Reference Documents

National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and the Canadian Coast Guard, working together, should take concrete actions to address the long- standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the following:

• the inability to track vessels continuously and to identify non-emitting vessels

• the barriers that prevent efficiently sharing and integrating relevant information about vessel traffic in Arctic waters

Response of each entity: Agreed. National Defence, Transport Canada, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard will continue taking steps to reduce gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness and limitations of existing surveillance capabilities, including that of small vessels, and barriers to information sharing.

We will take a risk-based approach to maritime domain awareness in the Arctic as we do for the east and west coasts, Great Lakes, and St. Lawrence Seaway. As part of the Marine Security Operation Centre Information Sharing Protocol and third-party review, we will incorporate measures to identify gaps in monitoring, assessing, and reporting on maritime domain awareness and way forward on operational flexibility, options, and tools. Legislative, regulatory, and other impediments will also be considered in renewal efforts. The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group’s Maritime Domain Awareness and Arctic Maritime Security implementation strategies will further focus our collective efforts for the development of a risk management approach that defines significant risks and corresponding mitigation measures. We will prepare action plans that clearly identify our respective responsibilities in this regard.

Reduced gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness and streamlining the process of sharing and integrating relevant information about vessel traffic in Arctic waters.

Key Interim Milestone A: The Marine Security Operation Centres (MSOC) National Managers’ Committee is working toward a review of the extant Information Sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with an aim to develop a revised agreement that takes into account all concerns. Presently, the partners are developing joint information sharing requirements. This will be informed by the completion of an information sharing survey and a Critical Information Matrix. These products will be used to lay the foundation for a review of the extant MSOC Information Sharing MoU. The MSOC National Managers’ Committee have until Dec 2022 to initiate the Information Sharing MoU review. This revised MoU will be in place by 31 December 2023.

Date of Completion: 31 December 2023

Key Interim Milestone B:
MSOC Assistant Deputy Ministers have directed that an independent third party review of MSOC to examine the management and decision-making processes of the MSOC Program be conducted. Building upon past reviews and evaluations, this comprehensive review and renewal project will develop options and provide recommendations that will improve the overall long-term efficacy of the MSOCs. Specifically, the comprehensive review and renewal project will concentrate its efforts analyzing current MSOC functions and outputs with the aim of identifying existing and potential gaps that impact MSOCs in providing Maritime Domain Awareness. It will also identify potential activities that could further strengthen and support the MSOC mission in the years to come. The comprehensive review and recommendations will be used to renew the MSOC program. Date of completion for the review will be 31 December 2023.

Date of completion:
31 December 2023

Key Interim Milestone C:
The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is procuring additional capability for increased Arctic Surveillance. RCN has recently taken delivery of the 3rd Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) with expectation to have the 6th and final platform delivered by 2025. With each additional AOPS added to the fleet, the RCN is improving its capacity for a more robust and thorough surveillance of the Arctic waters for increasingly longer periods during the navigable arctic season. Ancillary to this is the ongoing process of certifying AOPS for flight operations with Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Cyclone helicopters which, when completed, will greatly increase the surveillance footprint for any AOPS sailing in Arctic waters and carrying an air crew and Cyclone Helicopter.

Date of completion:
30 June 2025

Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)

To address delays in the delivery of equipment to replace and improve the key federal capabilities used for maritime surveillance in the Canadian Arctic and the risk that several types of equipment may cease operating before being replaced, National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should

Response of each entity: Agreed. National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada agree that it is important to acquire equipment in a timely manner and manage capability risks associated with Arctic water surveillance.

The continuous assessment and exploring of options to minimize project delays while navigating the challenges in advancing one of the largest, most complex capital equipment project programs across all of Government, including those specific projects used for maritime surveillance.

31 March 2024

Assistant Deputy Minster (Materiel) / Strategic Joint Staff (SJS)

• identify options and take action to acquire equipment in a timely manner

National Defence: National Defence will continue to engage with partners and central agencies as part of ongoing efforts to ensure continuous capability sustainment including, but not limited to, the timely acquisition of equipment. Our management action plans developed in response to the 2021 audit on the National Shipbuilding Strategy identify a number of efforts currently underway to address the risks associated with surveillance vessels.

31 March 2024

Key Interim Milestone A:
Ongoing, purposeful conversations and reporting of acquisition projects used for maritime surveillance to the Senior Review Boards (SRB) and as required, to the Program Management Boards (PMB).

Date of Completion:
31 March 2024

Key Interim Milestone B:
The advancement of a strategic initiative around overall improved scheduling outcomes, improved contractual language around scheduling and earned value management, will be incorporated into procurement templates as well as probabilistic scheduling techniques to better incorporate risk into the development of project schedules, including those applicable to maritime surveillance.

In addition to the above, the review of major procurements by the appropriate inter-departmental Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) committees established at the Deputy Minister (DM), Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM), Director General (DG) and Director levels of core departments and Central Agency members, will enable Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) capabilities through:

• Whole-of-government, collaborative decision-making on Defence and Canadian Coast Guard major procurements;
• Early identification of issues, regular monitoring and timely escalation for decisive resolution; and
• Consultation of implicated departments while ensuring consensus of the best procurement approach.

Date of Completion:
31 March 2024

• develop and approve contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced

National Defence’s cyclical planning and approval of operational plans will include risks associated with reduced surveillance capabilities of Arctic waters in the event that existing key satellites, ships, or aircraft are no longer operable or replaced.

This part of the MAP will be considered closed when:

1. Risk assessment has been included in mission authorities, Arctic Strategic Effects Framework, directives as applicable and
2. Planning guidance is disseminated for operational plan development/updates.

Strategic Joint Staff will include a risk assessment and planning assumptions in appropriate cyclical mission authority reviews (e.g., Op LIMPID), Arctic Strategic Effects Framework, and directives.

Planning guidance developed by the Strategic Joint Staff for Force Employers to develop subordinate plans, as part of routine operational planning review/development and updating following new guidance.

Date of Completion
31 December 2023

SJS

Recommendation 1. National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and the Canadian Coast Guard, working together, should take concrete actions to address the long-standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the following:

• identify to track vessels continuously and to identify non- emitting vessels
• the barriers that prevent efficiently sharing and integrating relevant information about

Agreed. National Defence, Transport Canada, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard will continue taking steps to reduce gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness and limitations of existing surveillance capabilities, including that of small vessels, and barriers to information sharing. We will take a risk-based approach to maritime domain awareness in the Arctic as we do for the east and west coasts, Great Lakes, and St. Lawrence Seaway. As part of the Marine Security Operation Centre Information Sharing Protocol and third-party review, we will incorporate measures to identify gaps in monitoring, assessing, and reporting on maritime domain awareness and way forward on operational flexibility, options, and tools.

Legislative, regulatory, and other impediments will also be considered in renewal efforts. The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group’s Maritime Domain Awareness and Arctic Maritime Security implementation strategies will further focus our collective efforts for the development of a risk management approach that defines significant risks and corresponding mitigation measures. We will prepare action plans that clearly identify our respective responsibilities in this regard.

1. Complete the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Strategy
2. Initiate Mobile MSOC pilot project
3. Complete the Arctic Maritime Security Strategy, an interdepartmental initiative comprising key security partners such as DND, RCMP, CBSA, CCG, and TC as part of the broader IMSWG initiative to reinforce maritime security efforts across Canada
4. Complete the Third Party review, which will concentrate its efforts on analysing current MSOC functions and outputs with the aim of identifying existing and potential gaps that impact MSOCs in providing MDA
5. Complete trials of new MDA tools (Purple Trac and OCIANA), which will address long-standing Arctic MDA gaps with a view to revising and refining the MDA requirements

1. The CCG’s primary objective in the MSOC is to provide MDA. This Strategy will depict the CCG’s role within the MSOC and outlines the CCG’s MDA capabilities, tools and technologies.
2. The aim of this pilot is to expand the CCG MSOC component and the production of MDA to CCG vessels and MSOCs with a view to enhanced MDA capabilities on the waters.
3. The Arctic Maritime Security strategy will provide Arctic Security objectives for the next 15 years. The purpose of the Arctic Maritime Security Strategy is to secure the maritime security interests of Canada against a range of threats in the global maritime domain to guarantee freedom of navigation and that citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected. The sub- committee has been reviewing Canadian capabilities, identifying gaps, and providing solutions which will correlate to objectives that departments will be able to address over the lifespan of this Strategy either through means of their own or through strong interdepartmental collaboration. This will be outlined in a detailed Action Plan.
4. The Third Party Review will develop options and provide recommendations that will improve the overall long-term efficacy of the MSOCs, which will be detailed in an Action Plan.

Deliverables:

• Marine Security Operations Centres Evaluation Plan
• Data Collection and Analysis Tools (e.g., interview guides, focus group guides, etc.)
• PowerPoint Presentation deck outlining preliminary findings and/or conclusions
• Final Evaluation Report and Recommendations

Optional work may be required following the Review, which will target one or both of the following aspects:

• Creation of an action plan and steps to implement and operationalise the review recommendations.
• Explore in depth one or more of the recommendations or issues identified with a view to further elaborating a path forward for addressing the issue at hand.

Lead Sector:

• Canadian Coast Guard – Operations

1. Draft CCG MDA Strategy, October 2023.
2. Mobile MSOC Pilot Project, Summer 2023.
3. A draft Arctic Maritime Security Strategy will be presented January 2023, which will enable broader consultation with non governmental partners.
4. Request for Proposal for the Third Party Review posted October 19,
   2022. Review will begin in November 2022 and be completed by July 2023.
5. OCIANA trials commenced October 2022, to be completed November 2022.Testing of the P-TRAC platform was completed September 2022.

Recommendation 2: To address delays in the delivery of equipment to replace and improve the key federal capabilities used for maritime surveillance in the Canadian Arctic and the risk that several types of equipment may cease operating before being replaced, National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should

• identify options and take action to acquire equipment in a timely manner
• develop and approve contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the

event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced

Agreed. National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada agree that it is important to acquire equipment in a timely manner and manage capability risks associated with Arctic water surveillance.

Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard. As previously highlighted, the Management Action Plan developed in response to the 2021 audit of the National Shipbuilding Strategy addresses a number of key issues to ensure that future Canadian Coast Guard ships to support maritime surveillance in the Canadian Arctic are delivered in a timely manner. In concert with Public Services and Procurement Canada and under the auspices of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, measures are in place to identify potential equipment capability shortfalls and mitigation measures have been put in place to address these shortfalls such as the Vessel Life Extension program, the procurement of interim icebreaking ships, the chartering of commercial vessels, and the expansion of the National Shipbuilding Strategy to include a third shipyard. These measures are in addition to those measures identified in the National Shipbuilding Strategy Management Action Plan. This collection of proactive measures in conjunction with Canadian Coast Guard new vessel procurement projects form the Canadian Coast Guard Fleet Renewal Plan and are designed to provide a capability-based approach to its future Arctic-capable fleet rather than a straightforward one for one ship replacement plan.

No MAP is required to address this recommendation as it has already been addressed by the previous OAG NSS audit MAP, that is already in place and being monitored.

Lead Sectors:

• Canadian Coast Guard – Shipbuilding and Materiel

Recommendation 2

To address delays in the delivery of equipment to replace and improve the key federal capabilities used for maritime surveillance in the Canadian Arctic and the risk that several types of equipment may cease operating before being replaced, National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should:

• identify options and take action to acquire equipment in a timely manner
• develop and approve contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced

Agreed.

(Joint intro)

National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada agree that it is important to acquire equipment in a timely manner and manage capability risks associated with Arctic water surveillance.

(PSPC specific portion)

The Management Action Plan (MAP), developed in response to the 2021 audit of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), identified a number of efforts to improve delivery and accuracy of schedules and ensure disciplined reporting of progress toward milestones. Public Services and Procurement Canada has completed many of these actions, including: a review of new and existing shipbuilding contracts to ensure the inclusion of Earned Value Management (EVM) and schedule-related obligations and deliverables; adding cost, schedule and risk management as a regular, recurring agenda item at governance committees; and, ensuring completeness of mitigation strategies for all NSS risks and implementation of approaches to track and report on progress. In addition to the implementation of this MAP, efforts have progressed with regards to the identification and integration of a third NSS shipyard to support Canadian Coast Guard program delivery inclusive of the provision of ice breaking capability in the North. These activities support Public Services and Procurement Canada’s ongoing and dedicated efforts to acquire equipment in a timely manner.

Receipt of evidence-based shipbuilding project schedules that are complete, current and reliable.

Development and dissemination of mitigation strategies for all identified NSS risks.

Management of process for the introduction of a third NSS shipyard

Deliverable A - Winter 2023

Deliverables B to D - Completed

Deliverable E - end of 2022/ early 2023 (with initial shipbuilding  contracts expected in Winter/Spring 2023)

Key interim milestone A:

Enhanced Project Performance Through Detailed Schedule Analysis. Continue to leverage the world-class Earned Value Management (EVM) project management methodology that integrates schedule, costs, and scope to measure project performance. This will enable schedule and cost forecasting, identification of windows of opportunities to address potential issues, and adjustment of project parameters in a timely and effective manner. Work with client departments to confirm capability to perform detailed EVM analysis, or contract on their behalf to obtain third-party expert support. Use the EVM analysis to evaluate windows of opportunities within the project/program schedules. Link integrated EVM data to Risk Management discussions (see Key interim milestone C).

Date of Completion:

• EVM Clauses in Key Build Contracts: Completed
• Implementation across all Governance Winter 2023

Key interim milestone B:

Comprehensive Review and Adjustment of Contracts. Review existing contracts for EVM and schedule-related obligations and deliverables. Assess the adequacy/acceptability and completeness of these obligations and deliverables and re-enforce and/or adjust specific clauses as required. Leverage the established NSS governance to consider proposed contract amendments aimed at ensuring use of EVM schedules, other shipyard-related schedule obligations, and deliverables are included as part of shipbuilding contracts. Lessons learned from the review of existing contracts will be applied to new contracts.

Date of completion: Completed
For new contracts: as required

Key interim milestone C:

Focused Governance Reviews and Decision-Making. Establish a dedicated, recurring agenda item for the review of integrated schedule information (including EVM data and long-term project and programme schedules) at ADM and DM-level governance committees. This recurring agenda item will have direct linkages to the Risk Management information and be reviewed in a consolidated and timely manner so that project and program schedules can be comprehensively discussed and decision-making can be effectively enabled.

Date of completion: Completed (ongoing activity)

Key interim milestone D:

Comprehensive Mitigation Strategies. To ensure clarity and transparency, ensure completeness of mitigation strategies for all NSS risks and implement approaches to track and report on progress. The degree of control on each of the mitigation strategies will also be analyzed. Integrate risk mitigation strategies into the ADM and DM-level governance Committees and ensure linkages with key project/program parameters such as cost and schedules (EVM) are established and monitored.

Date of completion: Completed (ongoing activity)

Key Interim milestone E

Third Shipyard. Given requirements for the construction of large ships in support of the Canadian Coast Guard,  the need for a third Canadian shipyard with the capacity and capability to deliver large ships has been identified. PSPC has been actively engaged in the process to support the inclusion of a third shipyard into the NSS. A prequalification process identified Chantier Davie Canada Inc. (CDCI) as the only capable bidder. Subsequent to this, a solicitation process was conducted and CDCI’s bid submission was comprehensively evaluated and deemed compliant.

Associated future activities:

• Discussions are underway with CDCI to successfully negotiate an Umbrella Agreement
  Date of completion: End of 2022/Early 2023
• Treasury Board submission seeking advance approval to enter into the Umbrella Agreement
  Date of completion: End of 2022/Early 2023
• Post Umbrella Agreement signing, intent is to enter into contracts with CDCI to build 9 large ships (6 Program Icebreakers, 1 Polar Icebreaker and 2 Ferries). Date of completion: Initial contract Winter/Spring 2023

Simon Page

Assistant Deputy Minister, Defence and Marine Procurement Branch

873-455-3834

Recommendation 1. Paragraph 6.36, page 14

National Defence, Transport Canada and Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, working together, should take concrete actions to address the long-standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the following:

• the inability to track vessels continuously and to identify non-emitting vessels
• the barriers that prevent efficiently sharing and integrating relevant information about vessel traffic in Arctic waters.

Agreed. National Defence, Transport Canada and Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard agree with the recommendation and will continue taking steps to reduce gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, limitations of existing surveillance capabilities including that of small vessels, and barriers to information sharing.

We will take a risk-based approach to maritime domain awareness in the Arctic as we do for the east and west coasts, Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway.  As part of the Marine Security Operation Centre (MSOC) Information Sharing Protocol and MSOC third-party review, we will incorporate measures to identify gaps in monitoring, assessing and reporting on maritime domain awareness and way forward on operational flexibility, options and tools.  Legislative, regulatory, and other impediments will also be considered in renewal efforts.  The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group’s Maritime Domain Awareness and Arctic Maritime Security implementation strategies will further focus our collective efforts for the development of a risk management approach that defines significant risks and corresponding mitigation measures. We will prepare action plans that clearly identify our respective responsibilities in this regard.

1. Transport Canada (leading the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group) will update Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework and supporting strategies – including the Arctic Maritime Security Strategy and Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy.

1. The Maritime Security Strategic Framework will enable a coordinated approach in addressing a range of maritime security challenges and interests. The Arctic Maritime Security Strategy will provide a unified, integrated approach to Arctic maritime security that recognizes the efforts and contributions of departments and agencies associated with the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (including Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, National Defence and Transport Canada). The Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy will outline a process to organize and use current national capabilities to identify, assess, and address maritime domain awareness issues through the engagement of stakeholders both at home and abroad.

Approval of Maritime Security Strategic Framework by the Assistant Deputy Minister Marine Security Committee – March 2023

Approval of Arctic Maritime Security Strategy by the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group – June 2023

Approval of Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy by the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group – June 2023

Marine Transportation Security Act Modernization (included as part of Bill C-33:  Strengthening the Port System and Railway Safety in Canada Act) – Tabled in Parliament November 2022

Marine Transportation Security Regulation Modernization initiative – Spring 2024 pre-publication

2. Transport Canada is reviewing legislation and regulations to address potential gaps and ensure that the marine transportation security framework continues to be appropriate to modern threats and risks to the marine transportation system.

2. Potential legislative and regulatory gaps are identified and addressed, ensuring that the security of Canada’s marine transportation system recognizes and addresses threats and risks.

Recommendation 2: Paragraph 6.66, page 23

To address delays in the delivery of equipment to replace and improve the key federal capabilities used for maritime surveillance in the Canadian Arctic and the risk that several types of equipment may cease operating before being replaced, National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should:

• Identify options and take action to acquire equipment in a timely manner
• Develop and approve contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced.

Agreed. National Defense, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada agree that it is important to acquire equipment in a timely manner and manage capability risks associated with Arctic water surveillance.

Regarding Transport Canada’s air asset capacity, the department currently uses the Dash 7 aircraft to perform surveillance in the Arctic and has not developed a lifecycle replacement plan.  However, the department is in the process of procuring a remotely piloted aircraft system, which is scheduled for delivery in early 2023.  The system is expected to augment the department’s surveillance capacity in the Arctic. 

3. Transport Canada has exercised options for acquiring equipment in a timelier manner and developing contingency plans to address the risk posed by critical equipment failure in support of the National Aerial Surveillance Program. Transport Canada will continue to use the Dash 7 aircraft as the primary aircraft for Arctic surveillance pending a long-term strategy for the fleet.

   Transport Canada is working on a strategy to acquire a substantial inventory of Dash 7 parts to increase aircraft serviceability. Due to the limited availability of parts, Transport Canada intends to procure a presently available large package of replacement parts to augment its existing stock. Additionally, TC will continue to utilize both its internal and commercial engineering services to develop and have approved alternate parts, aircraft modifications, and repair designs to address issues.

3. Increased inventory of Dash 7 parts. This will help address ongoing issues and will go a long way to optimize the availability of parts during the operational season (May to December) over the next few years.

4. In relation to developing and approving contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced, TC ASD will continue to seek funding to update avionics on the other NASP aircraft to enable them to operate in Northern Domestic Airspace. With this improved capacity, the Dash 8 fleet will be able to act as a contingency for the Dash 7.

4. Avionics upgrades on NASP Fleet (dependent on funding from Whales 2.0 Initiative). One aircraft modernized per year starting in 2024/25 over three years.

5. The Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which is scheduled for delivery in 2023 is expected to augment Transport Canada’s surveillance capacity in the Arctic.

5. As a developmental capability, following the training of personnel and the development of regulations and standards, RPAS is planned to be added to NASP fleet as an operational asset in 2025.

6. Transport Canada has already identified the lack of infrastructure as an issue in the Arctic and has submitted and been approved for funding in the Oceans Protection Plan to build a hangar in Iqaluit.

   The Request for Proposals for the hangar will be released in Q4 of fiscal year 22/23.  If economically feasible, the construction will start in fiscal year 2023/24 and be completed in 2024/25. The new hangar will support the maintenance of aircraft operating in the region and allow for the possibility of extending surveillance operations into late fall or winter.

   The facility will also support the operations of the new remotely piloted aircraft system.

   This infrastructure can also enhance the support provided to the Arctic operations of other government departments.

6. NASP Complex in Iqaluit

The Canadian Coast Guard, National Defence, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should implement mechanisms to:

• obtain complete, current, and reliable schedules to support shipbuilding projects; and
• ensure that progress toward forecast targets and delivery timelines is monitored to enable timely decision making.

Key Interim Milestone A: IPTs will ensure that fulsome shipyard-produced IMS updates, supported by metrics outlining a clear critical path, are presented during recurring NSS governance committee meetings. This will be achieved by regular dialogue between DND Project Management Offices (PMO) and shipyards, with the onus resting on shipyards to present robust IMSs during NSS governance committee meetings. This will promote a collective understanding of shipyard programmatic challenges, thereby informing broader strategic decisions to manage overall shipbuilding project schedules.

Date of completion: Q2 FY 2021/2022

Key Interim Milestone B: IPTs will ensure that EVM is used as an analytical tool to measure shipyard-produced

IMS performance, with results presented during recurring NSS governance committee meetings. This will be achieved by the NSS Program Management Office and DND PMOs engaging contracted EVM experts to analyse periodic shipyard EVM deliverables and report summaries of their findings. This will promote a collective understanding of shipyard- produced IMS performance and serve as a data point to inform broader strategic decisions to manage overall shipbuilding project schedules.

Date of completion: Q2 FY 2021/2022

Key Interim Milestone C: IPTs will review new and existing shipbuilding contracts to determine whether shipyard-related schedule obligations and deliverables are appropriate and/or are being met. On an
as-required basis, IPTs will then utilize established NSS governance to consider proposed contract amendments aimed at ensuring adequate shipyard- related schedule obligations and deliverables are included as part of shipbuilding contracts. This activity will be led by PSPC and supported by DND as a member of the IPTs. This will ensure that Canada has appropriate contractual mechanisms in place for shipyards to produce robust IMSs and for IPTs to manage overall shipbuilding project schedules.

Date of completion: Q2 FY 2021/2022

Mr. Troy Crosby Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)
613-904-5512