Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Maritime Domain Awareness [National Defence, Transport, Fisheries & Oceans]
- National Defence fully agrees with the recommendation of the Auditor General. The surveillance of Arctic waters is a whole-of-government effort and National Defence is committed to doing its part.
- An important aspect of this interdepartmental collaboration is the work of our Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC).
- That is why, through our Management Action Plan, we committed to work with our government partners to improve our information sharing regime by undertaking a comprehensive review to identify gaps and measures to mitigate them.
- Enhancing our maritime awareness is also linked to our essential capabilities, such as modernising our naval fleet.
- The procurement of six AOPS will significantly enhance our domain awareness capabilities, including by enabling us to reach areas of the Arctic that were previously inaccessible.
- The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) recently took delivery of its third AOPS, and anticipates the delivery of the remaining three by 2025.
- From a Defence perspective, our commitment to NORAD is also fundamental to the way in which we protect the North, including through maritime warning.
- We are investing $38.6 billion over the next 20 years to enhance and modernise our contributions to NORAD.
- This marks the most significant upgrade to Canada’s NORAD capabilities in nearly four decades. It will include investments in improving command and control, enhancing surveillance and threat detection, modernizing air weapons systems, modernising infrastructure, and supporting research and development.
- Together, these initiatives will address some of the core issues identified by the Auditor General, in terms of our ability to better track vessels and to share quickly and effectively what we know with those who need to know.
Auditor General Report – Recommendation 1
Key Findings:
- Federal organizations’ actions did not address long-standing gaps in the surveillance of Arctic waters.
- While Marine Security Operations Centres helped federal organizations collaborate on building maritime domain awareness, weaknesses in the mechanisms that support information sharing, decision making, and accountability affected the Centres’ efficiency.
Recommendation 1:
- National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and the Canadian Coast Guard, working together, should take concrete actions to address the long-standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the following:
- the inability to track vessels continuously and to identify non-emitting vessels
- the barriers that prevent efficiently sharing and integrating relevant information about vessel traffic in Arctic waters.
Details
- In its Management Action Plan (MAP), National Defence notes that the procurement of six AOP vessels will enhance the Navy’s Arctic surveillance capabilities. Notes on the following key projects can be found as follows: AOPS, CP-140 Aurora, and CH-148 Cyclone.
Marine Security Operations Centres
- A key aspect of the intergovernmental response to Recommendation 1 relates to improving information sharing through the MSOCs to enhance maritime domain awareness.
- MSOCs help to detect, assess and support a response to any threat to marine security that could affect the safety, security, environment or economy of Canada.
- Specifically, through its MAP, National Defence commits to working with Transport Canada (TC), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) to initiate a review of the MoU governing information sharing at the MSOC-level (to be completed by 31 December 2023).
- In addition, the MAP identifies that an independent third-party review will be launched to examine management and decision-making process of the MSOC program (to be completed by 31 December 2023).
- The contract to conduct the 3rd Party Review has been awarded to Deloitte. The 3rd Party Review will be complete by 14 April 2023.
- MSOCs are a unique example of multi-agency integration. Core Participants of the MSOC (DND/CAF, RCMP, DFO/CCG, CBSA and TC) operate under an MOU signed in 2004. DND/CAF leads two coastal centres and the RCMP leads the centre covering the Great Lakes and St-Lawrence Seaway. The operational and technical authority of the MSOCs is the RCN.
Recommendation 2: Procurement Delays [National Defence, Transport, Fisheries & Oceans]
- National Defence fully agrees with the recommendation of the Auditor General regarding the importance of acquiring equipment in a timely manner and of managing capability risks associated with Arctic water surveillance.
- Defence procurement is a whole-of-government effort. We are working with our key partners – PSPC, ISED, and Defence Construction Canada – to improve the speed at which we deliver capabilities and to consider more innovative approaches to procurement.
- I also believe that National Defence can work internally to streamline how we approach procurement.
- Some of this work is identified in our Management Action Plan, including making our internal governance structures more efficient and responsive.
- We are also seeking to better integrate risk considerations into our most fundamental processes to ‘bake’ them into our templates and schedules.
- This will go a long way in making sure that we are identifying gaps earlier and addressing them in a timelier way.
Auditor General Report – Recommendation 2
Key Findings:
- Fleets, equipment, and infrastructure used for monitoring maritime traffic need timely replacement and enhancement.
- Existing infrastructure improvement projects are behind schedule and the Nanisivik Naval Facility will not effectively support the vessels that operate in the Arctic.
- The report highlights the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, CP-140 Aurora and Nanisivik Naval Facility as capabilities facing challenges, delays, and requiring immediate action to address capability gaps in Arctic surveillance.
- The report noted that the Nanisivik Naval Facility would not be equipped with heated fuel tanks, limiting its period of operation to approximately 4 weeks per year.
Recommendation 2:
- National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should:
- identify options and take action to acquire equipment in a timely manner;
- develop and approve contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced.
Details
Procurement and Infrastructure Delays
- National Defence has taken a number of concrete steps to improve procurement, including:
- Working with Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and Defence Construction Canada (DCC) in accelerating procurement for low-risk, low-complexity projects;
- Increasing National Defence’s contracting authorities to $7.5 million for competitive services contracts, to $5 million for the procurement of competitive goods (plus $2.5 million for contract amendments) and to $375 thousand for non-competitive goods and service contracts;
- Investing in our procurement professionals to make sure we have the expertise and capacity we need to advance projects.
- The report highlights the CP-140 Aurora, Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships and Nanisivik Naval Facility as capabilities facing challenges, delays and requiring immediate action to address capability gaps in Arctic surveillance.
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