The Strat C2 program is the responsibility of the SJS headed by the DOS. The SJS is a staff organization in National Defence Headquarters whose primary role is direct support to the CDS as described in the SJS Mission and Vision Statement:
The SJS provides military analysis and decision support to the CDS who is the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada. This enables the CDS to effect strategic command. The SJS supports the CDS in translating government direction into effective and responsive CF operations by, for example, taking part in the preliminary stages of operational planning with other government departments, CF operational and environmental commands, and the strategic staffs of Canada’s key allies. The key roles of the SJS are:
to provide timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS as the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada;
to enable the CDS’ strategic level planning, initiation, direction, synchronization, and control of operations; and
to translate the CDS’ intent into strategic directives.Footnote 2
Additionally, the CDS has assigned the Operational Authority for the CAF Command Network to the DOS, delegated to the Joint Information Intelligence Fusion Centre (JIIFC),Footnote 3 and the Deputy Minister (DM) and the CDS have assigned the DOS the following DND/CAF Functional Authorities, which are managed by the Strategic J4:Footnote 4
Transportation;
Food Services;
Fuels and Lubricants;
Ammunition program performance;
Postal Services Policy; and
CAF Road and Vehicle Safety Program.
In 2018 the SJS was comprised of the following organizations:
Director General Operations (DGO) comprised of:
Director Current Ops (DCO),
Director Arms Control Verification (DACV), and
JIIFC;
Director General Plans comprised of:
Director Strategic Plans (DSP),
Director National Security (DNS),
Director Strategic Engagement and Capacity Building (DSECB),
Director Plans North America (DPNA), and
Director Strategic Effects and Targeting (DSET);
Director General Support / Strategic J4 (DGS/Strat J4) comprised of:
Director Support Operations Coordination (DSOC),
Director Sustainment Strategy and Readiness (DSSR),
Director Logistics Programs (D Log P), and
Logistics Branch Integrator (LBI);
Director General Strategic Initiatives (DGSI) comprised of:
Director Strategic and Operational Analysis (DSOA); and
Strategic Initiatives Coordination;
Director General Coordination (DG Coord); and
Director Integration of Gender Perspectives (D IGP).
In 2012, prior to CAF Transformation (Bound 2), the SJS structure was comprised of the DOS, DGO, DGP and DG Coord organizations with 76 Reg F, 7 Res F, and 11 civilian staff.Footnote 5 Following CAF Transformation (Bound 2) the SJS was reorganized with the transfer of the Canadian Forces Integrated Command Centre (CFICC) to the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and eventual establishment of the DGS/Strat J4 organization. The Strat J4 element was created in 2015. It was established as a strategic level office to prioritize, synchronize and coordinate joint sustainment requirements for the CAF to sustain operations between DND/CAF corporate and operations functions and among Level One (L1) organizations.Footnote 6
1.2.2 Program Objectives
The Strategic Command and Control program objectives are:Footnote 7
Ensure direction, resources and activities are aligned with requirements for current and future CAF operations;
Support informed decision making and advice by the CDS and senior DND/CAF leadership;
Enable and support CAF Environmental Chiefs of Staff, and operational commanders are enabled and supported to force generate CAF force elements; and
Enable DND/CAF operations through the coordination and integration of strategic logistics support and sustainment activities.
1.2.3 Stakeholders
Principal DND/CAF stakeholders of the Strat C2 program include the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), Canadian Army, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, CJOC, Military Personnel Command, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, Judge Advocate General, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) (ADM(Pol)) and ADM (Materiel) (ADM(Mat)). External stakeholders include the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, NATO, NORAD and other allies.
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1.3 Evaluation Scope
1.3.1 Coverage and Responsibilities
When the Strat C2 program was established in 2017, it was initially based on the former 2013 National Defence Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) Sub Sub Programs 5.2.1 Strategic Capability Planning Support and 5.2.2 Strategic Force Posture Planning Support. The CAF’s Contracted Airborne Training Services (CATS) was later added to the Strat C2 program during development of the DRF.
Early discussions with the SJS, ADM(Mat) and RCAF staff to establish the scope of the evaluation concluded that the CATS activity was not relevant to the Strat C2 program and it was omitted from the evaluation. Elements of the CATS program were subsequently assigned to the RCAF and ADM(Mat) as part of their DRF Ready Forces Programs.
The Strat C2 evaluation focused on the following five key activities identified in the program Logic Model at Annex C:
Develop and maintain the strategic vision for the CAF;
Support strategic and operational situational awareness;
Develop CDS guidance and direction for CAF support and sustainment of operations;
Develop CAF operations, readiness and global engagement plans; and
Manage strategic logistics support.
1.3.2 Resources
Expenditures and personnel attributed to the Strat C2 program are provided at Table 2.
1.3.3 Issues and Questions
In accordance with the TB Directive on Results (2016),Footnote 8 the evaluation report addresses the evaluation issues related to relevance and performance. An evaluation matrix listing each of the evaluation questions, with associated indicators and data sources, is provided at Annex D . The methodology used to gather evidence in support of the evaluation questions can be found at Annex B .
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2.0 Findings and Recommendations
2.1 Relevance
Key Finding 1: There is an ongoing and future need for the Strat C2 program to support the Chief of the Defence Staff in the effective command and control of the CAF in support of Canada, Canadians and Canadian national interests.
The National Defence ActFootnote 9 provides for the appointment of a CDS who is charged with the control and administration of the CAF. Unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, all orders to the CAF that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the GC and the MND must be issued by or through the CDS. Under the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the CAF, the commanders of military commands are responsible directly to the CDS or such officer as the CDS may designate, for the control and administration of all elements allocated to them.Footnote 10
The Strat C2 program, embodied in the SJS, directly supports CDS decisions concerning the preparation, planning and execution of CAF operations including the development of readiness targets, the issuance of readiness directives, the promulgation of Force Posture Plans and the development and issuance of CDS directives and orders. The program also provides timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS as the principal military advisor to the GC.
Key Finding 2: The Strat C2 program supports DND/CAF in executing its departmental and federal roles and responsibilities; however greater clarification of roles and responsibilities between this and related DND/CAF programs is required.
The CDS serves as the principal military advisor to the GC. In addition, the CDS fulfils his responsibilities for the control and administration of the CAF by exercising command at the strategic level. The CDS is supported in fulfilling his advisory and command roles by the SJS, led by the DOS, who reports directly to the CDS and who has the authority and responsibility to issue guidance as directed by the CDS. The role of the SJS is as follows:
The SJS provides timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS in his advisory role to the Government; and
The SJS supports the CDS in his critical role of translating Government direction into effective and responsive CAF operations, enabling the CDS to effect strategic command, by allowing him to plan for, initiate, direct, synchronize and control operations at the strategic level. In doing so, the SJS supports the CDS by establishing both access and military information exchanges with select government departments that directly lead or support security and Defence missions and ensuring effective liaison with the strategic military staffs of key allies.Footnote 11
The SJS organization has evolved and grown significantly since 2006 but the program’s activities remain aligned with DND/CAF roles and responsibilities.
Key Finding 3: The Strat C2 program supports defence policy initiatives in Strong, Secure, Engaged , is aligned with DND/CAF priorities, and is a key component in support of the Department’s Strategic Outcomes.
The Strat C2 program is comprised of activities that are essential to the CAF’s ability to achieve the GC’s Defence priorities and ability to perform its core missions in accordance with SSE. This includes support to the following defence policy initiatives in SSE:
SSE initiative 12 - Integrate GBA+ in all defence activities across the CAF and DND, from the design and implementation of programs and services that support our personnel, to equipment procurement and operational planning;
SSE initiative 68 – the SJS’ JIIFCcontribution to integrate existing and future assets into a networked, joint system-of-systems that will enable the flow of information among multiple, interconnected platforms and operational headquarters; and
SSE initiative 72 – Establishment of a CAF targeting capability to better leverage intelligence capabilities to support military operations.
As well, the annual CDS Directive on CAF Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R), produced by the Strat C2 program, is aligned with DND/CAF priorities and establishes a clear relationship between readiness, operational requirements and GC policy.
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2.2 Performance—Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)
Effectiveness of the Strat C2 program was evaluated using program documents and data, and interviews of key program staff and stakeholders.
2.2.1 Decision Support and Situational Awareness
Key Finding 4: The Strat C2 program contributes to strategic and operational situational awareness in support of senior leadership decision making and military advice to Government.
As noted by interviewees, the SJS provides situational awareness (SA) products on a daily basis, ranging from morning briefs to the CDS to the constant contact and information flow with the CFICC that is quickly relayed, as required, to the CDS and the senior DND/CAF leadership.
The SJS is the principle conduit of strategic and operational SA in support of the senior CAF leadership decision making and advice. This is supported by CAF operational command centres, intelligence sources, and key stakeholders including Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, Transport Canada and allies. Information is gathered, processed and disseminated through staff engagements and various Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS) that range from Unclassified to Top Secret.
The CDS and the key DND/CAF leadership, or their respective staff, are provided regular briefings for their SA. The briefing schedule has evolved over the evaluation period based on the nature of current CAF operational activities and the requirements of the incumbent Minister, DM and CDS. The DND/CAF leadership, including the MND, DM, CDS and DOS, are also provided classified daily operations and intelligence briefs each morning on tablets prepared by the SJS Strategic Situation Centre (SSC).
There is also a comprehensive plan to provide the CDS and MND notification of any urgent operational developments through the SJS DCO organization.Footnote 12 The DCO is the focal point for current operations issues and is responsible for:
SA and reporting on current domestic and international operations;
SJS/CAF lead for CDS/MND Commander’s Critical Information Requirements;
Managing MND Office/Privy Council Office Requests for Information;
Strategic level Crisis Management for operations;
Decision support and strategic advice on current domestic and international operations;
Providing analysis of key strategic issues; and
Maintaining the SSC, which provides the CDS/DOS with a strategic command support element for intelligence and operations including:
morning classified briefing products to DND/CAF senior leadership (E-binder) and open-source intelligence strategic orientation briefs; and
CAF lead for Air Security Incidents and Operation NOBLE EAGLE.Footnote 13
As mentioned previously, the strategic 24 hour/7 days a week watch centre for the SJS is the CFICC. The CFICC informs the strategic leadership of significant events or incidents that have occurred on operations, reporting to the CDS through the SJS DCO. In addition to reporting on the CJOC’s operations, the CFICC monitors worldwide events (including terrorist incidents, territorial incursions by one state into another, missile launches, among a host of other newsworthy events) to ensure that strategic leadership is informed. The CFICC also receives all Significant Incident Reports and Casualty Reports from all CAF units and distributes these to multiple organizations, including the SJS.
Key Finding 5: The Director of Arms Control Verification (DACV) conducts operations, on behalf of the GC in fulfillment of Canada’s arms verification objectives and obligations, which provide strategic situational awareness to the CAF and GC rather than direct staff support to the CDS as part of the SJS. Nonetheless, the SJS remains the optimum CAF organization for the DACV to perform its mission.
The DACV is a unique element of the Strat C2 program mandated by the GC/GAC to perform arms control verification in fulfillment of Canada’s obligations to a number of international arms control treaties and agreements. The DACV’s arms control activities, and strategic level military and political engagements, contribute to strategic situational awareness for the CAF and GC.
The DACV staff were part of the operations branch of the former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) based on NDHQ Policy Directive P2/94.Footnote 14 The DCDS staff were split between the new Canada Command, Canadian Expedition Force Command, and the newly established SJS when CAF Transformation occurred in 2006. While other DCDS operations staff were assigned to the new operational commands, the DCDS J3 ACV organization was assigned to the SJS and became the SJS DGO DACV.
As part of the SJS, the DACV plans, coordinates, executes and reports on international arms control verification regimes in support of Canada's legally and politically binding obligations and rights.Footnote 15 The Canadian DACV team partners with NATO nations and non-aligned partner nations to perform arms verification missions, and works closely with the US Armed Forces to ensure treaty obligations are met for Russian arms verification missions in Canada and the US, as well as in Russia and non-NATO nations.
During the course of this evaluation the following points were noted with regard to ACV:
The Report on Transformation 2011 noted, “Though structurally dissimilar, there were no gross functional inconsistencies noted [between the operational commands and SJS], with the possible exception of the existence of an Arms Control Verification (ACV) capability within the SJS.” However, unlike CJOC, the DACV performs political/diplomatic engagements of a strategic nature from the political to the tactical level.
When the ACV teams are deployed to operations they are eligible for various benefits, including the associated CAF service medal. They could be eligible for the CAF Operations Funding Account (OFA) as those funds are “directly attributable to a specific mission…”; however:
By definition, “OFA expenditures are incremental, which is defined as costs considered above and beyond the normal cost of an organization and/or planned activities.” The DACV costs are not considered incremental and are provided a baselined budget to execute their mission out to three years in advance.
The DACV employs Temporary Duty (TD) funds as part of its annual budget to attend annual meetings that are part of International Treaty and Agreement obligations but separate from its ACV missions. The TD and mission expenditures are approved and tracked separately using the DACV Operations and Maintenance budget.
While OFA eligible operations may be approved by Memorandum to Cabinet, Prime Minister approval letter, MND approval letter or CDS Direction, the DACV has a standing task from the GC to execute its ACV mission at a well-established funding level which requires no special approval or incremental funding.
Based on the preceding considerations, it was concluded in discussions with program staff that the SJS remains the best organization for DACV to conduct its multifaceted strategic level engagements and activities. However, if a Joint Force Command that is currently under consideration is established, then consideration could be given to establishing the DACV as a unit within that organization dependent upon its mandate and focus.
2.2.2 Strategic Vision Supports Current and Future Operations
Key Finding 6: Staff capacity to provide analysis and advice in support of the CAF strategic vision has diminished over the evaluation period; however, work continues in support of Strategic Outlooks, Force Posture and Readiness Directives, and other strategic planning.
The DGSI organization was established in late 2012 by the DOS, MGen Hood, and the CDS, Gen Lawson, to enhance SJS strategic analysis through four Strategic Orientation Look Ahead (SOLA) reports each year, and an annual Strategic Outlook report that would support FP&R planning, Military Strategy, and Global Engagement plans.Footnote 16
As of April 2018, DGSI had produced ten SOLAs and 100 peer-reviewed strategic studies, with some of the reports briefed to the Prime Minister and read by the former government’s MND. The DGSI had two lines of effort:
Shorter studies, responsive to CDS inquiries, that provided analysis at the strategic and operational levels; and
SOLA-type strategic studies – multiple papers, providing in-depth analysis of a strategic level subject.Footnote 17
The annual Strategic Outlook was to assist identification and prioritization of key threats to Canadian security to inform CAF planning.
In 2015, DGSI was comprised of the Director GSI, three CAF staff officers, and seven civilian Strategic Analysts provided from Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC). Strategic analysis reports were produced to support CDS military advice, FP&R requirements, Force employment/military response options, strategy development, strategic doctrine, a variety of initiatives and capability development in Horizon 1 (one to five years).Footnote 18
Following the turnover of the CDS in July 2015 and DOS in August 2015, a draft DOS letter was produced in September 2015 regarding the annual SOLA Briefings but was never promulgated. It indicated that the new CDS recognized the value of the SOLAs and Strategic Outlook process, but proposed a revised SOLA briefing program and the desire for each SOLA to produce actionable outcomes.
Nonetheless, Strategic Analysts were subsequently withdrawn over a two year period without backfill or other mitigation.Footnote 19 A proposal has now been put forward by DGSI to establish five new civilian positions to fill the Strategic Analyst requirements. In the meantime, there has been a diminished interest and capacity to produce SOLAs; however DGSI still provides FP&R and Strategic Outlook support and maintains contact with external partners to support their research.Footnote 20 As well, the following issues remain with the Strategic Outlook/SOLA reports:
They are not institutionalized;
Outcomes of reports are not developed or followed through on; and
Reports are disconnected from other processes and not integrated into planning.Footnote 21
Interviewees noted that the Five Eyes (AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US) National Assessments, which look ahead as far as 50 years, the Counter-Violent Extremist Organization (C-VEO) framework assessment, and assessments by Allied committees such as the Multinational Strategic Operations Group are all pulled into the CAF FP&R and Force Mix and Structure Design (FMSD)Footnote 22 as part of the SSE and FP&R driven changes to the CAF force structure.
Finally, a draft CAF Canadian National Military Strategy was produced by DGSI following release of the new defence policy, SSE; however that document remains in draft undergoing further revision.Footnote 23