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Pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA): Processing procedures and guidelines

This section contains policy, procedures and guidance used by IRCC staff. It is posted on the department’s website as a courtesy to stakeholders.

When assessing an application, decision makers must consider all applicable protection grounds. They must give reasons for all grounds when rejecting a PRRA application. If decision makers allow the application on 1 of the grounds, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds in the decision.

On this page

Assessing the evidence

PRRA decision makers are to analyze the evidence related to the PRRA application in a manner consistent with the principles of procedural fairness, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR), taking into account the applicable standard of proof.

In their initial examination and analysis, decision makers must consider the evidence as a whole, not in separate silos. The applicants have the burden of satisfying the decision maker that they meet the requirements of section 96 or section 97 of the IRPA.

Identifying the issues

Identifying the issues is key to good analysis and decision making. Decision makers must examine the entire application and submissions to identify the issues determinative of the case under the relevant provisions of the IRPA and the IRPR. The decision maker’s research and analysis must focus on these issues and the evidence presented. Failure to meaningfully grapple with key issues and the evidence submitted may call into question whether a decision maker conducted a thorough assessment upon judicial review.

For more on the process of quality decision making and standards of review, please see Decision making: Standard of review and process for making a reasonable decision.

Consideration of submissions

The applicant should make it clear in their submissions what risk would be faced in the country of removal. The applicant is expected to explain how the alleged risk might lead to a personalized risk to life; or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, the danger of torture, or the reasonable possibility of persecution and which refugee Convention grounds are applicable.

Submissions should address:

  • all the risks the applicant fears
  • the reasons why the applicant is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the country of removal
  • if the risk would be faced in every part of that country, or if the risk is faced generally by other persons in or from that country
  • if the risk faced is inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, and if the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards
  • if the risk is caused by the inability of the country to provide adequate health or medical care

Accepting new evidence

Paragraph A113(a) provides that persons whose claim for refugee protection has been rejected may only present new evidence that arose after the rejection, that was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of rejection.

This “new evidence” rule does not apply in cases where the previous decision maker did not consider the risk allegations or did not assess the case on its merits. This situation can arise if the previous panel or decision maker excluded a refugee claimant or PRRA applicant without considering whether or not they had a well-founded fear of persecution.

An example would be if the previous decision maker did not accept the applicant’s identity as a citizen of country A and therefore did not engage in a risk analysis of that country. However, if the decision maker now accepts the applicant’s identity as submitted, they must consider the evidence as to their identity and resulting risk in that country.

Generally, if the applicant alleges a particular risk in the country of removal, and that risk had not been considered in a previous decision, the decision maker should not apply the “new evidence” rule to this risk evidence. In such cases the PRRA is the first instance where these risks will be assessed, and so they must be examined.

When a risk has been previously assessed by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), a PRRA decision maker may rely on the previous findings made by the IRB. A PRRA is not intended to be a second chance to make the same refugee claim, or to be an appeal of a negative IRB decision. However, the deference afforded to previous IRB decisions is not absolute. Previous findings made by the IRB may be rebutted by new evidence of materially changed circumstances of the applicant or changed country conditions (Arsu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 471).

When refugee protection has been vacated by the IRB, the refugee claim is deemed to have been rejected [subsection A109(3)]. It may be inferred that the date of the vacation decision is the relevant date for purposes of paragraph A113(a). However, this should be examined on a case by case basis. Evidence that post-dates the original refugee decision is generally not admissible in vacation proceedings, as the purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether refugee protection was obtained by misrepresentation or withholding information, and if so, whether there was sufficient other evidence before the original panel by which the person could have been found to be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. If the applicant was not permitted to present evidence at the vacation hearing that post-dates the original decision, an officer may find that evidence of this nature could not reasonably have been expected to have been presented at the vacation hearing, and therefore allow the PRRA applicant to present such evidence. That said, the Court has found that the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the IRB has some discretion to allow new evidence for the purpose of the analysis under subsection A109(2), where the record from the first determination was deficient. For guidance, the manager should send a request to the Asylum Branch (AB).

When a PRRA is returned by the Federal Court (FC) or consent is provided for a re-determination by a different decision maker, new submissions will generally be solicited. The new decision maker must then consider all submissions received; those made in support of the original PRRA as well as the new material.

Conducting research

The decision maker undertakes research independent of the issues identified in the application. The research sources consulted will vary with each individual case, but some sources can be found on the Country of origin information page. The decision maker should make sure to consult the most recent and updated versions of country reports to ensure there have been no changes in country conditions that could affect the decision.

Using information obtained through Internet research

Other than the sources identified above as “conventional” research information, copies of all documents obtained from the Internet and used in the decision-making process must be retained on the case file. This practice ensures not only that the document is available for review by the Court, but also that the “version” of the document available to the Court is the same as that consulted by the decision maker.

Subject to the following paragraphs, decision makers will retain discretion with regard to whether a document should be shared with the applicant prior to rendering a decision.

If it can be demonstrated that the document is “publicly accessible”, it is not necessary to share it with the applicant. “Publicly accessible” documents should originate from reliable and trusted sources that do not require special privilege or an account to access, and should be available at sites directly related to the source.

However, some publicly accessible documents may need to be disclosed. The Federal Court of Appeal noted in Mancia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (C.A.), [1998] 3 FC 461 that each case has to be decided according to its own circumstances. It is possible for an applicant to establish a breach of procedural fairness if a publicly accessible document is not disclosed to them prior to a decision being rendered. Consequently, decision makers should question themselves whether the information contained in the document is information that would be known by an applicant, in light of the nature of the submissions made and the applicant’s case history.

Key points:

  • Where a document post-dates the submissions, prior to rendering a PRRA decision, decision makers will disclose any document that shows changes in the country conditions that could affect the decision
  • Pursuant to section 167 of the IRPR, decision makers retain the authority to determine if an oral hearing is required, unless section A113.01 applies and the hearing is mandatory
  • Decision makers may seek responses from applicants with respect to any relevant documentation that comes to light and on which they intend to rely to render a negative decision
    • This can be done through a procedural fairness letter or at a hearing should one be held
  • In cases where a hearing is mandatory, decision makers may share documentation, as stated above, in line with the principles of procedural fairness
    • However, if the document is determinative of the case, the document should be identified in the Hearing Notice and shared before the hearing
    • The applicant should be given an opportunity to address the document at the hearing or in writing

For more information on hearings, see Oral hearings.

How much research is enough?

One of the implicit assumptions about PRRA is that decision makers will become very knowledgeable about many countries over time. This experience should enable them to make judgments without the need for extensive additional research in straightforward cases. If the decision maker has addressed all the issues identified or presented, the research should be complete. See below for further details on how to weigh and evaluate evidence.

Weighing the evidence

Having obtained information on the facts of the case, the decision maker has to assess the credibility and probative value of the evidence, assign weight to this evidence and determine whether it is sufficient.

Key points:

  • Credibility refers to worthiness of belief
  • Probative value refers to the capacity of the evidence to establish the fact it is used to prove
  • Weight is a function of credibility and probative value (weight = credibility x probative value)
    • The weight to be given to evidence may depend on the credibility of that evidence, its probative value, or some combination of the 2
    • For more information on these concepts, see the Weighing Evidence - Chapter 2: General principles on the IRB website
  • Sufficiency refers to how much evidence is required to establish a fact or meet an evidentiary or legal burden

It is not always easy to decide which fact or collection of facts is more reasonable or more likely in a case. PRRA decision makers must be fair, sensitive and judicious in their approach to assessing the value of the evidence being considered.

For example, a decision maker must be satisfied of the underlying facts on a balance of probabilities. The facts alleged must be reasonable and logical given the existing country conditions. That said, PRRA applicants are not expected to provide evidence to support every single aspect of their application and they should be given the benefit of the doubt if there are no credibility concerns. In addition, although testimony and evidence filed by the applicant is presumed to be true, this presumption may be rebutted. If the weight that the decision maker gives to any piece of evidence is insufficient to establish the facts as alleged by the applicant, reasons must be given.

In reviewing a supporting document, decision makers should consider the following:

  • the date of the document
  • the author’s identity
  • the source of the information
  • the qualifications/expertise of the author
  • the reasons for which it was prepared
  • whether the document shows signs of bias
  • whether it appears to be contrived
  • whether its contents are consistent with other reliable evidence
  • whether its contents are consistent with statements made by the applicant to immigration authorities in other contexts (for example, Basis of Claim form, statements made at the port of entry and before the IRB, evidence in response to a procedural fairness letter, etc.)
  • the extent to which the document has been corroborated by trustworthy evidence
  • whether the author was a witness to the events described or whether it consists of hearsay (a legal term describing evidence that is based on the reports of others rather than the personal knowledge of a witness)

Supporting documents such as identity cards must be examined in light of the applicant’s individualized risk in the country of removal. For example, certain identity cards, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) card, are treated differently by the local authorities depending on the applicant’s nationality and their status in that country. Decision makers should refer to the most recent publicly available information on the documents available on the Country of origin information page.

Decision makers may assess third parties as per paragraph R168(d)  in order to verify their evidence. The credibility of third parties and their evidence should not be conflated with the credibility of the applicant. It is only if the evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the applicant’s credibility that the decision maker should consider whether an oral hearing is required, per R167 (Huang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 940 at paragraph 47).

For more information on hearings, see Oral hearings.

Decision makers must weigh the evidence in a fair and impartial manner, judiciously considering both positive and negative elements. They must clearly explain why one piece of evidence was preferred over another in the written decision. It is not necessary to mention every piece of evidence submitted. However, they must mention evidence that is directly applicable (for example, that mentions the applicant by name) or evidence that squarely contradicts the decision maker’s finding of fact.

PRRA decision makers must be careful to avoid veiled credibility findings. “Veiled credibility findings” refers to when decision makers appear to dismiss the evidence by giving it no weight, but in fact they are questioning the credibility of the evidence provided. For example, if a decision maker assigns some evidence “no weight”, it suggests the evidence is either not credible or has no probative value, or both. Consequently, when the court reviews the record and finds the evidence had probative value, the applicant may successfully argue the decision maker was really challenging the credibility of the evidence, and should have convened an oral hearing. In Balogh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 447, the Federal Court provides a helpful explanation on the distinction between credibility and sufficiency of evidence. 

For more information on hearings, see Oral hearings.

Note: Although the RPD does not have to assess the risk of a claimant if their identity is not established, that is not the case in a PRRA. Decision makers have to assess the risk due to the imminent removal of the applicant. In Ladipo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 408, the Federal Court stated that “Whether the applicant’s identity is established to the satisfaction of a PRRA officer or not, the obligation of that officer is to assess the applicant’s risk against the country of removal.”

Standard of proof

Establishing the facts – balance of probabilities

After the decision maker has assessed and assigned weight to the evidence, they must decide what facts have been established on a balance of probabilities (that is, are more likely than not to be true). For information on how to apply the appropriate standard of proof, see the Program Delivery Instructions on Decision making: Standard of review and process for making a reasonable decision.

Legal test to be met

Section A96 – serious possibility or reasonable chance

To meet the definition of Convention refugee under section A96, an applicant must establish a subjective fear of persecution and that this fear is objectively well-founded.

The objective legal test requires that applicants prove a “reasonable chance”, or a “serious possibility” of persecution on Convention grounds: fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social group or political opinion. In other words, while applicants must establish their case on a balance of probabilities, they do not have to establish that persecution would be more likely than not.

Paragraphs A97(1)(a) and (b) - balance of probabilities

The same legal test applies to both paragraphs A97(1)(a) and A97(1)(b). In both cases, it must be more likely than not that the risk would occur, meaning that the risk would occur on a balance of probabilities.

That means the requisite degree of danger of torture envisaged by the expression “believed on substantial grounds to exist” in paragraph A97(1)(a) is that it is more likely than not.

Similarly, the degree of risk to life or risk of cruel or unusual treatment or punishment under paragraph A97(1)(b) must be proven to be more likely than not.

Although the words used to describe the standard of proof – balance of probabilities – are the same as the words used to describe the legal test to be met, these are still 2 distinct steps. An officer must assess the evidence and determine whether a fact has been proven on a balance of probabilities. The officer must also determine whether the legal test under A97(1)(a) or A97(1)(b) has been met by assessing whether it is more likely than not that the risk would occur.

Self-serving evidence

“Self-serving evidence” generally describes evidence that appears to have been created or fabricated for the purpose of bolstering the case. In a broader sense, all testimony and documents a party submits in a proceeding are self-serving to the extent that they are created by or for the party and may be beneficial to their case. A finding that the evidence is self-serving may impact the credibility of the author and/or the weight attributed to the evidence.

While officers are permitted to take self-interest into account when assessing an applicant’s documentary evidence, courts have held that it is an error to dismiss evidence for the sole reason that it is self-serving or that it originated from an applicant’s relatives and/or friends. Evidence from sources close to the applicant and its credibility should be assessed in the same manner as any other documentary evidence. The considerations listed in paragraph 28 of Rahman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 941 found below is a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be considered when assessing the weight to be given to evidence that may be considered self-serving:

  • the role of the author played in the events recounted – were they a witness or did the applicant merely recount the events in question to the author
  • the relationship of the author to the applicant – is the author a close family member but, as a witness, nonetheless able to speak independently to the events
  • the content of the witness statement – does it merely parrot the applicant’s evidence or does it have a degree of independence based on the author’s own vantage point, and what was that vantage point
  • any inconsistencies between their statement and other objective evidence in the case 

The risk must not be faced generally – generalized oppression and crises

IRPA provides for protection in cases of generalized oppression or crisis through 2 programs for stays of removal. An Administrative Deferral of Removals (ADR) is a temporary measure when immediate action is needed to temporarily defer removals in situations of humanitarian crisis. The Temporary Suspension of Removals (TSR) program interrupts removals to a country or place when general conditions pose a risk to the entire civilian population. Examples include armed conflict within a country or place or an environmental disaster resulting in a substantial temporary disruption of living conditions. In both programs, the CBSA can remove persons found inadmissible to Canada for criminality, international or human rights violations, organized crime, or security as per subsection R230(3) despite the imposition of an ADR or TSR. The programs and the current list of countries or areas under suspension are found on the CBSA website Arrests, detentions and removals – Removal from Canada.

The application for protection, by contrast, is meant to deal with an allegation of personal risk or one faced by persons in the same situation.

In section A97, the requirement that risk be personal is incorporated into the definition of a person in need of protection. This is not so in section A96. However, an application for protection based on a situation of generalized oppression may meet the requirements of section A96 if the applicant’s risk is a risk of sufficiently serious harm and is linked to a Convention ground as opposed to general country conditions.

The Federal Court of Appeal has rejected the comparative approach (asking whether the applicant is more disadvantaged than others) in favour of a non-comparative approach that asks whether there is a reasonable chance of serious harm on the basis of 1 of the 5 Convention grounds. On this point, see paragraphs 17 to 19 of Salibian v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 FC 250.

In Fodor v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 218, paragraph 19, the Federal Court noted that the Federal Court of Appeal has long held the following opinions:

  • A claimant to Convention refugee status:
    • need not show that they have themselves been persecuted in the past
    • may show a fear of persecution through evidence of the treatment afforded to similarly situated persons in the country of origin
    • need not show that they are more at risk than others in their country or other members of their group

The Federal Court of Appeal considered the question of indirect persecution in Olobor v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1150 at paragraph 39. The Federal Court of Appeal concluded that indirect persecution does not constitute persecution within the meaning of the United Nations 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention). Consequently, the fact that family members face persecution does not make an applicant a Convention refugee unless he or she personally meets the definition.

State protection

Where the applicant faces a risk of persecution, danger of torture, risk to life, or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, the issue to be determined in every case will be whether the applicant is able to obtain the protection of the state. It is not sufficient to assert a subjective belief that protection is not available. The onus is on the applicant to rebut the presumption of adequate state protection with clear and convincing evidence that, on a balance of probabilities, state protection is inadequate or non-existent (Cervenakova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 477 at paragraph 25).

The standard to be applied is that state protection must be adequate and effective on an operational level, often referred to by the courts as the “operational adequacy” test.

Operational adequacy test

In order to conclude that state protection exists, a state must be able to provide adequate protection to the applicant at an operational level.

In order to determine whether the presumption of state protection has been rebutted, the following factors should be considered:

  • the efforts made by the applicant to obtain protection, including:
    • reports made to the authorities
    • whether sufficient details were provided
    • follow-up efforts
    • whether other agencies besides the police were approached
  • measures taken by the state and the efficacy of those measures, including:
    • applicable laws in place
    • mechanisms to protect (police, other agencies)
    • enforcement efforts including, for example, crime-fighting initiatives
    • tangible results including, for example, arrests resulting from crime-fighting initiatives and the impact on crime rates
    • any operational difficulties faced by the state authorities
  • evidence of similarly situated individuals
  • particular circumstances of the applicant

The assessment of operational adequacy cannot be anecdotal in nature based on a single incident. The evidence must demonstrate that the lack of state protection the applicant might have experienced in the past and/or might fear experiencing upon return in the future is part of a larger pattern that applies to the region or the state rather than a local failure.

Key points to keep in mind are:

  • The refusal of certain police officers to take action is not sufficient to demonstrate that a state is unable or unwilling to provide protection
    • The refusal to respond had to be institutional in nature or a more general refusal by the police force to provide the protection conferred by the country’s political and judicial institutions
  • A standard of “effective” protection to which police forces in Canada aspire should not be imposed on other states
  • No government can guarantee the protection of all of its citizens at all times
    • It is not enough for the applicant to show that the state has not always been effective in protecting similarly-situated persons
  • "Effective protection" can be difficult where assailants are unknown, even for the most effective and well-resourced police forces

What will meet the standard of operational adequacy will vary with the country and the circumstances of the applicants. It is imperative that the reasons in the decision clearly demonstrate that the decision maker considered the operational effectiveness of state protection in light of the specific circumstances of the applicant. Decisions should always set out the operational adequacy analysis intelligibly and transparently.

Inability or unwillingness to make use of state protection

Paragraphs A96(a) and (b) specify that to meet the definition of a Convention refugee, a person who faces a risk of persecution must be unable or, by reason of their fear of persecution, be unwilling to avail themselves of state protection or, if they do not have a country of nationality, must be unable or unwilling to return to their country of former habitual residence by reason of their fear of persecution.

In cases of dual nationality, the applicant must establish a well-founded fear of persecution in every country of nationality. For more information, see the section below on Country against which risk is assessed.

The terms “unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail oneself of the protection of that country” are discussed in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection. The Handbook defines the terms as:

98. Being unable to avail himself of such protection implies circumstances that are beyond the will of the person concerned. There may, for example, be a state of war, civil war or other grave disturbance, which prevents the country of nationality from extending protection or makes such protection ineffective. Protection by the country of nationality may also have been denied to the applicant. Such denial of protection may confirm or strengthen the applicant's fear of persecution, and may indeed be an element of persecution.

99. What constitutes a refusal of protection must be determined according to the circumstances of the case. If it appears that the applicant has been denied services (e.g., refusal of a national passport or extension of its validity, or denial of admittance to the home territory) normally accorded to his co-nationals, this may constitute a refusal of protection within the definition.

100. The term unwilling refers to refugees who refuse to accept the protection of the Government of the country of their nationality. It is qualified by the phrase “owing to such fear”. Where a person is willing to avail himself of the protection of his home country, such willingness would normally be incompatible with a claim that he is outside that country “owing to well-founded fear of persecution”. Whenever the protection of the country of nationality is available, and there is no ground based on well-founded fear for refusing it, the person concerned is not in need of international protection and is not a refugee.

The Handbook defines “who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” as follows:

101. This phrase, which relates to stateless refugees, is parallel to the preceding phrase, which concerns refugees who have a nationality. In the case of stateless refugees, the “country of nationality” is replaced by “the country of his former habitual residence”, and the expression “unwilling to avail himself of the protection...” is replaced by the words “unwilling to return to it”. In the case of a stateless refugee, the question of “availment of protection” of the country of his former habitual residence does not, of course, arise. Moreover, once a stateless person has abandoned the country of his former habitual residence for the reasons indicated in the definition, he is usually unable to return.

102. It will be noted that not all stateless persons are refugees. They must be outside the country of their former habitual residence for the reasons indicated in the definition. Where these reasons do not exist, the stateless person is not a refugee.

103. Such reasons must be examined in relation to the country of “former habitual residence” in regard to which fear is alleged. This was defined by the drafters of the 1951 Convention as “the country in which he had resided and where he had suffered or fears he would suffer persecution if he returned”.

104. A stateless person may have more than one country of former habitual residence, and he may have a fear of persecution in relation to more than one of them. The definition does not require that he satisfies the criteria in relation to all of them.

105. Once a stateless person has been determined a refugee in relation to “the country of his former habitual residence”, any further change of country of habitual residence will not affect his refugee status.

Potential country of reference

A person may not have to be a citizen of a potential country of reference, but may have a right to acquire citizenship by application. The condition of not having a country of nationality must be beyond the power of the applicant to control.

Country of reference for stateless persons

  • If stateless, the country of reference is the country of former habitual residence (CFHR)
  • If there is more than 1 CFHR, the applicant must be at risk in at least 1 CFHR (but not necessarily all)
  • Ability to return legally not required
  • Applicant must be unable or unwilling to return to any CFHR
  • If applicant can safely return to any CFHR, then they are not in need of protection

For more information on assessing risk for a stateless person, see the section below on Country against which risk is assessed.

Internal flight alternative

When considering an application for protection, the decision maker must be alert to the possibility that the applicant, although at risk in 1 part of the country, might reasonably be expected to obtain protection at some other location within that country. In such a situation, the applicant can be denied protection because they could avail themselves of an “internal flight alternative” (IFA). An IFA must be a realistic and attainable option, accessible without great physical danger or undue hardship. It must offer stable protection from the risk, where there is an established authority to which the person can turn for recourse.

The test to be applied in determining whether there is an IFA involves 2 parts. First, the decision maker must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the applicant being persecuted in the location of the IFA. Second, conditions in the location of the IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable for the applicant to seek refuge there, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the applicant.

The burden of establishing that an IFA is not a viable option rests with the applicant. When assessing the reasonableness of the IFA, the decision maker should consider the particular circumstances of the person and of the country involved to establish whether it would be unreasonable to require a person to return to some part of the State. Elements such as convenience or preference of the applicant to live in a particular part of the country should not render an IFA unreasonable.

While there may be similarities between the factors considered under the IFA test and the hardship factors considered in a humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) application, these are 2 procedures governed by different objectives and considerations. For instance, separation from family may be relevant in an H&C application but, in an IFA assessment, hardships flowing from separation from relatives would only render an IFA unreasonable if an applicant's life or safety would be jeopardized. The standard for demonstrating that an IFA is unreasonable is high. The applicant must present actual and concrete evidence of the existence of conditions that would jeopardize their life or safety if they were to relocate to the location of the IFA.

Where a decision maker examines an IFA in a new or previously unconsidered location, (that is, the IFA was not considered in a previous RPD/RAD/PRRA decision), in the spirit of natural justice, the decision maker should provide reasonable notice to the applicant that the IFA with a specific city or region is being considered giving them the opportunity to rebut. See the Federal Court decision Moreno v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1224 for more details.

For more information on internal flight alternatives, please consult the IRB’s online resource Interpretation of Convention Refugee and Person in Need of Protection in the Case Law, Chapter 8 – Internal flight alternative.

Compelling reasons

The concept of “compelling reasons” is set out in subsection A108(4). This provision allows refugee protection to be conferred on humanitarian grounds to the special and limited category of persons who “have suffered such appalling persecution that their experience alone is a compelling reason not to return them, even though they may no longer have any reason to fear further persecution” (Ortiz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1365 at paragraph 60).

Subsection A108(1) states:

  • 108 (1) A claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances:
    • (a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country of nationality;
    • (b) the person has voluntarily reacquired their nationality;
    • (c) the person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of that new nationality;
    • (d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the person left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee protection in Canada; or
    • (e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist

At the same time, subsection A108(4) provides that:

108(4) Paragraph (1)(e) does not apply to a person who establishes that there are compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country which they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous persecution, treatment or punishment

The 1951 Refugee Convention contained cessation of refugee status clauses, which were adopted by federal legislation under the 1976 Immigration Act and in IRPA. In general, a person who has obtained refugee status in a country of protection can have that status ceased if certain conditions of re-availment, re-establishment or reacquiring the protection of the country of origin were met, as per paragraphs A108(1)(a) to (d). 

However, there is a notable exception to the finding that a person’s refugee status has ceased if the reasons for which the person sought protection have ceased to exist and if there are compelling reasons arising out of the previous persecution for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country of origin, as indicated in paragraph A108(1)(e) and subsection A108(4).

In Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Obstoj (C.A.), [1992] 2 FC 739 (FCA), the Federal Court of Appeal found that Parliament did not intend to restrict the compelling reasons subsection to strictly the cessation context of the Act, but to the entire Canadian refugee determination system. Thus, a compelling reasons analysis could be raised in the context of PRRA decisions where certain conditions are met. First, the applicant must establish that, at some point in time, they met the definition of a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. Second, there must have been a change in circumstances such that the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist. Where these conditions are met, the decision maker should consider whether there are compelling reasons to grant refugee protection. 

In Yamba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2000) 254 NR 388 (FCA), the Federal Court of Appeal held that where there is past persecution coupled with a change in country conditions, the decision maker must consider if the evidence establishes compelling reasons not to return the person to the country of origin. This obligation arises whether or not the applicant raises the exception, although the burden is on the applicant to adduce sufficient evidence to benefit from that provision.

Therefore, decision makers must ask themselves:

  • Did the applicant face persecution, torture, treatment or punishment at one point in the past such that they met the definition of a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection?
  • Was there a change in the country conditions resulting in the disappearance of the reason for which the person faced persecution, torture, treatment or punishment?
  • Are there any compelling reasons, based on previous persecution or mistreatment, to grant protection?

In order to establish if the reasons raised by the applicant are “compelling reasons”, this excerpt from the 2016 decision in Moya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 315 gives guidance:

[121] With respect to the threshold, if any, which applies to determine whether, on the facts, compelling reasons have been established, Justice Crampton acknowledged the interpretation in Suleiman. He noted (at para 51) that the requirements of subsection 108(4) may be met when past persecution is not demonstrated to be appalling or atrocious, but highlighted that these situations must be “truly exceptional or extraordinary” relative to other cases.

[122] This is consistent with the underlying principle that the exception applies to a “tiny minority” of refugee claimants. […]

[127] The RAD first identified its task as “to establish whether the claimant’s particular case can be distinguished from cases of persecution that do not fall under s.108(4),” noting that this is a question of fact. The RAD then referred to the guidance from the case law that has established that the compelling reasons exception is applicable in exceptional circumstances. It also cited the jurisprudence that refers to appalling and atrocious persecution. The RAD did not, however, limit its consideration of compelling reasons to the narrower category of appalling and atrocious persecution; the RAD considered whether the past persecution described by the applicant, in comparison to other cases, reached the threshold where the exception had and had not been established. Although several of those cases refer to appalling persecution as the threshold, there is no error in imposing a high threshold as all the jurisprudence consistently notes this requirement.

Factors that could lead to a rejection of the application

All protection grounds must be considered and applied, and reasons given in respect of all grounds in coming to a determination that the application be rejected. The factors defined above and listed below are not an exclusive list, but they cover common reasons for rejecting applications, under all grounds of protection:

  • harm feared is not serious
  • harm feared is the law of general application, lawfully imposed, fitting international standards
  • harm feared is not objectively supported
  • there is effective state protection at an operational level
  • there is a reasonable IFA
  • the applicant possesses status in another country where they can be returned
  • risk is caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care

Country against which risk is assessed

The PRRA decision maker must examine risk with respect to the country to which the applicant is being removed. The CBSA removals officer determines the country of removal in accordance with section R241.

Should the PRRA decision maker be uncertain about the country of removal, or if they have questions regarding the country of removal that was selected (for example, the IRB found the applicant to be excluded under Article 1E of the Refugee Convention and there is indication that their status in the Article 1E country is still valid), they should discuss the case with their manager to see if the manager should seek clarifications from the CBSA regarding the country of removal and whether the applicant has been informed accordingly of the country to which they are being removed. The decision maker should not proceed with the risk assessment until they have discussed with their manager.

There may be circumstances in which an officer may need to consider risk in the country of nationality or of habitual residence, even if these are not the country of removal, in addition to considering risk in the country of removal. For example, this may be required in cases where the applicant is stateless, or in cases where, per section A98, a decision maker needs to assess whether Article 1E applies. In all cases, before proceeding with assessing risk in a country that is not the country of removal, the manager should seek guidance by sending a request to the Asylum Branch (AB).

Country of nationality or citizenship or habitual residence

The definitions of “Convention refugee” and “person in need of protection” confine the protection to persons who are outside their country of origin. The definitions include distinctions between persons who have a country of nationality and persons who do not; the latter may seek international protection when they are outside their country of former habitual residence. In cases where the applicant has multiple nationalities, the decision maker must examine the need for protection with respect to all countries if an application is to be allowed. If the applicant is not at risk in 1 of their countries of nationality, then the application is to be rejected in accordance with section A96 and section A97. Per Martinez Cabrales v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1178 at paragraph 53:

[53] … This Court has previously held that in the case of dual nationals, the RPD properly may refuse to analyze a secondary country of reference where it finds no risk in the first such country: Harris v Canada (MCI), 1997 CanLII 5567.

This principle is applicable even if the applicant has never entered or lived in 1 of the countries of nationality.

Where citizenship in another country is available, an applicant is expected to make attempts to acquire it and will be denied refugee protection if it is shown that it is within their power to acquire that other citizenship. If multiple nationalities are an issue and this issue was not raised during the determination of the person’s refugee claim, the applicant should be given the opportunity to address this and obtain evidence that has not been raised as part of their submissions. Decision makers must follow procedural fairness throughout the process to ensure the applicant has been given the opportunity to respond. 

The expectation to acquire available citizenship includes the situation of a person who must renounce citizenship in the country of persecution in order to acquire citizenship in another. For the PRRA, the person should be deemed to be a citizen of the country in which they have a claim to citizenship. The operative principle is whether it is within the Applicant’s power to obtain citizenship as of right as long as established procedures are followed. The Federal Court states in Lobsang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 131 at paragraphs 27 to 28:

[27] The burden is on the Applicant to establish that access to citizenship is not within his control: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Williams, 2005 FCA 126 at paras 21-22, 27 [Williams]; Tretsetsang at paras 6-7, 67.

[28] Where citizenship in another country is available, claimants are expected to attempt to acquire it. This approach is consistent with the principle that international protection is to serve as surrogate protection and that the only valid reason for a potential refugee to be unwilling to avail himself of the protection of a country of nationality is based on a well-founded fear of persecution in that country: Williams at para 27; Tretsetsang at 68-71.

With respect to stateless persons who have multiple countries of former habitual residence, the Federal Court in Alhaddad v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 655 at paragraph 22 states that:

[22] The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Thabet sets out the approach for determining Convention refugee claims for stateless persons, who have habitually resided in more than one (1) country:
…
In order to be found to be a Convention refugee, a stateless person must show that, on a balance of probabilities he or she would suffer persecution in any country of former habitual residence, and that he or she cannot return to any of his or her other countries of former habitual residence.

(Thabet at para 30.)

In all cases, before proceeding with assessing risk in a country that is not the country of removal, the manager should seek guidance by sending a request to the Asylum Branch (AB).

Refugees “sur place”

Paragraphs 94 to 96 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection, states the following:

94.The requirement that a person must be outside his country to be a refugee does not mean that he must necessarily have left that country illegally, or even that he must have left it on account of well-founded fear. He may have decided to ask for recognition of his refugee status after having already been abroad for some time. A person who was not a refugee when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee at a later date, is called a refugee “sur place”.

95. A person becomes a refugee “sur place” due to circumstances arising in his country of origin during his absence. Diplomats and other officials serving abroad, prisoners of war, students, migrant workers and others have applied for refugee status during their residence abroad and have been recognized as refugees.

96. A person may become a refugee “sur place” as a result of his own actions, such as associating with refugees already recognized, or expressing his political views in his country of residence. Whether such actions are sufficient to justify a well-founded fear of persecution must be determined by a careful examination of the circumstances. Regard should be had in particular to whether such actions may have come to the notice of the authorities of the person's country of origin and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities.

The concept of a refugee “sur place” relates to the person’s well-founded fear of persecution and therefore should be considered pursuant to section A96. An example of a refugee “sur place” would be when a person converted to another religion while in Canada, and adherents of that religion face persecution in their country of origin.

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2025-11-18