Evaluation of the Governance of Chief of Military Personnel (CMP)

May 2016

1258-219 (ADM(RS))

Reviewed by ADM(RS) in accordance with the Access to Information Act. Information UNCLASSIFIED.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the evaluation of the governance of the Chief Military Personnel (CMP) organization. This includes a focussed look into the Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) and the core component of the governance of Director Casualty Support Management (DCSM). The evaluation was conducted by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) (ADM(RS)) in compliance with the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Policy on Evaluation, and the Department of National Defence (DND) Evaluation Plan.

Background

The Evaluation commenced in January of 2015 and sought to examine the performance of the CMP organization during the period 2009-2014. The focus was to assess the ability of the organization to provide sound management of military personnel. Results of the evaluation were utilized to help shape ongoing internal reviews, including the Defence Renewal Lean Headquarters Initiative and the 2015 Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Review of the JPSU.

Program Description

CMP

On behalf of the CDS, CMP provides functional direction/guidance to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) on all military personnel management matters, monitors compliance with CAF personnel management policies and is accountable for the effective management of the CAF personnel system. CMP’s primary strategic objective is to have the right CAF member with the right qualifications positioned in the right place at the right time. The organization oversees numerous sub-elements, including military personnel research and analysis, career management, recruiting, professional development and training, health services, the Chaplain General, morale and welfare services, compensation and benefits, alternate dispute resolution, history and heritage and honours and awards.

DCSM/JPSU

DCSM is a national-level organization that provides oversight and coordination leading to the standardized and harmonized application of policies and the delivery of multi-faceted programs to ensure support for the CAF community, both serving and retired. The operational arm of DCSM is the JPSU. The JPSU is a CAF unit, headquartered in Ottawa, with eight regional elements overseeing a total of 24 IPSCs and seven satellite centres. An IPSC has three main components: a service section, a support platoon and partner organizations. IPSCs and their satellites provide individual contact and support for serving and former CAF personnel, their families and the families of the fallen.

CMP Relevance

The evaluation noted that the CMP organization plays a critical role in supporting commanders and supervisors, from the CDS down, by ensuring that policies and programs are in place to support the individual military members and the CAF as an institution. CMP’s sub-programs affect the core ability of the CAF to operate and have a critical influence on the morale and welfare of individual CAF members. As a result, they impact the overall health of the CAF as an institution. The evaluation found that the overall governance provided by CMP is necessary to ensure that the wide range of support services needed to manage military personnel are aligned and coordinated and are provided in a manner that supports DND/CAF and Government of Canada priorities and objectives.

CMP Performance

The governance and management provided by CMP is generally effective. CMP regulations, plans and orders are aligned with higher direction, and the execution of strategies and plans to deliver this direction were seen to be synchronized and coordinated across all relevant sub-organizations. CMP decision making was seen to be agile, responsive, effective and informed. Stakeholders have also expressed a generally positive level of satisfaction around the services provided by CMP.

There are several opportunities for improvement. There are concerns over the lack of a meaningful performance management framework (PMF) throughout the organization, and evidence that risk management is not consistently applied nor understood across CMP for most major projects and programs. There are also issues concerning the span of control as it was deemed to be excessive in certain groups with commanders or leaders responsible for too many direct reports. This has the potential to distract from core responsibilities. Misalignment of tasks and functions within certain segments of the CMP organization were also detected, which resulted in difficulties for staff and for effective program delivery. Finally, there is a need to further improve staff training and succession planning, which, coupled with the frequent rotation of military personnel in the organization, is impacting the overall performance of program delivery. CMP does not have an internal plan in this regard.

The examination of CMP efficiency and economy revealed that the organization could take additional steps to employ practices that would lead to lower costs and a better use of existing resources.

Effective Governance of the JPSU/IPSC

The scope of the evaluation also included an examination of the effectiveness of the governance of the JPSUs and the IPSCs, specifically on the following:

• All tasks and resources for which the JPSU is accountable are well managed;
• The JPSU organization is “the right size” and subject to continuous review;
• The JPSU staff possesses the necessary training and skills; and
• JPSU decision making is agile, responsive, effective and informed.

Overall, the evaluation found that better use could be made of performance measurement and risk management practices to enhance program and service performance. For example, it does not appear that staff-to-client ratios are tracked, or that standards are in place. It was also noted that the JPSU’s command and control structure was creating problems for the organization including a staff overburdened with excessive workloads and at risk of burnout. In regard to the adequacy of skills and training, the evaluation found that good interpersonal relationships and best fit were often more important than having the right skills as training and development was available for new hires. The delay caused by this development of skills does, however, impact overall performance.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Findings—Relevance

Key Finding 1: Continued Need. CMP governance addresses a demonstrable need to manage the provision, training and sustainment of the necessary military personnel to meet Canadian defence obligations.

Key Finding 2: Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities. CMP governance is in alignment with the roles and responsibilities of the federal government to provide, train and sustain the military personnel resources necessary for the defence of Canada.

Key Finding 3: Alignment with Government Priorities. CMP governance ensures that military personnel programs align with DND/CAF and Government of Canada priorities and strategic objectives.

Findings—Performance (Effectiveness and Efficiency)

Key Finding 4: CMP plans are well integrated and synchronized.

Key Finding 5: The use of performance measurement frameworks could be improved in CMP.

Key Finding 6: The use of risk management could be improved in CMP.

Key Finding 7: The span of control is excessive at some levels within CMP.

Key Finding 8: Some functions within CMP appear to be poorly placed.

Key Finding 9: Committees are a crucial element in CMP governance.

Key Finding 10: Succession planning and training for key capability gaps is limited within CMP.

Key Finding 11: Plans are detailed and are modified as necessary.

Key Finding 12: The use of basic planning tools and management techniques varies within CMP.

Key Finding 13: Clients, both institutional and individual, are generally satisfied with CMP services.

Key Finding 14: Shared situational awareness is good at higher levels in CMP, but knowledge management could be improved in other areas.

Key Finding 15: Plans have been developed to update and produce policies, but poorly tested policies and out-of-date orders and regulations are still causing inefficiencies.

Key Finding 16: CMP is working to increase efficiency in governance.

Findings—Effective Governance of the JPSU/IPSC

Key Finding 17: Although management of the JPSU has been effective, better use could be made of management tools such as performance measurement and risk management.

Key Finding 18: The JPSU’s current command and control structure has resulted in communications problems, extra work for the Commanding Officer (CO) of JPSU and CMP, problems of understanding by key stakeholders and disagreement among staff on the fundamental structure of the IPSCs.

Key Finding 19: Although initiatives exist to limit staffing shortfalls, staff-to-client ratio has not been maintained nor studied resulting in staff burnout.

Key Finding 20: Although there is ongoing review of the organization, there is no evidence of long-term planning.

Key Finding 21: Although IPSC staff sometimes commence employment not fully qualified with the specific job skills required, they are screened for the necessary interpersonal skills. Training is available to further develop job-specific skills.

Key Finding 22: Although short-term decision making is informed, effective and timely, long-term decision making is uninformed.

Recommendations

• As previously mentioned, the ongoing review of the Defence Renewal Lean Headquarters Initiative and the 2015 CDS Review of the JPSU will address the issues identified in this evaluation. This includes recommendations to do the following:
• establish a relevant PMF with links to a broader CMP reporting system, including more applicable personnel intake data;
• apply risk management within all CMP projects and programs;
• improve on both span of control and functional alignment, while giving full consideration to the effective use of committees and delegations of authority that are as complete as possible;
• improve use, within CMP, of basic management tools, such as the business plan, strength, weakness, opportunity and threat (SWOT) analysis, specific, measureable, achievable, realistic and timely (SMART) performance measurement and others, to communicate plans, priorities, intent and objectives;
• improve knowledge management by making information products more accessible, clearly authorized and produced in a cost-effective manner;
• implement a training needs analysis to identify critical pan-CMP capability gaps and to determine whether to address them through training or succession planning; and
• continue the review, prioritization and production of new or updated policies, plans and orders in CMP and ensure these receive the necessary command attention.

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Context for the Evaluation

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the ADM(RS) evaluation of the overall governance of the CMP organization. It includes a focussed look into the governance of the JPSU, the core component of DCSM. There have been no ADM(RS) evaluations previously undertaken on the governance of CMP. However, there have been numerous ADM(RS) evaluations and audits on its sub-components. In certain instances, comments and observations have been made on governance issues. Where pertinent, these comments and observations have been included in this evaluation.

1.2 Program Profile

1.2.1 Organizational Description of CMP

The commander of CMP has three main roles: the functional authority for personnel management for the CAF, J1 for the CAF, and Commander Military Personnel Command (MPC). The CMP’s primary strategic objective is to have the right CAF member with the right qualifications positioned in the right place at the right time. Thus, the CMP’s overall mission is to recruit, train and educate, prepare, support, honour and recognize military personnel and their families for their service to Canada.

CMP is composed of the following organizations:

• the command structure/headquarters elements: Assistant CMP (Asst CMP), which includes the Chief of Staff (COS) and other important pan-CMP coordination divisions, namely Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), Director General Military Careers (DGMC), and Director General Military Personnel (DGMP);
• the three formations of MPC: Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG), Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)¹, and the Director General Health Services Group; and
• the remaining elements of the national-level J1 staff: Chaplain General, Director General Morale and Welfare Services (DGMWS), Director General Compensation and Benefits (DGCB), Director General Alternate Dispute Resolution (DGADR), Director History and Heritage (DHH) and Director Honours and Recognition (DH&R).

CAF military personnel management is a complex system of systems that sits firmly as the foundation of societal, legislative and regulatory frameworks and military personnel doctrine. There are five strategic pillars of military personnel management held in place by the planning, coordination, integration and research functions and the CAF Military Personnel Management System (i.e., the command structure specified previously). The five strategic pillars of CAF military personnel management activity are as follows:

• Recruit. This pillar includes the attraction, recruitment and selection of highly capable individuals to meet the needs of the DND/CAF. (CFRG)
• Train and Educate. This pillar focuses on individual training and education. To achieve its primary objective, a sufficient number of trained and educated professional military personnel must be delivered through a training delivery system driven by the specifications and the military employment structure requirements as informed by capability planning and lessons learned. (CDA)
• Prepare. This pillar includes medical, dental and spiritual support, all of which are focused on ensuring a healthy and fit force. (Director General Health Services (DGHS) and Chaplain General)
• Support. This pillar includes casualty support, family support, fitness, sports, the commissariat, insurance and compensation and benefits. Its goals include timely and effective morale, welfare and casualty support to personnel and their families, the development of a culture of fitness and well-being and fair remuneration, equitable benefits and integrated relocation services. (DGMWS and DGCB)
• Honour and Recognize. This pillar is centred on honouring and recognizing military personnel and their families, as well as military history and heritage. The effects to be achieved through this pillar include timely and appropriate recognition of serving, retired and deceased CAF personnel and their families, the preservation and communication of Canadian military history and the fostering of pride in Canadian military heritage. (DHH and DH&R)

1.2.2 Organizational Description of DCSM/JPSU

The DCSM, part of DGMWS, is a national-level organization that provides oversight and coordination leading to the standardized and harmonized application of policies and the delivery of multi-faceted programs to ensure support for the CAF community, both serving and retired. The operational arm of DCSM is JPSU. JPSU is a CAF unit, headquartered in Ottawa, with eight regional elements overseeing a total of 24 IPSCs and seven satellite centres. An IPSC has three main components: a service section, a support platoon, and partner organizations. IPSCs and their satellites provide individual contact and support for serving and former CAF personnel, their families and the families of the fallen.

1.2.3 Measuring Governance

Effective governance allows an organization to meet its goals and objectives. For the purposes of this evaluation, governance consists of the following five core activities:

• Planning involves the selection of an organization’s specific objectives and then designing the plans, policies, programs and procedures to facilitate their achievement. This includes identifying objectives, assumptions and conditions, selecting among alternatives and finalizing the plan for implementation. Planning includes decision making as it involves selecting an option.
• Directing in the context of this evaluation means the approval by the proper authorities of plans for execution, but it also includes guiding, motivating and supervising subordinates.
• Controlling has as its purpose to ensurethat activities conform to the planned action and are delivering the expected results. Control is normally conducted through a monitored performance measurement framework.
• Organizing involves determining and enumerating the activities required to achieve the objectives of the organization, the grouping of these activities, the assignment of such groups of activities to a manager, the delegation of authority to carry them out and the designation of coordination authority relationships, both horizontally and vertically, in structure.
• Staffing involves filling specific positions by defining their requirements, selecting individuals and providing them the necessary training and/or development.

In support of CMP’s overall mission and objectives, these governance activities produce the following outputs:

• Plans (include all types of plans, policies, doctrine, standard operating procedures, guidelines, standards and processes)
• Programs and projects
• Performance Measurement Framework
• CMP organization
• CMP establishment

As a result of these outputs, CMP ensures the following governance outcomes:

• All tasks and resources for which CMP is accountable are well managed.
• CMP organization is “the right size” and subject to continuous review.
• CMP staff possesses the necessary skills and training.
• CMP decision making is agile, responsive, effective and informed.

The relationship between activities and outcomes of CMP’s governance functions are illustrated in the logic model developed by the evaluation team found in Annex C.

1.2.4 Stakeholders

For the purposes of this evaluation, the term stakeholder refers to individuals, groups or organizations within the DND/CAF and elsewhere that provide, oversee or use CMP’s services. Internal to the CAF, these include all members of the CAF, as well as all force generators, force employers, force developers and all individuals/staff involved in personnel matters. External to the DND/CAF, stakeholders include the Government of Canada, Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC), TBS, military families, veterans and their families and numerous other actors.

1.3 Evaluation Scope

ADM(RS) conducted the evaluation between January 2014 and March

015 to meet the coverage requirements of the TBS policy on evaluation and in response to a specific request from CMP. The evaluation examined the relevance and performance of CMP governance over the period of 2009 to 2014.

The individual elements of CMP have been and will be evaluated in a series of evaluations throughout the evaluation cycle. However, this specific assessment of governance is the only evaluation that examines the application of that function across the whole of CMP.

1.3.1 Coverage and Responsibilities

Governance is crucial to enabling CMP to deliver on its designated program requirements within its Program Alignment Architecture (PAA). The governance of CMP is linked to the DND/CAF PAA under the strategic outcome “Defence Remains Continually Prepared to Deliver National Defence and Defence Services in Alignment with Canadian Interests and Values.” CMP has responsibilities for specific portions of the following program and sub-programs:

• 4.0 Defence Capability Elements Production
  • 4.1 Military Personnel and Organization Lifecycle
  • 4.1.1 Military Personnel – Regular Force Portfolio Management
  • 4.1.2 Military Personnel – Reserve Force Portfolio Management
  • 4.1.3 Military Personnel – Recruitment
  • 4.1.4 Military Personnel – Transition and Release
  • 4.1.5 Military Personnel – Professional Development Training
  • 4.1.6 Military Personnel – Occupation Training
  • 4.1.7 Military Personnel – Morale and Well-Being
  • 4.1.8 Military Personnel – Health Care
  • 4.1.9 Organization – Security, Protection, Justice and Safety Program
  • 4.1.10 Military Personnel and Organization – Strategic Coordination, Development and Control

This evaluation focuses on the governance of CMP with the goal of assessing whether the expected outcomes of the program have been achieved, its relevance and its efficiency and economy. The evaluation also specifically explores the governance of DCSM, JPSU, and IPSC in the context of the larger topic to assess the achievement of their expected outcomes with respect to governance.

1.3.2 Resources

The evaluation team was not able to identify the specific resources dedicated to the governance function. In certain instances, governance can be tied to an entire organizational element. In other cases, it is only linked to one or more specific positions in the organization, or it can even be a component of an individual’s normal job responsibilities. Although governance is most closely tied to PAA sub-sub-program 4.1.10, there are elements of governance in all ten of the sub-sub-programs of sub-program 4.1.

The evaluation team did a costing analysis of the entire CMP organization (PAA sub-program 4.1). On average, total annual funding² associated with CMP was $2,047,230,377 during the evaluation period. This includes $557,731,027 of military Regular Force salary. (The person year cost includes students on the basic training list (Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School, Royal Military College and the Borden schools) plus those posted to the JPSU detachments. These costs will be further developed.)

1.3.3 Issues and Questions

In accordance with the TBS Directive on the Evaluation Function (2009),³ the evaluation addresses the five core issues related to relevance and performance. An evaluation matrix listing each of the evaluation questions, with associated indicators and data sources, is provided at Annex C. The methodology used to gather evidence in support of the evaluation questions can be found at Annex A.

2.0 Findings and Recommendations

The following sections discuss the relevance and performance of CMP governance. The evaluation examined the extent to which the program addresses a demonstrable need, is aligned with federal roles and responsibilities and government priorities, achieves its expected outcomes and demonstrates efficiency and economy in resource utilization. The effectiveness of the governance of JPSU/IPSC is also dealt with as an extra issue of the evaluation.

2.1 Relevance—Continued Need

To determine whether the governance of CMP continues to address a demonstrable need, the following key indicators were used:

• evidence that the provision of governance of military personnel management is responsive to the needs of DND/CAF; and
• evidence that there is a need for the CMP organization.

The following findings are based on evidence from document review and key stakeholder interviews.

Governance is a function that ensures assigned tasks are accomplished. One measure of effective governance is that all required objectives have been completed. CMP was established in 2008 and consists of a complex portfolio of programs. Its core purpose is to ensure that military human resources are generated, sustained, supported and recognized. The governance of CMP is required to ensure the objectives mentioned in Key Finding 1 are met.

While it is clear that governance is crucial to the delivery of CMP objectives, other factors also have to be examined to determine whether there is a continuing need for the organization itself. These include the unique requirements of the CAF, the complexity of strategic-level military personnel management within the CAF and the institutional requirements or benefits from the centralization of military personnel management.

The recruitment and management of military human resources differs greatly, at points, from the management of civilian human resources within government departments. Most federal departments have multiple civilian entry points with skill requirements set by government-wide classification standards. This model does not apply to securing and managing military human resources. First of all, there are no multiple entry points. The majority of those entering the CAF join as raw recruits who require extensive initial training. Secondly, many military jobs do not have civilian equivalents, or they have operational remits that put them beyond the norms of civil employment. Military career fields must therefore be completely described and specified to allow for career progression and development. These recruiting and job categorization realities drive a unique and ongoing training requirement that must be satisfied. There are other differences including the need to provide support to operations, to provide medical and dental support and to address quality of life and veterans’ issues. CMP is required to manage both the normal human resources management issues typical to all federal government departments as well as those unique to the CAF.

CMP enables three critical military duties to be performed. First, care of one’s subordinates is a duty in the CAF, not a bureaucratic or managerial function. It is a core component of the profession of arms and a duty borne by all members of the CAF. CMP plays a critical role in supporting commanders and supervisors, from the CDS down, by ensuring that policies and programs are in place to support the individual military members and the CAF as an institution. Second, the CDS is required to have military forces ready to respond to the tasks and priorities of the government. Many of CMP’s sub-programs affect the core ability of the CAF to operate, have a critical influence on the morale and welfare of individual the CAF members and impact the overall health of CAF as an institution. Programs exist to entice new recruits, to maintain the morale of serving members, to tend to the ill and injured, to afford support of various natures to the families and to assist veterans. CMP programs constitute a system that contributes critically to supporting CDS’s requirement to have “ready” forces. Third, CDS has a requirement to report to the government and Canadians on the status of the CAF. This includes reporting on complex strategic level military human resource issues. The CAF responds to a broad number of external factors: it is responsible to external stakeholders, from Canadian taxpayers to the highest offices of government; it is responsible to consider the reports of external observers from parliamentary committees (i.e., the Auditor General, the Ombudsman and others); and, it is responsible to amend and adjust policies and practices as legislation and higher direction change. CMP, as an organization, ensures that these three duties can be performed competently, professionally, operationally well and responsively, thus greatly enhancing the operational effectiveness of the CAF.

There are institutional benefits accrued from the centralization of strategic-level military human resources management. Prior to Unification in 1967, the CAF operated on a dispersed model of military human resources management.⁴ Each Environment (land, sea and air) had a full suite of personnel services, which represented enormous duplication and redundancies, few economies of scale and competing and contrary approaches in seeking resources for program execution. Centralization of this program, from 1967 onward, has served to make military human resources management both more effective and efficient. It has allowed for a fuller consideration of pan-CAF requirements and their broader institutional concerns and permitted joint occupations (non-environmental specific ones) to receive the attention it needs. There are three other benefits to this centralized approach. First, it allows a common and consolidated response to external stakeholders. Second, it permits the development of specialized functions at the centre, which further contributes to effectiveness and efficiency. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the centralization of personnel functions in CMP greatly reduces the span of control issues that a dispersed model would cause to the CDS.

In summary, there is a continuing need of governance within CMP to ensure that its goals and objectives are being achieved. CMP has merits as a CAF organization due to the unique requirements of CAF military personnel resource management, the complexity of external and internal demands on the programs coordinated and the benefits accrued by the centralization of military human resources service provision.

2.2 Relevance—Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

This section examines the extent to which the governance of CMP aligns with departmental and federal roles and responsibilities. The findings in this section are based on evidence from program documents reviewed for the evaluation.

The following indicator was used in the assessment of alignment with federal roles and responsibilities:

• evidence of the importance of governance in fulfilling the federal government’s role and responsibilities for providing military personnel management.

It is the Canadian federal government’s responsibility to provide an effective defence force to ensure the nation’s security. All federal government organizations are required to manage their human resources as effectively and efficiently as possible so that they can deliver on assigned priorities. In the DND/CAF, CMP is the organization that manages military human resources at the strategic level. Governance within CMP aims to ensure that an effective defence force is generated, sustained, supported and recognized. CMP governance is thus in alignment with federal roles and responsibilities.

2.3 Relevance—Alignment with Government Priorities

This section examines the extent to which the governance of CMP’s objectives is consistent with federal government priorities and DND/CAF strategic outcomes. The findings in this section are based on evidence from documents reviewed for the evaluation.

The following indicators were used to make this determination:

• documentary evidence of the degree of alignment between the governance of military personnel management and federal government priorities; and
• documentary evidence of the degree of alignment between the governance of military personnel management and the objectives of DND.

The strategic outcomes of the DND/CAF include the contribution to the Defence of Canada, the Defence of North America and international peace and stability. These outcomes are further articulated in the Canada First Defence Strategy, which outlines the key missions of CAF. These strategic outcomes represent the priorities of the federal government. To achieve its strategic objective, the DND/CAF must have the appropriate capabilities. While the development of capabilities is often platform-centric, no defence mission can be accomplished without the necessary and appropriate human resources. CMP ensures that the right service personnel with the right skills are at the right place at the right time. It does so by ensuring high standards of recruitment, detailed training and education, careful career management and providing the services and support that ensure personnel are operationally fit and have high morale. Governance within CMP ensures that the programs it provides, and those that are being developed, are consistent with DND/CAF strategic objectives and federal government priorities.

2.4 Performance—Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)

This section discusses the achievement of the governance of CMP’s expected outcomes, with a focus on the following immediate outcomes:

• All tasks and resources for which CMP is accountable are well managed.
• CMP organization is “the right size” and subject to continuous review.
• CMP staff possesses the necessary training and skills.

Intermediate outcomes are considered in this evaluation insofar as the following:

• CMP decision making is agile, responsive, effective and informed.

Findings with respect to effectiveness have been based on a literature review, a review of relevant reports, a review of program documentation and interviews with program stakeholders.

2.4.1 Immediate Outcome – All tasks and resources for which CMP is accountable are well managed

The following indicators were used to assess the achievement of this outcome:

Indicator 1: Evidence that CMP regulations, plans and orders are aligned with higher direction.

Indicator 2: Evidence that CMP strategies and plans are synchronized.

Indicator 3: Evidence that CMP achieves the integration of personnel support through coordination of activities and resources both internally and externally.

Indicator 4: CMP has a PMF that is applied throughout the organization.

Indicator 5: Evidence that risk management is consistently applied across CMP to all major projects and programs.

Indicators 1 to 3:

To determine whether CMP efforts were aligned, synchronized and integrated, a review of how those terms were understood and used within the organization was undertaken. General descriptions of these terms are as follows:

• Align. CMP plans, projects and programs are in compliance with higher direction.
• Synchronize. CMP arranges activities in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative effect for personnel support programs.
• Integrate. CMP coordinates the activities of internal elements, supported by and supporting organizations (Level Ones (L1)), and stakeholders external to the DND/CAF to ensure the CAF personnel management system has unity of purpose and effort and can deliver its core strategic and operational objectives.

Testing whether CMP plans were aligned, synchronized and integrated, including determining whether they were compliant with higher-level direction, whether there were higher-level coordination mechanisms and phased timelines and whether pan-CAF integration was obvious.

Effort is made in CMP to ensure that orders and regulations align with higher direction. This effort is limited by the lack of staff capacity (numbers) and capability (expertise) to complete the needed changes when new policies or revisions are introduced. Staff capacity can be overwhelmed with the volume of new or revised policies requiring attention and where other priorities distract from work in this key area. Staff capability can also be insufficient when detailed knowledge is required to properly interpret and implement new policies or revisions to existing ones. Errors in interpretation, whatever the cause, generate additional work. This is particularly a concern in respect of compensation and benefits policies where errors generate numerous grievances. Policy re-alignment in CMP occurs in two ways. Typically, incremental improvements are coordinated through the personnel policy program coordinated by DGMP. However, if areas require greater attention, issues may be rectified by the implementation of a major campaign such as that being conducted by the Director Official Languages (DOL). Similarly, one of the Business Process Renewal initiatives is the completion of the Defence Administrative Orders and Directives series of orders, a long outstanding requirement which has lagged due to capacity issues. The inefficiencies caused by out-of-date orders will be discussed in the efficiency section below.

The synchronization of plans is reflected in their time-phased execution. In annual plans, such as the posting plot and the Strategic Intake Plan (SIP), synchronization is manifested in the gateways and milestones that indicate their progress to completion. Typically, annual plans unfold according to predetermined cycles. Activities are slotted into (synchronized) specific gateways in these cycles to permit the overall process to continue. For instance, merit boards (though this is not their primary purpose) are conducted at a specific period to facilitate and feed into the data necessary to continue to the posting plot. For larger projects, major phases are denoted as spirals, and, within each spiral, normal task synchronization occurs. Given all this, it is evident that synchronization occurs widely in CMP.

As the functional authority for personnel issues, CMP must also ensure that personnel generation and support are integrated. This is an ongoing focus in most CMP programs. It is reflected in coordination mechanisms, the plans themselves and in organizational structures. Integration is coordinated through a variety of function-specific standing committees. These mechanisms include the CAF Personnel Generation Committee, the Individual Training and Education Committee, the Professional Development Council, and, at the highest level in CMP, the CAF Personnel Management Committee. Major CMP plans show that detailed integration has taken place. For instance, the involvement of the Environments is crucial for the production of both the SIP and the annual posting plot. The understood requirement to integrate is also demonstrated by the organizational structure of the Environments personnel. The roles and functions of the Environments, as described on their own websites, attest to the close linkages and coordination they perform with CMP.

Indicator 4: Evidence that PMFs are applied throughout CMP

The fundamental purpose of a PMF is to support decision making. A performance measurement system must be closely linked to the logic model of the program being executed. Properly designed, a PMF system will inform decision makers as to whether outputs are being efficiently achieved (via key performance indicators) and whether results/outcomes are being effectively achieved (via key results indicators). The greatest inherent danger with a performance measurement system is the over-collecting and the over-reporting of data that does not contribute to decision making. For performance measurement systems to work best, they must be clear, vertically linked, and focus on the core strategic and operational issues of the organization. In general, CMP measures and reports well on performance at the strategic level, but PMFs in the Level Twos (L2) are less robust.

Effective PMF reporting has increased in importance as a result of recent changes to the DND/CAF PAA. Performance measures from this system are now included in both the DND Report on Plans and Priorities and the Departmental Performance Report. PAA PMF remit for each sub-sub program was one efficiency measure, one output measure, and one effectiveness measure. The requirement to report on every sub-sub program has driven a form of performance measurement down to all CMP L2s. Even in cases where data was available, these remits were inappropriate as they were not fully focussed at the strategic level, and they generated a large amount of unnecessary staff work. Within CMP, the reporting of these PAA-demanded metrics is centrally coordinated by the DGMP performance management team. This team assisted the offices of primary interest (OPI) in the development of the appropriate metric through a course (PMF 101) and by using the TBS Guide to Developing Performance Measurement Strategies as a baseline. While this process provides some signal of the strategic results achieved by various programs in CMP, there is no indication that these programs are well run.

The L2s within CMP have a wide mix of PMFs. Some, like DGMPRA and Asst CMP, track task execution purely by timeline milestones, as do many of the projects in CMP. This may be entirely adequate for their programs. However, a number of L2s (i.e., DGMC, DGCB, Chaplain General and DGADR) include PMFs in their respective business plans, but they have not brought them to fruition. While DGMP does not have a divisional PMF, DOL has a well thought-out and elaborate PMF in its campaign plan. DGHS has a relatively mature PMF that is currently being restructured, and CDA has been working on developing one. Early versions of CDA’s PMF (June 2013) were unwieldy and convoluted, although later versions have shown gradual improvement. CFRG has long indicated in its business plans that it has a PMF for its recruiting centres, and it has produced a clear and concise internal working instruction on the subject for its other activities. This working instruction should be closely linked to SIP reporting requirements. TBS guidance on the use of performance measures in programs specifies that all substantial programs require a PMF. The non-existence and uneven quality of some of the existing PMFs at the L2s within CMP suggest a need for more centralized control and standardization of their usage. While the DGMP performance management team has provided some general direction on this issue, it does not appear that there is consistent application of PMFs across CMP. All L2s should have a PMF that reflects their core business and permits them to monitor their Key Performance Indicators and thus easily report on their Key Results Indicators.

By way of contrast, CMP has a very effective PMF system for reporting the progress of its annual SIP. This reporting is coordinated by the DGMP performance management team. The PMF includes carefully defining each reporting metric, setting boundaries for each metric and grading what a deviation from the baselines implies. With the Regular Force Personnel Data Reporting Catalogue, the performance management team clearly defines from where it draws its data. The SIP’s progress and all other personnel issues are reported quarterly in the Regular Force Quarterly Canadian Armed Forces Personnel Management Report, allowing the Armed Forces Council to make adjustments to key programs as they proceed. Note that this system reports only on Regular Force efforts; Reserve Force recruiting goes largely unmentioned, despite the critical importance of component transfers to the success of the SIP.

Indicator 5: Evidence that risk management is consistently applied across CMP to all major projects and programs

The DND/CAF widely applies risk management practices, especially at the corporate level. Information on how to conduct risk analysis, detailed in guides and through various instructions, is readily available within the DND/CAF.⁵ In fact, the integrated risk management environment in the DND/CAF is both elaborate and highly interconnected. For example, the annual Corporate Risk Profile feeds into the development of Defence Priorities and helps structure both the Report on Plans and Priorities and the Departmental Performance Report. CMP has a vital role in mitigating two crucial corporate risks: R1 Defence Readiness and R2 Defence Team Capacity. Risk analyses contained within L1 business plans are also expected to feed into the Report on Plans and Priorities.

Given these inter-linkages, it is imperative that risk analysis in L2 business plans be easily transformed into higher-level documents. However, the use of risk analysis in most CMP L2 business plans is either weak or incomplete. In certain instances, risk is only mentioned in passing, if at all, while in other cases, it is inferred that risks are understood and acted upon. Where used, the proper identification of risks is sometimes adequate, although the risk management process is often not completed (e.g., mitigation strategies described without designating residual risks).

Most risk mitigation strategies represent requests for additional resources. This may be entirely appropriate within a business plan, but it raises two serious questions: Does an L2 have the additional capacity to make internal systemic changes to address perceived deficiencies? And, does the L1 staff have sufficient system perspective and authority to reallocate or propose the reallocation of funds in critical areas. For example, although it is a legislative requirement to offer aboriginal programming, CFRG’s fiscal year (FY) 2014/15 business risk management plan proposed a 75 percent cut (approximately $500,000) to such programming. In the same year, the CDA hospitality plan sought $20,000 in incremental funding for aboriginal events, within an overall program that sought $846,000 in additional funding. It is unclear how the L1 staff reconciled the risk of cuts to a legislative program with a request for hundreds of thousands of dollars for standard, but perhaps less critical, events. Given all this, more attention must be given to integrating risk management in business planning across CMP organizations.

Risk management is equally important for policy development and for the execution and delivery of projects. Out-of-date policies impede efficiency within CMP (this is discussed further in this report), yet introducing new and untested policies represents questionable risk management practices. This has been the case particularly in DGCB, untested policies can lead to overpayments and subsequent recovery actions.⁶ The risk of policy error is transferred to individual service members without clear accountability from the policy developers. CMP’s larger and more formal projects, such as the Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation Project, risk analysis has been undertaken in detail, and within the guidelines specified for project management.⁷

2.4.2 Immediate Outcome – CMP organization is “the right size” and subject to continuous review

The following indicators were used to assess the achievement of this outcome:

• evidence that span of control in CMP does not prevent leaders from effectively managing their tasks;
• evidence that tasks are grouped logically to the best effect and that leaders have the authority required to complete their assigned tasks; and
• evidence that CMP committees contribute to the effective management of the organization and add value by achieving their purpose as defined in their terms of reference.

Indicator 6: Evidence that span of control does not prevent leaders from effectively managing their tasks

Span of control refers to a supervisor’s number of direct reports. There is no ideal span of control as this can be influenced by a number of factors specific to a given position. These factors can include the geographic distribution of direct reports, their capabilities and those of their supervisor, the value-added the supervisor can contribute, the number, similarity and level of complexity of the tasks performed by the direct reports and the number of and type of administrative tasks required. A narrow span of control (i.e., few reports) is advantageous when close supervision is required for the execution of complex and interdependent tasks, while a wide span of control (i.e., many reports) is practical when tasks are generally similar or independent.

The evaluation team reviewed the span of control across the breadth of CMP (to the director level) and considered what, if any, alternative control measures had been put in place to mitigate associated issues. The CMP organizational structure was tested against the DND/CAF Organization and Establishment Policy manual’s recommendation that “an individual’s span of control should not be less than three subordinates, nor more than seven,”⁸ although this recommendation is a long standing historical military model that may be more appropriate for field forces than for other military or civilian DND staff elements. Potential mitigation measures related to span of control issues include restructuring, staff organization, committees, delegation of authority and clear orders and direction (including strategy documents and statements of intent). For the purposes of this evaluation, a principal staff officer from headquarters was considered a direct report but not the subordinate heads of staff sections.

Span of control is not an issue internal to the L2s within CMP as most abide by the recommended range specified by the Organization and Establishment Policy manual. Span of control is also not an issue for the three CMP formations: CFRG, DGHS and CDA. Although the Commander CFRG has seven direct reports in six recruiting centres and headquarters, this is not an issue given the similarity of the tasks executed by the recruiting centres. In the case of DGHS and CDA, their respective wide spans of control are mitigated by large headquarter staff structures. Span of control varies across the other L2s within CMP as well, but none were noted as significant. Potential problems could arise, however, in larger divisions such as DGMC and DGCB where tasks are generally complex, the directorates are large, the director general’s staff is small and the number of additional administrative tasks is quite large.

Every senior officer in CMP that was interviewed by the evaluation team mentioned a span of control problem between CMP and the direct reports. This perspective may be attributable to three main points: recognition of the complexity of tasks CMP controls and manages, L2 access to CMP and a direct number count of the direct reports.

At the strategic level in CMP, span of control is affected by the complexity of subordinate organizations’ tasks and the associated difficulties of coordinating work across them. Most L2 organizations within CMP are organized functionally, are somewhat operationally independent and require leaders with unique expertise and skills to manage them effectively. There is little in normal military career development that exposes military leaders to the full range of tasks contained within CMP. In fact, many of the subordinate components within CMP could constitute separate career fields in and of themselves. Substantial coordination is required between L2s in CMP, which can be exceedingly complex to carry out. Thus, task complexity in CMP has a significant impact on span of control arrangements.

Span of control at the strategic level is also affected by the complexity of the commander’s job, which may be reflected in an individual’s access to the commander. This is not merely a time management issue, but is related to the effectiveness of the delegation of authority in the organization. Delegation of authority is the conferring of a specified authority from a higher to a lower level within an organization, allowing a direct report to make decisions and take action.⁹ This process permits a supervisor, who has more responsibilities than can be reasonably and effectively performed by a single individual, to assign some of them to his/her direct reports. The supervisor retains overall responsibility but now has delegated responsibilities (the direct report is responsible for performing certain tasks for the supervisor) and reserved responsibilities (the supervisor must perform the tasks).¹⁰ If a supervisor’s reserved responsibilities are onerous, there is less time to interact with direct reports. In general, the commander of CMP has a large number of reserved responsibilities that range from the important requirement of reporting to external and internal stakeholders to the need to address disciplinary matters. Span of control could be improved in CMP by as vast a delegation of authorities as possible and practical.

Span of control is influenced by organizational structure and hence the number of direct reports. In late 2013, the CMP had approximately thirteen direct reports. The direct reports were the three formations (CFRG, CDA and DGHS), the seven divisions (Chaplain General, DGMWS, DGCB, DGADR, DGMPRA, DGMC and DGMP), the two directorates (DHH and DH&R) and the Asst CMP (as the principal staff officer / deputy commander). Shortly thereafter, DHH and DH&R were allocated as direct reports to the Asst CMP, thus reducing the CMP’s span of control by two. Planning was underway in CMP to create only two reporting chains: one based on personnel generation and the other on personnel support. This has been somewhat stymied due to a lack of clarity respecting the reporting entitlements/requirements for specialist advisors and the traditional reporting privileges assigned to the CDS. For instance, the Chaplain General, the Surgeon General and DGMWS all have immediate access to the CDS if needed. In December 2014, additional adjustments were made to the CMP organization to further improve span of control. Specifically, DGCB, DGADR and Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation (formerly reporting to DGMP) will be reporting directly to the Asst CMP. The CMP’s span of control is currently nine organizations, with more restructuring planned to reduce the span of control.

Several mechanisms have been undertaken to improve the span of control at the strategic level within CMP. Restructuring has been employed, and there may be a requirement for even more. Greater use could be made of guiding committees for certain subordinate elements (refer to the Committees section for more information). The most complete delegation of authority possible should also be explored; that is, retaining only the minimum necessary residual responsibilities practical. In any event, all possible efforts should be continued to ensure orders and instructions fully express the aims, desire and intent of the CMP. One additional mechanism may require more exploration. As well noted in doctrine manuals, “the staff consists of officers who assist the commander in the exercise of command.” The three formations report upward through a small staff coordinated by the COS CMP, and other staff functions are carried out under the Asst CMP. It is unclear whether the staff is of sufficient size to fully assist the CMP in the exercise of command. Though Vice Chief of the Defence Staff instruction may limit the ability of CMP to form a proper headquarters staff, consideration should be given to further expanding staff at the strategic level.

Indicator 7: Evidence that tasks are grouped logically to the best effect

Generally, most organizations consist of four core elements: the strategic leadership, the line element, the standard setters and the support element.¹¹ In CMP, the strategic leadership consists of the CMP, the Asst CMP and other elements in the command suite. The line elements produce the key outputs of the organization, which, in CMP’s case, are primarily services for individuals or for CAF organizations. These services are grouped on a functional basis. For instance, DGMC provides postings and career service, DGCB provides pay services and DGHS provides health services. The standard setters establish the rules and procedures so that the line elements can work more effectively and efficiently. Standards can be set for pan-CAF issues, such as DOL’s undertakings for the official languages program. Standards can be set for pan-CMP issues, such as DGMP’s activities for policy coordination. The standards can be set by CMP L2s internally through the issuance of orders, instructions and directions to guide the work of their subordinates. Support elements provide the necessary internal support so that an organization can carry out its required tasks. For instance, Director Military Career Support Services provides the support that enables the work of the other directorates within DGMC. The Director Military Personnel Planning and Program Coordination within Asst CMP performs a similar function in supporting business planning across CMP.

Sub-organizations may be poorly placed if their responsibilities are inconsistent with other elements within a functional group, or if they otherwise detract from the core focus of the group principal. Given legacy issues and the unique nature of CMP’s pan-CAF responsibilities, some of its components do not fit naturally within some of its broad functional groupings. The most obvious orphan organization over the last few years has been Director Reserve Support Management as it has been moved frequently from division to division. It is essentially a career service organization for reservists, and it may now be better placed within DGMC, the core career service organization in CMP. Similarly, DHH and DH&R have been placed under the Asst CMP to improve span of control issues for the CMP. The work under these service organizations could well be detracting from the Asst CMP’s critical roles as the key resource manager and the deputy commander. Special attention is required to ensure that directorates and divisions, as well as their associated functions, are appropriately placed within the CMP organizational structure.

Indicator 8: Evidence that CMP committees contribute to the effective management of the organization and add value by achieving their purpose as defined in their terms of reference

The extensive use of committees is a common practice in government. There is a broad range of reasons for their use, including the facilitation of group deliberation and judgement, the coordination of plans and policies, the transmission of information and the ownership of responsibility and authority for a particular task or program that cannot be delegated to a single person. The use of committees can be especially important in cases where the work is interdependent and requires a joint effort to coordinate delivery, or where approval from senior decision makers is required. However, committees do not replace the authority or responsibilities of the chain of command. Committees also have certain disadvantages, including the fact that they can be costly in terms of both time and money, they can lead to less than optimal compromises, indecision may persist, parochial interests may dominate or their proceedings may focus on unimportant issues or those that are beyond their authority. To be successful, a committee must have a well-defined scope and authority, be appropriately sized, have properly selected members, have carefully determined agenda underpinned by its defined scope and have an ability to confirm that its stated goals and objectives have been achieved.

Committees are used extensively within CMP for both internal and external purposes. Within the CMP divisions, they are used to coordinate and regulate internal programs. Across CMP, some committees are used as horizontal coordination mechanisms to deliver programs, whereas others serve as informational / situational awareness mechanisms.¹² As CMP is the functional authority for many pan-CAF issues, committees are also used to coordinate with external stakeholder.¹³ CMP’s capstone committee is the CAF Personnel Management Council (CFPMC), which serves as a filter for work advanced to the wide variety of strategic governance committees to whom CMP reports or participates. CMP is a member of all core strategic governance committees for L1s.¹⁴

The use of committee is generally effective within CMP as most have valid terms of reference and clear records of decisions with stated action items articulated and executed, and they continue to be relevant. Most CMP committees’ terms of reference are defined and embedded in Defence Administrative Orders and Directives or in other publications and instructions. While this practice emphasizes the importance of the committee and might compel participation, the process of adjusting a committee’s terms of reference is difficult. A detailed test of the record of decisions of CFPMC demonstrated that its decisions were clearly recorded and carried out. As well, a cursory review of the records of decisions from the Personnel Development Council, the Individual Training and Education Committee and the National Defence Clothing and Dress Committee showed that similar practices were being followed. Committees have been re-aligned as necessary to retain effectiveness and relevance. For example, some committees, such as the CAF Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee, have lapsed, while others, such as the CFPMC and the Non-Public Property Board, have been re-tasked and reinvigorated.¹⁵

Aside from the roles many committees play in the general support of CMP governance, select committees appear to play an even more direct role in the governance of specialized areas. A direct role in advising or assisting specialized functions is evident in the work of the Interfaith Committee on Canadian Military Chaplaincy for the Chaplain General and in the work of the Non-Public Property Board for the DGMWS. These committees could well serve as useful models elsewhere in CMP to help shape the strategic governance of specialized elements, assist in the delegation of technical authorities and aid in the mitigation of span of control.

2.4.3 Immediate Outcome – CMP staff possesses the necessary training and skills

The following indicators were used to assess the achievement of this outcome:

• evidence that CMP staff are qualified for the jobs in which they are employed;
• evidence that training is available to CMP staff to increase their knowledge and skills related to the specific jobs in which they are employed; and
• evidence that succession planning is formally conducted in CMP to ensure that individuals are ready for positions in CMP.

The skills, knowledge and experience required for each position in an organization are normally identified as part of organizational design. Recruitment for civilian staff positions typically is undertaken with a view that the successful candidate will already possess the majority of the position’s job requirements. Further training for civilians is self-identified in personnel management reports and elaborated in CMP L2 business plans. Civilian staff training receives ample attention in CMP and will not be discussed further in this report. In contrast, military personnel do not generally arrive fully qualified in a new job. Some measure of training and experience is almost always required so that they can both perform in their jobs and be cultivated for future tasks. The remainder of this section will discuss how military personnel are prepared for employment in CMP.

Training for military personnel within CMP is conditioned by the particular needs of specific positions. Some positions can be filled by generalists or specialists without the need for additional training as the necessary job skills have been acquired through normal career progression. For example, generalists occupy career manager positions in DGMC, while medical professionals occupy many positions in DGHS. Not all training requirements are satisfied, however, through normal career progression. Often local training is provided to better prepare newly arrived individuals for their jobs. DGMC, for instance, conducts an annual orientation conference in September, and other groups, such as CFRG and the JPSU, organize development programs. Much of this local training is focused at the divisional level, but there are numerous additional skills that are required by staff across CMP including project management, risk management, performance measurement and policy development. In some cases pan-CMP gaps have been identified and addressed. DGMP, for example, as the designated policy coordinator for CMP, realized that training in policy development was deficient and as a result took action to rectify the situation. Other existing pan-CMP training deficiencies have not been fully dealt with due to the “stove-piped” nature of divisional training and the lack of a centralized training coordinator.

Some of the training deficit for individual positions within CMP could be rectified with better succession planning. CMP does not have an internal plan in this regard. CMP would greatly benefit from having individuals who have previously served in the organization fill senior policy and program positions. These individuals would become fully effective more quickly and would likely be more familiar with complex policy issues. While there are a few individuals who have rotated in and out of CMP over the years, this has been more by circumstance than by plan.

2.4.4 Intermediate Outcome – CMP decision making is agile, responsive, effective and informed

The following indicators were used to assess the achievement of this outcome:

• evidence that current plans and programs are modified as required to improve service delivery and ensure objectives are met;
• evidence that CMP responds to crises and urgent issues in a timely manner with clear processes that minimize disruptions in response;
• evidence that CMP is regarded as a credible service provider by other L1s and by individual service members;
• evidence that CMP has the capability and capacity to plan at all levels, that plans are developed, adapted and adjusted both in preparation and execution to meet specified outcomes, and that alternatives are considered; and
• evidence that high-quality knowledge management is conducted in CMP and that staff advice to decision makers is informed by shared situational awareness, clear guidance and direction.

Indicator 9: Evidence that current plans and programs are modified as required to improve service delivery and ensure objectives are met

Indicator 10: Evidence that CMP has the capability and capacity to plan at all levels, that plans are developed, adapted and adjusted both in preparation and execution to meet specific outcomes, and that alternatives are considered

As the functional authority for personnel matters within the CAF, CMP prepares detailed plans, projects and programs to coordinate and deliver on assigned strategic and operational objectives. Many of the plans must be horizontally integrated in consideration of the many stakeholders across CMP, across the DND/CAF, across government and external to the DND/CAF who must be consulted in the preparation, coordination and execution of the plans. Moreover, many of the plans must be vertically linked. For instance, while DGMP develops SIP, CFRG and DGMC execute it. The development and implementation of CAF-wide personnel policies, in particular, require careful horizontal and vertical integration as do their business plans.

Most CMP plans address issues either in Horizon 1 (0-2 years) or Horizon 2 (2-5 years) time frames. Plans for Horizon 1 are typically focussed on delivering annual programs,¹⁶ while Horizon 2 plans are usually focussed on delivering major changes within the two-to-five-year period.¹⁷ CMP contributes to, and participates in, capability-based planning processes of the Environments and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. However, CMP has not applied this practice, as yet, to its own capability needs.

The necessary expertise to develop particular plans is highly varied, but sufficient capability exists to deliver most necessary CMP plans. Certain plans within CMP, in particular the SIP and the Posting Plot, are unique and do not lend themselves to traditional military planning. Planners involved in their preparation require experience in their development and careful guidance to ensure their effectiveness. Similarly, policy development requires a unique skill set and relevant training and development (see comments in the training section). Most plans in CMP lend themselves to standard military planning techniques, and their structure and use clearly reflect this “orders” format. Typical examples include the Canadian Forces Health Services Group Commander’s Planning Guidance – FY 2014/15, the CFRG Recruiting Operation Plans and the Strategic Initiating Directives used within CMP. Good capacity and capabilities seem to exist in this area as the necessary skills and knowledge are usually acquired through common military training and experience. Project management, certainly on major CMP initiatives, closely follows common project management practices. However, care must still be exercised to ensure that project requirements are clearly defined and that goals and objectives are set.

CMP staff change and modify plans and programs as required. Changes and adjustment to most plans of an annual nature are based on time-dependent milestones. This is a common practice in Asst CMP, DGMPRA, DGCB and DGMC. Elsewhere, the SIP is modified on a quarterly basis based on performance metrics reported through DGMP’s performance management team. Recruitment is advanced or restricted based on the necessities or likelihood of reaching designated targets or to prevent surplus recruiting. Many of these plans are more administrative than operational in nature. Therefore, the need for formal branches and sequels to be developed to ensure their delivery is not as great as the need for normal adjustments in their implementation to account for variations in tempo and scope. Strategic initiating directives, new strategies, campaign plans and projects often reflect the necessity to change and adjust existing programs. For instance, DOL’s Official Languages Action Plan 2012-2017 and the Employment Equity plan reflect the requirement to better align DND/CAF policies and practices with legislative requirements. Likewise, CFRG 2016, a business process renewal initiative, reflects an identified need to change how recruiting is performed in order to make it more effective and efficient.¹⁸

MPC Order 2000-1 – Level 2 Planning Instructions describes a range of basic planning tools, common in management literature, to be used in business planning in CMP. This order contains instructions on how to use, develop and articulate a vision statement, mission statements, assumptions, SWOT analysis, SMART objectives, risk management, as well as other related techniques. An analysis of the L2s’ business plans reveals that few of them fully exploit the value of these important tools. Errors abound comprising ponderous vision and/or mission statements, facts stated as assumptions, incomplete or weak SWOT analyses and a seeming indifference to the use of the SMART technique. The weak use of risk management practices was discussed in Key Finding: 6. Many L2 business plan narratives have shown remarkably little change over a five-year period. Often the same problems or requests for redress surface repeatedly on an annual basis. Arguably, it is questionable whether these front-end pieces serve a useful function, and often their voice/tone (i.e., to whom they are addressing) is confusing. If business plans are to be required, then their content must be clearly defined, and management tools must be fully employed.

Planning is carried out extensively in CMP. Generally, the production of strategies, plans and project documentation is completed to a high standard. However, the use of a number of basic management tools would further improve the quality of planning in CMP.

Indicator 11: Evidence CMP is regarded as a credible service provider by other L1s and by individual service members

Based on interviews conducted with their representative, L1s were generally satisfied with the services and support received from CMP.

Individual service member satisfaction is continuously tracked for CMP via surveys conducted by DGMPRA. They include the CAF Recruiting Survey, CAF Exit Survey, Reserve Force Retention Survey, Your Say Survey and many others that, given their high numbers, risk creating survey fatigue. The personnel-related results from these surveys are collated and reported to more senior levels by the DGMP performance management team. These results are a regular part of CMP reporting to various departmental executive management committees but primarily to the Armed Forces Council. Remedial action is generally taken if negative trends are observed. The data captured by this system indicates that individual service members are generally satisfied with CMP services.

Indicator 12: Evidence that knowledge management is of high quality in CMP with staff advice to decision makers informed by shared situational awareness, with clear guidance and direction available and with both institutional and individual clients aware of the services and entitlements

Knowledge management is important in governance as it underpins shared situational awareness and thereby improves both the efficiency and effectiveness of task completion. Shared situational awareness implies a common understanding of the operational environment, the commander’s priorities, and the agreed-upon methods to achieve the commander’s goals and objectives. Shared situational awareness is critical amongst the command element in CMP, but also throughout the organization and, to a degree, among its clients. There are a variety of means to ensure knowledge management is effective. One way is to hold meetings, whether daily, weekly, quarterly or annually. Another way is to disseminate information products. This could include not only websites, campaign plans, program descriptions and newsletters, but also doctrine manuals, standard operating procedures, handbooks, guidelines and instructions.

Shared situational awareness at the higher levels in CMP is good for a number of reasons. First of all, regular near-term meetings (daily and weekly) within CMP ensure L2s are kept abreast of developing events. Secondly, the quarterly MPC Council and CAF Personnel Management Committee serve as venues to discuss operational and strategic-level issues. Finally, the basic strategy, operational model and doctrine in CMP have remained consistent over the last five years. These practices enable CMP to clearly communicate priorities to immediate subordinates and ensure there is a common understanding of strategic and operational goals.

Knowledge management within some L2 organizations may be less effective. Subordinates generally need both strategic/annual direction and the necessary doctrine and standard operating procedures to perform their tasks effectively. While some direction is transmitted to staff at meetings and conferences, formal written direction is of uneven quality. The DGMP business plan is used as the annual direction to DGMP staff, and it is well crafted. Some of the other L2 business plans are less focussed and suffer from a haphazard use of the basic business tools of SWOT and SMART, and they have unclear statements of vision, mission and objectives. The Surgeon General and the Commander CFRG prepare and issue detailed formal annual plans, but CDA’s campaign plan is a colourful PowerPoint presentation. Current and approved standard operating procedures and orders are vital to the effective delivery of all programs in CMP. For instance, most L2s have their own handbooks, instructions or orders. Keeping them current and aligned with changes in policy can be an enormous task, and often these important documents are either out of date or in revision. DGMC policies, Cost Move Budget (Quality Assignment Work Instruction) and Posting Process (Quality Assignment Procedure 2350), for instance, were written in 2000 and were still available on the Defence Information Network during the period of this evaluation. They are obviously outdated. In the CFRG case, over the last few years the annual business plans announced the Recruiting Handbook was in the process of being revised, although it is unclear whether this has been completed. Especially in instances when transitions/rewrites are occurring, it is vital that current versions are identified. Further work is therefore required to improve knowledge management within L2 organizations.

Information products play a key role in promoting knowledge management especially those products that facilitate individuals to perform a “self-serve function,” or that promote general awareness. There are three main issues with how major information products are dealt with in CMP. First of all, many are not easily accessible. CMP produces numerous important information products ranging from mental health strategies to leave regulations, strategies and doctrine. They should be easy to find and access via the main CMP Defence Information Network site, but they are not. Instead, the main CMP publication page, as it existed at the time of the data collection phase of the evaluation, was an eclectic mix of interesting, albeit not necessarily “key” documents. At other times, the distribution of critical documents is unnecessarily limited. For example, hard copies of the new CAF recruiting strategy was distributed to senior officers and non-commissioned members but are not widely available to others. At the same time, key planning documents, such as the current SID, are not as readily available as older ones posted on the CMP Defence Information Network site. Secondly, many information products suffer from a lack of identified authority in their creation and approval. All publications produced within CMP with pan-CAF implications should be published under the due authority of the CMP or the CDS. Given the variety of products produced, there is no obvious standard format for the body of the texts, but the front-end of these publications should at least clearly delineate the custodians and approval authority. For instance, the Caring for Our Own document contains no indication of authorship or authority for amendment. Finally, the production of expensive-to-print, glossy, coloured pamphlets and documents is overdone. As early as 2000, CAF joint doctrine manuals were no longer printed in colour and were only made available in electronic versions. A similar view to cost savings does not seem to exist at some levels in CMP. Many of these glossy products, such as CAF Campus – Operational Framework, the CDA’s 2012 Annual Report, the Surgeon General’s 2014 Annual Report, and Religions in Canada (Director Human Rights and Diversity, 2008) may have valuable content, but their need to be printed in hard copy is questionable. CMP information products must be made readily accessible and subjected to better standardization, formal approval and cost control.

2.5 Performance—Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

The following section examines the extent to which the governance of CMP uses resources in relation to the production of outputs and progress towards outcomes.

2.5.1 Demonstration of Economy

To assess the ongoing economy of the governance of CMP, the evaluation sought evidence that the most economical means are being used to govern military personnel management.

A detailed study of economic measures in regard to governance in CMP was not conducted. In general terms, when evaluating economy in a program, two approaches apply: one is to examine economy from a perspective of determining how great the costs are to secure the resources necessary to conduct the program; the other is to determine of whether the overall costs of the program seem to merit the outcomes achieved. While both these processes are easily applied to substantive, money-spending programs, they were more difficult to model onto governance. What follows below are general observations on the economic aspect of CMP governance.

When examining the CMP structure, some consideration was given to what constituted CMP overhead costs. This was complicated by the fact that the DND/CAF does not have a clear definition of what constitutes overhead for either formations or National Defence Headquarters entities. Therefore, as each division and directorate in CMP was examined, a rough tally was kept of the number of staff in immediate support of senior officials (executives, generals and colonels). When reviewed against similar staff organizations within the Environments, they were found to be comparable.

As stated numerous times, CMP is the functional authority for pan-CAF personnel matters. Despite this authority, a substantial amount of effort is devoted to presenting practically every personnel policy issue to the Armed Forces Council. This process permits the CDS to make the final decision on CAF personnel policies, and it certainly reinforces the consensual nature of senior-level decision making within the DND/CAF. However, to some extent it prevents Commander CMP from having the full range of authority and responsibility for assigned tasks, and it adds extra staff costs given the requirement to continually seek permission to do things.

Like all entities in the DND/CAF, all levels of CMP devote a lot of time to business planning and staffing. The amount of effort dedicated to both of these activities could be described as considerable. The frequency with which reporting formats are changed for business plans— practically on an annual basis—further complicates staff work in this area. The current year’s (FY 2015/16) business plan electronic format appears useful. To the extent possible, CMP should standardize the internal business planning reporting process for a number of years and encourage greater efficiency and effectiveness in both business planning and staffing processes.

2.5.2 Demonstration of Efficiency

To assess the ongoing efficiency of the governance of CMP, the evaluation sought evidence that the most appropriate and efficient means are being used to govern military personnel management.

Like economic considerations, determining efficiency factors for governance is also challenging. To test efficiencies, the evaluation team borrowed a number of concepts from lean management. Specifically, it evaluated whether rework was caused and whether work was organized along lean principles.

CMP continues to develop mechanisms to try to limit rework. A major cause of rework in CMP is out-of-date, improperly prepared or overly complex regulations and orders. It was evident that rework resulted from two areas. One area is around grievances and the work to revise existing regulations. CMP closely monitors both grievances and external factors in efforts to prioritize needed policy revisions. This work is coordinated by DGMP, with oversight provided through the Military Personnel Policy Review Committee. That said, an even higher level of attention may be required in certain aspects of policy development to reduce the number of grievances. A second form of rework is when decision briefs are returned for revision from senior committees. This has happened on occasion to CMP presentations. The Canadian Forces Personnel Management Council now serves as a vetting mechanism for CMP policies and procedures, which have to be placed before core strategic governance committees. The membership of the Canadian Forces Personnel Management Council allows pan-CAF stakeholders an opportunity to be fully engaged in the development and modification of policies. This process is an attempt to ensure, to some extent, that CMP material brought before senior committees is not sent back for rework.

Two specific functions in CMP, policy development and grievances, have the appearance of having been organized along the principles of lean management.¹⁹ In a centralized model, a complete function or service is performed in one office/location. If a centralized model was being used, all policy would be developed in one office and all grievances would be fielded by another, but this is not the case in CMP. Policy development is centrally coordinated by DGMP, but decentralized for execution by teams embedded in L2 organizations across CMP. This allows policy developers immediate access to the staff expertise in the matters under consideration to render them more effective and efficient. This process seems to be working well. Grievances are handled in a similar fashion, but with less centralized coordination. Other cross-functional areas, such as infrastructure management, might also benefit from decentralized execution but with centralized planning and control.

2.6 Other Issues: Effective Governance of the JPSU/IPSC – Achievement of Expected Outcomes

The JPSU is led by a CO, a deputy CO, and is supported by a headquarters organization (JPSU HQ). The CO JPSU is also the DCSM, who provides, among other things, policy and programs for the JPSU. The JPSU consists of eight regional elements across the country, each led by a regional officer commanding.

Each region is composed of several IPSCs. Nationally, there are a total of 24 IPSCs and seven remote sites. An officer commanding does not have the same authority as a CO. This means that numerous matters of administration or discipline requiring CO intervention have to be handled at the national level.

IPSCs comprise two sections. A military platoon with a small staff manages the day-to-day administration and the discipline of ill and injured individuals posted to it from local units (approximately 1700 nationally). Its primary goal is to assist members in returning to work, but it also facilitates the transition to release whenever necessary. The other section (led by a manager) is a services section that provides numerous services to members posted to the IPSC platoon in question, as well as to walk-in clients who are generally other service members or family members. The services section also coordinates the activities of several service partners, such as health services case management or VAC. Both IPSC sections, although closely linked, are independent. One individual does not oversee or command both sections; this is the detached officer commanding’s responsibility.

For the purpose of this report, unless otherwise indicated or implied, the term JPSU shall refer collectively to DCSM, JPSU, and IPSCs.

At CMP’s request, the evaluation looked specifically at the governance of the JPSU. This section discusses the achievement of the JPSU governance expected outcomes, with a central focus on immediate outcomes. The logic model outcomes used for section 2.4 have also been used for this section, with the exception of some minor changes in terminology.

Therefore, to assess the effectiveness of the JPSU governance structure, the evaluation measured performance against the following criteria (outcomes):

• All tasks and resources for which the JPSU is accountable are well managed.
• The JPSU organization is “the right size” and subject to continuous review.
• The JPSU staff possesses the necessary training and skills.
• JPSU decision making is agile, responsive, effective and informed.

The evaluation applied key performance indicators against each outcome. Findings are based on program data and documentation, departmental documents, interviews with key staff and stakeholders and a client questionnaire.

With respect to key informant interviews and for the analysis of the client questionnaire results, the following scale was used throughout this section of the evaluation to indicate the relative weight of the responses for each of the respondent groups:

• Almost all findings reflect opinions of 90 percent or more of the respondents.
• Many/most findings reflect the views and opinions of at least 60 percent of the respondents.
• Some/several findings reflect the views and opinions of at least 25 percent of the respondents.
• A few findings reflect the views and opinions of at least two respondents but less than 25 percent of the respondents.

2.6.1 Immediate Outcome – All tasks and resources for which the JPSU is accountable are well managed

This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indicators:

• Aligned: evidence that regulations, direction and guidance align with higher orders and direction;
• Integrated: evidence that plans reflect the coordination of activities and resources both internally and externally;
• evidence of a well-designed PMF used in the execution of programs and projects and
• evidence of a well-designed risk management framework used in the execution of programs and projects.

Indicator 1: Evidence that regulations, direction and guidance align with higher orders and direction

Most respondents to a JPSU-wide survey indicated that regulations, direction and guidance provided at the JPSU level usually or always align with higher-level orders and direction. The evaluation also reviewed DCSM directives and procedures, which are the primary DCSM regulations, and found clear reference to strategic guidance and direction, as well as to the relevant and required policies and procedures. Of note, DCSM directives and procedures are regularly updated to reflect changes originating in higher-level orders and direction, as well as in policies and procedures.

Indicator 2: Evidence that plans reflect the coordination of activities and resources both internally and externally

Effective integration, from a governance perspective, implies that the plans and activities of the JPSU are effectively coordinated with all stakeholders. Integration also takes place between stakeholders themselves, the transition between Canadian Forces Health Services (CFHS) and VAC is a case in point. CFHS and VAC integration was analyzed in great detail in a 2012 audit by the Office of the Auditor General and, consequently, it will not be discussed in this evaluation, with the possible exception of a few relevant comments later in this section of the report.

Integration takes place both at the individual IPSC level and at the national level in order to provide necessary services. Individually, at the IPSC level, activities must be integrated within the IPSCs themselves, with service partners, with other government departments, with operational units, with CAF staffs and with base services. At the national level, integration is focused on service partners, other government departments and CAF staff.

There is a satisfactory level of integration within the IPSCs as evidenced from many survey participants responding “usually or always satisfied.” However, some respondents indicated there was a degree of confusion between the JPSU and the DCSM chains of command, which has resulted in, for example, incorrect routing of requests and submissions for higher-authority approval. This is discussed further as part of the grouping of tasks (section 2.6.2). A message heard consistently throughout the evaluation is that successful integration within an IPSC is directly and strongly correlated to the individual personalities of the key players and interpersonal relationships. This is likely due to the lack of a single person being officially in charge at an IPSC (see section 2.6.2). Willingness of actors to work together and get the job done is essential to the proper functioning of an IPSC.

At the local level, most IPSC respondents indicated a satisfactory level of integration with service partners and likewise had an associated positive perception. Ongoing communication with and across all concerned agencies is key to minimizing integration issues. There is extensive evidence that such communication occurs on a planned and regular basis. Notwithstanding, some staff respondents said that certain partners would benefit from an even greater level of integration. For example, 30 percent and 18 percent of all respondents identified CAF Case Management Services and VAC, respectively, as requiring greater integration with all stakeholders. The following two additional issues were noted on several occasions:

• Co-location of the IPSC with its service partners could improve as this is perceived to be important to integration. Personnel explained how the lack of co-location at small IPSCs has contributed to poor information exchange across the CAF/VAC transition, and it can subsequently result in a lack of integration.
• On occasion, the issue around health services / medical / client confidentiality has made the relationship with the IPSCs challenging. There is frustration within some IPSCs and other service partners about the inability to access sufficient medical information to make informed decisions respecting Return to Duty programs or programs designed for family members. The medical community has cited the need to protect the confidentiality of medical information as per normal medical policy. This results in difficulties developing appropriate programs for members and/or their families, at times. An ability to work well together is essential in these instances to ensure that members and their families receive the services they need.

At the national level, there was evidence of strong integration between JPSU, other CAF elements, VAC and other service partners. While the system appears to be working, there are opportunities for improvement.

The evaluation findings demonstrate that greater care must be taken to ensure better integration of policies and procedures. For example, transition issues are addressed through CFHS case management policies, DCSM directives and procedures and CANFORGENs, which all make reference to VAC involvement, but without a clear direction as to which VAC supporting policies align. The coordination of related policies, procedures and associated paperwork, and ensuring that these align with VAC documentation, needs to be better. Having documentation common with VAC might be a good approach.

Although outside the scope of the evaluation, there was evidence of some challenges in client transition from the CAF to VAC. Interviewees noted that the Integrated Transition Plans, whose responsibility lies with IPSC to coordinate and develop, are well-managed and an effective tool in this regard, but interdepartmental difficulties remain. In part, these challenges are the result of CFHS and VAC assessing the same client using different sets of policies, programs and requirements. Some senior interviewees said the two departments simply do not understand one another.

The DND-VAC Joint Steering Committee is considered an effective and important mechanism to assist in this regard. The evaluation noted that some senior retired CAF members have assumed key positions within VAC, and that VAC is placing additional personnel in CAF units. This should be helpful. VAC suggested “if we share transition, there needs to be a body that looks at it from the members’ point of view—not each organization’s point of view. The member pays the price in timing and coordination.”

The evidence is inconclusive respecting whether a satisfactory level of integration exists between the IPSCs, bases and unit COs. Interviewees provided a wide array of responses. No definitive trends can be identified, as comments range from outstanding integration with the local base to weak integration. Other issues reported during staff assistance visits by JPSU HQ and from interviews include the following:

• a perception that IPSCs are not considered priority organizations;
• concerns around not getting all the information required from units to support clients;
• local base personnel not understanding the core mandate of IPSC (a transition to release instead of return to work); and
• a reluctance to support the posting of ill and injured personnel to JPSU.

It should be noted that the program authorities are well aware of these issues, and there was clear evidence of an active communication program underway by IPSCs to minimize or eliminate these concerns. Overall, despite the challenges noted above, the integration of IPSC within the JPSU appears to be working, and, generally, there is no evidence of significant additional costs or delays in the delivery of services due to a lack of integration.

Indicator 3: Evidence of a well-designed PMF used in the execution of programs and projects

There is evidence that JPSU has a PMF in place, but it is not clear to the evaluation team to what extent it is employed to support management and resourcing decisions. A PMF was developed in 2009 at the creation of the JPSU/IPSC, and another was recently developed for the DND/CAF Program Alignment Architecture.

Evidence of their use and data from either of these PMFs are not available. Nevertheless, extensive statistical, quantitative and qualitative data are routinely produced by IPSCs and transmitted through the regional officers commanding to JPSU HQ. While the evaluation team found proof of their use in policy and program reviews, it could not find any demonstration of how they are integrated, reported or used in a performance measurement strategy. Some snapshots of specific data are used in briefings to senior management committees. However, when the evaluation team requested further details to develop arguments around performance, the data provided (after an extensive collection and analysis process by JPSU HQ) differed from what was originally observed. Furthermore, the data appeared to be erroneous. It should be noted that the section primarily responsible for data analysis and reporting was under-strength” and had no leader at the time. Some interviewees stated that JPSU has neither the time nor the personnel to carry out effective performance reporting.

JPSU HQ conducts thorough and regular staff assistance visits to all of IPSCs and their stakeholders on a four-year rotation cycle. Recommendations are subsequently made and corrective action identified. However, there is no indication of any formal follow-up until the next staff assistance visit.

During the interview process, officers commanding and headquarters personnel were consulted regarding performance measurement. Interviewees pointed to a lack of awareness of the existence and use of performance measurement. Comments from officers commanding ranged from neutral (“I don’t see or use performance measurement data”), to negative (“waste of my time collecting data”). Managers at both JPSU HQ and DCSM were neutral in their assessment of the collection, usage and utility of performance measurement data, and they consider this to be an area in need of further improvement.

When asked what performance data they use in decision making, most interviewees responded with “Return to Duty” numbers. Data respecting casualty tracking and staff-to-client ratio were also identified. However, interviewees did not indicate receiving any feedback about the performance data reported to JPSU HQ. They stated that they only get feedback if there is a problem, and that they do not even know where to obtain the data should they ever want to use it.

DCSM does have a section devoted to collecting and assessing performance data, but when asked, only one interviewee reported using it.

Indicator 4: Evidence of a well-designed risk management framework used in the execution of programs and projects

During interviews, most respondents indicated that DCSM/JPSU either does not have a risk-management strategy in place or, if it does, it is informal. Some just did not know. The evaluation also was unable to find any documentation that articulated a risk management strategy. This was confirmed by senior managers.

2.6.2 Immediate outcome – The JPSU organization is “the right size” and subject to continuous review

This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indictors:

• evidence that leaders’/managers’ span of control does not exceed their ability to effectively manage their responsibilities;
• evidence that tasks and work are grouped logically to the best effect;
• evidence that delegation of responsibility includes the appropriate authority;
• evidence that all committees established in JPSU contribute to effective management by achieving their purpose and adding value; and
• evidence that the organization is subject to periodic review and adapts to meet future requirements.

Indicator 1: Evidence that leaders’/managers’ span of control does not exceed their ability to effectively manage their responsibilities

As described above, span of control can refer to the number of a leader’s/manager’s direct reports, the leader’s/manager’s level of responsibility, or both. According to questionnaire results, many managers report having sufficient time to manage their direct reports. This would indicate a good span of control; however, when asked if they had enough time, and an adequate number of staff and responsibilities, responses varied. Personnel did indicate that managers are accessible, and almost all questionnaire respondents reported having sufficient access to their immediate supervisor/superior.

Two key issues were identified by respondents. The first was staffing problems. Respondents stated that a lack of staff was impacting their ability to fulfill all their responsibilities. Employee turnover and a complex staffing process were specifically noted. When asked to suggest solutions, few did, although switching positions from Regular Force back to Primary Reserve was suggested by some. Further discussion on staffing can be found in indicator 5.

The second concern was in regard to the CO JPSU’s span of control, which is both geographically (the entire country) and numerically (8 regional OCs, 24 IPSCs, 7 remote sites, 1700 posted-in members, 3700 walk-in clients) huge. A lack of subordinate COs is preventing a multitude of administrative processes from being immediately addressed; if they can be quickly and adequately managed, file “turn-around” time would be reduced. This would also allow for a significant increase in the command and control of the members posted-in to IPSC. The span of control problem also extends to the deputy CO JPSU, who must focus on extensive administrative tasks thereby limiting his capacity to respond to emergencies and impeding his level of responsiveness.

Indicator 2: Evidence that tasks and work are grouped logically to the best effect

The evaluation found varying opinions on the fundamental nature and construct of an IPSC. Some respondents saw it primarily as a service centre with a platoon of CAF members who happen to be co-located. Others viewed it as a platoon of ill and injured with a co-located service center. Some officers commanding stated that it takes a long while to determine how each IPSC is structured. There was no commonly held opinion other than the nearly unanimous sentiment that personalities and a willingness to work together are what result in an IPSC’s success. Despite this, when surveyed, most staff indicated that work in JPSU is usually or always organized logically, and that assigned tasks are usually or always linked to higher-level objectives.

Although many staff indicated via the questionnaire that the organization has clear lines of reporting, they commented that there is no one person in charge at an IPSC. The actual functioning varies from centre to centre largely on the strength of personalities and a willingness to work together. The evaluation team interviewed a total of 14 service managers/platoon commanders representing all of the eight regions and noted widely varying points of view and degrees of understanding. Stakeholders report that they are not clear about lines of reporting. Military personnel tend to gravitate to the platoon commander simply because it is a military position. The CO JPSU is content with the current structure.

When asked if there are any changes they would recommend for the chain of command structure, some staff and most managers stated that the officers commanding should be COs. A benefit of officers commanding becoming COs would be a reduction in the large volume of files needing to go to CO JPSU and CMP for decision/action, and thus a reduction in their workload. The following examples include approval of accumulated, special and short leave, terms of service renewal and conduct of summary trials:

• evidence that current plans and programs are modified as required to improve service delivery and ensure objectives are met;
• evidence that CMP responds to crises and urgent issues in a timely manner, with clear processes that minimize disruptions in response;
• evidence that CMP is regarded as a credible service provider by other L1s and by individual service members;
• evidence that CMP has the capability and capacity to plan at all levels, that plans are developed, adapted and adjusted in both the preparation and execution phases to meet specified outcomes, and that alternatives are considered;
• evidence that high-quality knowledge management is conducted in CMP, and that staff advice to decision makers is informed by shared situational awareness, clear guidance and direction.

When asked if any other changes could be made to improve the grouping of tasks organizationally, senior leaders responded that DCSM and JPSU could be merged into one organization. There seems to be no apparent reason to have them as separate organizations unless DCSM’s tasks, which are unrelated to JPSU, would somehow be affected.

The chain of command structure sometimes leads to official communication channels within JPSU/IPSC not being uniformly understood or followed, resulting in some frustration and miscommunication. The IPSC Service Manager, while directly responsible to the Officer Commanding, takes functional direction from JPSU HQ Operations and Training. Many interviewees responded that this construct is working, and some stated that it does not, noting communication issues. For example, the evaluation team heard several examples of information that would normally be passed to the chain of command being passed instead to the Service Manager from JPSU Operations and Training and then relayed informally to the platoon commander. A few platoon commanders reported that they often receive differing information or no information at all from the chain of command on the same issue. Opinions varied widely among platoon commanders and service managers about how things should work. The closest to an average opinion is that officers commanding are more concerned with the platoon than the services section, and that information should come down the chain of command through the regional headquarters.

Indicator 3: Evidence that delegation of responsibility includes the appropriate authority

Managers have assigned tasks and responsibilities requiring proper authority to conduct them. In the current JPSU construct, most managers indicated in interviews that they have the necessary authority to complete their assigned tasks and fulfill their responsibilities.

Indicator 4: Evidence that all committees established in the JPSU contribute to effective management by achieving their purpose and adding value

There is evidence that all committees established in the JPSU contribute to effective management by achieving their purpose and adding value. Committees do not require an unreasonable amount of time from attendees and make a positive contribution.

According to the questionnaire results, half the staff members attend formal or ad hoc committee meetings. On average, those attending committee meetings spend 2.4 hours weekly preparing for and attending them. Most of those attending committee meetings indicated that concerned stakeholders also participate and that existing committees are useful to decision making and/or the sharing of relevant information. Additionally, many staff indicated that there are usually or always sufficient opportunities for concerned stakeholders to discuss and/or resolve relevant issues.

Indicator 5: Evidence that the organization is subject to periodic review and adapts to meet future requirements

There is little evidence that the organization is subject to periodic reviews and adapts to meet future requirements. Some questionnaire respondents indicated that workload demands are determined and considered in future planning, but that the IPSCs do not, or only sometimes, have the necessary staff to serve their client base. While interview respondents confirmed insufficient staffing levels, they provided no evidence that the organization is subject to periodic review and adapts to meet future requirements.

The organization appears to be reactionary rather than proactive as it does not formally assess its future requirements and prepare plans accordingly. Interviewees up to senior management levels stated that this is a crisis management organization, and long-term planning does not take place. Senior management stated that the organization lacked strategic planning expertise, and that it would be extremely helpful to have someone dedicated to organizational planning.

Another apparent concern is the high instances of staff turnover. Good governance requires an adequate establishment populated by qualified personnel. The questionnaire and interviews revealed a widespread shortage of staff. When asked why this is the case, interview respondents provided multiple explanations, none of which stand out as a recurring trend. These include the following:

• the difficulty of finding available reservists for hire;
• cuts and delays in hiring in the public service;
• uneven distribution of existing manpower;
• the challenge of developing properly trained staff;
• loss of staff due to mental health issues as staff become overburdened;
• increasing client loads due to increasing programs; and
• greater awareness of IPSC.

Program data underlines the large growth in clients without a corresponding increase in staff. Since the formation of JPSU and IPSC, the number of active clients has increased 167 percent (from 2106 to 5625). In the same period, the number of positions in JPSU (military and civilian) has only grown 23 percent (239 to 295). The evaluation team repeatedly heard examples of staff overwork and burnout. Recently program managers have been successful in mitigating the problems by obtaining additional staff positions and/or redistributing staff. The evaluation also heard speculation from senior management that staff possibly spend too much time with some files. This issue needs to be studied.

Interview respondents indicated that, despite the shortage of staff, the job continues to get done. When asked what have been the consequences of getting the job done regardless of limited resources, respondents pointed to staff turnover and burnout.

The evaluation asked senior leadership what has been done to improve the situation; one out of five respondents stated that the organization has a reactionary approach, and two others stated that Reserve Force positions were changed into Regular Force positions to facilitate staffing. This solution, however, is not unanimously considered the correct approach. It was pointed out that Regular Force positions are not equivalent to Reserve Force positions in that the Regular Forces require more time for non-task-related duty and career development activities. The DGMPRA confirmed that it currently has no projects underway to determine future client levels for IPSC. It also does not appear that staff-to-client ratios are tracked, or that standards are in place.

2.6.3 Immediate outcome – JPSU staff possess the necessary training and skills

This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indictors:

• evidence that individuals, when assigned to JPSU, have the necessary job qualifications for their position; and
• evidence that individuals in the JPSU receive training to improve their job skills and capabilities.

Indicator 1: Evidence that individuals, when assigned to the JPSU, have the necessary job qualifications for their position

There is some evidence that individuals, when assigned to the JPSU, have the necessary job qualifications for their position. However, a number of individuals require job-specific training following their hire to become fully qualified to effectively fulfill their responsibilities.

Employment in JPSU requires individuals who are the “right fit” for the emotional, high-stress environment inherent in the job. Several staff members believe that personnel hired by, or posted to, the organization are usually or always qualified for this task. Nevertheless, as explained by some in comments provided via the questionnaire and by many interview respondents asked about this issue, people hired by, or posted to IPSC are not always fully qualified to do their jobs. The staff members further pointed out that they were not too concerned about this as specific job skills could be easily taught. What is important, however, is that a new hire has the right interpersonal skills and personality attributes for the job, thereby ensuring they are the right fit. The fact that some employees have quit or become clients due to job stress, (see section 2.6.2), demonstrates the importance of careful screening during the hiring process.

Indicator 2. Evidence that individuals in the JPSU receive training to improve their job skills and capabilities

There is evidence that individuals in JPSU receive training to improve their job skills and capabilities. Many staff members indicated that the learning and training they received is usually or always relevant to their job. However, only some indicated that they have a formal or informal personal learning and/or training plan. Of these, many indicated that it the plan is followed, including being funded as required. Only a number of individuals indicated that this is never or only sometimes the case.

Among comments provided via the questionnaire, staff provided several possible explanations for deficiencies in training, which may be indicative that training is not considered a priority for the organization. The following are some examples:

• lack of encouragement to follow training plans because of timing and lack of resources;
• career development is exclusive to military personnel;
• budget cuts or lack of funds; and
• no time for a personal learning plan.

2.6.4 Intermediate outcome – JPSU decision making is agile, responsive, effective and informed

This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indictors:

• evidence that current plans and programs are modified as required to improve overall service delivery;
• evidence that future requirements are being determined;
• evidence that JPSU responds well to crises / urgent issues;
• evidence that clients are satisfied; and
• evidence that high-quality knowledge management is conducted in JPSU, and that staff advice to decision makers is informed by shared situational awareness, clear guidance and direction.

Indicator 1: Evidence that current plans and programs are modified as required to improve overall service delivery

In the questionnaire, many staff members mentioned that programs, activities and plans are usually or always modified as required to improve overall service delivery. A review of program documentation found little evidence of the existence of planning documents; however, evidence of procedural and process documents was discovered. The latter are reviewed and updated regularly. Organizationally, JPSU has a Continuous Improvements section focussed on the analysis of various inputs, such as national casualty tracking, monthly reports, staff assistance visits and client and supervisor satisfaction questionnaires. These inputs, in turn, are meant to lead to improvements in JPSU services. Staffing shortages have largely curtailed the effectiveness of this section during the period of the evaluation.

Indicator 2: Evidence that future requirements are being determined

The evaluation found no indication that future requirements are being determined. Documents contain no such information, and this was confirmed by senior managers who pointed out that JPSU is a crisis management organization. This lack of long-term planning has contributed to the staffing difficulties (see section 2.6.2, indicator 5).

Indicator 3: Evidence that JPSU responds well to crises / urgent issues

JPSU responds well to crises / urgent issues. Almost all staff indicated that procedures and directives for dealing with urgent matters and requests are usually or always clear. Client satisfaction data confirms that urgent issues are well managed. However, the combination of staff shortages and the number of urgent issues has led to some staff burnout (see section 2.6.2).

The nature of the organization combined with the nature of the issues it handles mean that CO JPSU has to get directly involved with individual files, which can rapidly implicate the most senior levels of the Department and the Government. This happens regularly and places a huge workload burden directly on the position. The deputy commanding officer is forced to be involved in extensive administrative tasks that could have been delegated to subordinate COs if they existed. As a result, the deputy commanding officer is severely limited in his/her capacity to respond to crises/emergencies, impeding his/her ability to assist and delegate to CO JPSU.

Indicator 4: Evidence that clients are satisfied

A presentation to the departmental leadership in 2014²⁰ indicated that client satisfaction was down slightly, that wait time satisfaction was steady, and that the JPSU still met the strategic outcome objectives. As discussed, there is no evidence of how this data was obtained. There is significant client satisfaction data collected at the local level, but there does not appear to be a mechanism for collecting and analysing that data at the national level.

Indicator 5: Staff advice to decision makers is informed by shared situational awareness, clear guidance and direction

Although official communications channels are sometimes opaque (see section 2.6.2, indicator 2), almost all staff indicated that they usually or always have a clear understanding of issues, and that they receive clear guidance and direction to enable them to do their work well. This permits them to provide pertinent advice; however, there is also evidence that lessons learned and best practices are not always shared with program staff.

When asked how knowledge is shared, almost all interviewees stressed local initiatives, such as stakeholder meetings and discussions. At the national level, the message was different. Many respondents stated that, other than annual national level conferences, best practices are rarely shared across the organization. There is a feeling among some at the regional and local level that the sharing of best practices or lessons learned may happen at the managerial level but may never reach the staff members who deal with the issues.

The intent to share information, however, is clear. The Caring for Our Own report states that “The Lessons Learned cell uses a knowledge management system that allows employees to share observations on service delivery, policies, protocols and other activities; it also allows for feedback, identifying issues and lessons learned during the analysis of the gathered information, and putting to use knowledge gained through past experiences. This cell verifies stores, disseminates and uses lessons learned in support of organizational objectives.”²¹ This section was understrength during the evaluation, which may explain why information sharing is currently not viewed positively.

When asked if they feel they have the right type and amount of information and advice to make decisions, most interview respondents, including all decision makers, said yes. A few pointed out that they did not have the authority to make decisions despite having all the information to do so.

There appears to be a contradictory perception of the role of regional headquarters in the decision-making process, with a few respondents emphasizing the positive role of the officer commanding and another few saying that decisions seldom involve the officer commanding. This is consistent with other evidence of a personality-driven organization where individuals have a clear impact on the consistency and success of operating processes.

Annex A—Management Action Plan

The examination of the Governance of the MPC was superseded by the ongoing review provided by the Defence Renewal Lean Headquarters Initiative and the 2015 CDS Review of JPSU. Accordingly, those reviews will address the issues identified in this evaluation, as well as numerous others identified through the deep examination of key sub-units. The CDS Review of JPSU was initiated in August 2015 and completed in November 2015. It has made over 50 recommendations to improve JPSU performance, and work is presently underway to address those concerns.

The Lean Headquarters initiative will develop a more agile and effective structure within NDHQ to ensure that our resources are focused and aligned with current and future Defence priorities.

With respect to the evaluation, Lean Headquarters and the CDS review will specifically address the following key management actions.

Planning and Performance Management

Management Action

CMP will work with ADM(RS) to establish a PMF that will include appropriate measures to provide the necessary information to managers to help them make sound business decisions. This will be used in the preparation and establishment of integrated business plans

OPI: MPC/Deputy Commander

Target Date: Draft PMF completed by September 2016 and implemented by April 2017

Personnel Capacity

Management Action

As part of the Lean Headquarters Initiative an examination of the organizational design and span of control will ensure that both the size and capability of management teams are appropriate. Based upon this review, a re-allocation of resources may occur, and training gaps may be identified.

OPI: MPC/COS

Target Date: Lean Headquarters recommendations will be presented in October 2016, provided the contractor delivers the final report by July 2016

Organizational Design

Management Action

As part of the Lean Headquarters Initiative, an examination of the organizational design and span of control will ensure that both the size and capability of management teams are appropriate. Based upon this review, a re-allocation of resources may occur, and delegation of authorities will be examined.

OPI: MPC/COS

Target Date: Lean Headquarters recommendations will be presented in October 2016

JPSU Governance

Management Action

The CDS Review of the JPSU has identified this issue and has addressed the command structure concerns. Implementation of a new command structure and appropriate communication and clarification of roles have been initiated.

OPI: MPC/Deputy Commander

Target Date: July 2016

JPSU Personnel

Management Action

The CDS Review of the JPSU has identified this issue and has addressed the command structure concerns. Targets are being established, and staffing of all vacant positions has been made a priority.

OPI: MPC/DGMWS

Target Date: Implemented

Annex B—Evaluation Methodology and Limitations

1.0 Methodology

The evaluation team used multiple lines of evidence and complementary qualitative and quantitative research methods as a means to ensure the reliability of information and data supporting the findings. The methodology established a consistent approach in the collection and analysis of data to support evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Based on the evidence from available sources, the evaluation team reviewed the achievement of expected outcomes and the program’s efficiency and economy to develop a balanced picture of the relevance and performance of the governance of CMP and JPSU/IPSC. Information and data were correlated to each evaluation question and corresponding indicators.

1.1 Overview of Data Collection Methods

Data collection methods were selected based on the data required to address performance indicators in the Evaluation Matrix (Annex D). The following data collection methods were used to gather qualitative and quantitative data for each type of operation in the evaluation:

• literature and document review;
• client questionnaire (JPSU/IPSC);
• key informant interviews; and
• administrative, financial and human resources data reviews.

1.2 Details on Data Collection Methods

1.2.1 Literature and Document Review

A preliminary document and literature review was undertaken as part of the planning phase of the evaluation to garner a foundational understanding of governance in general, as well as governance within CMP and JPSU/IPSC. A comprehensive document review was undertaken as part of the conduct phase of the evaluation, focusing on relevance and performance.

The following documents were reviewed during the conduct phase of the evaluation:

• Academic management literature, such as James Mooney’s The Principles of Organization (1947), Alvin Brown’s The Organization of Industry (1947), Neil Carter et al. How Organizations Measure Success (1995), Geert Hofstede and Gert Hofstede’s Cultures and Organizations (2005), James Womack and Daniel Jones’s Lean Thinking (1996), and many more books and articles.
• Foundation documents:
  • Corporate documents: Reports on Plans and Priorities, Departmental Performance Reports, Canada First Defence Strategy and Speeches from the Throne;
  • Legal documents: acts and regulations, such as the National Defence Act; and
  • Other documents: evaluations, audits, other internal studies, such as previous ADM(RS) evaluations, business plans, performance measurement plans, CMP organizational guidance, direction and policy.

The document review was conducted in part using a customized template organized according to the evaluation questions and indicators.

1.2.2 Client Questionnaire

A bilingual (English and French) questionnaire to collect information and opinions on several indicators related to JPSU/IPSC was administered to the entire DCSM/JPSU/IPSC organization to determine the extent to which several of the outcomes of the governance of DCSM/JPSU/IPSC are being achieved.

A five-point scale was presented for each question, followed by a section for comments. From approximately 300 questionnaires distributed, 230 responses were received.

1.2.3 Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews and information sessions with stakeholders, directly or indirectly involved in the provision of governance, served as an important source of qualitative information.

Interviewees were emailed an interview guide prior to the interview. Most individual interviews were conducted in person or by telephone; some were conducted using written responses. Follow-up questions to selected individuals were posed and answered by email. The interview guide was explained to interviewees before the beginning of the interview, and interviewees were encouraged to be open and candid in their responses to the questions.

The evaluators took notes during the interviews, and subsequently transcribed their notes. These notes were then shared and compared with a view to reaching a common record.

1.2.4 Review of Financial and Human Resources Data

Limited CMP financial and human resources data was reviewed as described in section 1.3.2 of this report. The data, covering FYs 2008/09 to 2013/14, was extracted from the Defence Resource Management Information System.

2.0 Limitations

Table B-1. Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Strategies. This table lists the evaluation methodology limitations and the mitigation strategies associated with those limitations.

Annex C—Logic Model

Inputs

• CDS / Deputy Minister direction and guidance
• Personnel
• Resources
• Legislation and regulation

Activities

• Planning
• Directing
• Controlling
• Organizing
• Staffing

Outputs

• Plans
• Programs and projects
• Performance Measurement Framework
• CMP Organization
• CMP Establishment

Immediate Outcomes

• All tasks and resources for which CMP is accountable are well managed.
• CMP organization is “the right size” and subject to continuous review.
• CMP staff possesses the necessary skills and training.
• CMP decision making is agile, responsive, effective and informed.

Intermediate Outcomes

• The CAF establishment is completely and effectively populated (not evaluated).
• Members and their families perceive the CAF as a competitive and trusted employer (not evaluated).
• The CMP capabilities that are necessary to support mission success are deployable and effective (not evaluated).

Ultimate Outcome

• The CAF secures, prepares and sustains the necessary human resources to maintain its operational capabilities, while supporting CAF members and their families both during and after their service (not evaluated).

Annex D—Evaluation Matrix

Table D-1. Evaluation Matrix—Relevance. This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining CMP’s relevance.

Table D-2. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Effectiveness). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the governance of CMP’s performance in terms of achievement of outcomes (effectiveness).

Table D-3. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Efficiency and Economy).This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the governance of CMP’s performance in terms of efficiency and economy.

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Footnote 1 The CDA was renamed Military Personnel Generation on June 3, 2015 as a result of a broadening of the Command’s mandate to include Recruiting Group and Military Personnel Generation Requirement. Source: Military Personnel Generation intranet site.

Footnote 2 These calculations are based on the financial data available in the Defence Resource Management Information System and in the Military Pay Costing Database.

Footnote 3 TBS. Directive on the Evaluation Function, April 1, 2009. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=15681&section=text. Last consulted on July 4, 2014.

Footnote 4 Unification involved the amalgamation of the three distinct services—the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force—into one service, the CAF.

Footnote 5 For example, the TBS website: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/rm-gr/rm-gr-eng.asp, the VCDS intranet site, and the document Risk Management for CF Operations (B-GJ-005/502/FP-000).

Footnote 6 Chief Review Services. Audit of Military Compensation and Benefits, October 2014. (Note that Chief Review Services changed to ADM(RS) as of May 13, 2015).

Footnote 7 Project Approval Directive 2015, Chapter 10 – Project Risk Analysis and the Project Risk Management Plan. Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation. Risk Management Plan, version 1.0, May 2012.

Footnote 8 Chief of Programme / Director Defence Force Planning 7. DND/CF Interim Organization and Establishment Policy (CFP 219).

Footnote 9 Chief of Programme / Director Defence Force Planning 7, DND/CF Interim Organization and Establishment Policy (CFP 219).

Footnote 10 Alvin Brown. Organization of Industry, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1947.

Footnote 11 Henry Mintzberg. Mintzberg on Management. New York: The Free Press, 1989.

Footnote 12 Examples of the former include the CAF Military Personnel Policy Committee, the Basic Training List Management Working Group and the Spectrum of Care Review Committee. These types of committees ensure CMP plans and projects are effectively planned, coordinated and synchronized. Examples of the latter include CMP’s daily coordination meetings and the bi-annual MPC Council.

Footnote 13 This includes committees such as the Cost Move Committee, the Professional Development Council and the Individual Training and Education Committee.

Footnote 14 These include the Armed Forces Council, the Programme Management Board, the Commander’s Council, the Defence Management Committee and the Defence Capability Board.

Footnote 15 The May 2012 Chief Review Services report Audit of the Non-Public Property Governance, Strategic Management and Business Planning outlined the problems which hampered the effectiveness of this committee. A modified Defence Administrative Order and Directive 9003-1 – Non-Public Property Governance Framework, CMP and the Non-Public Property Board was issued in late 2014 to ensure the Non-Public Property Board continues to serve its useful function.

Footnote 16 Plans in this category include the SIP, the CFRG Recruiting Operation Plan, the DGMC Posting Plot, and, of course, the L1 and L2 business plans.

Footnote 17 Plans in this category include most of the projects sponsored by CMP (including business process renewal projects), and the numerous campaign plans guiding particular programs such as the DOL’s Official Languages Action Plan 2012–2017 and the Surgeon General’s Mental Health Strategy.

Footnote 18 DND/CAF. Defence Renewal Plan, October 2013.

Footnote 19 For principles of lean management, see James Womack and Daniel Jones. Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in Your Corporation, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Footnote 20 Support to the Ill and Injured” PowerPoint presentation to the Programme Management Board, March 2014.

Footnote 21 DND. Caring For Our Own