote 19 Defence Priorities 2011-2014, CFDS, and “Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future: Canada's Northern Strategy”, Government of Canada, 2009. JCRs joining the adult Canadian Ranger movement is discussed in Finding #13 in Section 3.2.4 Unintended Outcomes of the Cadet and JCR Programs.

Footnote 20 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraph 3.2.4.

Footnote 21 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraph 3.3.6.

Footnote 22 A review of regionally directed spending on CF familiarization activities revealed disparities in cadets participating, both regionally and elementally. For example, while more than 4,000 army cadets in the Eastern region participated in a CF familiarization activity, no sea cadets did. In the Pacific region, three times as many air cadets participated in a CF familiarization activity than did sea cadets. There were no CF familiarization activities for cadets in the Northern region. Source: Youth Programs Statistics Report 10/11, Table 5-01.

Footnote 23 Between 2003 and 2012, there was major rewrite of the cadet training curricula, called the Cadet Program Update. The goals were to: (1) improve the management and administration of the program; (2) rationalize connectivity between the Sea, Army and Air Cadet Programs to ensure the sustainability of a high-quality program within current resource levels; and (3) incorporate contemporary professional practices from the fields of education and youth development within the Cadet Program, thus ensuring a program of the highest quality.

Footnote 24 A review of regionally directed spending on recreational sports revealed disparities in cadets participating, both regionally and elementally. For example, while 2,285 air cadets in the Central region participated in a regional recreational sport activity, only 125 army cadets did. In the Prairie region, while 425 air cadets participated in an activity, no sea or army cadets did. There were no regional recreational sport activities for cadets in the Northern region. Source: Youth Programs Statistics Report 2010/11, Table 5-01.

Footnote 25 CRS Evaluation survey (Cadet Participant), April 2012.

Footnote 26 Due to the small number of responses, Métis JCR survey data was combined with that of First Nations JCRs.

Footnote 27 Statistical evidence indicates that a high proportion, perhaps 50 percent, of Aboriginal youth continue to drop out of high school before graduation, often engaging in high-risk behaviours, Brant-Castellano, M. (2008). Reflections on Identity and Empowerment.

Footnote 28 Almost $10 million in 2010/11 (Youth Programs Statistics Report 2010/11, Table 4-05). The CIC Training Organization acknowledges that it is “very well resourced to deliver the existing mission” (CIC Training Organization Strategic Plan 2012-2016).

Footnote 29 CIC Training Organization Strategic Plan 2012-2016.

Footnote 30 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraph 3.5.32.

Footnote 31 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraph 3.4.1.

Footnote 32 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraphs 3.6.8 and 3.6.10.

Footnote 33 Between 2007 and 2012, $3.2 million was spent on the Fortress system.

Footnote 34 The findings of the evaluation of the Grant Program for the National Headquarters Offices of the Cadet Leagues are presented in Annex D.

Footnote 35 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), section 3.8.

Footnote 36 The example given was of an Army Cadet League provincial branch that runs its own expeditions for cadets, which are not supported by DND/CF. The MOU includes reference to League-supported activities that may be conducted in order to enhance the objectives of the cadet program (termed "optional training"); however, such training is in the context of supporting the corps/squadron program. The running of activities such as expeditions is also not mentioned in the mission or objectives of the Army Cadet League of Canada as defined in its policies manual.

Footnote 37 It should be noted that each League has a different mission, vision and/or objectives.

Footnote 38 As of September 2012, there were 23 corps/squadrons that had merged into 11 combined cadet units (“purple corps”) to help ensure survival in the short-term. In general, the creation of “purple corps” has been successful in helping units to survive and, for some of them, even grow their number of cadets and staff. “Purple corps” are seen as a viable alternative delivery model by DND/CF for certain communities; however, the Leagues are the main obstacle to “purple corps” existing on a permanent basis.

Footnote 39 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraph 3.8.7.

Footnote 40 The CRS evaluation surveys did not specifically ask about charging fees; however, this was found to be occurring at air cadet squadrons and army cadet corps in at least three provinces. Air Cadet League Provincial Committees charging fees is contrary to what is stated in the Air Cadet League of Canada’s Policy and Procedure Manual, section 1.1.7 Philosophy – “Air Cadets are not required to pay membership fees or dues in order to belong”.

Footnote 41 The 2010/11 report is almost 300 pages long.

Footnote 42 This figure should be interpreted with caution, as the survey coverage was low (23 percent) and Quebec was significantly over-represented in the sample.

Footnote 43 Source of data was review of program files carried out by the CRPGs.

Footnote 44 Air Cadet League of Canada’s Policy and Procedure Manual, section 1.3.4 The “Air in Air Cadets.”

Footnote 45 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraphs 3.3.10 and 3.3.9.

Footnote 46 Air Cadet League of Canada’s Policy and Procedure Manual, section 1.3.4 The “Air in Air Cadets.”

Footnote 47 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat’s Policy on Evaluation, April 1, 2009.

Footnote 48 Ibid.

Footnote 49 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), Table 3.1. The average cost per cadet for 2008-2011 was calculated using the official population of cadets, whereas the figure for 1993 was calculated using the population of cadets as of June 1, 1993 (the end -of-year cadet population, which is typically lower than the yearly average). Using the June 1 methodology for FY 2010/11 yields $4,928 cost per cadet, which is actually 46 percent higher than in 1993.

Footnote 50 These differentials exclude the leveraging of costs (for example, user fees or contributions from other non-government sources), which are difficult to quantify. However, they are not thought to significantly affect the overall findings. External contributions were available for one allied cadet program and differences in costs compared to the Canadian program were still found to be substantial.

Footnote 51 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraph 3.7.33. The 1993/94 evaluation compared costs to the Australian, German, United States and United Kingdom's cadet programs.

Footnote 52 The Scout Program (for youth aged 11-14) is divided into four activity areas: Citizenship, Leadership, Personal Development, and Outdoor Skills. The Venture Scout Program (for youth aged 14-17) is divided into four main elements: Leadership, Company organization (ability to solve problems, make decisions and plans, and conduct activities), Lifestyle/Spiritual, and Activity (“Measuring Success the Scouting Way,” Scouts Canada, 2005). The 4-H Program focuses on skills development, as well as personal development of life skills such as citizenship, leadership, responsibility and independence (4-H Canada 2010/2011 Annual Report).

Footnote 53 Currently, there are three CATOs dealing specifically with quality assurance and improvement of CIC training (CATO 24-11, CATO 24-08 and CATO 24-09).

Footnote 54 Direct costs only; calculated from the 2010/11 Youth Programs Statistics Report, Tables 4-05 and 4-08.

Footnote 55 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995) paragraphs 3.3.4, 3.4.12 and 3.4.7.

Footnote 56 The allied countries used in this comparison can be characterized as generally similar culturally in terms of attitudes to risk aversion both within government and amongst parents regarding child safety and well-being.

Footnote 57 Calculated using the 2010/11 Youth Programs Statistics Report, Tables 6-01 and 2-03 to 2-27.

Footnote 58 Ibid, Table 6-01. Includes D Cdts & JCR funding to support regional summer training programs (comprising funding for flying scholarships, gliding programs and transportation).

Footnote 59 The exact costs of the glider pilot licence program were unavailable and were therefore estimated. The average cost per cadet of $13,000 is believed to be an underestimate, with the actual cost more realistically in the region of $15,000 per cadet or $8 million in total.

Footnote 60 CATO 13-28 “Advanced Training – Staff Cadets.”

Footnote 61 CATO 17-32 Cadet Training Allocation.

Footnote 62 Cadets Advanced Training Parameters, April 19, 2005, VCDS. 1085-1 (VCDS).

Footnote 63 Authorisation is 22,300 at CSTCs, 2,500 as Staff Cadets and 1,007 in national/international activities.

Footnote 64 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), Table 2.8.

Footnote 65 Ibid., paragraph 2.7.7.

Footnote 66 In order to perform the historical comparison, the proportion of cadets completing advanced training was calculated using the number of cadets in the program as of January 1.

Footnote 67 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), Annex J, Appendix 6.

Footnote 68 Based on the official cadet population (the preferred methodology today, but not available for 1993).

Footnote 69 2010/11 Youth Programs Statistics Report, Tables 2-03 to 2-27.

Footnote 70 Ibid., Table 11-01.

Footnote 71 Youth Programs Statistics Reports Table 10-02 (2006/07), Table 9-02 (2007/08-2008/09), Table 11-01 (2009/10-2010/11). Note that the number of JCRs participating in enhanced training is not disaggregated by type (summer camps versus regionally and nationally organized activities).

Footnote 72 Data provided by D Cdts and JCR.

Footnote 73 JCR Program Planning Guidance FY 2008-2009 to 2012-2013, Chapter 5, 503, 4.(3) and 4.(4).

Footnote 74 Youth Programs Statistics Report 2011/12, Table 11-02.

Footnote 75 All data for this section sourced from Youth Programs Statistics Report 2011/12, Table 5-01.

Footnote 76 Includes direct and indirect costs (the proportion is 17.6 percent if considering direct costs only).

Footnote 77 CATO 17-34 – Local Support Allocation, Cadet Unit.

Footnote 78 Cadet numbers have increased 5 percent over the past two years, most likely due to efforts initiated under the Cadet Population Growth Initiative. Given the current population of cadets (52,000), the targets of growing to 60,000 by June 2013, and 70,000 by June 2016, seem wholly unrealistic.

Footnote 79 CATO 11-10, Annex A specifies that cadet corps/squadrons shall not be formed unless it appears 30 or more cadets will be at the unit. Percentages calculated from Youth Programs Statistics Reports 2007/08 and 2008/09 (Table 6-03), 2009/10 (Table 1-02) & 2010/11 (Table 1-03).

Footnote 80 Youth Programs Statistics Reports for 2007/08 and 2008/09 –Table 6-04; for 2009/10 and 2010/11 – Table 1-04.

Footnote 81 Youth Programs Statistics Report 2011/12, Table 1-06. Note that data was not collected prior to 2011/12.

Footnote 82 CRS Evaluation surveys (CO and Cadet Program Staff), April 2012.

Footnote 83 Briefing Note: “TBS- Youth Employment Initiatives.” DM, National Defence. Judd, J. (September 25, 1998).

Footnote 84 2012 Ipsos Reid Public Awareness and Perceptions of the Cadet Program Final Report.

Footnote 85 Ibid. Sourced from original survey data files QC12_03 and QC12_04. Local training was rated as very important or important by 80 percent of cadets (7 and 6 on the given scale); for summer training, the figure was 72 percent.

Footnote 86 DND/CF Cadet Program Evaluation Final Report (1995), paragraph 3.6.27.

Footnote 87 Scouts Canada Program Review 2012.

Footnote 88 “Attracting and Sustaining Youth Participation in After School Programs,” S. Lauver (2004).

Footnote 89 An example alternative delivery model is that used for military family support services/programs. Military Family Resources Centres are established as third-party, not-for-profit organizations, operating with paid staff and volunteers, including volunteer elected committees.

Footnote 90 An example alternative delivery model is that used for military family support services/programs. Military Family Resources Centres are established as third-party, not-for-profit organizations, operating with paid staff and volunteers, including volunteer elected committees.