Reference Material – Public Affairs Products

Speaking Notes for The Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, Minister of National Defence

ASEAN ADMM+ – December 9, 2020

Minister Lich,

ASEAN defence ministers, colleagues and partners.

Let me start by recognizing and congratulating Vietnam for its strong Chairmanship of ASEAN during this difficult year.

And on behalf of the government and people of Canada, I would like to thank you for inviting me to speak as a Guest of the Chair.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak about Canada’s deep commitment to forging closer cooperation with ASEAN and its member nations.

My friends, as Pacific nations, there is much that unites us.

Our support for maintaining the rules-based international order, for multilateralism, and for cooperation.

We are immersed in the culture, economic, and security realities of the region.

As a proud Dialogue Partner, Canada has worked with ASEAN for more than four decades now.

We’ve seen that ASEAN is a clear example of how multilateralism creates a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

And whether it’s environmental issues; smuggling or tackling illegal fishing, we too believe in the power of cooperation to solve complex challenges.

We also recognize that ASEAN is vital to upholding the rules-based international order and is central to Indo-Pacific stability.

It ensures nations benefit from an open, prosperous and inclusive region. Where they have the freedom and ability to shape their own destiny.  And where their rights are respected.

That’s why Canada is committed to increasing our engagement across the Indo-Pacific region, now especially with ASEAN.

It’s why we have stood with our partners in Indonesia, the Philippines and New Zealand when they have suffered tsunamis, typhoons and earthquakes.

It’s why we co-chaired the maritime security workshop with Vietnam and the European Union to help increase regional and global peace and security.

And it’s why Canada continues to deepen our presence in the region.

Now over the past three years, the Royal Canadian Navy has deployed to the region five times, including a number of port visits to ASEAN members.

And we continue to deepen the 40 years of Military Training and Cooperation Programme with nations in the Indo-Pacific.

And today, seven Southeast Asian countries now host our courses, with participation in the region more than doubling since 2018 — and still growing.

We also support UN Security Council sanctions-monitoring against North Korea. And just last week, one of our ships and an Aurora patrol aircraft finished another deployment in Northeast Asia.

This mission shows our dedication to peace, stability and upholding the rules-based international order.

These are the same values that inform our approach to Southeast Asia.

We see this spirit of cooperation in Canada's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has created urgent and unprecedented need around the world.

We’ve contributed more than 600,000 units of Personal Protective Equipment to six ASEAN member states and the Secretariat.

And $5 million dollars to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support COVID-19 diagnostic work in 26 countries — including three ASEAN member states. And these kits are among the most accurate laboratory methods in the world for detecting the virus.

We’ve also helped strengthen pandemic response in the region, committing $25 million dollars to our joint program for mitigating biological threats since 2013.

We recognize too, that lasting personal and organizational relationships don’t develop overnight.

That’s why Canada continues to expand our defence diplomatic footprint in the region, opening new Defence Attaché offices in Vietnam and Malaysia just this year.

This increased engagement is outlined in Canada’s twenty-year defence policy, which we committed to increasing investments to over 70% per cent in our defence portfolio.

We are building new warships, supply ships, and investing in surveillance aircraft to ensure Canada remains a consistent presence in the Indo-Pacific.

And we will expand our Navy, our Air Force, Army, and Special Operations Forces ties with ASEAN countries, through high-level bilateral engagements, staff talks, and participation in military exercises.

We will keep prioritizing exchanges in military education, including through our Military Training and Cooperation Programme.

After the pandemic subsides, we’ll invest in additional courses so that even more personnel can participate…

With training in areas that meet your interests and needs, including CBRN, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peace support operations.

Canada also remains committed to advancing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

We know that East Asia Summit Leaders and the ASEAN Regional Forum have demonstrated support for this as well.

And just this week, Canada announced $8.5 million dollars to support ASEAN and its member states in integrating Women, Peace and Security considerations into regional and national policies.

Based on our strong commitment to multilateralism and our shared values as a Pacific nation, Canada seeks to observe the Expert Working Groups on Maritime Security and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response, and eventually, to become a full member of the ADMM+ itself.

Now we will contribute our voice, our values and our resources.

Here and around the world, we are adamant about supporting the global based system.

We will always stand up for the freedom of navigation and overflight, while respecting the rights and jurisdiction of coastal states.

And we will help build our mutual capacity in a respectful manner on land, in the air, and at sea.

Canada is ready to move ahead when ASEAN members feel the time is right.

We are ready to increase our Navy, Army, Air Force and Special Forces’ engagement with your armed forces.

And we are ready to throw our full support behind ASEAN to its strategic goals:

We will speak up for ASEAN centrality, promote respect for international law and strengthen regional co-operation.

Friends, together we have shared a great deal through 40 years of meaningful cooperation.

I believe we can achieve even more.

Canada is keen to work more closely with ASEAN as a predictable, consistent and sustainable partner, and to help strengthen cooperation across the Indo-Pacific.

Thank you very much for this opportunity for allowing me to speak today, merci beaucoup.

12th Annual Conference on the South China Sea: Welcome Dinner Keynote

Hanoi, Vietnam – November 16-17, 2020

Good evening everyone.

I’m pleased to join you for this dinner, even if only virtually.

Though it is morning here in Ottawa, it’s important for us to come together in a spirit of friendship, cooperation and partnership, no matter the hour.

The global pandemic has added a new layer of complexity to an already challenging global environment.

It is why this year underscores the need for us to collaborate to keep our nations safe and secure, while protecting human rights around the world.

And though we are focused on helping our people make it through the pandemic and other security challenges, we cannot ignore climate change, which is contributing to more extreme weather events and natural disasters.

No nation or people are immune from this destructive force, and I want to offer my sincere condolences to the people of Vietnam, who’ve lost loved ones as a result of the worst typhoon season in decades.

We mourn with you the tragic loss of Vietnamese civilians and military personnel in the resulting landslides.

And Typhoon Vamco bears down, I want to extend my condolences to our Filipino friends for the loss of life they have experienced, and hope for the safety of those impacted in Vietnam.

In situations like these, Canada will always help our friends in need.

We know that today’s challenges demand an unprecedented level of international cooperation and unity.

[PAUSE  - Acknowledgements]

That is why Canada is committed to working with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

It’s my honour to be here with so many distinguished guests and friends from our partners and allies in the region, including:

  • Doctor Pham Lan Dzung [FAH’ LAn dzoong]; and
  • His Excellency, Ambassador Giorgio Aliberti [AL-i-BER-tee].

I want to thank the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam,
The Vietnam Lawyers’ Association,
And the Foundation for East Sea Studies
For organizing this important annual conference…

And for inviting me to speak with you tonight about the importance of the Indo-Pacific, not only to Canada but to global peace and security.

[PAUSE - Canada-ASEAN Relationship]

As a Pacific nation, Canada has played an active role in the Indo-Pacific region.

Whether by addressing peace and security issues…
Advancing economic cooperation…
Or assisting with humanitarian and development efforts…

Canada has been committed to strengthening relationships between our peoples and our nations.

It is why Canada remains deeply committed to forging closer cooperation with ASEAN. It’s why we’ve been a dialogue partner for more than four decades, with Canadian diplomatic representation in all 10 ASEAN member states.

We are also committed to expanding our defence representation.

And so this month, we officially opened our new Defence Attaché office in Vietnam.

And as we grow our defence ties, Canadian trade and investment in the region is rapidly growing, across multiple sectors — in areas like aviation, telecommunications, and agri-food, to name a few.

This mutually beneficial trade generates billions of dollars each year for ASEAN countries and Canada alike.

And we remain ready and eager to expand our role and deepen our relationship with ASEAN and its member nations.

ASEAN is a testament to cooperation and mutual respect between nations in the region…

Its strong multilateral architecture creates a whole that is far greater than the sum of its parts.

[PAUSE -  Multilateralism, Int’l Law and UNCLOS]

All of us here understand that there is significant power in working together to promote global security, stability, and prosperity.

Multilateralism is the framework that affords all of us the fortitude and flexibility to face our common challenges head on.

That’s why we stand united with you in upholding and defending the rules-based international order.

All nations must come together to ensure that our global commons remain free and safe, and benefit all of us.

And one of the key pillars of our global framework is international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

For nearly 40 years, UNCLOS has helped us maintain freedom of navigation and other navigational rights, while respecting the rights and jurisdiction of coastal states.

The success of UNCLOS underscores the importance of maintaining and respecting international law.

All of our countries benefit by respecting international law, including as contained in UNCLOS. We call on all nations to comply with the Convention.

[South China Sea]

As you know, approximately 90% of the world’s trade travels by sea — with one third passing through the South China Sea – or the East Sea as it is known in Vietnam.

So of course Canada remains concerned by the tensions associated with territorial and maritime disputes in the region…

Canada opposes unilateral actions that escalate regional tensions, and undermine stability in the South China Sea.
We oppose the threat or use of force
Large-scale land reclamation…
Building outposts on disputed features and using them for military purposes.
Canada supports lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight in accordance with international law.

We continue to urge all parties to live up to previous commitments...

Including the commitment to demilitarize disputed features…

And commitments made in the 2002 Declaration of Conduct for the Parties in the South China Sea.

We expect that any future Code of Conduct will be rooted in international law — and that it will not affect the rights of third parties.

We also call on all states to refrain from taking actions that could put at risk the lives and security of fishers in the region.

[PAUSE - Convening Power]

We will continue to work with close allies to foster dialogue and cooperation, based on mutual respect between nations, because Canada favours a multilateral approach to problem-solving.

Across a range of issues, Canada has demonstrated a strong record of effectively convening nations…
Of bringing them together to discuss difficult challenges …
And achieving positive results.

That includes addressing defence and security challenges facing the international community and the region.

For example, in 2018, we co-hosted twenty Foreign Ministers and representatives in Vancouver to develop a clear strategy on North Korea and strengthen the sanctions regime.

We believe that a diplomatic solution to instability on the Korean Peninsula is the best way forward.

In the face of aggressive actions, the international community responded with a unified approach.

And as part of this effort, Canada launched Operation NEON.

[PAUSE – Op Neon and UN Command]

Currently, approximately 240 Canadian crew members of HMCS WINNIPEG and a [CH-148] Cyclone maritime helicopter are deployed on Operation NEON, monitoring attempts to evade UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea.

They are assisted by a CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol detachment, based out of Japan.

Our personnel are working with our international partners to identify and share information on suspected evasion activities, like ship-to-ship fuel transfers.

We also have military personnel deployed at the United Nations Command, where Canada’s Lieutenant General Wayne Eyre recently held the position of Deputy Commander.

As such, Canada has assumed greater leadership and responsibility in the region.

[CAF in Indo-Pacific]

And as Canada’s Minister of National Defence, I’m proud of the important collaboration between the Canadian Armed Forces and our regional partners and allies. 

Our defence policy – Strong, Secure, Engaged – acknowledges the importance of the Indo-Pacific to Canadian security and prosperity.
It reinforces Canada’s commitment to being a reliable partner in the region, through consistent engagement and strong partnerships with likeminded nations.

We have conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

And we have stepped-up our contributions to initiatives that advance peace and security across the region.

Initiatives that promote cooperation, multilateralism and the respect of international law.

[PAUSE - Op PROJECTION]

Some of those initiatives include the port visits and engagements conducted by the Royal Canadian Navy with allies and partners, as well as transits in the region.

Recently, HMCS WINNIPEG sailed to the East China Sea, through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Canada fully respects and supports international law, including the rights of navigation, and the rights and jurisdiction of coastal states.

[PAUSE – Capacity Building and MTCP]

Beyond our work with navies around the region, Canada has also been collaborating with partners for decades through training and capacity building programmes.

For example, we provide staff courses, peace support and language training, for countries around the world.

A dozen member states from the Indo-Pacific region are currently participating in our Military Training Cooperation Programme, building ore effective militaries and partnerships.

To date, more than 3500 personnel have participated in this programme.

And Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Programme provides counter-terrorism training, equipment, and technical assistance to ASEAN members.

For example, we trained over 900 regional law enforcement officers through our partnership with Indonesia and the Philippines. And our capacity building partnership with Malaysia has helped first responders better prepare for terrorist attacks.

Through our training and capacity building programmes, our military personnel have had the opportunity to work with members of allied and partner nations — learning from each other, and developing new skills.

[PAUSE – Conclusion]

Canada will continue to maintain its defence presence in the region.

We will work with our trusted allies and like-minded partners to uphold the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region, including in Southeast Asia, and around the world.

If called upon, we are willing to do more.

We will always look for ways to work together to advance our common interests for peace and security.

We remain eager to share knowledge and learn from our allies and partners in the region — and we welcome new collaborations and ways of working together.

Conferences like this one are so important, because they foster productive dialogue and bring together diverse and valuable perspectives.

And they promote coordinated and multilateral approaches to problem solving.

I wish you well in your upcoming discussions.

I hope they are productive and help unlock solutions to some of our most pressing challenges.

Thank you, and Bon Appétit!

Media Lines

Speaking points and memory joggers for DM Jody Thomas – Panel 1: Threats and Challenges to Canada and Strategies for Resiliency and Coordination with Like- Minded Nations” is held at the 89th Annual Ottawa Conference on Security & Defence

10 March 2021

Opening Points (8 minutes)

Introduction

Thanks Dick, and thank you Marta.

I also want to thank CDAI for the invitation, and for the work they do to encourage tough, informed conversations.

CDAI is hosting important discussions over the next few days and I’m really glad to participate.

So, Dick, the short answer is that I’d absolutely agree with Marta on the broader big picture.

As you know, GAC and DND may differ in our specific responsibilities and the tools we use to do our jobs.

However, we are in-lock step with how critical it is we meet this moment in history with the seriousness and the cooperation that it requires.

Cooperation is Key

Truly, collaboration and alliances are key: Who is working with us and for us, and who is working against us. Our next decade will be defined by alliances organized around values, economic systems, technologies, and military calculations.

We can’t be complacent about maintaining and strengthening our trusted relationships.

In fact, given the complicated global picture, we cannot cooperate too much amongst ourselves and our trusted allies, both today and in the years ahead.

And I don’t just mean internationally.

Security is Everyone’s Responsibility

As much we have voices from GAC and DND speaking with you right nowwe have so many more federal departments who are, and who must increasingly be part of the wider conversation around defending Canada.

Canada is hugely fortunate in our stable food supply. Our mineral, petroleum and renewable resources. Our fresh water. Our economic stability, technology and intellectual property. We have a lot to lose.

The security of our way of life should never be a foregone conclusion.

Trade. Innovation. Industry. Infrastructure. Supply chains. Our national identity. Food security. Natural resources. These all have a role in our country’s security.

We need to continue a whole of government conversation around Canada’s long-term safety and security. That cooperation is essential and I’m so gratified to see more and more of it occurring in meetings around town.

But it can’t just be Government.

The collaboration has to be wider than that. Within Canada: Think tanks, academia, the private sector, finance, industry, the general public and more—all have a part to play in our collective defence.

Important Allies and Partners

Outside Canada: cooperation with our allies that are similarly invested in rules-based order is vital.

Marta talked about the Five Eyes. That is a critical forum to share intelligence. NATO Allies and partners are also fundamental to our collective security.

We also have to keep strengthening and deepening our relationship with our neighbour and closest ally, the United States.

Certainly our defence and security relationships are already very strong. We have been trusted partners for a long time. But as a country, we need to understand their position and priorities in the world and how those are evolving. We cannot have a full discussion about Canada’s defence and security approach without that understanding. That alignment will be key.

COVID

Here at home, COVID continues to be our biggest immediate threat.

I firmly believe Canada has been right to focus straight-ahead on addressing the challenge.

In meeting the challenge head on, we’ve identified a number of weaknesses that we are already working to address.

COVID-19 has reinforced that a robust, effective supply chain is a strategic enabler for the Government of Canada and—in a national crisis—is a critical lifeline.

So I think we have a real opportunity to strengthen our domestic supply chain and also strenghthening supply chain security.

Globally, we also need to recognize that many of our adversaries have carried on strengthening their capabilities while Canada and our like-minded allies have been turned inward to help our populations.

And not only have our adversaries worked to strengthen their capabilities, but at the same time, COVID has put pressures on global alliances as countries focus on domestic challenges.

Climate Change

Canada’s biggest existential threat is climate change.

It is a massive destabilizer both in Canada and around the world. That will only increase.

Here at home, we’re already seeing its impact in multiple ways. Areas we thought of as pristine and untouchable are now opening up for the extraction of critical minerals or resources. Our northern waterways are evolving and changing as sea ice melts. That all has implications for Canada on many different fronts.

We are also seeing increased pressure on the Canadian Armed Forces and what they are being called upon to do domestically.

In 2019 we had more people deployed on domestic operations than in international operations. It was a terrible year for fires and floods. Canadians needed the CAF, and they were there. It’s likely those pressures will continue and we will need to factor them into our ongoing planning and preparation for the foreseeable future, if not indefinitely.

And as we grapple with these challenges at home, we know our allies are facing similar circumstances. And whether it’s COVID or climate change, the destabilizing influence favours those actors who benefit from a chaotic world, rather than one rooted in stable rules, order and institutions.

This brings us to the broader point. Where does Canada need to go from here from the perspective of National Defence?

Continental Defence

Canada has a Defence Policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged. That’s what we’re guided by and what we’ll continue to be guided by as long as it is government policy.

Within that, I have a couple of key priorities within my immediate wheelhouse, starting with the Defence of North America. I’ll just touch on that.

We must be able to protect our continent from external threats—threats which previously did not exist, or could not reach us.

We are currently developing options to bolster Canada’s defence capabilities and contribute meaningfully in the defence of North America, including through NORAD modernization.

Several of the core capabilities in SSE – such as the future fighter, Canadian Surface Combatant, and Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships – will directly contribute to the defence of North America.

That said, we always knew we would need to make more decisions about funding and policy to enhance the CAF’s ability to defend Canada, to replace the surveillance capabilities provided by the North Warning System, and to work with the US to modernize NORAD more generally.

During a February 2021 bilateral meeting, the Prime Minister and US President Biden also agreed to expand cooperation on continental defence and in the Arctic, including by modernizing NORAD.

Over the next year, the Defence Team will be working with a number of stakeholders to develop a series of options for Government consideration and we will go from there.

Dick, I imagine you’ve plenty of material to work with between what Marta and I have said so I’ll pass things back to you for your questions.

Transcript: Panel 1: Threats and Challenges to Canada and Strategies for Resiliency and Coordination with Like-Minded Nations” is held at the 89th Annual Ottawa Conference on Security & Defence

Text in the language of origin and for internal use only
Transcript prepared exclusively for National Defence

DATE: March 10, 2021 9:45 a.m. EST
LOCATION: Webcast
PROVIDER: Media Q

PRINCIPAL(S): Mike Hamilton, Chief Distribution and Marketing, RBC Insurance, Richard Fadden, Former Director of CSIS and National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister Jody Thomas, Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence, Marta Morgan, Deputy Minister, Global Affairs Canada

MODERATOR: Welcome back to panel one, Threats and Challenges to Canada and Strategies for Resiliency and Coordination with Like-Minded Nations. I’m going to introduce you to Mike Hamilton who is here with RBC Insurance. He will be convenor. I want to make two comments about him and his background.

February 26th this year was the 30th anniversary of the battle of 73 Easting, considered one of the fiercest tank battles not just in the Gulf War but in modern history. Mike Hamilton was deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm as a 22 year old lieutenant in the armoured cavalry regiment.

He led his platoon into battle of 73 Easting. Mike was an officer in command in the lead platoon of Eagle troop and the second armoured cavalry regiment commanded by then army captain H.R. McMaster.

Mike Hamilton is a highly decorated veteran of the US Armed Forces. Today he is Senior Vice President, sales distribution and marketing with RBC Insurance, one of our strategic partners. Thanks Mike for your support and for being here with us today.

MIKE HAMILTON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen, Deputy Ministers Thomas and Morgan, members of the Canadian Armed Forces and distinguished guests, many of whom join us today from across the globe. I’m delighted to be here at the 89th annual Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence.

I’m happy we can do it by WebEx but hopefully we’ll be able to get back to Ottawa soon. Before I joined the corporate ranks as Yuri insinuated in the beginning, I spent ten years serving in the US army. Being part of these events and supporting the Canadian Armed Forces is something I’m personally connected to and view it as a pay it forward.

Now I’m proud to work for an organization that also believes in supporting our military community. RBC Insurance has committed itself over the years to providing an enormous amount of support. To date we’ve donated over $630,000 to various programs to include mental health services and counselling to military families through (inaudible due to technical problem at source).

To build our commitment to Canada’s military we also offer a variety of opportunities to partner with RBC and support the military family experience because we want to ensure that the million and a half military members, families and veterans enjoy the financial security they deserve for their service to the nation.

We look forward to providing continued support for our military community. This year’s conference is about securing democracy and sovereignty against a thousand cuts and isolation attacks such as daily attempts to hack our government data bases, information systems, critical infrastructure would not individually merit a large scale response.

But if and when these attacks accumulate over time they can undermine our sovereignty both physically and virtually. In fact daily threats such as cyber crime and fraud are not only threatening our sovereignty but also impact all consumers directly, civilian and military.

This is what brings us together for the 89th conference this year. We have a great number of speakers lined up to discuss these topics over the next couple of days. We at RBC Insurance believe having discussions like these are essential to navigate through uncertain times.

This is why we are here and we are also the premier sponsor of the Ottawa Conference. Thank you to the organizers of this conference, Yuri and (inaudible) who have worked tirelessly to make this event a success. Thank you all for attending the conference. I hope you get the most out of the next two days.

I am pleased to introduce our first panel today led by Mr. Richard Fadden. Dick Fadden as many of you know him is an officer of the Order of Canada. He has served in various senior roles in public service including as a director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Services, deputy minister of Defence and national security advisor to both Prime Minister Trudeau and Harper.

He is currently a board member of the Conference of Defence Association Institute hosting this event today.

RICHARD FADDEN: Good morning everybody and welcome to the conference. We’d like to start with this high level view of the environment in which (inaudible due to technical problem at source) defence and security policy is conducted today. We hope there will be an emphasis on Canada but also a recognition that many middle powers find themselves in similar circumstances.

A number of the remarks and some of the questions will be about the west generally, not just about Canada. I hope we’ll be able to draw on real challenges that the two deputy ministers and their Ministers face in managing our foreign and defence policy. In some ways the world is as dangerous as it was during the Cold War, different reasons, different circumstances.

But you can hardly argue today that Ms. Morgan and Ms. Thomas have an easy time with nothing worrying them. We’re pleased today to have with us two very distinguished Canadian public servants. Jody Thomas is the deputy minister of National Defence, one of my illustrious successors.

Marta Morgan, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs works in Global Affairs Canada. We have 60 minutes. I’m hoping we can take some of this time to chat between ourselves and then we’ll take some questions from the floor. Without further ado why don’t we start with Ms. Morgan who has a few comments to set the circumstances for us that we will be talking about a bit later.

MARTA MORGAN: Thank you Dick. It’s great to see you again, albeit remotely. It’s a real pleasure for me to be here today to be able to speak with you and participate in this panel with my good friend and colleague Jody Thomas.

I’m going to talk about the international security landscape and strategies for building national resilience and strengthening alliances which is very relevant given Dick’s comments about middle powers like Canada because we have to work with our allies and those alliances are one of the strongest and most reliable ways for us to build our own national resilience.

My remarks will cover three themes, First of all, a brief review of the historical context. Secondly, an overview of security threats and challenges and finally a discussion of how we can build national resilience including through strengthening our alliances.

Let me start by reminding ourselves of the historical approach to international security. The central institutions of the rules based international system, the UN, Bretton Woods and (inaudible due to technical problem at source) and with it the constant nuclear threat, wars by proxy and the suppression of democratic freedoms and human rights.

Through the Cold War the rules based international system bent but didn’t break, providing us in the west and many other regions of the world with a set of tools and norms we could rely on to prevent the worst possible (inaudible due to technical problem at source).

Lorsque la Guerre Froide a pris fin, le monde a récolté un dividende de la paix sans précédent.

VOICE OF TRANSLATOR: Democracy took root in parts of the world where it was once thought unattainable and the spread of market economies unleashed talent and knowledge that led to the technological revolutions of the information age.

MORGAN: Conflict didn’t disappear amid waves of ethnic cleansing, Rwanda descended into genocide and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait. But our reactions and our remedies to these new challenges resulted in our reinforcing the rules based international system along with the creation of important new rules and norms.

The UN Security Council showed itself fit for purpose in authorizing broad international military action to push Saddam out of Kuwait. Canada led in the creation of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and eventually the International Criminal Court.

We spearheaded the concept and the practice of responsibility for human security, action to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers and the Ottawa Convention to ban anti personnel landmines. The Beijing Declaration and platform for action and the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1325 were important milestones towards gender equality and the protection of women’s human rights.

Then came 9/11. The world’s attention shifted to counter terrorism and the long wars and instability that followed from Afghanistan to Iraq and the Sahel. Proxy wars and geopolitical blocs made a comeback but at this time centered mainly in and between the regional powers of the broader Middle East.

VOICE OF TRANSLATOR: Conflict and confrontations obtained from that stage eroded the international system founded on these rules. The regimes came to consider the aggression from the military and the territory expansion as options that were viable.

MORGAN: (Off microphone) Russia occupied and annexed Crimea while prosecuting a conflict which continues to this day in the Donbass. Radiological and chemical weapons have been used to assassinate rivals. China threatens and cajoles several of its neighbours and as Canadians know well, uses the instrument of arbitrary detention to subvert the rule of law and the due process of democratic (inaudible due to technical problem at source). (inaudible due to technical problem at source) emerging features of today’s security landscape. I will start with China. China’s economic heft and growing global influence mean it has the will and capacity to reshape the current international system into something less rules based and less compatible with the interests and values of a country like Canada.

How should we and our allies and partners respond? Let me take a page from one of Canada’s closest partners, the European Union. In March 2019 they released a landmark strategic outlook which described China as first a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives when it comes to key global issues such as climate change, global trade and stewardship of the global (inaudible due to technical problem at source).

Second, an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership and third, a systemic rival that promotes alternative models of governance that threaten democratic systems. Equally important the EU notes the need for a differentiated approach depending on the issue and the usefulness of linkages across the policy space to increase leverage.

There are clear echoes of this approach in the early declarations of the new US administration. In his first major foreign policy speech President Biden affirmed the US will take on directly the challenges China represents for American prosperity, security and democratic values.

Confront China’s economic abuses, counter its aggressive coercive action and push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property and global governance and cooperate with China when it is in America’s interest to do so.

President Biden also affirmed this differentiated approach would be pursued in concert with allies and partners and through its renewed role in international institutions. Both of these approaches emphasize the need to cooperate with China on issues of mutual concern.

Think climate change, to compete economically and on innovation and human capital among other things and to promote democracy and contest China on issues and values as well as the importance of working closely with allies.

Another important global trend which has been mentioned is the use of below threshold activity to undermine our economic advantages and our democratic systems. These below threshold threats in such form as cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns combined with the current pandemic and the impact of climate change remind us that not all security threats are hard power threats.

To counter these challenges we must work closely across government using our diplomacy, defence and national security tools to build national resilience. Let me turn to the issues of developing national resilience and strengthening our alliances.

First becoming more resilient will require significant diplomatic efforts to address the gaps in the system. For example, how we approach cyber security and the norms that will apply to state behaviour and cyber space; how we apply governance and regulatory regimes at the national and international levels; to tackle issues arising from advances in the field of artificial intelligence and what steps we take to protect our sovereignty and security in a newly accessible optic.

VOICE OF TRANSLATOR: Then the resilience takes a more large vision of security. COVID and climate change requires that. Jody will talk more about those issues but COVID has increased economic instability with consequences on security and climate change that have touched on the department.

MORGAN: (Off microphone) and climate change as disruptive threats that need to be factored into our security plans and readiness posture.

How will Canada address all of these multifaceted challenges?

Put simply, the answer is this. We will tackle them using the alliances we have and building the alliances we need. This effort starts with the enduring alliance we have with the United States.

This is a binational alliance that has global reach but it is an alliance rooted in and reliant on the security of our shared continent. This involves among other things a path to the revitalization and modernization of NORAD which the President and Prime Minister agreed to launch a few weeks ago.

Our system of alliances extends to the Five Eyes which grants us unique capacity to contribute to and draw from a system of coordinated resilience and shared threat assessments. Through the G7 Canada influences global trends. We strengthen international economic and security policy and we tackle mainstream cross cutting issues such as climate change.

Next comes NATO, the very bedrock of its 30 members’ collective security, the OSCE, the OAS, the ASEAN regional forum, the G20, the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. Each serve Canada well in their specific sphere.

Of course there’s our commitment to multilateral UN structures which often offer the only viable vehicle to address certain security challenges. Canada also joins, leads or creates alliances and partnerships to advance particular priorities.

For example, we lead in the LIMA Group and the ministerial coordination group on COVID19 and we’re at the forefront of many ad hoc alliances and other efforts to strengthen the rules based international system and uphold the dignity of the individual.

We created and we lead the Ottawa Group for WTO reform. We galvanized the support of 55 countries for the declaration against arbitrary detention. We played an important role in the adoption of landmark resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

We’re committed to spurring action to reverse the backlash against gender equality and to make the rules based international system more inclusive and more equitable. This network of alliances and partnerships gives us a voice and influence. It gives us the opportunity to reach out and rally partners to strengthen the international institutions and adapt the architecture to meet these evolving challenges.

To wrap up, these are challenging times. There are many new threats that are emerging on the international landscape and we need to work closely across government, coordinating our diplomatic, trade, development, defence and national security assets.

We need to work with not only our core allies but also increasingly with non-traditional international partners. As long as put in the work and match our diplomacy and our defence efforts towards these objectives, in this era of uncertainty we’ll continue to lead.
We’ll continue to have influence and to thrive both here and on the world stage. Thank you.

FADDEN: Marta thanks very much. That was a very useful survey that we will be able to draw on throughout the next couple of days. Jody, I have a question for you unless you would prefer to make a few opening remarks. Your call.

JODY THOMAS: I do have a few opening remarks if that’s okay. First thank you Dick and thank you Marta. I don’t think it will surprise anybody that what is interesting is that the Department of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada are in lockstep about how critical it is that we meet this moment in history with the seriousness and cooperation it requires.

I imagine that many of you are wondering if I’m going to address the current situation in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The short answer is no for the current allegations. I will not address those allegations as the integrity of investigations and the rights of the individuals involved are primordial.

However, I will say who we are, what we are and what we do is impacted by all of this. We know that I have no role as the deputy minister in the chain of command decisions but the civilian side of this department is impacted as both victims and perpetrators of sexually inappropriate behaviour and sexual misconduct.

The culture, attitudes and behaviours have to change or we fail and we can’t afford to fail. We have failed individual members of this institution and we have failed the institution as a whole. It’s too important in this department for Canada for us to lose that public trust.

What I will say is we cannot be complacent about maintaining and strengthening our trust relationships. Truly collaboration and alliances are key for our future as Marta said. Who is working with us and for us and who is working against us and our next decade from our perspective will be defined by alliances organized around values, economic systems, technologies and military calculations.

In fact given the complicated global picture we cannot cooperate too much. There is no such thing as too much cooperation amongst ourselves and our trusted allies both today and in the years ahead. I don’t mean just internationally.

As much as we have voices from Global Affairs Canada and DND speaking with you right now, we have so many federal departments who are and must increasingly be part of the wider conversation around defending Canada.

We’re hugely fortunate to have a stable food supply, our mineral, petroleum and renewable resources, our fresh water, our economic stability, technology and intellectual property. We have a lot to lose.

This should never be a foregone conclusion. Trade, innovation, industry, infrastructure, supply chains, our national identity, food security, natural resources – they all have a role in our country’s security. We need to continue a whole of government conversation around Canada’s long term security.

That cooperation is essential. I am gratified to see more and more of it occurring in meetings around town but it can’t just be government (inaudible due to technical problem at source) – think tanks, academia, the private sector, finance and industry, the general public and more.

We all have a role to play in our collective defence. Outside of Canada with our allies that are similarly invested in the rules based order, our cooperation is vital. Marta talked about the Five Eyes. That is a critical forum to share intelligence.

Our NATO allies and partners are also fundamental to our collective security. We have to keep strengthening that relationship with our neighbour and closest ally, the United States. Our defence and security relationships are strong and have continued to be, regardless of administration.

But we need to understand their position and their priorities in the world and how those are evolving. We cannot have a full discussion about Canada’s defence and security approach without that understanding because that alignment will be key.

Here at home COVID continues to be our immediate threat. I firmly believe Canada has been right to focus straight ahead on addressing the challenge. In meeting the challenge head on we have identified a number of weaknesses we’re working to address.

COVID-19 has reinforced that a robust effective supply chain is a strategic enabler for the government of Canada and in international crises, a national lifeline. I think we have an opportunity to strengthen our domestic supply chain and strengthening supply chain security.

Globally we need to recognize many of our adversaries have carried on strengthening their capabilities while Canada and our likeminded allies have been turned inward to our populations. Not only have our adversaries worked to strengthen their capabilities but at the same time COVID has put pressures on global alliances as countries focus domestically.

I equally believe Canada’s biggest existential threat is climate change. It is a massive destabilizer both in Canada and the world. That will only increase. At home we’re seeing its impact in multiple ways. Areas we though of as pristine and untouchable are now opening up for the extraction (inaudible due to technical problem at source) sea ice melts.

That has implications for Canada on so many different fronts. We’re seeing increased pressure on the Canadian Armed Forces and what they’re being called upon to do domestically. In 2019 we had more people deployed on domestic operations than in international operations.

It was a terrible year for fires and floods. Canadians needed the Canadian Armed Forces and they weren’t there. It’s likely those pressures will continue and we need to factor them into our ongoing planning and preparation for the foreseeable future if not indefinitely.

(inaudible due to technical problem at source) these challenges at home, we know our allies are facing similar circumstances. Whether it’s COVID or climate change, the destabilizing influence favours those actors who benefit from a chaotic world rather than ones rooted in stable rules, orders and institutions.

Which brings us to the broader point, where does Canada go? Our defence policy Strong Secure and Engaged, that’s what we’re guided by and will continue to be guided by. Within that I have a couple of key priorities within my immediate wheelhouse starting with the defence of North America and I’ll touch on that.

We must be able to protect our continent from external threats, threats which previously did not exist or could not reach us. The geographic isolation we have enjoyed for decades now no longer protects us and we must understand that. As such we are currently developing (inaudible) to bolster Canada’s defence capabilities and contribute meaningfully in the defence of North America including through NORAD modernization.

Several of the core capabilities in Strong Secure and Engaged such as the future fighter, the Canadian surface combatant and arctic and offshore patrol ships will directly contribute to the defence of North America. That said, we always knew we would need to make more decisions about funding and policy to enhance Canada’s ability to defend Canada.

To replace surveillance capabilities provided by the north warning system and to work with the US to modernize NORAD more generally. It’s not just the north warning system however (inaudible due to technical problem at source) has previously reference and a new look at the Arctic and the investment required to secure this vast region of Canada will be critical going forward.

During the February 2021 bilateral meeting, the Prime Minister and the US President Biden also agreed to expand cooperation on continental defence and in the Arctic including by modernizing NORAD. Over the next year the Defence team will be working with a number of stakeholders to develop a series of options for government consideration.

We will go from there. I have spoken too long. I know we want to get to questions. I’ll stop but I think what is critical is maybe for the first time in history although I’m sure it’s happened consistently that Global Affairs and DND are on the exact same page, so thank you.

FADDEN: Thank you Jody. That was a good reminder of a lot of the newer kinds of threats and challenges. I’d like to ask a question of both of you. I think throughout the conference there are three animals in the room: the Chinese dragon, the Russian bear and the US eagle.

I’d like to ask you about you both said Canada has to rely and wants to rely on alliances. In terms of people I’ve spoken to and readings I’ve done over the last while most people are ecstatic that Mr. Biden is now President of the United States.

But people are very concerned that over the course of the next two to four years he may lose control of the Congress. He has significant issues in his own party. He has a lot of (inaudible due to technical problem at source). Added to this is the real concern people have with trusting the United States again.

It seems to me you both made the point that in respect of North America we don’t have a heck of a lot to worry about but if you think about the world more generally and dealing with the dragon and the bear, can you talk a bit about how Canada and other middle powers should cope with reality that the US of today and tomorrow is not necessarily the absolute ideal from our perspective or from the perspective of other middle powers?

MORGAN: Perhaps I’ll go first Dick. That’s the phrase of the pandemic – you’re on mute or you’re not on mute (laughs). It had to happen. I’m glad I was the first. I think if we look at the relationship we have with the US, two weeks ago when Prime Minister Trudeau and President Biden met they agreed to a road map for a renewed US Canada partnership which is very ambitious.

It’s very robust and it (inaudible due to technical problem at source) the relationship we have with the US across multiple fronts regardless of which administration is in power. The kinds of issues that are raised in that roadmap like border for example have been issues we’ve been working closely on with the US in one way or another.

Sometimes in surprising ways recently. I think it’s a powerful signal of our partnership and security cooperation is obviously a key pillar of that relationship. There are significant commitments there to advance security cooperation. This is administration has demonstrated not only in words but starting to demonstrate in action, their commitment to multilateralism, to engaging with allies.

I talked a bit about President Biden’s articulated approach to China also was very clear on their determination to engage allies in this. I think all countries right now have to keep a strong focus on the domestic situation given the both health and economic impacts of COVID-19.

Honestly I think we’re all in the same boat on that but all of the early signs coming out of the Biden administration have been very positive in terms of their commitment and willingness to engage quickly with their key allies and partners like Canada.

THOMAS: Very quickly, I agree with what Marta has had to say. I think people will hear that a lot today. I think what is interesting about the outcomes of the early meetings between the President and our Prime Minister are very aligned in their view of the world.

Certainly our sizes make a difference in our ability to respond to it but with the discussion about NORAD modernization, continental defence and the Arctic it changes the nature of the relationship in that it’s not just a take relationship where Canada is taking guidance, cooperation, protection, defence from the US. We are experts on the Arctic.

Between the Canadian Coast Guard, what the Canadian Armed Forces is able to do in the Arctic and our plans to move into the Arctic which as I said earlier are nascent but their interest in our knowledge and our ability to operate in the Arctic is a game changer in that relationship and will be critical going forward as we talk about Russia and China.

I also agree that as western nations have had to look down and in to respond to COVID, the criticality of alliances has changed. Perhaps countries were talking about moving away from an alliance based system.

They understand now with the economic pressures because of COVID the only way we can protect ourselves and respond to threats is through alliances. The buying power of countries has changed as a result of COVID. Alliances will be critical going forward because of it.

FADDEN: Thanks very much. Marta, I wonder if I could direct a question to you. You mentioned in your opening remarks the international order that was established after the Second World War.

I take your point that it’s gone up and down, effectively functioning parts of it but the security arbiter for the planet, the UN Security Council, is effectively gridlocked much like it was during the Cold War.

There seems to not be a great deal of interest right now in Security Council reform, probably because it’s not going to happen in the short term. I wonder if you would comment generally, how do we – and by we I mean the west as much as Canada, get around the fact that the Security Council which is very central to international stability and order, is not functioning as well as would all hope.

MORGAN: One of the things that I talked about when I talked about our alliances Dick is the need for a multifaceted set of alliances that are fit for purpose. When we see a weakness in certain parts of the international system, one of the responses has been to create and strengthen alliances outside of that system.

The global coalition against Daesh has been a good example where Canada has been a strong participant. We’ve participated both in the US led coalition and also in the NATO military alliance activities there.

I think too for example the work we are doing on the LIMA Group to bring together allies in Latin America and Europe on Venezuela, which has the potential to be not just a challenging humanitarian crisis which it is right now and a challenging democratic crisis but has the potential to be destabilizing within the region.

That is one of the areas where Canada has shown some strength and capability to innovate, bringing together
– I pointed out the Ottawa Group. It’s not a security issue but I do think a well functioning trade system that allows for prosperity for all and that puts a strong rules set underneath our trading relationships ultimately does contribute to global stability and security. Those are the kinds of things we need to be thinking about as we look forward.

FADDEN: Thank you. Jody, I’ll ask you a question if I may. It’s pretty well recognized that (inaudible due to technical problem at source) amenable to diplomatic economic pressure and they tend to carry on doing what they want to do in most circumstances.

That being the case I am led to ask you what if anything should the defence policies of the west do to reinforce our capability to periodically tell one or both of these countries to hold back?

We have not been, we the west, particularly effective with either of them. My second question would be, can our defence policy cope with both concerns about Russia and China at the same time?

THOMAS: Those are very good questions. The deployment of the navy in particular to the South China Sea will (inaudible due to technical problem at source) of the messages that can be sent.

They’re not aggressive, they’re not overt but they are about the rules based order and freedom of navigation, the freedom of the seas and the fact that we will not be bullied into changing the geography of the world.

A lot of people wonder why we care about the South China Sea. It’s because the geography of this planet has been changed and we’ve allowed it to happen. What happens when China decides that their next to the Northwest Passage? We have to respond.

We have to understand the implications of actions now that maybe seem benign, maybe don’t. They’re done with intent and they’re done with purpose. We have to look at the Belt and Road Initiative which has become a checklist of things that China is going to (inaudible due to technical problem at source) through that.

It would be naïve of us to assume anything else. The north warning system, the protection of the continent, the attention we pay to the Canadian air cadence is critical and those messages about what we can do, what we will do and presence, persistent presence, matter.

Canada can’t obviously deter China and Russia alone but with the Five Eyes, through coalitions, through exercising, through overt and non-overt messaging, we make it clear we’re not here to be bullied and we won’t be bullied and that harm against one is harm against all.

(Inaudible due to technical problem at source) has been the underlying precept of NATO but I think that has broadened that now. Five Eyes as an example. The persistent presence the Canadian navy has had in the Indo Pacific is a message and I think that message is being heard.

FADDEN: I have a question for both of you. I’m desperately trying to find the slightest distance between the two. It’s about nuclear. We don’t talk as much as we have in the past about the threat of nuclear war between say Russia and the west (inaudible due to technical problem at source).

Negotiations for new ones aren’t progressing. There’s the issue with Iran. The Security Council members and the plus two are hopeful that with the return of the Democratic administration in the US we might be able to resurrect something there although I would argue that’s uncertain.

We have North Korea where it is at least arguable that they present as Jody implied a risk to North America. What do we do about things nuclear? I tend to argue with you, climate change and cyber things are the more immediate and medium term issues but I sometimes wonder if we’re not slightly ignoring the nuclear angle to all of these things because in the end, perhaps less likely but the consequences are immense.

I wonder if both with respect to Canada but also more generally you could say a few words if you worry about things nuclear in your jobs. Should you be worrying more than you are? How do you situate?

MORGAN: Well Dick you’ve commented there’s no light between me and Jody multiple times on this panel but I can say there’s no light between you and me on this issue. I think this requires concerted international focus.

We clearly are contributing on issues related to Iran through our participation in the international atomic energy agency to oversee Iran’s compliance and have been really supporting the E3 in supporting the continuation of the JCPOA which will not perfect does restrict Iran’s capability to secure nuclear weapons.

Jody mentioned our operations in the South China Sea but also in terms of Op Neon, in terms of North Korea. I think that we as Canada need to stay engaged both in these particular regional issues but also within the multilateral frameworks which require attention and that are significant and long term threats if we allow this issue to drift.

THOMAS: I’ll only quickly add that I worry about everything and the level of worry about the nuclear threat is unchanged in the Department of National Defence. It is something we discuss with Global Affairs, we discuss with Ministers and it is among Ministers and NATO chiefs of defence a consistent topic of conversation.

The distraction of the nuclear threat has reduced despite all evidence to the contrary allows two things. One, ignorance about the reality of the threat and you take your eye off the ball and other things are happening underneath that.

The bait and switch happens either in regional settings such as the potential of Iran being able to develop nuclear weapons or in the known nuclear countries allows us to sit in naïve isolation and naïve confidence that it’s not going to be an issue. I think it is.

The fact that it perhaps doesn’t reach our shores is not (inaudible due to technical problem at source) not to be concerned. I don’t (inaudible due to technical problem at source) think the nuclear threat against North America has increased. The nuclear threat in the world has.

FADDEN: I think Jody it was you who mentioned the Arctic initially. One of the things I found when I was still working was that everybody talked about the threat from the Arctic and Arctic security and frequently when public servants took this to Ministers, they sort of looked at you scratching their head a bit saying what are you telling me?

Are the Russians going to come over the pole and invade Canada? No. Yes, there’s the passage but what is the threat that Canada faces in respect to the Arctic? Is China a factor or should China be a factor?

THOMAS: The threat is multifaceted. It is the quickest route to get to Canada and North America should aggressive action be taken from Russia or China. It is a threat from that perspective. Do I think it’s an immediate threat? No, but it’s there and we have to understand that.

In the short term, the changing sea ice is allowing more shipping in the Northwest Passage so there is an environmental threat that (inaudible due to technical problem at source). Accidents will occur.

It’s not well charted. China and Russia both potentially could chart and understand the water column in the Arctic better than us because of the resources they’re putting up there.

It will be the last domain for resource exploitation. We do not underestimate at all that threat of resource exploitation in the Arctic by China in particular. Whether it is the last remaining protein source because fishing is moving north as climate change occurs.

Whether it is petroleum, whether it is critical minerals. China has a voracious appetite and will stop at nothing to feed itself and the Arctic is one of the last domains and regions left and we have to understand it, exploit it and more quickly than they can exploit it.

The other thing (inaudible due to technical problem at source) of Russia in northern military bases in the Russian side of the Arctic, it’s not for nothing. Nobody would invest that kind of money in building up the military capacity in the Arctic without reason, intent or purpose. We should not be naïve about that. It doesn’t mean it’s immediate but it means it’s there.

MORGAN: I think what’s interesting about the way Jody has characterized this is that we have significant interests in the Arctic. The Arctic is changing dramatically.

The dramatic change because of climate change which is allowing for navigation through the Arctic is opening up a whole range of potential threats, not just to our security but to our interests, to our broad interests.

This is a region where the strategic international importance of this region is going to increase significantly and is increasing now significantly compared to what we’ve seen in the past.

We need to continue to work closely with our Arctic allies to ensure we have an approach to the Arctic that sustains peace, stability and the rule of international law as new players are capable of entering the Arctic and new activities can take place in the Arctic that couldn’t before. I think we need to see this in a very integrated, holistic and broad way when we think about the Arctic.

THOMAS: (Inaudible due to technical problem at source) say to that is exactly why Marta is at Foreign Affairs and I’m at Defence.

FADDEN: (Laughs) good stuff. Let’s take a couple of questions from the floor. I’m going to ask one question which I hated to receive when I was either in Defence or in NSA is, given everything we’ve talked about, should we rethink the ballistic missile defence? We haven’t talked about it a lot. It has not gone away as a topic. Since that’s a bit more in your bailiwick I wonder if you could comment on that Jody.

THOMAS: As we talk about integrated air missile defence here in Defence, (unintelligible) is a solution to one set of problems and integrated air missile defence is a range of solutions to a range of problems. I would prefer to have the conversation about the range of problems.

I believe we should be in the room when something is happening to Canada or to North America. I think there are ways of achieving that goal without a significant investment in one particular solution over another.

The range of threats, the range of solutions is what needs to be discussed, not one solution to one set of problems. There are lots of other threats to Canada that are not ballistic missiles and they are air breeding and they could come at us from a significant distance. Let’s talk about the range threats and the range of solutions rather than getting caught up in the politics of one particular line of defence would be my thought.

MORGAN: I think Jody has answered that very well.

FADDEN: Another question from the floor and this one concerns Taiwan. You’ll both be aware that China has slowly been increasing the pressure on Taiwan.

One of the ways we the west have been signaling our displeasure at the prospect of too much pressure and China doing something kinetic with Taiwan is sending our ships through the Straits regularly.

The question was and this is for Jody more than Marta, is our navy in any position to do anything about this particular issue, the protection of Taiwan which is an ally of Canada, an ally of the west generally?

THOMAS: Actually the question is for Marta in that it is a policy recommendation to government and the government decision that we would take any particular action. We are waiting for the new surface combatants but I do believe the (unintelligible) vessels that is the majority of the Canadian navy fleet just got upgraded. It does have the capacity to both exercise any action that the government would ask us to take. The fiscal capacity is there. The policy intent is what would be required.

MORGAN: I would go back to my earlier comments. I think in general across a whole range of issues and across a whole range of threats, we need to work closely with our allies.

There’s no alternative to Canada on any of (inaudible due to technical problem at source) vis a vis China whether it’s on the economic side, on the environmental side, on the security side, on the human rights (inaudible due to technical problem at source) work with allies. Whatever we need to do needs to be in conjunction with those allies in order to be effective.

FADDEN: I’m running out of time. Let me ask you one more question. China is trying to gain a foothold around the planet and in particular in Canada it is trying to gain a technological foothold. It invests in universities and things of this nature and in particular it is involved with Huawei and 5G.

You’ve both talked about the necessity of maintaining close alliances in particular with 5G. Would you care to comment on how our allies are responding to our unwillingness to do anything about Huawei?

I appreciate this is a government decision and not yours to make but is it something that worries you that on this issue which is quite important to the United States in particular we seem to be a bit on the side or is it a matter that has lost a bit of its importance over the last little while?

MORGAN: I would say Dick I think we all recognize and one of the things we’ve all been talking about today, it’s only the first panel and probably at least three people have mentioned it already is the importance of cyber security to Canada and to everyone really.

Cyber threat we all recognize is a critical vector that we need to protect ourselves. It’s clear that we need to protect our own national interests and our own security. We have in place at the moment through the CSE a rigorous review process for telecommunications equipment.

This issue is under active consideration by the government, how to proceed in terms of 5G. It’s something we communicate quite frequently with our international allies, particularly the Five Eyes.

THOMAS: I would just add to what Marta has said, that the jewel in the crown is the capacity within CSE and our international reputation and so I don’t know if CSE is participating in this conference but I do think it is a capacity (inaudible due to technical problem at source) use more of.

While I always like investment in the Department of National Defence, there is a real case for more investment in CSE to help us answer some of these questions. They are internationally recognized as leaders in this field and their confidence is what matters I would say more than mine or Marta’s.

FADDEN: A question about Japan. You both commented on the value of alliances. I think that’s beyond reasonable debate. Japan is a long ways away. It is an ally of Canada. We have formally a strategic relationship with them but if you talk to many Japanese officials, they will tell you they would like a bit more enthusiasm from the Canadian side.

They are as you know near China, near North Korea. They are really threatened yet they are in all ways a western democratic country. We don’t seem terribly keen on – the we can also be the west generally – very keen on engaging with Japan, bringing Japan slightly closer into some of the alliances you have talked about.

You may not agree with my analysis that we’re not as enthusiastic as we could be but could you talk a bit about Japan and Canada and the west and are there ways we might be able to tighten our relationship with Japan? Would you give it a try Marta?

MORGAN: I’ll give it a go. We are very enthusiastic about our relationship with Japan. We have a strong longstanding relationship that spans economic, it spans culture, security. We know Japan has been a critical player in the region for security, a key democracy (inaudible due to technical problem at source) and I can’t overstate our degree of commitment to that relationship.

I think there is a lot of opportunity. The G7 is one forum where we have the opportunity where Japan is also a member to make sure that Japan – to bring Japan close and to work closely with Japan in a multilateral setting that has proven to be very effective, not so much security focused, more economic and stability focused.

Those kinds of relationships are equally important in terms of moving forward with Japan.

FADDEN: Jody, any thoughts?

THOMAS: The Defence relationship with Japan is very strong and I think evidenced by the 16 weeks of ship and aircraft time that we give to Op Neon. That’s a really important program for Japan which is the sanctions monitoring the UN agreement on North Korea. That’s just one example.

We recently worked to strengthen that relationship with a defence cooperation agreement. There is nothing right now that I think limits (inaudible due to technical problem at source) indicate that we don’t have a strong relationship as Marta has said. We’re working more in the Indo Pacific. If we’re in the Indo Pacific it involves Japan. It is close and it is likeminded.

FADDEN: Thank you both of you. Our time is up I’m told. We very much appreciate you taking the time to have joined us this morning. I’m glad to see that Global Affairs and National Defence are (unintelligible) on everything. I’d still love to be in some closed meetings as a little fly on the wall to see if that’s true across the boards but thank you very much, most interesting contribution. Thank you indeed.

MODERATOR: Thank you so much deputy minister Thomas, deputy minister Morgan and Dick Fadden for doing such a great job of moderating this and asking some good and tough questions to everyone. There’s one little confession before we all head out. This panel I had a hard time getting a title for it.

For the longest time I just called it the Big Picture panel and I think we did a really good job of analyzing the big picture for the rest of the conference. It sets us off in a good direction. Thank you very much everyone.

Cyber-Policy Messaging

Developed for VCDS keynote - C2ISR Conference

  • Anticipating the new geopolitical threat landscape, transforming to the changing operating environment, and acting decisively with effective military capability
    • Geopolitical landscape: Within cyberspace, Canada and its allies are increasingly challenged by adversarial actions from malign and hostile powers. These actors aspire to redefine the existing international rules-based order and undermine core Canadian and allied interests. If Canada and its allies fail to respond to this mounting competition, uphold democratic principles, and preserve the international rules-based order, these rival powers will continue to gain military, technological, and economic advantages. These gains could weaken Canada’s ability to defend itself against coercive behaviour and undermine the ability to provide a credible deterrent to potential aggression.
    • Operating environment: Strategic adversaries are also rapidly integrating cyber forces into their militaries. However, the lines that some adversaries draw between civilian and military activity are blurred. This tests the ability of Canada and its allies to respond, and continually pushes the bounds of acceptable activities in cyberspace. The use by states of non-state actors to maintain plausible deniability can complicate things even further.
    • Operating environment: Adversaries use malicious cyber actions below the threshold of armed conflict to employ a “death by a thousand cuts” strategy that over time erodes sources of national power. For example, malicious actions include disinformation campaigns, interference in elections, theft of personal information and intellectual property, and holding critical infrastructure at risk. They also help set the conditions for decisive advantage in conflict should it occur, especially if coupled with other instruments of military power.
    • Threat landscape: Cyberspace underpins the command, control, and function of all weapons systems that pose a threat to North America. Current adversary weapon systems like cruise missiles launched from submarines, ships, and aircraft, all rely on cyberspace for command, control, communication, launch, and flight processes, as do advanced space and counter-space capabilities, hypersonic weapons, ballistic missiles, and uninhabited aerial systems.
    • Threat landscape: Beyond military threats, cyberspace is also an attack vector that threatens governance, national unity, and public support, and can also disrupt an actor’s logistics and sap its will to fight. These threats are novel because they cross physical, technological, communications, logical, and cognitive spheres. Indeed, among the threat vectors, Canadians are most likely to face foreign threats in cyberspace.
    • Acting decisively with military capability: From a military perspective, a sustained large-scale conflict between states targeting militaries and national infrastructure through cyber means has yet to occur. Cyber conflict thus far has been evolving slowly with lower-intensity operations, and has not yet been decisive. However, as cyber operations evolve, they will be more effectively integrated as an instrument of military operations and warfare, and will one day form a larger part of military conflict.
  • Advancing information operations and cyber capabilities
    • Strong, Secure, Engaged directed DND/CAF to assume a more assertive posture in the cyber domain by hardening our defences, and by conducting active cyber operations against potential adversaries.
  • Developing military-specific information operations and offensive cyber operations capabilities to target, exploit, influence, and attack
    • Cyber capabilities are essential for modern militaries to confront and defeat threats of the future. Cyber capabilities are designed to degrade, disrupt, deny, or interfere with an adversary’s capabilities by targeting specific technical aspects, such as communications, logistics, network functions, and administrative controls.
    • As well as potentially playing a role in combined arms warfare, cyber capabilities – both defensive and offensive – could provide a strategic deterrent to Canada’s adversaries, provide a means to compete under the threshold, reinforce confidence in its population, and may ultimately prevent conflict.
    • Given the importance and fragility of these capabilities, DND/CAF needs to adopt a mindset of long-term strategic focus, along with the nimbleness to procure, develop, and execute these capabilities in a fluid strategic environment.
    • Cooperation with other government departments and allies is critical. The authorities and policies vary by department, agency, and country, thus demanding creative solutions and urgent work to find common ground.

Issue: Operations PROJECTION Asia-Pacific and ARTEMIS – HMCS Calgary

Media Query:
Produced in anticipation of media queries
Reporter:
N/A
Date:
3 Feb 2021
Deadline:
N/A

Overview

From 26 February to 3 September, 2021, Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Calgary will be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region on Operation PROJECTION Asia-Pacific and Operation ARTEMIS in the Indian Ocean, to further strengthen Canada’s relations with partners in those regions and contribute to maritime security and stability in international waters.

During these operations, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is conducting training, exercises, and engagements with foreign navies and other international security partners.

Approach / Approche: The Public Affairs (PA) approach is active. The Maritime Component Commander (MCC) has the PA lead. All PA activities shall be well-coordinated between Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) PA and MCC PA. Identity protection measures are not in place for Operations PROJECTION or ARTEMIS.

Key Messages

  • HMCS Calgary will deploy to the Asia-Pacific region on Operation PROJECTION from the end of February until September 2021 to conduct forward naval presence operations in the region in line with Canada’s Defence Policy Strong, Secure, Engaged objectives. During this period, the ship will also participate in Operation ARTEMIS and sail in the international waters of the Middle East and Indian Ocean regions.
  • Operation ARTEMIS is Canada’s contribution to a coordinated multinational effort, Combined Task Force 150, to deter and deny terrorists the use of the seas as a venue for illegal activities that they use to fund or conceal their movements.
  • Operations PROJECTION and ARTEMIS demonstrate Canada’s ongoing commitment to global peace and security. The deployment of HMCS Calgary to the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions contributes to making the world more secure and stable and also shows how the Royal Canadian Navy is ready to support Canada’s interests around the world.
  • The deployment of HMCS Calgary allows the Canadian Armed Forces to work with partner nations to enhance military cooperation. Those activities will help build trust, bolster partnerships and improve interoperability with our partners.
  • (Additional lines on Op ARTEMIS can be found on the CJOC PA ARTEMIS SharePoint)

Issue specific content

Impact of COVID-19 – From previously approved language

  • The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces takes the health and well-being of their members very seriously. As such, over the past several months, The Royal Canadian Navy has taken several steps to mitigate the risk to the naval team, both in sea-going and shore-based units, ensuring Canada’s Naval Forces remain “Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight.”  A number of precautionary measures were put in place to protect our sailors and their ability to deploy, when needed. 
  • In preparing HMCS Calgary’s ship’s company for this deployment, members self-isolated at home while they conducted their personal pre-deployment preparations. Once ready to embark the ship for collective pre-deployment training and preparations, the ship’s company were all tested to ensure they did not have COVID-19 before embarking.
  • While the ship is deployed, the same measures that have been in place over the past few months to minimize the potential exposure to COVID-19 will continue. The COVID-19 situation worldwide is constantly assessed and we re-evaluate these procedures and adjust them as required.
  • The current measures and protocols in place are as follow:
    • The ship will remain in close communication with our allies on the status of COVID-19 in their countries;
    • While deployed on Operations PROJECTION and ARTEMIS, HMCS Calgary will make port visits in different locations.  The purpose of these port visits is to conduct administrative tasks such as fueling ship, obtaining food and supplies, and effecting any required repairs;
    • Port visits will remain administrative in nature, meaning that the ship’s company will not be allowed to visit the ports as we have done in the past. They will have to remain on the ship and/or in the vicinity of the jetty to which the ship is secured;
    • When the ship goes alongside in a foreign port, there will be significant restrictions as to who can come in the ship and they will be screened for COVID-19 beforehand; and
    • Increased cleaning routines for the ship and personal hygiene standards for the ship’s company have been established onboard.
    • These measures will ensure our sailors remain safe, healthy and able to complete their mission.

Port visits

  • While deployed under Operation PROJECTION, HMCS Calgary is scheduled to make various brief port visits throughout the Asia-Pacific region to refuel and resupply the ship. Some planned port visits between February and September 2021 include Pearl Harbour, Guam, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji, as well as Bahrain during Op ARTEMIS. These visits are subject to change at any time due to operational reasons and COVID-19 restrictions.

EX TALISMAN SABRE 21 (TS21)

  • Canada will be taking part in Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 21 (TS21) in July 2021 with HMCS Calgary participating in this training activity under Op PROJECTION. Canada last participated in the exercise in July 2019 with HMCS Regina, M/V Asterix and a Canadian Army contingent.
  • Occurring every two years, TS21 is the largest bilateral combined training activity between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and United States (US) military. It is designed to test forces in planning and conducting Combined and Joint Task Force operations and improve the combat readiness and interoperability between Australian and US forces. This exercise has also welcomed participation from Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, along with international observers from various nations in past iterations.
  • TS21 is the ninth iteration of the exercise and consists of a Field Training Exercise incorporating force preparation (logistic) activities, amphibious landings, ground force manoeuvre, urban operations, air combat and maritime operations.
  • TS21 will run from late June to mid-August 2021. This time frame includes the initial surge of equipment and people, and their subsequent departure after the exercise. Exercise activities will peak during 18-31 July 2021, when HMCS Calgary is scheduled to participate.
  • Twitter handle: @TalismanSabre (Australian Defence Force)

[Placeholder for strategic Narrative – being developed by JTE Stratcom]

CH-148 Cyclone helicopter

  • HMCS Calgary is deploying with a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter and associated Air Detachment onboard.
  • The Cyclone is capable of conducting Surface and Subsurface Surveillance and Control, utility and search and rescue missions. It can also provide tactical transport for national and international security efforts. This twin-engine helicopter is compatible with the latest high-tech naval frigates and includes several new safety features. Its aluminum and composite airframe is built with lightning-strike and high-intensity radio frequency pulse protection. The aircraft also incorporates flaw tolerance and engine burst containment.
  • (Taken from the RCAF MRLs – Lifting of the op pause, 16 June, 2020) We have full confidence in the risk analysis process, the people who oversaw it, and the mitigation measures that have been put in place. Further, we are confident in both the aircraft itself, and the people who work with it—if we were not, we would not be deploying it to operations.
  • (Taken from the RCAF MRLs – Lifting of the op pause, 16 June, 2020) The CH-148 Cyclone is safe to fly, and the aircraft will still be authorized to carry passengers for operational reasons and requirements. The mitigation measures we have put in place temporarily restricts familiarization flights, as these are not essential for operations. As a result, they will not be permitted until further notice.
  • Note – any other questions about the Cyclone fleet will be referred to the RCAF.
  • The Cyclone has a day-and-night flight capability, and can fly in most weather conditions in temperatures ranging from -51°C to +49°C. The CH-148 is approximately 10% faster than a Sea King. 

HMCS Calgary

  • HMCS Calgary has approximately 250 highly trained and professional officers and sailors who are well prepared to meet the challenges of their deployment on Operations PROJECTION and ARTEMIS. HMCS Calgary is delivering robust capabilities working with our partner navies to strengthen international partnerships and stability in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions.
  • HMCS Calgary is a Halifax-class frigate. Halifax-class frigates carry extensive anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare weapons and sensors to complement their substantial anti-air warfare defenses. The combination of these weapon and sensor systems, coupled with state of the art damage control and machinery control systems, make HMC frigates one of the most advanced warship designs in the world.
  • Canada’s Halifax-class frigates have been deployed extensively to deal with a wide range of domestic and international security challenges, including the threats of terrorism, illegal resource exploitation, pollution and fisheries violations, narcotics trafficking, and illegal immigration. They have also enforced Canadian sovereignty, provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, supported Search and Rescue operations, and defended Canada’s broader national interests abroad.

Naval Tactical Operations Group (NTOG)

  • HMCS Calgary is also deploying with a Naval Tactical Operation Group’s (NTOG) Enhanced Naval Boarding Party.
  • The NTOG Enhanced Naval Boarding Party capability provides the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Navy with the agility, flexibility, and tactical expertise to confront and deter a variety of threats in high-risk maritime operational environments.
  • The NTOG includes specially trained teams that can deploy onboard a variety of vessels, including Halifax-class frigates, and that also deploy ashore on operations. Teams are trained in hand-to-hand combat, improvised explosive device identification, close quarters fighting, and tactical shooting.

Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) – From previously approved language

  • Her Majesty’s Canadian Ships at sea operate in accordance with the standards outlined in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Customary International Law, to render assistance to distressed mariners and their vessels.
  • Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is an international maritime safety treaty that is regarded as the most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of ships. The treaty provides direction to ensure that ships comply with minimum safety standards in construction, equipment, and operation. It also stipulates a legal obligation for all vessels to offer assistance to those in distress. This legal obligation applies to all vessels and their crews. Though SOLAS does not apply to warships, all Royal Canadian Navy ships at sea operate in accordance with the standards outlined in this convention.
  • Crews of NATO vessels, including HMCS Calgary are fully aware of their responsibilities with regard to the International Maritime Law regarding Safety of Life at Sea. Royal Canadian Navy sailors are well-trained professionals and equipped to respond rapidly to various operational contingencies such as the provision of assistance at sea to distressed mariners and their vessels.

Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) – From previously approved language

  • The integration of gender perspectives into operations, such as the deployment of HMCS Calgary to the Asia-Pacific region, improves our understanding and awareness of the operating environment and optimizes planning, decision-making, execution and evaluation of the mission.
  • All Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) missions incorporate the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 by applying Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) and integrating gender perspectives throughout all phases of the operation. Deployed CAF members are required to complete the online course “Introduction to GBA+” prior to deployment.
  • Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) is an analytical tool used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and gender-diverse people may experience policies, programs and initiatives. The “plus” in GBA+ acknowledges that GBA goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences. We all have multiple identity factors that intersect to make us who we are; GBA+ also considers many other identity factors, like race, ethnicity, religion, age and mental or physical disability.
Drafted by:
Developed from previously approved language
Capt A. Croizer, CJOC Exped PAO
Consulted:
Maj M.F. Gough, Senior PAO MCC
LCdr R. Hearnshaw, Future Ops MCC
A. Campion, CJOC POLAD
LCdr T. Kliem, CJOC J3 Desk O
Maj M. Archambault, CJOC Exped Snr PAO
LCol K. Allison, CJOC CPAO
Approved by:
Capt(N) T. MacLean, COS MCC
Date:
11 February 2021

Issue: Operations PROJECTION Asia-Pacific and NEON – HMCS Winnipeg

Media Query:
Produced in anticipation of media queries
Reporter:
N/A
Date:
24 August 2020 (updated 27 Aug 20)
Deadline:
N/A

Overview

From September to December 2020, Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Winnipeg will be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region on Operation PROJECTION Asia-Pacific and Operation NEON, to further strengthen Canada’s relations with partners in the area.

During these operations, the CAF are conducting training, exercises, and engagements with foreign navies and other international security partners.

Approach: The PA approach is active within mission limitations. While following the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) Public Affairs (PA) lead, all PA activities shall be well-coordinated between Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) PA and MCC PA. Identity protection measures are not in place for Operation PROJECTION or NEON.

CJOC PA will respond to queries pertaining to:

  • CAF operations in the Korean Peninsula
  • Op NEON
  • Op PROJECTION (using MCC-approved MLs)
  • Transits will be referred to using UNCLOS language, provided in SJS Op NEON narrative. *TS is outside NEON AO.

Coordination with ADM(PA) and GAC will be required for the following topics:

  • North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs
  • Role of sanctions
  • Maritime sanctions evasion and the reporting of violations
  • Canadian efforts to build capacity of other countries to implement UNSC sanctions against North Korea
  • Canadian autonomous sanctions against North Korea
  • The participation of other nations in this effort
  • China

Key Messages

  • HMCS Winnipegis deployed to the Asia-Pacific region on Operation PROJECTION from September to December, 2020, to conduct forward naval presence operations in the region as well as participating in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), an international naval exercise with partner nations, in line with Canada’s Defence Policy Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) objectives.
  • While deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, HMCS Winnipeg will also operate under Operation NEON. Op NEON is Canada’s contribution to a coordinated multinational effort to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea, by conducting surveillance operations to identify suspected maritime sanctions evasion activities.
  • Operations PROJECTION and NEON demonstrate Canada’s ongoing commitment to global peace and security. The deployment of HMCS Winnipeg to the Asia-Pacific region contributes to making the world more secure and stable and also shows how the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is ready to support Canada’s interests around the world.
  • The deployment of HMCS Winnipeg in the Asia-Pacific region will allow the CAF to work with partner nations to enhance military cooperation. It is expected that activities, such as those undertaken during Operations PROJECTION and NEON, will help build trust and bolster partnerships.

Operation NEON – Largely based on existing language

  • Operation NEON is Canada’s contribution to a coordinated multinational effort to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea. These UN sanctions, imposed between 2006 and 2017, aim to pressure North Korea to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs and respond to North Korean nuclear weapon tests and ballistic missile launches.
  • During 2019 and 2020 and into 2021, Canada will periodically deploy military ships, aircraft and personnel to conduct surveillance operations to identify suspected maritime sanctions evasion activities, in particular ship-to-ship transfers of fuel and other commodities banned by the United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR). This contribution bolsters the integrity of the global sanctions regime against North Korea.Since 2019, the following RCN ships deployed on Op NEON:
    • HMCS Regina and MV Asterix deployed in June 2019;
    • HMCS Ottawa deployed in August 2019; and
    • HMCS Winnipeg deploys in September 2020.
  • As part of Operation NEON,  the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) deploys on a rotational basis a RCN Halifax-class frigate, a RCAF CP-140 Aurora with crew and supporting personnel, and three CAF members embedded permanently into the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) onboard USS Blue Ridge (U.S. 7th Fleet) or within the multinational staff Headquarters in Japan.
  • Canada's participation in this multinational initiative is a demonstration of the international solidarity in support of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea continues to rapidly adapt its already sophisticated methods of sanctions evasions. Canada is working with our partners in the region in a coordinated effort to identify apparent maritime sanctions evasions, by maritime smuggling, in particular ship-to-ship transfers of fuel and other commodities banned by the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Operation NEON –Narrative (SJS – Dated 26 August)

  • Canada fully supports the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions resolutions on North Korea. The series of UN sanctions, imposed between 2006 and 2017, aims to pressure North Korea to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs and respond to North Korean nuclear weapons tests and ballistic missile launches.
  • In January 2018, at the Vancouver Foreign Ministers Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula, Canada, along with other partners, agreed that maintaining unity in increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea would be essential to achieving the common goal of a peaceful, negotiated solution to the threat posed by that country’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
  • Later in 2018, a new multinational surveillance initiative was launched. The aim of this initiative is to limit North Korea’s ability to skirt sanctions by identifying those who violate sanctions and sharing that information with implicated countries. As part of this multinational effort, Canada periodically deployed military assets to conduct surveillance activities in the Asia-Pacific region under Operation PROJECTION – Asia Pacific. Together with our partners and allies, the initiative is also supporting the work of the UNSC 1718 Committee's Panel of Experts, which is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of UNSC sanctions on North Korea.
  • On 28 April, 2019, Prime Minister Trudeau announced that Canada would renew its contribution by launching a two-year military operation, known as Operation NEON. Operation NEON involves scheduled deployments of CAF ships, aircraft and personnel throughout 2019 and 2020, and into early 2021, in an effort to identify instances of maritime sanctions evasions by smuggling, in particular through illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products and other commodities banned by United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR).
  • In 2019, Canada deployed a total of two frigates and two CP-140 Aurora aircraft on a rotational basis in support of UNSCR 2397. These contributions facilitated the detection, deterrence, and disruption of illicit ship to ship transfers of refined petroleum. In addition to the periodic deployment of air and sea assets, Operation NEON also includes the deployment of permanent staff to support the Enforcement Coordination Center aboard United States Ship Blue Ridge
  • Under Operation NEON, CAF personnel work alongside our allies and partners in international solidarity and in support of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and across the Asia-Pacific region. The deployment of CAF personnel and resources helps bolster the integrity of the global sanctions regime against North Korea as it holds to account those whose actions violate UNSC resolutions. Canada’s maritime operations are conducted in accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). 
  • The information shared by members of the initiative has helped partner nations take action to support the full implementation of UNSC resolutions and has helped the Panel of Experts to identify a number of instances of maritime sanctions evasion. This information helps the Panel propose recommendations for the UNSC and Member States on further improving the implementation of sanctions and countering North Korea’s evasive activities.
  • Among other CAF deployments, Operation NEON demonstrates the importance that Canada places on security in this region, international security and the importance of upholding the UN Security Council sanctions regime. Operation NEON provides a meaningful presence, strengthens regional ties and supports the rules-based international order. It further demonstrates Canada’s resolve in standing with allies and partners in accordance with Canadian values.

Past support to UNSCR 2397 enforcement

  • Prior to the launch of Operation NEON, Canada deployed personnel, ships and aircraft twice in support of UNSCR sanctions resolutions on North Korea under Operation PROJECTION – Asia Pacific:
    • October 2018 – HMCS Calgary deployed with a CP-140 Aurora
    • May 2018 – HMCS Vancouver deployed with a CP-140 Aurora

Policy Alignment

  • The CAF deployment on Operation NEON is in line with the Minister of National Defence’s Mandate Letter from the Prime Minister (December 13, 2019) and Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy.

    1. Minister’s Mandate Letter:

    Ensure the continued effectiveness of Canadian Armed Forces deployments, including Operation IMPACT in the Middle East, Operation NEON in the Asia-Pacific, NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia, the NATO Mission in Iraq and Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine

    2. Strong, Secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy

    Minister Freeland Introduction (page 7):

    Canadians have always been ready to share the burden and responsibility of making the world a safer place. We have a long history of working collaboratively with partners to prevent and respond to conflicts and crises abroad, including our support for peace and stabilization operations. The same applies to policy and advocacy that strengthen global norms on peace and security.

    Global Governance (page 51)

    Global governance is undermined when rules are ignored or norms flouted. North Korea’s ongoing efforts to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, including two nuclear tests in 2016 and numerous ballistic missile tests, show clear disregard for multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, and further demonstrate that North Korea poses a serious and increasing threat to both regional stability and international peace and security.

    Weapons Proliferation in North Korea (page 54)
    The risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-remains troubling. The proliferation of ballistic missile technology as a means to deliver these weapons is also a source of concern. The number of countries with access to ballistic missile technology, including some with the potential to reach North America or target Canadian and allied deployed forces, has increased and is expected to grow and become more sophisticated. North Korea’s frequent nuclear and missile tests underscore this point. As well, North Korea continues to maintain a chemical and biological weapon program.

Related Links

[End of SJS Narrative]

Impact of COVID-19 – From previously approved language

  • The Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) takes the health and well-being of their members very seriously. As such, over the past several months, The RCN has taken several steps to mitigate the risk to the naval team, both in sea-going and shore-based units, ensuring Canada’s Naval Forces remain “Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight.”  A number of precautionary measures were put in place to protect our sailors and their ability to deploy, when needed.
  • In preparing HMCS Winnipeg’s ship’s company for this deployment, members self-isolated at home while they conducted their personal pre-deployment preparations. Once ready to embark the ship for collective pre-deployment training and preparations, the ship’s company were all tested to ensure they did not have COVID-19 before embarking.
  • While we appreciate this has been challenging for the ship’s company and their families, those measures are necessary to ensure the health and safety of the team.
  • While the ship is deployed to the Asia-Pacific region, the same measures that have been in place over the past few months to minimize the potential exposure to COVID-19 will continue. The COVID-19 situation worldwide is constantly assessed and we re-evaluate these procedures and adjust them as required.
  • The current measures and protocols in place are as follow:
    • The ship will remain in close communication with our allies on the status of COVID-19 in their countries;
    • While deployed on Operations PROJECTION and NEON, HMCS Winnipeg will make port visits in different locations including Guam, United States.  The purpose of these port visits is to conduct administrative tasks such as fueling ship, obtaining food and supplies, and effecting any required repairs;
    • Port visits will remain administrative in nature, meaning that the ship’s company will not be allowed to visit the ports, as we have done in the past, they will have to remain on the ship and/or in the vicinity of the jetty to which the ship is secured;
    • When the ship goes alongside in a foreign port, there will be significant restrictions as to who can come in the ship and they will be screened for COVID-19 beforehand; 
    • Additionally, increased cleaning routines for the ship and personal hygiene standards for the ship’s company have been established onboard.
  • These measures will ensure our sailors remain safe, healthy and able to complete their mission.

Port visits in the United States

  • HMCS Winnipeg visited Pearl Harbour in August following their participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, and will visit again in December 2020, for the final port visit of its Op PROJECTION Asia-Pacific and Op NEON deployment. The ship will also be stopping in Guam on both their transit west and again during their sail home.

Note:  Lines below about Canada’s bilateral relations with the United States were taken from Global Affairs Canada website

  • Canada and the United States enjoy a unique relationship forged by shared geography, similar values, common interests, deep connections and powerful, multi-layered economic ties.
  • The United States is Canada’s most important ally and defence partner. Our defence relations are longstanding and well entrenched. Canada and the United States have been partners in the defence of North America since the Second World War, and continue to cooperate closely in support of international peace and security.

EX KEEN SWORD

  • Exercise KEEN SWORD is a biennial, joint/bilateral field training exercise designed to increase combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. forces and the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF), aimed at enhancing their readiness and partnership capabilities. The first iteration of Exercise KEEN SWORD took place in 1986.
  • From October 26 to November 5, HMCS Winnipeg will participate in exercise KEEN SWORD, a joint military exercise involving sea, ground and air assets.
  • KEEN SWORD is a biennial exercise designed to increase combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. forces and the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF).
  • The exercise is an opportunity for the Canadian Armed Forces to work with our Allies and partners in support of the rules-based international order.
  • The Royal Canadian Navy participated for the first time in 2018 as observer. This year, the RCN will have an active role in the exercise with HMCS Winnipeg
  • This exercise will involve the 240 CAF members onboard HMCS Winnipeg, with approximately 9,000 U.S. military personnel and their Japanese counterparts, who will operate from military installations throughout mainland Japan, the Okinawa prefecture and surrounding territorial waters.
  • The ship will resume its Operation NEON mission in November following the end of the exercise.

CH-148 Cyclone helicopter

  • HMCS Winnipeg is deploying with a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, marking the second Cyclone to conduct flight operations as part of Op PROJECTION and Op NEON.
  • The Cyclone significantly enhances our frigates’ ability to conduct Surface and Subsurface Surveillance and Control and once the operational pause on the fleet was lifted by the RCAF, planning continued to deploy a Cyclone once again on Op REASSURANCE.
  • (Taken from the RCAF MRLs – Lifting of the op pause, 16 June, 2020) We have full confidence in the risk analysis process, the people who oversaw it, and the mitigation measures that have been put in place. Further, we are confident in both the aircraft itself, and the people who work with it—if we were not, we would not be returning it to operations.
  • (Taken from the RCAF MRLs – Lifting of the op pause, 16 June, 2020) The CH-148 Cyclone is safe to fly, and the aircraft will still be authorized to carry passengers for operational reasons and requirements. The mitigation measures we have put in place temporarily restricts familiarization flights, as these are not essential for operations. As a result, they will not be permitted until further notice.
  • Note – any other questions about the op pause on the Cyclone fleet will be referred to the RCAF.
  • The Cyclone is capable of conducting Surface and Subsurface Surveillance and Control, utility and search and rescue missions. It can also provide tactical transport for national and international security efforts. This twin-engine helicopter is compatible with the latest high-tech naval frigates and includes several new safety features. Its aluminum and composite airframe is built with lightning-strike and high-intensity radio frequency pulse protection. The aircraft also incorporates flaw tolerance and engine burst containment.
  • The Cyclone has a day-and-night flight capability, and can fly in most weather conditions in temperatures ranging from -51°C to +49°C. The CH-148 is approximately 10% faster than a Sea King. 

HMCS Winnipeg – From previously approved language

  • HMCS Winnipeghas approximately 230 highly trained and professional officers and sailors who are well prepared to meet the challenges of their deployment on Operation PROJECTION and NEON. HMCS Winnipegis delivering robust capabilities working with our partner navies to strengthen international partnerships and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
  • HMCS Winnipeg is a Halifax-class frigate. Halifax-class frigates carry extensive anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare weapons and sensors to complement their substantial anti-air warfare defenses. The combination of these weapon and sensor systems, coupled with state of the art damage control and machinery control systems, make HMC frigates one of the most advanced warship designs in the world.
  • Frigates provide a formidable array of defensive and offensive capabilities that can respond effectively to various operational contingencies, at home and abroad, on behalf of the Government of Canada.
  • Canada’s Halifax-class frigates have been deployed extensively to deal with a wide range of domestic and international security challenges, including the threats of terrorism, illegal resource exploitation, pollution and fisheries violations, narcotics trafficking, and illegal immigration. They have also enforced Canadian sovereignty, provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, supported Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, and defended Canada’s broader national interests abroad.

Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) – From previously approved language

  • Her Majesty’s Canadian Ships at sea operate in accordance with the standards outlined in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Customary International Law, to render assistance to distressed mariners and their vessels.
  • SOLAS is an international maritime safety treaty that is regarded as the most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of ships. The treaty provides direction to ensure that ships comply with minimum safety standards in construction, equipment, and operation. It also stipulates a legal obligation for all vessels to offer assistance to those in distress. This legal obligation applies to all vessels and their crews. Though SOLAS does not apply to warships, all RCN ships at sea operate in accordance with the standards outlined in this convention.
  • Crews of NATO vessels, including HMCS Winnipeg, are fully aware of their responsibilities with regard to the International Maritime Law regarding SOLAS. RCN sailors are well-trained professionals and equipped to respond rapidly to various operational contingencies such as the provision of assistance at sea to distressed mariners and their vessels.

Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) – From previously approved language

  • The integration of gender perspectives into operations, such as the deployment of HMCS Winnipeg to the Asia-Pacific region, improves our understanding and awareness of the operating environment and optimizes planning, decision-making, execution and evaluation of the mission.
  • All CAF missions, such as the deployment of HMCS Winnipeg on Operation PROJECTION to the Asia-Pacific region, incorporate the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 by applying Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) and integrating gender perspectives throughout all phases of the operation. Deployed CAF members are required to complete the online course “Introduction to GBA+” prior to deployment.
  • GBA+ is an analytical tool used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and gender-diverse people may experience policies, programs and initiatives. The “plus” in GBA+ acknowledges that GBA goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences. We all have multiple identity factors that intersect to make us who we are; GBA+ also considers many other identity factors, like race, ethnicity, religion, age and mental or physical disability.

Questions & Answers

Q1. [Op NEON – Taiwan Strait Transit] Why did a Canadian military ship sail through the sensitive Taiwan Strait at a time of heightened tensions in the region? Is Canada trying to send a message?

A1. The Canadian Armed Forces operate in the Asia Pacific region, as it has for decades. HMCS Winnipeg is currently deployed in the region.

Having completed their participation in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) on September 1, 2020, HMCS Winnipeg has now transitioned to Operation PROJECTION Asia-Pacific.

During this operation, the CAF is conducting training, exercises, and engagements with foreign navies and other international security partners. The CAF also supports NATO Maritime Command, U.S. Naval Forces, and other allied operations.

HMCS Winnipeg transited from the southern Philippines to the East China Sea. This allows HMCS Winnipeg to participate in Canada’s contribution to a multinational effort to counter North Korea’s evasion of UN Security Council sanctions by maritime smuggling while in the region.

The most practical route between the southern Philippines to the East China Sea involves sailing through the Taiwan Strait. Transit through the Taiwan Strait is not related to making any statement.

HMCS Winnipeg’s current deployment is consistent with past Royal Canadian Navy practice and international law. For example, in 2018 HMCS Calgary, HMCS Chicoutimi, and HMCS Vancouver operated throughout the Asia Pacific region to build relationships, work with trusted international partners, and contribute to multinational efforts to counter North Korea’s maritime smuggling activity while in the region. Last year HMCS Regina, supported by the Naval Replenishment Unit (NRU) Asterix, to participate in Canada’s contribution to a multinational effort to counter North Korea’s evasion of UN Security Council sanctions by maritime smuggling while in the region. These naval activities included a transit through the Taiwan Strait in October by HMCS Calgary.

Drafted by:
Lt N. Morrison, PAO MCC
Consulted:

Developed from previously approved language
Maj M. Archambault, CJOC Exped SPAO
Maj R. Rheaume, CJOC J3 Eur
Andrew Campion, CJOC POLAD
Lt(N) L. Coleman, MARLANT PA 2IC
Maj M. Gough, Senior PAO MCC
Lt(N) R. MacDonald, Current Ops MCC

Approved by:
Capt(N) T. MacLean, COS MCC
Date:
24 August 2020
Modified:
27 Aug (Capt Croizer – editing, added NEON narrative)
05 Oct (Capt Croizer – Added Q&A)
20 Oct (Capt Croizer – added Key Msg)

Key Messages

Great Power Competition

  • The modern security and defence challenges foreshadowed in SSE – including great power competition, advances in technology and climate change – have accelerated. This is why Canada is strengthening its approach to domestic defence across all-domains – land, air, sea, space, and cyber. Keeping ahead of advances in technology is critical to success in defending North America.

5G

*Lines provided by Public Safety, verified by Global Affairs Canada

Background

There has been significant national and international media interest in Canada’s approach to 5G deployment, including security implications related to Chinese companies such as Huawei, in the last year.

Public Safety is leading on communications with input from Global Affairs Canada, Innovation Science and Economic Development Canada and security agencies.

An article published in the Globe & Mail (November 2019) stated that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment, who have been conducting a cybersecurity review on the Chinese telecom giant, disagree on a course of action.

Key Messages

  • While we cannot comment on specific companies, an examination of emerging 5G technology and the associated security and economic considerations is underway. This review includes the careful consideration of our allies’ advice.
  • Public Safety Canada and its partners at CSIS, the Communications Security Establishment, as well as Global Affairs Canada and Innovation, Science, and Economic Development, are working together on this important issue.
  • We will ensure that our networks are kept secure and will take the appropriate decisions in due course.

Canada-China Defence Relationship

Background

The Government of Canada is currently re-evaluating its approach towards China.

The Department of National of Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) maintain defence relations with foreign militaries around the world. DND/CAF are reviewing their defence engagement activities with China’s People’s Liberation Army.

Key Messages

  • As part of our defence policy – Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada committed to being a reliable player in the Asia-Pacific region through consistent engagement and strong partnerships.
  • This includes a commitment to develop stronger relationships with China.
  • However, the situation has changed since 2017.
  • The Government of Canada is currently in the process of re-evaluating its overall approach towards China.
  • At this time, the Department of National of Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces is reviewing their defence engagement activities with China.
  • Canada recognises China’s importance in global affairs, including in regional and international security.
  • Canada encourages China to be a responsible international player promoting the rules based international order, peace and security, the lawful conduct of freedom of navigation and overflight, and respecting human rights and minorities.
  • Canada is extremely concerned by China’s use of coercive diplomacy and the arbitrary detention of Canadian citizens.

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