Infection Prevention and Control Measures for Prehospital Care and Ground Transport of Persons Under Investigation for Ebola Disease or with Confirmed Ebola Disease

Table of contents

Introduction

Preamble

This update of the Infection Prevention and Control Measures for Pre-hospital Care and Ground Transport of Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Ebola Virus Disease (2019) has updated recommendations for:

  1. Classification of a Person Under Investigation (PUI) for Ebola disease (EBOD)
  2. Personal protective equipment
  3. Nomenclature

Background

Ebola Disease (EBOD) is part of a group of illnesses called Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHFs) that are caused by several distinct families of viruses. The infection prevention and control (IPC) advice in this document is developed for EBOD, however, the guiding principles and IPC measures are applicable for management of persons under investigation or with confirmed disease in healthcare settings associated with agents that cause VHFs (i.e., Lassa, Marburg, Crimean-Congo).

EBOD is a severe acute viral illness that begins with fever, often with malaise, myalgia, and headache, and is typically followed by progressive gastrointestinal symptoms that include anorexia, nausea, and abdominal discomfort, followed by vomiting and diarrhea. The diarrhea and vomiting are often profuse in later stages of the illness and lead to severe volume depletion, electrolyte abnormalities, and shock. While hemorrhage may occur, usually from the gastrointestinal tract, it is a late manifestation and occurs in a minority of patients. The incubation period of EBOD varies from 2 to 21 days. People with EBOD are not infectious during the incubation period.

Risk and transmission

EBOD is transmitted by direct contact (i.e., through non-intact skin or mucous membranes) with the blood or other body fluids (e.g., stool, emesis, urine, saliva, semen and sweat) of an infected individual and/or indirectly through contact with environmental surfaces and fomites contaminated with blood or other body fluids. The risk of transmission increases with the amount of infectious materials to which the individual is exposed.

Cases are not communicable before the onset of symptoms, but communicability increases with each subsequent stage of illness. Individuals with EBOD are most infectious in later stages of their illness when viral load rises and they experience copious fluid loss due to diarrhea, vomiting or hemorrhage. Cases remain communicable as long as blood or other body fluids contain the virus. This includes the convalescence period, before they have recovered, and the post-mortem period.

Investigations conducted to date, taking into account the thousands of EBOD cases in Africa and the very small number of EBOD cases in Europe and the US, have not demonstrated human-to-human transmission of EBOD in the absence of direct contact with an infected case. EBOD is not spread through the airborne route.

Public health case management relies on early identification of EBOD cases, patient isolation and care, diligent contact tracing, appropriate infection prevention and control measures, and safe burial. The following document contains additional information on case and contact management in community settings:

Aim and scope of this guideline

The purpose of this guideline is to provide infection prevention and control (IPC) guidance for safe prehospital care and ground transport of a PUI for EBOD or person with confirmed EBOD.

Prehospital care includes acute emergency patient assessment and care delivered in a variety of settings (e.g., street, home, LTC, mental health facility) at the beginning of the continuum of care. Clinical judgement remains essential, and this, along with jurisdictional policies, may result in decisions that differ from recommendations provided in this document.

This document has been developed based on the Canadian context and therefore may differ from guidance developed by other countries. Recommendations for non-healthcare-related interactions or settings are beyond the scope of this document.

Guideline development methodology

PHAC developed this guideline with technical expertise from the National Advisory Committee on Infection Prevention and Control (NAC-IPC) and subject matter experts. The recommendations are informed by a review of the evidence, expert opinion and core IPC principles as identified in PHAC's Routine Practices and Additional Precautions for Preventing the Transmission of Infection in Healthcare Settings. This advice is based on currently available scientific evidence and expert opinion and adopts a precautionary approach where the evidence is lacking or inconclusive. It is subject to review and change as new information becomes available.

Please refer to Appendix A for a list of members.

Target users

This document is intended for prehospital personnel including, but not limited to, medical first responders, paramedics, emergency ground transport personnel, firefighters, enforcement officers, and personnel within prehospital organizations responsible for education and training for occupational health and safety (OHS) and IPC. The term "prehospital personnel" in this document refers to these personnel. Prehospital organizations include but are not limited to emergency departments, rehabilitation hospitals, mental health hospitals and long-term care facilities.

Role of provinces and territories

The advice contained in this document should be read in conjunction with relevant federal, provincial, territorial and local legislation, regulations, and policies and adapted to local requirements as necessary. Recommended measures should not be regarded as rigid standards, but principles and recommendations which may be used to inform IPC practice.

Application of hierarchy of controls to EBOD: Engineering controls, administrative controls and personal protective equipment

The hierarchy of controls is a fundamental occupational health and safety framework, designed to optimize protection of the worker from exposures to hazards, including infectious hazards such as EBOD. Following the hierarchy of controls will produce safer systems and reduce potential illness or injury for healthcare workers (HCWs).

Elimination

While elimination may not be possible, to mitigate risk of transmission, systems and protocols should be in place to limit the care of persons under investigation for EBOD or confirmed patients with EBOD to centres designated to care for these patients, where available. Prehospital transport staff should be aware of designated centres for EBOD care in their province or territory.

Substitution

Substitution as part of the hierarchy of controls is not a feasible approach to preventing transmission of EBOD.

Engineering controls

Engineering controls are used to either remove the infectious agent or put a barrier between the HCW and the infectious agent. Engineering controls are those elements of the healthcare organization's physical plant/infrastructure that function to prevent exposure to and/or transmission of the infectious agent at the source, or along it's path.

Examples of engineering controls related to prehospital care and transporting of a PUI or confirmed patient with EBOD include the following:

Administrative controls

Administrative controls include policies, procedures, education, training and patient care practices intended to prevent exposure to and/or transmission of an infectious agent during the provision of care and transport. Each organization should develop comprehensive policies and procedures for putting on and removing PPE. To be effective in preventing transmission of EBOD and/or detecting cases of EBOD, administrative controls should be applied from the first encounter with a PUI for EBOD and continued until the patient is accepted into a receiving hospital.

Examples of administrative controls for prehospital care and transport of a PUI for EBOD or patient with confirmed EBOD include the following:

Table 1. Roles and responsibilities of the trained monitor
N/A Trained Monitor
Responsibility To assist with and ensure adherence to entire PPE use and removal process by HCWs providing direct patient care, and visitors (if permitted).
Role
  • Monitor / supervise PPE use and safe removal; generally does not enter patient room.
  • Guide / read aloud to HCW or visitor each step in putting on the PPE (use checklist).
  • Ensure appropriate PPE is selected and correctly used.
  • During PPE removal, observe and assist with removal of specific components of PPE.
  • Visually confirm and document that each step was completed correctly for PPE use and removal.
  • Constantly monitor technique while HCW or visitor is in patient room.
  • Provide immediate corrective instruction in real-time if HCW or visitor is not following recommended steps.
  • Should know the facility EBOD exposure management plan in event of unintended breach in procedure.
Number Needed One Trained Monitor at all times for each individual entering the room.

Occupational health considerations

Routine practices

Routine Practices are the IPC measures that should be applied in the routine care of all patients, at all times, in all healthcare settings, including prehospital care. Routine Practices and Additional Precautions are covered in detail in PHAC's Routine Practices and Additional Precautions guidance document.

Routine practices outlined in this document include:

Due to the unique setting of prehospital transport, hand hygiene sinks may not always be available. The following measures are recommended for the use of hand wipes:

Prehospital call assessment/triage

When calls are assessed by a dispatcher from individuals concerned about Ebola, the following questions as per the Appendix B Algorithm for Screening and Assessment for Ebola Disease (EBOD) in Persons Presenting to Healthcare Settings should be asked to identify a PUI for EBOD:

Additional precautions for Ebola disease management

Classification of persons under investigation for EBOD

This classification will determine PPE requirements.

Recommendations for source control

Recommendations for the use of Personal Protective Equipment

Principles of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

PPE recommendations for EBOD

  • Prehospital PPE for a stable PUI (e.g., vital signs within normal limits, no hemorrhaging, formed stool, no vomiting) will require:

    • fluid-resistant mask
    • separate face shield (or eye goggles)
    • gloves
    • fluid-resistant or impermeable gown

    If patient requires an AGMP, becomes unstable or is confirmed to have EBOD, HCW should follow recommendations for the unstable PUI or confirmed patient with EBOD.

  • Prehospital PPE for an unstable PUI [e.g., signs and symptoms of shock (resp. distress, hypotension, neurological impairment), hemorrhaging, possibility of intubation or resuscitation, diarrhea, vomiting, clinical findings suggesting that patient may contaminate the environment] or patient with confirmed EBOD will require:
    • fit-tested, N95 (or equivalent, or higher protection)
    • face shield long enough to prevent splashing underneath
    • double gloves
    • fluid resistant or impermeable gown or hazardous material suit
    • fluid-impermeable apron
    • fluid resistant or impermeable body coverings including foot and leg coverings, head and neck coverings

    *All exposed skin is protected

Moving patient in and out of transport vehicle

Environmental cleaning

Dedicated equipment

Cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicle

Handling waste and linen

Notifications

Appendix A: Acknowledgements

National Advisory Committee on Infection Prevention and Control (NAC-IPC):

Joanne Embree, MD, MSc
Pediatric Infection Disease Specialist, Shared Health
Professor, University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, MB

Matthew P. Muller, MD, PhD, FRCPC
Associate Professor, University of Toronto
Medical Director, Infection Prevention & Control, Unity Health Toronto
Toronto, ON

Molly Blake, RN, BN, MHS CIC
Program Director, Infection Prevention & Control, Winnipeg Regional Health Authority (WRHA)
Acting Program Director, Medical Device Reprocessing, WRHA
Winnipeg, MB

Patsy Rawding, RN, BScN, CIC
Health Services Manager, Infection Prevention & Control
Western Zone, NSHA Lead Manager in LTC
Middleton, NS

Patrice Savard, MD, MSc, FRCPC
Clinical Associate Professor, University of Montreal
Clinical microbiologist and Infectious diseases specialist, CHUM
Medical director, nosocomial infection prevention and control unit, CHUM
Montréal, QC

Jennie Johnstone, MD, PhD, FRCPC
Associate Professor, University of Toronto
Medical Director Infection Prevention and Control, Sinai Health
Toronto, ON

Stephanie W. Smith, MD, MSc, FRCPC
Professor, Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Medicine, University of Alberta
Director, Infection Prevention and Control, University of Alberta Hospital
Edmonton, AB

Suzanne Rhodenizer Rose, RN, BScN, MHS, CIC
Director, Clinical Planning, QEII New Generation Project
Project Infection Control Specialist
Halifax, NS

Anne Masters-Boyne, R.N., M.N.
Occupational Health Nurse, Employee Health Services, Horizon Health Network
Fredericton, NB

Jennifer Happe, BSc, MSc
Alberta Children's Hospital
Director, Infection Prevention and Control Canada
Infection Control Professional, Alberta Health Services
Calgary, AB

Nisha Thampi, MD, MSc, FRCPC
Medical Director, Infection Prevention and Control Program, Division of Infectious Diseases, Children's Hospital of Eastern Ontario
Associate Professor, Department of Pediatrics, University of Ottawa
Ottawa, ON

Susy Hota, MSc, MD, FRCPC
Medical Director, Infection Prevention and Control
Infectious Diseases Specialist, University Health Network
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, University of Toronto
Toronto, ON

Brian Sagar, MSc, BA
Senior Director, Communicable Disease
British Columbia Ministry of Health
Victoria, BC

Healthcare-acquired Infection Prevention and Control Section:
Maureen McGrath, BScN., RN
Steven Ettles, MPH
Amanda Graham, MPH
Jennifer Selkirk, MSc., RN

Appendix B: Algorithm for screening and assessment for Ebola disease in persons presenting to healthcare settings

Download a printable PDF version of Appendix B.

Appendix B: Algorithm for screening and assessment for Ebola disease in persons presenting to healthcare settings
Long description: Appendix B – Algorithm for screening  and assessment for Ebola disease in persons presenting to healthcare settings
Long description: Appendix B – Algorithm for screening and assessment for Ebola disease in persons presenting to healthcare settings

An algorithm for the screening and assessment of patients presenting to a healthcare setting is used as a tool to assess risk of EBOD and to make decisions about the appropriate IPC measures to enact. This is based on a multi-stage assessment of a person’s travel history, possible contact with EBOD via a person(s) under investigation (PUI), confirmed patient(s) with EBOD, or laboratory specimens, and symptoms.

The algorithm begins with an initial assessment of the person presenting to the healthcare setting. Assess the following factors:

  1. Within the previous 21 days, has the person lived in or travelled to a country with endemic EBOD, or a public health notice due to widespread EBOD transmission?
  2. Within the previous 21 days, is the person known to have had contact with a PUI for EBOD or patient confirmed to have EBOD, including through burial?
  3. Within the previous 21 days, has the person had contact with laboratory specimens from a PUI or patient(s) confirmed to have EBOD?
  4. Within the previous 21 days, has the person had contact with primates, bats, or wild animal bush meat from EBOD-affected countries or regions?

    If the answer to any of the above questions is NO, there is no risk of EBOD. As such, healthcare workers should proceed with usual assessment and implement IPC measures as per Routine Practices and Additional Precautions (RPAP). The EBOD-specific assessment ends at this point for this person.

    If the answer to any of the above questions is YES, the assessment should continue with an assessment of the person’s symptoms. Assess the following:

  5. Does the person have a fever of greater than or equal to 38 degrees Celsius, or
  6. Does the person have at least one other EBOD-compatible symptom?

    If the answer to these questions is NO, healthcare workers should proceed with usual assessment, implement IPC measures as per RPAP, and notify public health authorities.

    Next, assess:

  7. Does the patient require hospitalization for reasons unrelated to EBOD?

    If the answer is YES:

    • Advise infection prevention and control (IPC), Occupational Health and Safety (OHS), and infectious disease on admission;
    • Monitor and record temperature and other EBOD-compatible symptoms at least twice daily for 21 days after last exposure or travel;
    • Inform public health of outcome of monitoring;
    • Notify public health if patient is to be discharged prior to end of the 21 day monitoring period.
    • If the patient develops fever or other EBOD-compatible symptoms within 21 days of last exposure or travel, consider as a PUI for EBOD. Refer to the “PUI for EBOD” section of this description.

    If the answer is NO:

    • Contact public health for guidance on next steps of monitoring for 21 days after the last exposure or travel;
    • Public health should be satisfied with the patient’s status and arrangements for monitoring before the patient leaves the facility.

    “PUI for EBOD”: If the answer to question (e) [Does the person have a fever of greater than or equal to 38 degrees Celsius?] or (f) [Does the person have at least one other EBOD-compatible symptom?] is YES, the person should be considered as a person under investigation (PUI) for EBOD. Initiate the following actions:

    • Have the patient perform hand hygiene and adhere to respiratory hygiene (i.e., put on mask)
    • Initiate IPC measures including contact and droplet precautions
    • Place patient in a single room with private toilet facility, access to designated patient hand hygiene sink or supplies, and door closed
    • Limit exposure to essential healthcare workers and minimize their exposure
    • Have a Trained Monitor keep log of healthcare workers entering patient’s room
    • Immediately notify local public health authorities for guidance on further action
    • Apply appropriate precautions for safe management of potentially contaminated waste or linen
    • For public health follow up, record the names of healthcare workers and other people who may have had unprotected exposure to patient or patient’s blood and bodily fluids (BBF)

    If a PUI for EBOD is identified in an AMBULATORY CARE SETTING, i.e., outside of an acute care facility, complete the following actions:

    • Do not perform any interventions or procedures that may put healthcare workers in direct contact with the patient’s BBF. If healthcare worker must have direct patient contact, appropriate PPE should be worn as per Table 3 of the guideline.
    • Contact local public health or other designated authorities for guidance on patient transfer to designated EBOD hospital. Adhere to the current guideline.
    • Contact local public health or other designated authorities for instructions on cleaning the environment.
    • PUI for EBOD seeking care by phone should be advised to remain in place.

    If a PUI for EBOD is identified in a HOSPITAL SETTING, complete the following actions:

    • Notify IPC, OHS, infectious disease, medical microbiology and other relevant personnel
    • Perform a risk assessment to determine the infectious risk posed to healthcare workers and others
    • Inform your facility’s laboratory of PUI for EBOD and obtain specific instructions prior to collecting specimens for analysis. Initiate protocols for EBOD testing and testing for alternative or co-existing infections (e.g., malaria and typhoid fever)
    • If EBOD is confirmed, contact local public health authorities for guidance on patient transport to designated EBOD hospital
    • Have a Trained Monitor observe healthcare workers PPE use and patient care
    • If EBOD negative, notify public health if patient is to be discharged prior to end of 21 day monitoring period

    If the PUI for EBOD is stable, the following PPE should be used by healthcare workers:

    • Fluid-resistant mask with separate face shield or goggles
    • Gloves
    • Fluid-resistant or impermeable gown
    • If the patient requires an aerosol-generating medical procedure (AGMP), a fit-tested N95 (or equivalent, or higher protection) should be used.

    If the PUI for EBOD is unstable, or if EBOD is confirmed, the following PPE should be used by healthcare workers:

    • Fit-tested N95 (or equivalent, or higher protection) with separate face shield
    • Double gloves
    • Fluid-resistant or impermeable gown or hazardous material suit
    • Fluid impermeable apron
    • Fluid-resistant or impermeable foot/leg and head/neck coverings
    • All exposed skin is protected

Appendix C: Management of Ebola disease waste and environmental cleaning for prehospital care and ground transport

The following guidance provides measures for the safe handling, containment, transport and disposal of waste (including linen and sharps) generated during prehospital care and ground transport from persons under investigation (PUI) and persons confirmed with Ebola disease (EBOD), along with measures for cleaning the environment contaminated, or potentially contaminated, with the Ebola virus (EBOV). Its use is intended for prehospital personnel including, but not limited to, medical first responders, paramedics, emergency ground transport personnel, firefighters, and enforcement officers, along with personnel within prehospital organizations responsible for education and training in occupational health and safety (OHS), infection prevention and control (IPC) and environmental services.

The guidance is based on currently available scientific evidence, standards and regulations, and adopts a precautionary approach where the evidence is lacking or inconclusive. It is subject to review and change as new information becomes available.

The guidance should be read in conjunction with relevant federal, provincial, territorial and local legislation, regulations, and policies, and adapted to local requirements as necessary.

EBOD-associated waste

EBOV is categorized as a Risk Group 4 agent, under the Public Health Agency of Canada's Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, as it is likely to cause serious disease, and effective treatment is not available. Waste contaminated with the EBOV requires special handling and disposal to prevent exposure to the virus.

All EBOD-associated waste is considered as regulated biohazardous waste and includes items (including linen) contaminated with human blood and body fluids (i.e., respiratory secretions, saliva, emesis, feces, and urine) that warrants special handling and disposal as it may in certain situations present a risk of disease transmission. EBOD-associated waste that has been appropriately incinerated or autoclaved is not infectious and does not pose a health risk.

Recommended measures for prehospital organizations

The following measures are recommended for the safe management of EBOD-associated waste and environmental cleaning during prehospital transport:

Recommended measures for EBOD-associated waste during ground transport

All prehospital transport staff handling EBOD-associated waste should wear appropriate PPE, including additional PPE based on a risk assessment, along with following guidance for safe removal of PPE, according to the organization's policy.

Examples of EBOD-associated waste:

Human waste

Linen

Other non-sharps waste

Sharps Waste

Recommended measures for on- site spills and environmental cleaning related to EBOD-associated blood and other body fluids

References

Public Health Agency of Canada:

Canada:

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), United States:

Public Health Ontario:

World Health Organization:

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