Challenge: Detecting and responding to hostile information activities

Challenge Statement

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) require the means to rapidly identify, assess and respond to adversaries’ use of social media, mass communications and other tools that are being used to influence targeted audiences.

Background and Context

Adversarial states and non-state actors are engaging in hostile influence activities, e.g., information-based techniques, deception, and image-manipulation activities, to undermine a nation’s reputation, values, cohesion, authority and decision-making processes. Even though many nations are under threat from these types of activities, not all are aware of their existence. Most hostile influence activities are thought to occur in contexts and fora that are not being monitored by the security apparatus of the nations being targeted. But even when nations are aware of these subversive activities, few are thought to have devised strategies and plans for protecting their populations to their potential harm or responding skillfully to mitigate the consequences.

Desired Outcomes and Considerations

There is a need to understand when hostile actions are being undertaken, followed by a clear understanding of the population segments that are being targeted and their vulnerability to manipulation. Understanding the triggers and thresholds for mobilization is also crucial. Reliable indicators are needed for knowing when influence activities are achieving their desired effect (e.g., a measurable change in a population’s opinion or sentiment).

Examples of significant outcomes of this challenge include but are not limited to:

• Developing a typology of past hostile influence activities against Canada, using examples and case studies to discern patterns specifically related to social media strategies and techniques for organizing attacks (e.g., deriving sympathy, influence and financing);
• Identifying indicators of change in public opinion and behaviour, and the attendant triggers and thresholds;
• Developing tools and methods (e.g., a tactical warning tool) for detecting hostile activities affecting Canadian interests;
• Conducting research on adversarial motives, intent, strategies and information-based, social media techniques to develop a framework for identifying, assessing, and skillfully responding to hostile influence activities conducted on social media;
• Conducting research to explore relationships between influence activities, individual- and group-level vulnerabilities and the likelihood of mobilization in response to manipulations;
• Undertaking cross-cultural analyses to understand how and when hostile influence activities are used to exploit cultural sensitivities, fuel intercultural tensions or undermine social cohesion; and
• Identifying and analyzing case studies where other Allied nations have responded to information warfare activities in order to discern lessons learned.