Threats to the Battle River—Crowfoot by election - November 2025
Executive summary
On June 30, 2025, a writ was issued for a federal by-election in the electoral district of Battle River—Crowfoot, Alberta, with the election scheduled to take place on August 18, 2025. In response, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE TF) initiated enhanced monitoring and assessment of potential foreign interference (FI) threats and violent extremism targeting the by-election.
At the outset of the Battle River-Crowfoot by-election, SITE assessed the likelihood of the foreign interference attempts in this riding would be minimal. As anticipated, the SITE TF did not observe any activity consistent with known FI methodologies or violent extremist threats directed at the by-election that fell within the mandates of SITE TF members.
This report summarizes the SITE TF's activities and observations regarding foreign actors' intentions and FI activities directed at the by-election, covering the period from June 30, 2025, to August 25, 2025.
Background
The SITE TF is a whole-of-government working group that coordinates the Government of Canada's collection and analysis efforts concerning threats to Canada's federal election processes. Created in 2019, the SITE TF is made up of experts from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
The SITE TF provides a clear point of engagement with the security and intelligence community and coordinates intelligence review and analysis, provides situational awareness through threat assessments, reports, and briefings, and, where members' mandates permit, coordinates action to mitigate threats. The SITE TF works closely with other government agencies and stakeholders to ensure the integrity of the electoral process and to protect Canadian democracy.
SITE's monitoring and reporting
The SITE TF implemented a monitoring and reporting framework during the Battle River—Crowfoot by-election, allowing for the reporting of threat-related incidents by SITE members, candidates, and political parties. The SITE assistant deputy minister-level Elections Security Coordination Committee (ESCC) was tasked to govern these incidents, determining whether they warranted reporting to the Deputy Minister Committee on Intelligence Action (DMIA). In accordance with the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP), incidents during the caretaker period were reported to the Panel, while those outside this period were addressed through regular Government of Canada operations, with the DMIA receiving reports.
Throughout the monitoring period (June 30, 2025, to August 25, 2025), the SITE TF convened weekly meetings to review and discuss intelligence collection, assessment, and open-source analysis related to FI and violent extremism threats. The SITE TF provided regular updates to the ESCC and weekly situation reports (SITREPs) to the DMIA, detailing potential FI and violent extremism threats. These updates were informed by information collected under each member's respective mandate and incorporated input from each SITE member agency.
Additionally, the SITE TF delivered a classified briefing on FI and best practices for protection against FI threats to cleared party representatives in July, and completed a threat assessment on July 9, 2025, examining FI and violent extremist threats targeting or involving candidates in the by-election.
Threat assessment
At the outset of the by-election, SITE TF's assessment was that the Russian Federation may engage in opportunistic foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns, potentially featuring narratives that exploit regional or local sensitivities. However, given the limited online engagement generated by similar FIMI activities in the recent general election, the SITE TF assessed that such activity during the by-election was also unlikely to garner significant engagement.
The SITE TF further assessed that other foreign actors were unlikely to conduct FI activities targeting the by-election.
The SITE TF assessed that violent extremists were unlikely to engage in acts of serious violence against persons or property related to the Battle River—Crowfoot by-election.
Foreign interference
SITE defines FI as an “activity conducted or supported by a foreign state/actor that is detrimental to Canadian national interests and is clandestine, deceptive or involves a threat to a person.” In the context of Canadian electoral processes, the objective of FI is to affect electoral outcomes and/or undermine public confidence in Canadian democratic institutions.
Between June 30, 2025, and August 25, 2025, the SITE TF conducted monitoring activities to detect and assess potential foreign interference targeting the electoral district of Battle River—Crowfoot by-election. The results of this monitoring effort indicated that no foreign interference activities were observed during the specified time period that were directed at the by-election.
Violent extremism
SITE defines violent extremism as “threats or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious, or ideological objective in Canada.”
While the SITE TF is primarily focused on foreign interference, the RCMP and CSIS have mandates and authorities to investigate threats of violent extremism. The SITE TF monitored for threats of violent extremism directed at the electoral district of Battle River—Crowfoot by-election from June 30, 2025, and August 25, 2025. The SITE TF did not observe any threats of violent extremism directed at the by-election during that time.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the SITE TF did not observe any activity consistent with known foreign interference methodologies or violent extremist threats that fell within the mandates of SITE members during the Battle River—Crowfoot by-election. In future federal electoral processes, the SITE TF will continue to monitor and assess potential threats to Canadian electoral processes and work closely with other government agencies and stakeholders to ensure the integrity of the electoral process and protect Canadian democracy.