Appendix E: Past Options Indentified for Controls on Transboundary Movements

As previously noted in Section 4.3, a report entitled "Study of the Transboundary Movement of Waste Into/Out of Canada", May 1995 examined the nature and impacts of the transboundary movement of wastes between Canada and other countries. One of the elements of this report, as briefly summarized in Section 4.3, was a description of four policy options for managing such movements. These past options are more fully described herein, based on information from the 1995 study. Potentially associated impacts (advantages/disadvantages) are also documented.

As recognized elsewhere in the Discussion Paper, the federal government is obligated pursuant to the Basel Convention and the amended Canada-U.S. Agreement to put in place control mechanisms over the transboundary movements of non-hazardous waste (NHW). This situation notwithstanding, one of the previously identified alternatives, the 'do-nothing' or 'no controls' option, has been included herein for completeness, even though it does not meet our international obligations.

As described in the 1995 study, this option implies that the federal government would take no further action toward the implementation of policies or regulations affecting NHW transboundary movements. In effect, the waste flows would be kept as open as possible, with no effort made to monitor or impose conditions on waste haulers or disposal sites. The flow of NHW would, as a result, remain relatively unrestricted.

The advantages and disadvantages of this option were previously identified as follows:

• consistent with a free market approach to NHW management, and posing no apparent contradictions with NAFTA or GATT;
• the continued ability to export NHW would extend the life of existing Canadian landfills and postpone the need for new sites;
• efficient disposal systems and networks would evolve without duplicate expensive facilities in both countries;
• free market efficiency and competition would be promoted with greater opportunities to achieve economies of scale, job creation and, ultimately, lower prices for consumers and taxpayers. Communities hosting resulting large regional disposal facilities may also benefit economically from disposal fees, development incentives, and spin-off businesses; and
• a benefit to large, transnational waste management firms with integrated recycling/disposal operations and the capacity to consolidate large loads and ship long distances. Such companies are well positioned to operate recovery/recycling systems for materials which can be marketed on a continental basis.

• does not comply with Canada's international obligations;
• no effort forthcoming to support the provinces in efforts to control imports or exports;
• those advocating stronger environmental controls and/or the principle that communities should maintain responsibility for their wastes would be expected to oppose the apparent change of direction by the federal government;
• transboundary movements possibly interrupted by future restrictions and flow control regulations by provincial and foreign governments;
• concerns about potential flow of solid wastes to sites and countries with inadequate environmental standards would remain;
• low cost export disposal undermines the economics of 3Rs alternatives. May contribute to a loss of employment in the 3Rs, reductions in investments in 3Rs infrastructure, and resistance on the part of IC&I waste generators to 3Rs programs. Landfills in Ontario noted as losing an estimated $65 million (1992) in tipping fees each year due to exports damaging municipal 3Rs efforts where tipping fee revenues were used to fund waste reduction;
• waste management or the 3Rs industries would continue to face regulatory uncertainty and unpredictability regarding key business variables such as feedstock availability;
• local jurisdictions' ability impaired to plan and manage their waste management systems (difficult to implement long-term reduction plans given the risk that investments may be undermined by international economic forces); and
• regulation of hazardous wastes more difficult, to the extent it remains possible for hazardous shipments to move illegally within the relatively unknown NHW flows.

As envisaged under this option, the federal government would take no action to restrict or interrupt NHW transboundary movements, but would impose controls and conditions designed primarily to monitor waste flows and encourage disposal only in environmentally safe facilities. A number of regulatory tools are possible in this regard. In general, haulers would be required to report all exports/imports, seek prior informed consent of the importing jurisdiction, maintain acceptable levels of environmental liability insurance, assume responsibility for shipments that are rejected or diverted, and see that shipments are disposed of in environmentally safe facilities. Permits of equivalent level of safety are also contemplated by Bill C-32.

The advantages and disadvantages of this option were considered to include:

• consistent with Basel Convention and 1992 amendment to Canada-U.S. Agreement;
• if administered and enforced effectively, would be expected to reduce illegal movements of NHW and ensure that most shipments are directed toward environmentally safe facilities;
• identification of hazardous wastes hidden within the NHW network may be facilitated; and
• an overall reduction in exports may result, but trade would not be fundamentally altered.

• enforcement may be difficult given the number of waste haulers, disposal sites and jurisdictions. Administration and enforcement may become expensive and cost recovery through permitting fees, etc. may have to be considered (see Option 3, below);
• increased hauling costs through additional paperwork and administration, and possibly through the introduction of permitting fees. The cost and complexity of a control system may restrict or curtail the activities of some haulers;
• would not fully address concerns about the competitiveness of 3Rs industries;
• recycling industries relying on international trade could incur additional costs if recyclable materials were unintentionally captured within the control system; and
• a precise definition that is both easily understood and enforceable as to what constitutes waste v.s. recyclables would be required to not affect the 3Rs industry inadvertently.

Economic instruments envisaged under this scenario include taxes, fees, levies or surcharges which could be used to increase the cost of importing or exporting NHW. Several different formats are possible (e.g., a special levy could be applied on a per tonne basis to shipments of NHW leaving Canada). In any respect, they would increase the overall cost of exporting NHW, and could have a significant impact on transboundary movements.

The advantages and disadvantages of this option were previously considered to include:

• charges, if sufficient enough, would function as an economic incentive for the establishment of waste diversion and disposal facilities on either side of the border;
• offers the potential to raise revenues for regulatory agencies and increase government revenues, both from export charges as well as from increased municipal tipping fee receipts;
• 3Rs industries would become more competitive;
• charges on NHW imports to Canada may discourage future imports (little being imported at present); and
• cost recovery measures such as permitting or registration fees (subject to the actual fees imposed) likely to have only a minimal impact on overall transboundary flows.

• charges could rapidly decrease waste exports with a corresponding increase for domestic disposal capacity;
• will likely lead to increased import/export costs;
• export charges could affect shipments of recyclables if they are not clearly distinguished and recyclers could face cost increases; and
• import/export charges may be viewed as a trade measure and challenged on the grounds they are in contravention of NAFTA or GATT. American retaliation may affect recyclable materials used by Canadian industry.

Import/export bans or restrictions would prohibit shipments of NHW to or from a particular jurisdiction. They could apply generally to all imports or exports, or more narrowly to certain types of NHW, under certain conditions, and/or from designated sources. They represent the strongest and most direct option available and, to date, have not been enacted in either Canada or the United States. With respect to imports, such restrictive measures already exist in some areas (e.g., Ontario through its Certificate of Approval process). Attempts to ban NHW imports will likely continue to arise from state and provincial governments.

The previously identified advantages and disadvantages of this option include:

• forces jurisdictions to assume full responsibility for their own wastes and either expand disposal capacity or develop 3Rs alternatives (consistent with spirit of Basel Convention to this extent);
• opportunity for waste to flow to environmentally unsafe sites outside of the jurisdiction would be eliminated, as would the environmental costs/risks of long distance waste transport; and
• competitiveness of, and demand for 3Rs alternatives would increase, as would revenues from tipping fees at Canadian landfills.

• an immediate increase in disposal costs would result in pressure to expand domestic landfill capacity;
• resulting inefficiencies, due to forced tipping fee increases and duplication of facilities would have negative economic implications;
• bans may be viewed as inconsistent public policy as compared with managed flows of hazardous waste (which is considerably more dangerous). May result in confusion and concern over apparent policy contradictions;
• if the definition of waste v.s. recyclables is imprecise, the trade in recyclable materials may be interrupted, with potential economic consequences; and
• attempts to restrict imports and exports may be challenged on the basis of restricting free trade and contravening NAFTA and GATT.