Evaluation of the Canadian Armed Forces Strategy to Achieve Fundamental Change for the Reserve Force
January 2025
1258-3-066 (ADM(RS))
Reviewed by ADM(RS) in accordance with the Access to Information Act. Information UNCLASSIFIED.
Table of Contents
Overview
Evaluation of the New Vision for the Reserve Force
This evaluation was conducted between March 2023 and November 2024, when the New Vision for the Reserve Force was being drafted and approved. A developmental evaluation approach was applied to clarify the New Vision’s objectives, assess its relevance to the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) general objectives and identify the potential challenges with implementation, particularly in relation to the Primary Reserve.
Canadian Reserve Force
The Reserve Force is one of the components of the CAF, in addition to the Regular Force, and comprises four distinct sub-components: the Primary Reserve, the Canadian Rangers, the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service and the Supplementary Reserve. The Primary Reserve carries out several roles within the CAF including, but not limited to, participating in training, filling institutional roles and carrying out operations within Canada and abroad.
Alternate Formats
Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services)
CAF Challenges and the Role of the Reserve Force
In the New Vision, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) notes a greater contribution from the Reserve Force is needed to achieve the CAF’s operational outputs. The Regular Force faces mounting pressure to concurrently execute its assigned or implied missions. The Reserve Force must be integrated into CAF Force Posture and ReadinessFootnote 1 (FP&R) planning in order to contribute to maximizing the operational output of the CAF and prepare for large-scale mobilization. While the Reserve Force is not integrated into such planning efforts, the latest FP&R directive identified this need.
About the New Vision for the Reserve Force
The New Vision outlines the CDS’s intention to fundamentally change the Reserve Force and make its contribution to Canada’s defence and security objectives more effective. Such change focuses on three key areas:
Figure 2 Summary
This logic model graphic provides a visual illustration of the relationship between key intermediate and ultimate outcomes for the New Vision for the Reserve Force. There are three separate intermediate outcomes that lead to a single ultimate outcome. The three intermediate outcomes are:
- Capabilities: Reserve Force capabilities and capacities are integrated into CAF FP&R.
- Stewardship: Force Generators’ (FG) ability to forecast, allocate resources and make decisions regarding the Reserve Force is enhanced.
- Recruitment and Retention: Engagement and retention of a skilled and geographically diverse Reserve Force is increased.
The ultimate outcome is “a Reserve Force that is integrated into the Defence Team, ready to respond to institutional demands and contribute to Canada’s defence and security objectives.”
Key Takeaways
- The Reserve Force is not currently integrated into the CAF’s FP&R planning.
- While there is support for the development of new, enhanced and specific capabilities for Primary Reservists, stakeholders are less supportive of assigning unique capabilities to the Reserve Force and holding capabilities in reserve (i.e., at a lower state of readiness).
- A complex Reserve Force policy environment and insufficient Reserve data could limit the CAF’s ability to effectively plan and allocate Reserve Force resources.
- The New Vision seeks to address the recruitment and retention challenges unique to the Reserve Force that are not incorporated into larger CAF initiatives.
Overall Assessment
The New Vision calls for relevant and necessary improvements to the Reserve Force, particularly in the areas of capability allocation, policies and data alignment, as well as recruitment and retention for the Primary Reserve. However, without an overarching plan that matches the CDS’s strategic intent for the integration of the Reserve Force into CAF FP&R, there remains a risk that efforts to address Reserve Force challenges will remain inconsistent across the CAF. The New Vision, together with a clearly defined role for the Reserve Force, will ensure the Primary Reserve can support the CAF in achieving Canada’s defence and security objectives.
Capabilities
Key Takeaway 1: The Reserve Force is not currently integrated into the Canadian Armed Forces’ Force Posture and Readiness planning.
The New Vision calls for the Reserve Force to be integrated into FP&R planning, which is needed to determine what capabilities should be taken on by the Reserve Force. This objective is at risk due to a lack of funding prioritization and a continued lack of resources for the planning and development of Reserve Force capabilities. As a result, the CAF will have to provide other incentives to encourage the various military environments to develop capabilities for the Reserve Force that go beyond filling vacant positions on an individual basis.
Definition of “Capabilities” from the Department of National Defence Capability Based Planning Handbook:
A capability is a description of the military operational output or outcome that a unit, force or organization is able [and usually constituted or organized] to deliver.
Figure 4 Summary
This figure depicts the allocation and reallocation of Reserve Force funds. There are five chronological elements of this figure.
- The first element is related to funds announced for the Reserve Force in Strong, Secure, Engaged for FYs 2019/20 to 2036/37, amounting to $3,186,882,791.
- The second element is related to funds used for Reserve Force growth as well as compensation and benefits improvements (from Treasury Board Submissions between 2019 and 2022), amounting to $1,304,801,789.
- The third element is related to unused Reserve Force funds that were reallocated away from the Reserve Force and returned to the government (during FYs 2019/20 to 2023/24), amounting to $445,967,697.
- The fourth element is related to refocused government spending within DND/CAF’s budget in January and February 2024, which reallocated funds away from the Reserve Force, amounting to $741,708,465.
- The fifth element is related to the reallocation of funds for Our North Strong and Free (2024), which reallocated funds away from the Reserve Force, amounting to $694,404,840.
Key Takeaway 2: While there is support for the development of new, enhanced and specific capabilities for Primary Reservists, stakeholders are less supportive of assigning unique capabilities to the Reserve Force and holding capabilities in reserve (i.e., at a lower state of readiness).
In response to a questionnaire, CAF stakeholders reported their level of support for the following three capability scenarios for the Reserve Force and holding capabilities in reserve for the CAF overall:
Figure 5 Summary
This figure reflects the result of a questionnaire in which CAF stakeholders reported their level of support for four scenarios and described the pros and cons of each scenario.
The first scenario relates to having new/enhanced capabilities for the Reserve Force. Sixty-nine percent of respondents were in favour.
Pros included:
1) This would clarify the role of the Reserve Force.
2) The CAF could capitalize on mission-critical civilian skills (e.g., cyber security).
Cons included:
1) There are insufficient training and equipment resources.
2) There is limited availability of Class A Reservists to complete existing/new training.
The second scenario relates to having specific capabilities for the Reserve Force. Seventy percent of respondents were in favour.
Pros included:
1) This would clarify the role of the Reserve Force.
2) The CAF could capitalize on mission critical civilian skills (e.g., cyber security).
Cons included:
1) There are insufficient training and equipment resources.
2) There is limited availability of Class A Reservists to complete existing/new training.
The third scenario relates to having unique capabilities for the Reserve Force. Forty-one percent of respondents were in favour.
Pros included:
1) Certain capabilities could benefit from civilian experience (e.g., cyber).
2) It would help to clarify the role of the Reserve Force.
Cons included:
1) There are concerns Reservists might not voluntarily deploy when capability is required.
The fourth scenario relates to having capabilities held in-reserve by the Reserve Force. Forty-eight percent of respondents were in favour.
Pros included:
1) It would improve CAF’s state of readiness.
Cons included:
1) Shortages in existing people and equipment do not allow the CAF to hold capabilities in reserve.
The strategic integration of Reserve Force capabilities into FP&R planning must be appropriately resourced by the CAF and supported by the military environments. If these challenges are not addressed, the Reserve Force will likely continue to fill individual gaps in the Regular Force. As a result, there is a risk that the Primary Reserve will not be able to deliver capabilities in line with CDS objectives for the CAF or Canada’s defence and security objectives.
The Chief of Reserves is working with stakeholders across the CAF to:
- clarify the regulatory framework surrounding Reserve service;
- communicate the value of Reserve service to internal and external audiences; and
- align Force Development and FP&R planning with the New Vision.
Stewardship
Key Takeaway 3: A complex Reserve policy environment and insufficient Reserve data could limit the ability of the Canadian Armed Forces to effectively plan and allocate Reserve Force resources.
Reserve Force policy inconsistencies led to inequities requiring ongoing policy work.
The Queen’s Regulations and Orders (QR&O) 9: Reserve Force defines Class B service as temporary full-time service for Reservists and Class C as serving permanent full time on operations or duties of an operational nature in a Regular Force position or a position supernumeraryFootnote 2 to the Regular Force. Subsequent policies have created a new permanent Class B and have limited Class C to operational roles only, both of which deviate from the original definitions of Class B and C in QR&O 9.
Figure 7 Summary
This figure depicts a timeline of events related to Reserve Force classification policy changes. It shows a horizontal line with several diamonds, which represent a timeline and important years. Lines are drawn from each diamond to an associated text box, describing the key event.
The first textbox, associated with the year 1970, states “Class B (A) recommended: This new type of service (60+ days) circumvents Class C pay envelope and Regular Force capping.”
The second textbox, associated with the year 1983, states “Class C is now supernumerary to the Regular Force: QR&O 9 is amended to allow Class C to be supernumerary to the Regular Force.”
The third textbox, associated with the year 1993, states “Class B (A) implemented: Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources - Military) Instruction 2/93 is published.”
The fourth textbox, associated with the year 2001, states “Class C for ops only:
CANFORGEN CFG 095/01 ceases all non-operational Class C and uses Class B instead.”
The fifth textbox, associated with the year 2004, states “Permanent Class B: Military Personnel Instruction 20/04 creates Class B permanent positions (max. 6 years) and restricts Class C to ops.”
The sixth textbox, associated with the year 2012, states “Cap Permanent Class B to 4,500: The Primary Reserve Employment Capacity Study establishes 4,500 permanent Class B positions.”
The seventh textbox, associated with the year 2016, states “Office of the Auditor General questions permanent Class B: The 2016 report questions whether full-time Class B is aligned with the National Defence Act.”
The eighth textbox, associated with the year 2023, states “Call for a holistic review of Reserve Force classes of service: The New Vision proposes a return to the definitions contained in QR&O 9.”
These changes created inequities in pay and benefits within the Reserve Force classes and between the Reserve and Regular Forces, which required additional policy updates. Such policy updates continue today, requiring extensive Department of National Defence resource commitments.
The lack of coherence of the policy environment has widespread repercussions on the organization and members.
Most CAF questionnaire respondents reported their organization experienced challenges with the application of Reserve-related policies, and their Reservists experienced challenges regarding their compensation and benefits.
Figure 8 Summary
This figure details information related to the lack of coherence of the policy environment and its repercussions. It states that most CAF questionnaire respondents reported their organization experienced challenges with the application of Reserve-related policies, and their Reservists experienced challenges regarding their compensation and benefits. There are also two bar charts.
The first bar chart depicts the amount of Level 1 organizations that reported facing challenges with service classification policies. It shows that 45 percent reported many challenges, 33 percent reported some challenges, 10 percent reported few or no challenges, and 12 percent reported they were unsure.
The second bar chart depicts the amount of Level 1 organizations that reported their Reservists are facing challenges related to compensation and benefits. It shows that 39 percent reported many challenges, 39 percent reported some challenges, 12 percent reported few or no challenges, and 11 percent reported they were unsure.
The New Vision’s direction to clarify the Reserve Force obligations of service and related compensations and benefits must first start with an overarching strategy to develop a coherent policy framework for the Reserve Force. Without coherence, there is a risk that Reserve Force policies will be inconsistently applied across the CAF, including those related to compensation and benefits.
The siloed digital environment compounds policy and procedural delays and inconsistencies for the Primary Reserve. Systems for the Reserve Force are often separate and operate differently from systems for the Regular Force. These parallel systems cause delays and inconsistencies, especially in relation to compensation, benefits and component transfers for the Primary Reserve.
Guardian
The official system of record for organization and establishment
Monitor Mass
System used by L1s, each with their own standards for the employment of the Reserve Force
Revised Pay System for the Reserves
Reserve Class A and B
Central Computation Pay System
Regular Force and Class C
Improvements to the digital environment are taking place across the CAF. In the context of the Reserve Force, innovations are continuing to occur in silos, with different groups within the Reserve Force attempting to overcome data challenges on their own. This approach risks a continuation of the siloed approach to data that is already causing challenges for the Reserve Force and the CAF overall.
Several apps are being developed in silos by environments
Figure 9 Summary
This figure depicts three different applications that are being developed in silos by CAF environments.
The first application is the MyRCN App, developed by the Navy for the Naval Reserve to report leave submissions, fleet schedules and availability reports.
The second application is the 2 Canadian Division (2 Cdn Div) Army Reserve App, developed by the 2 Cdn Div (Quebec region) for both Regular and Reserve Force units to report and access information, including readiness and tasking opportunities.
The third application is the 2 Cdn Div Army Readiness Reporting, which is being developed by the 2 Cdn Div Army (Quebec region) to report readiness levels of both Regular and Reserve Force units.
Regarding the second and third applications, there is no indication if the readiness data is the same or from the same source.
The New Vision’s objective to improve the quality and accessibility of information, data and decision support tools will allow the CAF to have access to accurate and updated Reserve Force data and information that will inform readiness planning; however, such improvements will require collaboration across all parts of the CAF.
The Chief of Reserves is working with stakeholders across the CAF to:
- address outstanding challenges related to the Reserve Force personnel policy and programs, as well as oversee changes related to digitalization;
- assist and advise internal organizations on delivering on the four New Vision objectives by imbedding C Reserve Staff during staff planning; and
- examine the future of the Employer Support Program.
Recruitment and Retention
Key Takeaway 4: The New Vision seeks to address the recruitment and retention challenges unique to the Reserve Force that are not incorporated into larger Canadian Armed Forces initiatives.
While the Primary Reserve faces the same recruitment and retention challenges as the Regular Force (e.g., long wait times for medical and security assessments), these are compounded by additional challenges unique to the Reserve context. A key challenge for the Reserve Force is that it is in competition with the part-time employment sector, which can offer employment options that the Reserve Force cannot.
Figure 11 Summary
This figure depicts two bar charts in which command team members reported information on their perceived level of effectiveness related to addressing Reserve Force challenges.
The first bar chart depicts responses related to the effectiveness of addressing Reserve Force recruitment challenges. It shows that 10 percent responded effective, 42 percent responded somewhat effective, 36 percent responded not effective, and 12 percent responded they were unsure.
The second bar chart depicts the responses related to the effectiveness of addressing Reserve Force retention challenges. It shows that 10 percent responded effective, 51 percent responded somewhat effective, 30 percent responded not effective, and 10 percent responded they were unsure.
Figure 12 Summary
This figure depicts a scale with boxes of different challenges related to recruitment and retention of the Reserve Force on the left side, compared to the better prospects found at private and other external opportunities on the right side. The scale is tilting to the left side, reflecting more challenges on the Reserve Force side than on the private and external opportunities side.
- Left side (Reserve Force):
- The two recruitment challenges include:
- Inability to leverage specialized civilian skills due to obstacle of “professionalization;” and
- Inflexible training schedules.
- The three retention challenges include:
- Culture: Reservists not perceived as equal to Regular Force members;
- Lack of deployment opportunities; and
- CAF/civilian obligation challenges.
- The two recruitment challenges include:
- Right side (private/other part-time external opportunities):
- Two recruitment prospects include:
- Pay and benefits; and
- Flexible schedules.
- Two retention prospects include:
- Better balance for work-life obligations; and
- Pay and benefits.
- Two recruitment prospects include:
According to stakeholders, these challenges are compounded during three key life changes for Reservists: transitioning from full-time studies to employment, changes in family dynamics (e.g., marriage or civil union, changes in family size) and/or changes in a member’s civilian employment status (e.g., new employment, promotion or retirement).
The New Vision seeks to reduce barriers to continuing service and to improve support for Reservists. It calls for more efficient and effective administration systems, better career management for Primary Reservists, predictability of training and service, along with compensation and benefits equity with the Regular Force where work is similar. These retention efforts will also improve if supports can be enhanced during key life changes for Reservists. Undertaking the work to better understand the existing challenges of recruitment time into the Reserve Force is also part of the overall CAF recruiting improvement practices.
Figure 13 Summary
This divergent bar chart depicts the changing size of the Primary Reserve Force on an annual basis between FYs 2018/19 and 2023/24, accounting for intake and attrition. Positive values are depicted above the zero line, and negative values are depicted below the zero line.
- In FY 2018/2019, the number was 2,257.
- In FY 2019/2020, it was 1,393.
- In FY 2020/2021, it was -604.
- In FY 2021/2022, it was -800.
- In FY 2022/2023, it was -856.
- In FY 2023/2024, it was 660.
The Chief of Reserves is working with stakeholders across the CAF to:
- work with the new Recruiting Capability Board to ensure Reserve Force considerations are integrated in attraction and recruitment initiatives;
- improve the means by which the Chief of Reserves partners with internal organizations on delivering on the New Vision objectives (e.g., joint Chief of Reserves/Chief of Military Personnel tiger team);
- implement the changes outlined in the Employer Support Program to improve relevance to the individual Reservists;
- ensure a consistent approach to the Reserve Force employment model, better aligning it with the QR&Os and providing for flexible career options (e.g., component transfer);
- develop enhanced supports for Reservists during key career and life inflection points to encourage retention; and
- change the method of counting Reservists from APS to Trained Effective Strength.
International Comparison
Canada’s New Vision aligns with current efforts in the U.K. and Australia to define the role of the Reserve Force.
Both the U.K. and Australia are carrying out efforts to redefine their Reserve Forces. The U.K.’s Reserve Force Review 2030 seeks to expand the role of Reservists beyond filling vacancies in the Regular Force. Australia’s Total Workforce System looks to offer a greater variety of terms of service options for its Reserve Force that allows the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to capitalize on both the military and civilian skills of its Reservists. These initiatives align with the objectives of the New Vision and are the subject of ongoing study by the Chief of Reserves.
Australian Total Workforce System
The ADF has 10 service categories and service options that enable members to move between Regular and Reserve positions throughout their careers. This allows the ADF to retain a larger number of employees with a full spectrum of skills and experience.
Conclusion
The New Vision proposes a strategy for a modernized Reserve Force that is operationally relevant and ready to support the CAF in achieving Canada’s defence and security objectives. The evaluation found that the New Vision addressed many obstacles to achieving this goal, but a lack of a common and unified agreement on the tasks and purposes of the Reserve Force is evident. Such an agreement would provide direction on the integration of Reserve Force capabilities into FP&R planning, policy coherence and improvements to the data environment, as well as targets for recruitment and retention of Primary Reservists. Promoting fundamental and meaningful change at all levels, the Department of National Defence/CAF will require a long and sustained effort supported by careful monitoring, reporting and evaluation.
Page details
- Date modified: