Key Issues – Canada-China Defence Relations

Bilateral Military Training and Cooperation

  • In parallel with the whole-of-government review of Canada’s approach to China, National Defence is currently reviewing its military engagements with the People’s Liberation Army.
  • The last time the Canadian Armed Forces engaged in bilateral military training exercises with China was in 2018.
  • No bilateral military training with China has been conducted or planned since that time.
  • Canada will continue to engage in the broader Asia-Pacific region in a manner that promotes peace, security, and respect for international norms and laws.

Key Facts

Winter Survival Training Initiative Timeline:

  • January 2018: the Canadian Armed Forces sent a delegation to China to observe winter training conducted by the People’s Liberation Army.
  • February 2018: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sent a delegation to Canada to observe winter survival training conducted by the Canadian Armed Forces.
  • Winter 2019: Canada cancelled initial plans to invite the PLA to observe further iterations of winter survival training in Canada.

2019 World Military Games – Wuhan China: 

  • The Canadian Armed Forces sent a delegation of 114 athletes to the 2019 World Military Games in Wuhan, China.
  • The decision to participate in the Military Games was made in conjunction with Global Affairs Canada.
  • 9,308 military athletes from 109 countries took part in the Games, including 25 NATO members.

Bilateral Military Cooperation and Engagements:

  • Cooperation Plan Initiative (CPI): A non-binding cooperation arrangement signed in 2013 between Ministers of National Defence from Canada and the People’s Republic of China.
  • As a non-binding arrangement, the CPI does not require DND/ CAF to engaging or cooperating with the PLAC
  • In May 2018, the CAF conducted its last port visit with China.
    • HMCS Vancouver visited Hong Kong and undertook various non-training engagements alongside China Merchant’s Wharf.
  • Defence Attachés: The Canadian Armed Forces and the People’s Liberation Army maintain Defence Attachés at respective embassies as part of existing diplomatic relations.


  • Cooperation Plan Initiative is a non-binding cooperation arrangements that supports the following bilateral activities:
    • Senior level visits;
    • Defence Coordination Dialogue (DCD);
    • Exchanges and cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster response, search and rescue, anti-piracy, and maritime security;
    • Individual/sub-unit training in non-combat areas;
    • Academic exchanges.
  • As a non-binding arrangement, cooperation and engagement under the CPI is conducted at the discretion of the signatories.
  • Since the 2013 signing of the CPI, the CAF’s Strategic Joint Staff has participated in four Defence Coordination Dialogues with China:
    • November 28, 2013: Canada hosted;
    • September 23, 2014: China hosted;
    • November 28, 2016: Canada hosted;
    • April 10, 2018: China hosted.

Regional Defence Cooperation in Asia-Pacific

  • Canada remains a committed, engaged, and reliable ally and partner in the Asia-Pacific region.
  • The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) plays an active role in the region, through regular training and engagements with key allies and partners. 
  • For example, Canada has bolstered its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and is seeking membership in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus.
  • Additionally, through the Military Training and Cooperation Program, National Defence supports capacity building activities with 13 Asia-Pacific countries.
  • These efforts will enhance Canada’s ability to promote multilateralism and the rules-based international order, and to contribute to stability and security in the Asia-Pacific.

Key Facts

  • United Nations Command: Canada’s longest-standing commitment in Asia-Pacific supporting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
    • Under UN Command there are currently 7 CAF members deployed to Korea and 1 CAF member deployed to Japan.
    • Acting Chief of the Defence Staff Eyre served as the Deputy Commander UN Command (Korea) from April 2018 to July 2019.
  • Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP): supports activities with 13 Asia-Pacific countries to promote and enhance interoperability, democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.
    • China is not a member of the MTCP.

CAF Operations in Asia-Pacific

  • Canada remains a committed, engaged, and reliable ally and partner in the Asia-Pacific region.
  • As part of this commitment, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is an active participant in regional military cooperation with allies and partners. 
  • For example, Operation NEON is Canada’s contribution to a coordinated multinational effort to support UN Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea.
  • Under this operation, the CAF regularly deploys ships and aircraft to conduct surveillance operations to identify suspected maritime sanctions evasion activities.
  • Additionally, through Operation PROJECTION, the CAF conducts training, exercises, and engagements with foreign navies and other partners in the Asia-Pacific region.
  • Canada’s regional presence demonstrates our steadfast commitment to regional stability and upholding the rules-based international order. 

Key Facts

Operation NEON

  • CAF periodically deploys personnel, a frigate, and/or a CP-140 Aurora.
  • 2019-2020: Number of days CAF assets spent on patrol.
    • Frigates: 90 days; Asterix: 9 days
    • CP-140 Aurora: flew a total of 360 hours of missions over 91 days  
  • 2019-2020: Number of suspected ship to ship transfers observed by the CAF.
    • Frigates: 21
    • CP-140 Aurora: 29
  • November 2020: HMCS WINNIPEG completed a successful deployment accompanied by a Cyclone helicopter.
  • December 2020: a CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft detachment completed a successful deployment.
  • Key partners: Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.


  • Halifax-class frigates routinely deployed, with a crew of approximately 240 members.
  • 2021: HMCS CALGARY is currently deployed to the region under Op PROJECTION.

Transit of the Taiwan Strait

  • Canada is committed to promoting maritime peace and security, and maintaining the rules-based international order.
  • The Taiwan Strait is considered to be international waters.
  • During international naval deployments, the Canadian Armed Forces periodically transits through the Taiwan Strait.
  • During all international deployments, the CAF always operates in a manner that is consistent with international law.

Key Facts

  • Royal Canadian Navy vessels transit the Taiwan Strait on the way to international deployments:
    • 2018: 1
    • 2019: 3
    • 2020: 1
    • 2021: none to date
  • RCN transits through the Taiwan Strait are conducted independently.
  • Operation PROJECTION: the transit of CAF warships through the Taiwan Strait is always conducted under to Op PROJECTION.
  • Under this operation, the CAF participates in exercises and engagements with foreign navies and international security partners in the Asia-Pacific.
  • Operation NEON: CAF warships periodically sail through the Taiwan Strait en route to and from Op NEON as the most direct passage between the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
    • Op NEON is conducted in Northeast Asia and is Canada’s contribution to a coordinated multinational effort to support UN Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea.


Recent RCN Transits of the Taiwan Strait (Operation PROJECTION):

  • October 2018: HMCS CALGARY, Northbound from Da Nang to Op NEON.
  • June 2019: HMCS REGINA and MV ASTERIX, Northbound from Cam Ranh Bay to Op NEON.
  • September 2019: HMCS OTTAWA, Southbound from Op NEON to Laem Chabang and Northbound from Laem Chabang to Op NEON.
  • October 2020: HMCS WINNIPEG, Northbound from Balabac Strait to Op NEON.
  • 2021: none to date.

Continental Defence and the Arctic

  • Key security and defence challenges outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged --including climate change, technological advancements, and great power competition – have accelerated.
  • Deterring threats posed by new weapons requires modernization of CAF and NORAD capabilities, including enhanced all-domain surveillance in Canada’s northern and maritime approaches.
  • More broadly, the Arctic is at an inflection point where economic interests and geopolitical competition are increasing the strategic importance of the region for both Arctic and non-Arctic States.
  • Climate change will also continue to exacerbate challenges for CAF operations in the Arctic, and increase demand for responding to safety and security incidents. 
  • The Prime Minister and the U.S. President have agreed to expand cooperation on continental defence and in the Arctic, including NORAD modernization.
  • National Defence also remains committed to increasing our Arctic presence over the long-term and continuing to work collaboratively with our Indigenous, federal, territorial, and international Arctic partners on shared priorities.
  • These efforts will contribute to the collective defence of North America, and help ensure the Arctic, Northerners, and all Canadians continue to be safe, secure, and well-defended.

If pressed on China’s activities in the Arctic:

  • As the Arctic becomes more accessible, self-styled “near-Arctic States” like China will seek to influence the region, gain access to the region’s resources, and establish a strategic foothold.
  • This poses an increased threat to security and the environment in the North.
  • China employs a wide range of below threshold tactics in the Arctic, using all levels of state power, while avoiding direct confrontation and assuaging concerns about malicious intent.
  • National Defence will continue to work with like-minded countries in the Arctic to ensure that the region remains low tension and that the rules-based international order is preserved.

Key Facts

  • 1,000 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members support NORAD missions in aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning missions in defence of North America.
  • 1,800 Rangers in the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group work in 60 communities throughout the North.
  • 650 CAF members deployed to Op NANOOK 2020 over two deployments in February-March and August.
  • 300 Canadian Armed Forces personnel are stationed in Yellowknife with Joint Task Force North and other units.
  • The new Polar Epsilon 2 ground stations and expansion of the RADARSAT satellite program will enhance Arctic surveillance.
  • February 23, 2021: thePrime Minister and the US President Biden held their first bilateral meeting and agreed to expand cooperation on continental defence and in the Arctic, including by modernizing NORAD.


  • In Strong, Secure, Engaged, National Defence committed to acquiring next generation surveillance aircraft, remotely piloted systems, and all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and larger tracked vehicles for use in the Arctic.
  • National Defence has also taken the following steps to further improve the CAF’s presence and ability to operate in the Arctic:
    • Modernizing CAF capabilities in the Arctic, including through the acquisition of six new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels and supporting the modernization of the Inuvik Airport runway; and,
    • Investing in a range of space capabilities, such as building the Polar Epsilon 2 ground stations to receive and exploit the RADARSAT Constellation Mission data in support of surveillance in the Arctic.
  • Other large investments set out in SSE will contribute to overall continental defence, including commitments to acquire:
    • 15 new Canadian Surface Combatants for the Navy;
    • A fleet of 88 new fighters for the Air Force; and,
    • The All Domain Situational Awareness Program ($133M worth of investments over the last five years) to support the development of innovative solutions to address surveillance challenges in the North.
  • Canadian Armed Forces infrastructure in the North includes:
    • The North Warning System;
    • Three NORAD forward operating locations;
    • Canadian Forces Station Alert;
    • The Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay; and,
    • The Nanisivik Naval Facility.

Operations in the North

  • OP NANOOK: The CAF’s signature northern operation designed to exercise defence abilities in the challenging Arctic environment so we can defend and secure the Canadian North. During Op NANOOK, the CAF works with a variety of close partners, including Indigenous communities, federal and territorial governments, and Allies like the US, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, and France.
  • OP BOXTOP: The bi-annual resupply of Canadian Forces Station Alert and Fort Eureka.
  • OP LIMPID: The routine, and contingency, domestic surveillance and control of Canada’s air, maritime, land, and space domains.
  • OP NEVUS: An annual operation to perform maintenance on the High Arctic Data Communications System.

Arctic and Northern Policy Framework

  • In 2019, Canada’s Minister of Crown Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs released the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, which provides a long-term vision for federal activities in the Canadian and circumpolar Arctic through to 2030. The framework reinforces Arctic priorities set out in Strong Secured, Engaged and aligns with direction provided from the Prime Minister to the Minister of National Defence in the latest mandate letter.

National Defence and 5G

  • 5G networks will be a key driver of innovation and enable new technologies, such as cleaner energy, smart cities, and faster, more reliable communications technologies.
  • For National Defence, 5G technology will assist in providing increased connectivity between our digital platforms and our personnel, and will underpin new technological advancements.
  • The Government of Canada is currently reviewing its approach to emerging 5G technology and its associated economic opportunities and security risks.
  • Since December 2018, Public Safety has been leading this important review, in collaboration with its partners, including the Communications Security Establishment and National Defence.
  • The Government of Canada remains committed to protecting Canadian interests and securing our networks, and will take the appropriate decision once this assessment is complete.

If pressed on Five Eyes Allies with regard to Huawei and 5G:

  • The Government is committed to working collaboratively with our Five Eyes partners on the issue of Huawei and 5G.
  • National Defence understands the importance of protecting the security and integrity of Canada’s networks, while also maintaining interoperability with our allies and partners.  
  • The Government’s 5G review takes these considerations into account and demonstrates Canada’s commitment as a reliable partner in collective defence and security.


Review of 5G Technology

  • In December 2018, Public Safety Canada initiated a security examination to assess the risks associated with the shift to fifth generation telecommunications (5G), and to identify potential mitigation measures.
  • The examination is primarily focused on the technical, economic, and security considerations of 5G, including mitigating the extent to which 5G could enable potential exploitation of vulnerabilities by hostile actors.


  • As part of its cyber security mandate, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) works with telecommunications service providers representing over 99% of Canadian mobile subscribers. CSE provides advice and guidance to mitigate supply chain risks in telecommunications infrastructures upon which Canadians rely.
  • CSE’s Security Review Program tests and evaluates designated equipment and services considered for use on Canadian 3G and 4G/LTE networks, including Huawei.
  • On March 12, 2020, the Canadian Press published an article with excerpts of an interview with the Chief of the Defence Staff where he expressed concern about anything that could give China access to Canada’s military networks. He expressed confidence, however, in the Government’s ability to mitigate the threats associated with Huawei.
  • On July 14, 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) announced that it was banning the purchase of new Huawei 5G equipment after December 31, and requiring the removal of all Huawei 5G equipment in the UK’s networks by 2027. The UK’s decision has left Canada as the only FVEY partner without a ban of some level on Huawei equipment being used for its 5G network.

Recent Parliamentary Interest

  • Huawei, 5G, and Canada’s relationship with China has been a topic of interest for CPC leader, Erin O’Toole, and Foreign Affairs critic, Michael Chong. Opposition members frequently pose questions on Huawei and 5G during Question Period and parliamentary committee appearances.
  • The issue has been raised frequently at the House Committees on Government Operations and Estimates, on Public Safety and National Security, and on Canada-China Relations.
  • On November 18, 2020, Parliament passed a CPC motion (non-binding) calling for the government to decide within 30 days whether to allow China's Huawei Technologies to supply equipment for Canada's next-generation 5G wireless networks. In response, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness sent a letter to all Members of Parliament outlining the steps that Canada is taking to combat foreign interference.

Cyber Security

  • Cyber capabilities and expertise are critical to defending Canada against rapidly evolving 21st century threats.
  • The Canadian Armed Forces is continually working to strengthen mission-critical systems, integrate cyber activities into broader military operations, and develop new capabilities.
  • National Defence also works closely with other departments, Allied militaries, and our industry partners to identify evolving threats, increase interoperability, and share best practices.
  • One of these partners, the Communications Security Establishment, houses the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security which serves as a unified source of expert advice, guidance, and services.
  • The Cyber Centre works closely with government, the private sector, and academia to strengthen Canada’s cyber resilience.
  • Together, these efforts will ensure that Canada is able to confront new cyber threats from a position of strength, including from malicious actors trying to exploit the current COVID-19 pandemic to advance their interests.

If pressed on cyber threats posed by China:

  • The 2020 Cyber Threat Assessment conducted by the Cyber Centre indicates that the state-sponsored programs of foreign state actors, including China, pose the greatest strategic cyber threat to Canada.
  • We take this threat very seriously and have publically attributed malicious cyber actions to China in the past.
  • We are committed to continuing to work with partners in government and business, as well as with Canadians, to a build a stronger, more cyber-resilient Canada.

Key Facts

  • As committed in Strong, Secure, Engaged, the Canadian Armed Forces has created new cyber roles to attract talent and improve expertise.
    • Canadian Armed Forces members in cyber trades: 85
    • New cyber trade positions to be filled: 14
  • Created in 2018 as part of CSE, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security unites existing operational cyber security expertise from Public Safety Canada, Shared Services Canada, and CSE.


Cyber Centre 2020 National Cyber Threat Assessment

  • In November 2020, the Cyber Centre released its 2020 National Cyber Threat Assessment, naming China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as the key foreign state actors that pose a strategic cyber threat to Canada. The Assessment included the following key findings related to the threat posed by foreign state actors:
    • Though a direct attack is not expected, state-sponsored actors are likely developing cyber capabilities to disrupt Canadian critical infrastructure;
    • State-sponsored actors continue to conduct cyber espionage against Canadian businesses, academia, and governments to steal intellectual property and proprietary information, including data related to combatting COVID-19; and,
    • Online foreign influence campaigns by state actors are ongoing and not limited to key political events like elections.

The Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Operator

  • Established through SSE, the CAF cyber operator occupation includes both Reserve and Regular Force members who conduct defensive cyber operations and, when required and where feasible, active cyber operations, with the goal of enabling strategic decision-making, supporting operational objectives, and delivering tactical effects.

Active Cyber Operations

  • Strong, Secure, Engaged committed the CAF to assuming a more assertive posture in the cyber domain by hardening Canada’s defences and by conducting active cyber operations as part of government-authorized missions.
  • The Communications Security Establishment Act allows CSE to carry out foreign cyber operations to help protect federal (and designated) information and infrastructure, or to degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to, or interfere with foreign entities in accordance with Canada’s international affairs, defence, or security objectives.
  • CSE has always acted within its lawful authorities to help protect CAF wherever they are deployed.

Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Capital Program

  • The CAF’s Cyber Capital Program includes two key projects. The Decision Analysis and Response Project improves cyber threat detection and incident response capabilities, and supports the containment and eradication of threats to DND networks. The Network Command and Control Integrated Situational Awareness Capability Project monitors IT services and supports IT infrastructure protection.

Canadian Armed Forces and CSE Cooperation

  • The CAF and CSE have a long history of partnership in the development of highly technical and specialized capabilities that support CAF operations. This relationship continues with the emerging cyber capability development requirements.
  • CSE has the technical expertise in place to support CAF requirements. Cooperation between CSE and the CAF ensures the best use of tools and capabilities, reduces unnecessary duplication of efforts, and improves the chances of meeting mission objectives.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security

  • In 2018, the Government released its updated National Security Strategy to bolster Canada’s cyber security posture by focusing on three key themes: security and resilience, cyber innovation, and leadership and collaboration.
  • As part of this Strategy, the Government established the Canadian Centre for Security (Cyber Centre). Housed at CSE, the Cyber Centre is a unified source of expert advice, guidance, services, and support on cyber security operational matters, providing Canadian citizens and businesses with a clear and trusted place to turn for cyber security advice.

Canadian Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Reporting on COVID-19

  • Within National Defence, we have a team that evaluates threats from infectious diseases and environmental hazards.
  • This group of medical and intelligence experts focuses on potential threats to our military personnel and their operations.
  • Since the first indications of the outbreak on Dec 31, 2019, National Defence has worked closely with other government departments, as part of a whole-of-government effort.
  • All relevant information and analysis was briefed to senior officials in a timely manner, with copies of briefing material made available to other departments and agencies.
  • Since January 2020, National Defence has also participated in interdepartmental discussions related to COVID-19, and has shared information and analysis with various partners, including the Public Health Agency.
  • We continue to work collaboratively with our partners to ensure that we are basing our decisions on the best advice available.

Key Facts

  • January 2, 2020: the Public Health Agency of Canada alerted all federal departments and provincial authorities of the spread of COVID-19.
  • January 14, 2020: the Public Health Agency of Canada convened a meeting of the Canadian Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health.
  • January 17, 2020: the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command delivered its first written briefing to the Minister of National Defence.
  • January 27, 2020: the Government convened an Incident Response Group to follow the issue.
  • March 13, 2020: National Defence provided 134 pages of internal documents on COVID-19 to the House of Commons Health Committee, in response to a formal motion.
    • Medical intelligence reporting was excluded for national security purposes, in line with the terms of the motion. 


Recent Media and Parliamentary Interest

  • On April 20, 2020, the CBC published an article stating that the Medical Intelligence unit reported on, and issued warnings about, the Coronavirus in early January 2020.
  • In the House of Commons on April 11, April 20, and April 28, 2020, Members of Parliament asked the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence who in the Government had access to this reporting, when, and what actions were taken.
  • In response, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of National Defence spoke of the overall importance of intelligence sharing and that they would not comment on internal Cabinet discussions.

Canadian Forces Intelligence Command Intelligence Assessments

  • Intelligence assessments are essential to ensuring that we can continue to base our decisions on sound, rigorous analysis.
  • There was no gap between the National Defence assessment and that of the Public Health Agency of Canada with regard to COVID-19 and its transmissibility and risk in Canada.
  • The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) medical intelligence unit did not provide warnings or inform recommendations with information that was not already available to the Public Health Agency of Canada.
  • Government of Canada policy recommendations were developed by the Public Health Agency of Canada – not CAF medical intelligence.

Protecting Defence Industry and Research

  • Malign state and other actors are using a variety of means – licit and illicit – to acquire sensitive Canadian technologies and research for their own strategic interests.
  • Safeguarding sensitive technologies with military applications is paramount to preserving Canadian and Allied military advantage.
  • The Government takes all threats posed to Canada’s defence research and industry seriously - no matter where they emanate from - and takes action to combat these threats.
  • This includes administering rigorous investment reviews and export controls, as well as efforts to enhance research security.
  • Global Affairs Canada and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, are the main departments responsible for export control and investment review processes.
  • National Defence plays a key role in supporting these and other whole-of-government efforts to respond to economic-based security threats.  
  • National Defence will continue to work with our Government partners to ensure that our world-class defence industry and research sectors are protected and secure.

If pressed on any review that may involve China:

  • I would defer to my colleagues from other departments to answer these questions, as National Defence is not the lead department for either investment or export reviews.
  • To protect the integrity of the review process, we cannot comment on specific investment or export cases

Key Facts

  • Investment Canada Act (ISED lead): National Defence supports the implementation of the ICA by reviewing investments and advising on potential risks to defence capabilities and interests.
  • Export Controls (GAC lead): National Defence provides expert advice related to the export of Canadian defence goods and services, including dual-use commercial and military items.
  • National Defence also participates in discussions and shares best practices on economic security issues with internal and external partners, including Five Eyes.
  • February 2021: CSIS Remarks on National Security:
    • In a speech, Director of CSIS David Vigneault stated that foreign state and non-state actors are targeting Canadian companies through human and cyber based threats.
    • Canada’s artificial intelligence, quantum computing, ocean technology, and aerospace sectors were cited as facing particularly severe threat activity.


  • National Defence works with Government partners to combat threats posed by state and non-state actors that emanate from licit means (e.g. exports, investments, research collaboration)and illicit activities (e.g., espionage, intimidation, theft).

Investment Canada Act (ICA):

  • Led by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Act provides for:
    • The review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians in a manner that encourages investment, economic growth and employment opportunities in Canada and identifies those investments that could be injurious to national security.
  • As a proscribed investigative body under the ICA, National Defence supports implementation of the Act, providing advice on the impacts of investments on Canada’s defence capabilities and interests.
  • This includes the consideration of potential effects of investments on Canada's defence capabilities and interests, on the transfer of sensitive technology or know-how outside of Canada, and on the enabling of foreign surveillance or espionage, as well as the possible involvement in the research, manufacture, or sale of goods/technology identified in Section 35 of the Defence Production Act.

Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA):

  • Export permit applications for goods and services controlled the EIPA are evaluated through an interdepartmental review process led by Global Affairs Canada.
  • National Defence, Public Safety, and other departments and agencies support this process by providing expert advice related to the export of defence- and security-related goods and services, including dual-use (commercial and military) items.
  • Rigorous review by the security and intelligence community helps to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies to potential adversaries, whether this be deliberate or inadvertent, due to a lack of understanding of the investor’s or end user’s intent, or of the military applications of the technology in question.

Safeguarding Science:

  • Led by Public Safety Canada, the Safeguarding Science initiative aims to raise awareness within Canada’s scientific and academic communities of:
    • the risks of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear proliferation,
    • the potential for the proliferation of dual-use technology,
    • cyber security, and
    • best practices in maintaining a security-conscious research organization.
  • National Defence recognizes that Canadian institutions are at the forefront of innovation and research and development in several areas including science, technology and engineering. This can make their research a target for malign state-actors seeking to acquire sensitive technologies and information.

Open Science:

  • The Government of Canada’s move towards Open Science offers opportunities for promoting, advancing, and building awareness of science and research related to emerging technologies, while also presenting considerations and risks relating to protecting and safeguarding sensitive scientific research and information.
  • The Office of the Chief Science Advisor drafted a Roadmap for Open Science that applies the principle of ‘open by default’ with respect to scientific research outputs. However, it also recommends the development of a framework to define criteria for when restricting access to federal scientific research outputs is warranted.
  • National Defence is supportive of these efforts and recognizes the need for ongoing collaboration between science-based and national security departments.

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