C-174 - Conduct (Discipline) Appeals

This appeal relates to the manner in which the Appellant was driving while en route to provide assistance to another RCMP member. The Respondent found an allegation under section 7.1 (Discreditable Conduct) of the RCMP Code of Conduct established since the Appellant was driving in a dangerous manner, including driving up to speeds of 211 km/h, to provide assistance for a non-pursuable offence.

Before the Conduct Meeting and because the Appellant was on medical leave, the Respondent sought several extensions of the time limit to impose conduct measures. The Appellant contested these requests and sought to have his legal representative make submissions on his behalf at the Conduct Meeting as a form of accommodation. The Respondent denied the request. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the time limit extensions granted, the Respondent’s denial of his request to be represented and argues that the Respondent’s decision on the allegation was clearly unreasonable since he incorrectly applied the legal test for discreditable conduct.

The ERC found that, although the Respondent was properly granted permission to make submissions on appeal, those submissions exceeded the limited scope authorized under the Commissioner’s Standing Orders (Grievances and Appeals) and RCMP policy. The permission was restricted to correcting alleged false or misleading information in the Appellant’s submissions, but the Respondent challenged the Appellant’s interpretation of the evidence.

On the merits of the appeal, the ERC concluded that the Appellant’s procedural fairness rights were not breached. While the Appellant argued that the Respondent improperly delayed the conduct process by refusing to allow counsel to speak on his behalf at the conduct meeting, the ERC found that the governing framework entitled the Appellant to legal assistance, not legal representation. Because his counsel attended the meeting, advised the Appellant, and prepared written submissions, the Appellant had a meaningful opportunity to know the case against him and respond to it.

The ERC also rejected the Appellant’s challenge to the extensions of time granted during the conduct process. Applying the principles from Pentney, the ERC found that the Director General reasonably considered the circumstances surrounding the delays, including medical concerns and communication issues, and reasonably concluded that the delays were adequately explained.

With respect to the finding of discreditable conduct, the ERC determined that the Respondent properly considered the operational realities of policing, the applicable pursuit policies, the Appellant’s decision-making, and the risks created by his driving. The decision was supported by evidence, including the Appellant’s speed and the circumstances of the incident, and was therefore not clearly unreasonable.

The ERC recommends that the appeal be dismissed.