DAOD 8002-3, Security Intelligence Liaison Program

1. Introduction

Date of Issue: 2003-03-28

Application: This is a directive that applies to employees of the Department of National Defence (DND) and an order that applies to officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF members).

Supersession: NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/94, Police and Security Liaison Program

Approval Authority: This DAOD is issued under the authority of the J2/Director General Intelligence (J2/DG Int).

Enquiries: Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU)

2. Definitions

counter-intelligence (contre-ingérence)

Counter-intelligence means activities concerned with identifying and counteracting threats to the security of DND employees, CAF members, and DND and CAF property and information, that are posed by hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities.

security intelligence (renseignement de sécurité)

Security intelligence means intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities.

3. Program Overview


3.1 If a clearly defined threat to the security of DND and the CAF is established, the CFNCIU conducts liaison with police and security intelligence agencies under the auspices of the Security Intelligence Liaison Program (SILP) to identify the nature of such threats. See DAOD 8002-0, Counter-Intelligence, for a list of threats to the security of DND and the CAF.

3.2 Annually, National Counter-Intelligence Standing Intelligence Requirements (CI SIRs), which are recommended by the Counter-Intelligence Oversight Committee (CIOC) and approved by the DCDS, specify the security information that may be gathered and reported upon by the CFNCIU under the SILP. Collection of security information not addressed in the SIRs, such as during domestic operations, may occur under the auspices of the SILP, once specifically authorized by J2/Director General Intelligence (J2/DG Int) or CIOC.

Liaison Process

3.3 Except when mandated otherwise by NDHQ, the production of security intelligence and the manner in which security information collection is conducted shall be restricted primarily to open sources and liaison with police and security agencies through the SILP. This liaison shall be performed primarily by CFNCIU members who have retained their military police (MP) credentials and authority under section 156 of the National Defence Act for this purpose (see DAOD 8002-2, Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit).

3.4 While DND senior managers, commanders, commanding officers (COs) and their staffs have the responsibility to maintain situational awareness within their respective areas of responsibility, during which security information may inadvertently be acquired, the mandate for the organized collection of security information from civilian police and security agencies rests with the CFNCIU. Any security information collected by DND senior managers, commanders, COs and their staffs in these circumstances shall be provided to the CFNCIU to allow for its integration into DND and CAF security intelligence products.

3.5 An exception to this authority for the organized collection of security information allows the National Defence Command Center 2 (NDCC 2) to liaise with MP, and civil and security agencies, in support of its mandate to produce threat assessments in support of DND and the CAF.

Criminal Intelligence

3.6 The security intelligence process should not be confused with the liaison conducted by members of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) for the purpose of obtaining criminal intelligence, as the collection of this type of information is within their mandate. The CFNCIU shall not conduct liaison for the purpose of collecting criminal intelligence. Information of criminal intelligence value obtained by CFNCIU members during the normal conduct of their duties shall be passed to the CFNIS, the CF Provost Marshal, the local MP entity, or intelligence or security staff, as appropriate. See the Overview map in DAOD 8002-1, National Counter-Intelligence Program, for information on the uses of criminal intelligence.

Assessment and Analysis of Security Information

3.7 The CFNCIU is also responsible for assessing the reliability and accuracy of the security information it obtains.

3.8 NDCC 2 shall conduct analysis centrally of security information collected by the CFNCIU under the authority of the DCDS approved National CI SIRs This does not preclude G2/N2/A2 staff at other headquarters from applying a more detailed regional assessment of information obtained from open sources, through situational awareness liaison visits, or the intelligence received from NDHQ or the CFNCIU. Additionally, NDCC 2 or G2/N2/A2 staff may request CFNCIU collection activities in relation to a specific event or matters of concern within their areas of responsibility through Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM). Security information collected in such circumstances for NDCC 2 shall be channeled through CFNCIU HQ. Security information which is collected on behalf of a G2/N2/A2 request shall be passed directly to the requesting office with an information copy forwarded to CFNCIU HQ.

Control of Security Intelligence

3.9 The security of operations, the continued cooperation of civilian police and security sources, and the privacy of individuals, depend upon strict control over the dissemination of security intelligence. The protection of sources must at times limit what information can be passed to those authorities with the necessary security clearance and a need-to-know. Reports frequently contain information provided to DND and the CAF conditionally for their exclusive and limited use.

3.10 Dissemination of security intelligence reports to outside of DND and the CAF, whether in whole or in part, shall be in accordance with DND and CAF policy, and access to information and privacy legislation.

4. Responsibilities

Responsibility Table

4.1 The following table identifies responsibilities pertaining to the SILP:

The … is responsible for …

J2/DG Int

  • overall development and implementation of the SILP.


  • monitoring the SILP;
  • implementing unit collection activities in accordance with the SILP policy;
  • disseminating and retaining information and intelligence;
  • coordinating associated liaison with foreign and national agencies;
  • obtaining legal advice to ensure that all collection methods employed by the CFNCIU are in strict compliance with the law; and
  • controlling and accounting for all funds allocated for the specific conduct of the SILP.

J2 Plans Pol 4

  • developing policy and resolving issues related to the SILP; and
  • preparing SIRs annually for CIOC review and DCDS approval.


  • having oversight of the SILP to ensure that all activities are conducted in accordance with the requirements of DND and the CF and applicable laws.

5. References

Acts, Regulations, Central Agency Policies and Policy DAOD

  • Government Security Policy
  • National Defence Security Policy
  • DAOD 8002-0, Counter-Intelligence

Other References

  • Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act
  • National Defence Act
  • DAOD 8000-1, National Counter-Intelligence Program
  • DAOD 8002-2, Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit
  • NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98, Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations
  • A-SJ-100-001/AS-000, Security Orders for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces
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