Orthoebolaviruses: Infectious substances pathogen safety data sheet

For more information on Orthoebolaviruses, Ebola disease, and viral hemorrhagic fever, see the following:

• Biosafety guidelines for laboratories handling specimens from patients under investigation for Ebola disease
• Infection prevention and control measures for Ebola disease in acute care settings
• Infection Prevention and Control Measures for Prehospital Care and Ground Transport of Persons Under Investigation for Ebola Disease or with Confirmed Ebola Disease
• Ebola disease: Symptoms and treatment
• National case definition: Viral hemorrhagic fever

Section I: Infectious agent

Name

Orthoebolaviruses

Agent type

  Virus

Taxonomy

Family

Filoviridae     

Genus

Orthoebolavirus

Species

Orthoebolavirus bombaliense (Bombali virus), Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense (Bundibugyo virus), Orthoebolavirus restonense (Reston virus), Orthoebolavirus sudanense (Sudan virus), Orthoebolavirus taiense (Taï Forest virus), Orthoebolavirus zairense (Ebola virus)

Synonym or cross reference

Bombali virus (BOMV), Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), Ebola virus (EBOV), Reston virus (RESTV), Sudan virus (SUDV), and Taï Forest virus (TAFV)^{Footnote 1Footnote 2Footnote 3Footnote 4}. Former species names include Bombali ebolavirus, Bundibugyo ebolavirus, Reston ebolavirus, Sudan ebolavirus, Taï Forest ebolavirus, and Zaire ebolavirus^{Footnote 5}. Disease caused by viruses in the Orthoebolavirus genus is generally referred to as Ebola disease^{Footnote 6}. Specifically, EBOV causes Ebola virus disease (EVD), SUDV causes Sudan virus disease (SVD), and BDBV causes Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD). Ebola disease has also been referred to as Ebola haemorrhagic fever and viral haemorrhagic fever^{Footnote 7Footnote 8}.

Characteristics

Brief description

Orthoebolaviruses have a large non-segmented, negative-strand RNA genome of approximately 19 kb that encodes glycoproteins (i.e., GP, sGP, ssGP), nucleoprotein (NP), virion proteins (i.e., VP24, VP30, VP35, VP40), and the Large (L) protein containing the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp)^{Footnote 4}. Orthoebolaviruses vary in size with diameters of 50–80 nm and lengths between 10,000 and 14,000 nm^{Footnote 4}. Filovirus virions are enveloped with a characteristic filamentous, thread-like morphology^{Footnote 4}. Virions may also be branched, circular, “U” shaped, or “6” shaped^{Footnote 9}.

Properties

Orthoebolaviruses exhibit a broad cell tropism, with several cell types, including monocytes, macrophages, dendritic cells, endothelial cells, fibroblasts, hepatocytes, and adrenal cortical cells, supporting viral replication^{Footnote 7}. To enter the host cell, orthoebolaviruses rely on the interaction between the GP envelope protein and various host attachment factors, such as human folate receptor-α, β1 integrins, TYRO3 receptor tyrosine kinase family members, T-cell immunoglobulin and mucin domain 1 (TIM1), and lectins^{Footnote 9Footnote 10}. Upon binding to the receptors, orthoebolaviruses can enter the host cell using three mechanisms, namely macropinocytosis, clathrin-mediated endocytosis, and caveolin-mediated endocytosis^{Footnote 9}. Following uptake and entry, the viral genome is released in the host cell cytoplasm where virus replication begins, with the L protein, which contains the RdRp domain, as well as NP, VP35, and VP30 forming the ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex^{Footnote 10}. The RNP complex, GP, and VP40 are then transported to the plasma membrane where VP40 coordinates virion assembly and budding^{Footnote 9}.

Orthoebolavirus replication and dissemination is dependent on effective evasion of host immune responses^{Footnote 11}. The structural proteins, VP24 and VP35, contribute to immune evasion by supressing the type I interferon response, while sGP impairs the humoral response by binding to ebolavirus-neutralizing antibodies.

Section II: Hazard identification

Pathogenicity and toxicity

Early signs of Ebola disease are non-specific and flu-like, and may include fever, fatigue, anorexia, headache, chills, malaise, rash, arthralgia, and myalgia^{Footnote 3}. Within the first week of disease onset, severe gastrointestinal signs and symptoms (nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and high-volume diarrhea) occur and may be followed by persistent fever and increased gastrointestinal fluid loss and hypotension from dehydration. Other occasionally reported symptoms include cough, dyspnea, conjunctivitis, hiccups, and localized chest, abdominal, muscle, or joint pain^{Footnote 12}. While some patients may recover after a relatively mild clinical course, hemorrhagic manifestations may begin 4–5 days after onset and include conjunctival bleeding, petechiae, oozing from venipuncture sites, hemoptysis, hematemesis, melena, and vaginal bleeding^{Footnote 3Footnote 12}. During the terminal phase (7-12 days after onset), multiple organ dysfunction syndrome and/or damage, including acute kidney injury and respiratory failure, occur as a result of tissue hypoperfusion and vascular leakage, often in conjunction with dysregulated inflammation. Kidney injury is characterized by oliguria or anuria. Patients occasionally develop neurological (e.g., meningoencephalitis, confusion, delirium, convulsions), cardiological (e.g., myocarditis and pericarditis), and/or ocular (e.g., uveitis) manifestations^{Footnote 3Footnote 12}. Other late symptoms include dysphagia, throat pain, and oral ulcers^{Footnote 12}. A maculopapular rash has also been described. In fatal cases, patients die from hypovolemic shock and multiorgan failure between 6–16 days post-infection^{Footnote 7}. Hemorrhages, which occur in less than half of patients, can be severe. Infected pregnant women are at high risk of miscarriage or stillbirths, and newborn babies of infected mothers rarely survive^{Footnote 3}. The average Ebola disease case fatality rate (CFR) is approximately 50%, ranging from 25 to 90% in individual outbreaks^{Footnote 6}. 

Cases of BDBV infection in the 2007 outbreak in Uganda were characterized by fever, intense fatigue, headache, abdominal pain, vomiting, and diarrhea^{Footnote 13}. Just over half of patients experienced bleeding manifestations (including hematuria; hematemesis; bleeding from the eyes, nose, and vagina; and/or bloody stool). Additional symptoms included dysphagia, dyspnea, and a rash. The average duration was 10 days (range 2-26 days) from symptom onset to recovery. The average duration from symptom onset to death was 10 days (range 3-21 days).

Four orthoebolaviruses are known to infect and cause disease in humans: EBOV, SUDV, BDBV, and TAFV^{Footnote 4Footnote 14}. Human disease caused by RESTV has not been observed to date, although antibodies against RESTV infection were observed in four of nine animal handlers working with infected non-human primates^{Footnote 4}. There are no reports of human infection or disease caused by BOMV, and its pathogenic potential is unknown^{Footnote 15}.

Epidemiology

EBOV, SUDV, and BDBV have caused outbreaks of Ebola disease in humans, with most cases reported in equatorial Africa^{Footnote 3Footnote 7Footnote 16}. TAFV has caused only one documented case of human infection and disease in an ethologist who conducted a necropsy on a chimpanzee^{Footnote 17}.

Numerous EBOV outbreaks have been documented in Africa since the first outbreak was reported in 1976^{Footnote 16}. The largest outbreak occurred in 2014 in West Africa (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone), comprising more than 28,500 cases including over 11,000 deaths^{Footnote 16Footnote 18}.

Between 1976 and 2022, nine SUDV outbreaks were reported across Sudan and Uganda, comprising 956 cases (confirmed and probable)^{Footnote 19}. Recent outbreaks were reported in Uganda in 2022 with 142 confirmed cases, 22 probable cases, and 55 confirmed deaths^{Footnote 20}, and in 2025 with 12 confirmed cases, 2 probable cases, and 4 deaths^{Footnote 19}.

BDBV was first discovered during a severe outbreak in Bundibugyo District, Western Uganda Administrative Region, Uganda, in August 2007^{Footnote 21}. Reports on exact case numbers vary with one article reporting 93 putative cases, 56 laboratory-confirmed cases, and 37 deaths^{Footnote 22}, and the US Centers of Disease Control and Prevention reporting 131 cases and 42 deaths^{Footnote 19}. In August 2012, BDBV reemerged approximately 400 km northwest of Bundibugyo District, in the Isiro Health Region, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)^{Footnote 21}. Reported case numbers vary depending on the source and include: 38 laboratory-confirmed cases with 13 deaths (CFR 34%)^{Footnote 21}; 36 confirmed and 16 probable cases, including 28 deaths (CFR 54%)^{Footnote 23}; and 59 cases (38 confirmed and 21 probable, with 34 deaths)^{Footnote 24} .

On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Health in the DRC declared an Ebola outbreak caused by BDBV^{Footnote 25}. On 17 May 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General determined that the Ebola disease caused by BDBV in DRC and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)^{Footnote 26}. As of 8 June 2026, 515 confirmed cases and 91 confirmed deaths (CFR 18%) have been reported in the DRC^{Footnote 27}. As of 6 June 2026 cross border and local transmission have been detected in Uganda with 19 confirmed cases, and 2 confirmed deaths (CFR 11%)^{Footnote 28}.

Healthcare workers, individuals who come in contact with the blood or bodily fluids of infected persons, and those who participate in funeral rituals are at the highest risk of infection^{Footnote 13Footnote 29Footnote 30}. Comparative serological studies of gold mining communities in Western Uganda and non-mining communities in Central Uganda identified being male, mining, going inside mines, cleaning corpses, and coming in contact with suspected filovirus cases as risk factors for filovirus seropositivity^{Footnote 31}. Being male was associated with a high risk of seropositivity most likely due to occupational trends, while miners may have an increased risk of exposure to bats, a putative reservoir host.

Host range

Natural host(s)

Fruit bats of the Pteropodidae family are thought to be the natural hosts of orthoebolaviruses^{Footnote 6}.

Evidence of EBOV infection has been observed in non-human primates, bats, dogs, rodents, and duikers^{Footnote 32}. BOMV has been detected only in bats, specifically little free-tailed bats and Angolan free-tailed bats^{Footnote 33}. TAFV has been detected only in wild chimpanzees^{Footnote 17}. RESTV infection has been observed in non-human primates and pigs^{Footnote 34}.

Evidence of human infection with BOMV, BDBV, RESTV, SUDV, TAFV, and EBOV has been reported^{Footnote 3Footnote 21Footnote 35Footnote 36Footnote 37Footnote 38}.

Other host(s)

Mice, guinea pigs, hamsters, and non-human primates are experimental hosts of EBOV^{Footnote 39Footnote 40}.

Infectious dose

Unknown. In an experimental setting, rhesus monkeys exposed by the aerosol route experienced clinical disease with inhaled doses of 2.6 log₁₀ plaque-forming units (PFUs) of EBOV^{Footnote 41}.

Incubation period

The incubation period ranges from 2 to 21 days (mean of 4-10 days)^{Footnote 3Footnote 7Footnote 24Footnote 29}.

Communicability

Orthoebolaviruses are not airborne, and tare primarily transmitted through direct contact of mucous membranes or broken skin with the blood or bodily fluids (e.g., urine, sweat, feces, vomit, milk, and semen) of infected individuals, contact with contaminated objects (e.g., bed sheets, syringes, needles, utensils, etc.), and exposure to infected animals (e.g., fruit bats or non-human primates)^{Footnote 3Footnote 29Footnote 42}. Most EBOV outbreaks can be traced back to a single animal-to-human spillover event, followed by human-to-human transmission through direct contact with infected tissues, bodily fluids, or contaminated fomites^{Footnote 3Footnote 7}. Human-to-human transmission often involves close contact with a sick individual, with numerous cases reported in healthcare personnel^{Footnote 29}. Traditional funeral practices involving contact with a deceased patient also pose a high risk of transmission^{Footnote 29Footnote 30}. Butchering of non-human primates as well as handling and consuming freshly killed bats have been associated with EBOV outbreaks^{Footnote 7}.

Section III: Dissemination

Reservoir

Fruit bats belonging to the Pteropodidae family are thought to be the natural reservoir host of EBOV^{Footnote 12}. Angolan free-tailed bats are a potential reservoir host of BOMV^{Footnote 43}. The reservoir hosts of BDBV, RESTV, SUDV, and TAFV are unknown^{Footnote 21}.

Zoonosis

Orthoebolaviruses are zoonotic, likely spreading from bats and non-human primates to humans^{Footnote 3Footnote 12Footnote 44}. Bats may transmit orthoebolaviruses to an amplifying host, animal or human, and a high viral load in the first amplifying host may facilitate transmission to and between humans mainly through contact with body fluids^{Footnote 45}.

Vectors

Unknown.

Section IV: Stability and viability

Drug susceptibility

Monoclonal antibodies for EBOV include ansuvimab™ and Inmazeb™^{Footnote 6}. Efficacy of these antibodies against other orthoebolaviruses is unknown.

Susceptibility to disinfectants

Orthoebolaviruses are susceptible to 3% acetic acid, 1% glutaraldehyde, alcohol-based products, calcium hypochlorite, and sodium hypochlorite^{Footnote 46Footnote 47Footnote 48}. The WHO states 10 minutes of contact time with 0.5% hypochlorite is effective on nonporous, contaminated surfaces without visible spills^{Footnote 49}. For surfaces with visible spills, complete disinfection can be achieved by covering the spill with a paper towel or cloth and pouring 0.5% hypochlorite solution on it and allowing 15 minutes of contact time with the surface. The United States Environmental Protection Agency maintains a list of registered antimicrobial products effective against EBOV^{Footnote 50}.

Guanidine thiocyanate-based lysis buffers commonly used for extraction of nucleic acids from patient samples can be effective for inactivation of filoviruses including EBOV^{Footnote 51Footnote 52Footnote 53}. However, treatment with lysis buffer alone may not render an EBOV-containing sample completely non-infectious due to incomplete virus inactivation^{Footnote 51Footnote 54Footnote 55}. The inactivation efficacy may also vary depending on the sample matrix. As such, additional inactivation steps may be required. In one study, infectious virus was not detected by plaque assay following treatment of high-titer EBOV stock with commercially available guanidine-thianocyate-based lysis buffers^{Footnote 51}. In contrast, others reported that treatment with guanidine thiocyanate-based lysis buffer alone did not fully inactivate EBOV in serum or blood, and complete inactivation was achieved only when lysis buffer was combined with detergent, ethanol, or heat^{Footnote 55Footnote 56}. Similarly, no viable EBOV was detectable when high-titer virus stock was incubated with guanidine thiocyanate-based lysis buffer for 10 minutes, followed by an equal volume of 95% ethanol for 3 minutes^{Footnote 54}.

Physical inactivation

Heating at 60°C for 60 minutes is effective for inactivation of EBOV stock^{Footnote 57Footnote 58}, and effectively inactivated EBOV in serum samples while maintaining stability of biochemical markers including glucose, blood urea nitrogen, and electrolytes^{Footnote 46}. Inactivation of EBOV stock may be achieved by boiling at 100°C for 10 minutes^{Footnote 57Footnote 59}. Incubation for 1 hour with 0.5% Tween-20 at 56°C inactivated human serum spiked with EBOV Makona variant, and allowed for successful detection of seropositive field samples in ELISA^{Footnote 60}. EBOV Makona variant in whole-blood thin smear was inactivated by fixation with 100% methanol after 15 minutes^{Footnote 61}. Inactivation of EBOV was achieved with gamma irradiation (1.2 x10⁶ rads at 4°C or 2.0 x 10⁶ rads at -60°C) combined with 1% glutaraldehyde^{Footnote 47}. EBOV is moderately sensitive to ultraviolet-C (UVC) radiation^{Footnote 62}.

Please see the Biosafety Guidelines for Laboratories Handling Specimens from patients Under Investigation for Ebola Virus Disease for more information.

Survival outside host

Under West African climate conditions of 28°C and 90% relative humidity, EBOV can persist in dried human or non-human primate blood for 7 to 10 days^{Footnote 63}. One study found that EBOV was not recovered from experimentally contaminated surfaces (plastic, metal or glass) at room temperature^{Footnote 64}. However, when dried in tissue culture media onto glass and stored at 4°C, EBOV survived for over 50 days. EBOV Makona variant suspended in organic soil persisted on steel and plastic surfaces for up to 192 hours compared to less than 24 hours on cotton^{Footnote 65}. EBOV suspended in serum can persist in the environment for up to 46 days. In average West African climatic conditions of 27°C and 80% relative humidity, EBOV Makona variant remained viable on gloves (<1 hour), cotton and goggles (<24 hours), and other PPE such as respirators, suits and hoods (<72 hours)^{Footnote 66}.

Section V: First aid/medical

Surveillance

The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)’s national case definition of viral hemorrhagic fever, which includes Ebola disease, defines a confirmed case as detection of virus-specific RNA by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) from an appropriate clinical specimen (e.g. blood, serum, tissue) and demonstration of virus antigen in an appropriate clinical specimen (e.g. blood, serum, tissue) by enzyme immunoassay (EIA)^{Footnote 8}. Laboratory confirmation may also be achieved by one of the above criteria and demonstration of virus antigen in tissue (skin, liver or spleen) by immunohistochemical or immunofluorescent techniques; detection of specific IgM antibody by EIA, immunofluorescent assay or Western Blot; demonstration of a fourfold rise in IgG serum antibody by EIA, immunofluorescent assay or Western Blot; or detection of an independent target gene and/or independent sample through RT-PCR. A case can also be confirmed  by isolation of virus from an appropriate clinical specimen (blood, serum, tissue, urine specimens or throat secretions).

Please see the Biosafety Guidelines for Laboratories Handling Specimens from patients Under Investigation for Ebola Virus Disease for more information.

Note: The specific recommendations for surveillance in the laboratory should come from the medical surveillance program, which is based on a local risk assessment of the pathogens and activities being undertaken, as well as an overarching risk assessment of the biosafety program as a whole. More information on medical surveillance is available in the Canadian Biosafety Handbook.

First aid/treatment

There is currently no approved treatment for Ebola disease in Canada^{Footnote 67}. Treatment relies on supportive care, including intravenous fluid replacement, supplemental oxygen, anti-emetic medications, and anti-diarrhoeal agents^{Footnote 3}.

In 2020, the Food and Drug Administration approved Inmazed (a mixture of three monoclonal antibodies including atoltivimab, maftivimab, and odesivimab-ebgn), and a human monoclonal antibody, ansuvimab-zykl (Ebanga) as a treatment for EBOV infection in adults and children^{Footnote 68}. These monoclonal antibodies are recommended by the WHO for treatment of EVD^{Footnote 6}.

There are no specific treatments for infection and disease caused by other orthoebolaviruses.

Note: The specific recommendations for first aid/treatment in the laboratory should come from the post-exposure response plan, which is developed as part of the medical surveillance program. More information on the post-exposure response plan can be found in the Canadian Biosafety Handbook.

Immunization

In Canada, the ERVEBO (rVSV-ZEBOV) vaccine has been approved for prevention of disease caused by EBOV^{Footnote 69}. ERVEBO is recommended for individuals 18 years of age or older as post-exposure prophylaxis to those who have been exposed to EBOV in Canada. In Canada, ERVEBO is available through the PHAC National Emergency Strategic Stockpile (NESS). ERVEBO is indicated only for protection against EVD caused by EBOV (Orthoebolavirus zairense), and is not indicated for use against other orthoebolaviruses.

Note: More information on the medical surveillance program can be found in the Canadian Biosafety Handbook, and by consulting the Canadian Immunization Guide.

Prophylaxis

Post-exposure administration of ERVEBO within 72 hours of exposure to EBOV for susceptible, asymptomatic exposed individuals may confer protection^{Footnote 69}. Immunization may also be considered up to 10 days post-exposure. For previously immunized individuals, ERVEBO may be considered if the vaccine was received more than 18 months prior to the current exposure.

Note: More information on prophylaxis as part of the medical surveillance program can be found in the Canadian Biosafety Handbook.

Section VI: Laboratory hazards

Laboratory-acquired infections

In 1976, an investigator in England pricked his thumb through a protective rubber glove while working with homogenized liver from a guinea pig infected with EBOV^{Footnote 19Footnote 70}. He became ill 6 days after the incident and presented with anorexia, nausea, abdominal pain, loss of appetite, fever, diarrhea, vomiting, and rash over the course of approximately 2 weeks^{Footnote 70}. He recovered over 10 weeks. In 1994, a Swiss zoologist contracted TAFV after performing a necropsy on a chimpanzee^{Footnote 17}. An incident occurred in Germany in 2009 when a laboratory scientist pricked herself with a needle that had just been used on a mouse infected with EBOV; however, the person remained healthy and human infection was not confirmed^{Footnote 71}. In 2004, additional incidents were recorded in the United States and a fatal case in Russia^{Footnote 72}.

Note: Please consult the Canadian Biosafety Standard and Canadian Biosafety Handbook for additional details on requirements for reporting exposure incidents.

Sources/specimens

Sources/specimens that pose a risk of transmission may include blood, feces, urine, vomitus, saliva, sweat, amniotic fluid, breast milk, aqueous humor, tears, and semen^{Footnote 73Footnote 74}. EBOV has been isolated from blood, saliva, semen, aqueous humor, urine, and breast milk^{Footnote 14Footnote 74}. Infectious EBOV was recovered from the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) of a patient with late relapse meningoencephalitis^{Footnote 75}. EBOV RNA has been detected in saliva, aqueous humor, tears, feces, vaginal fluid, sweat, urine, amniotic fluid, CSF, breast milk, and semen^{Footnote 14}.

Primary hazards

Exposure of mucous membranes or broken skin to infectious material, exposure to contaminated fomites, and autoinoculation with infectious material are the primary hazards associated with orthoebolaviruses^{Footnote 3Footnote 29Footnote 42Footnote 70Footnote 71}.

Special hazards

Work with, or exposure to, infected non-human primates, rodents, or their carcasses represents a risk of human infection^{Footnote 6Footnote 76Footnote 77}. Aerosol-generating medical or laboratory procedures may also pose a biosafety risk^{Footnote 73}.

Section VII: Exposure controls/personal protection

Risk group classification

All members of the genus Orthoebolavirus are Risk Group 4 Human Pathogens and Risk Group 4 Animal Pathogens^{Footnote 78}. Orthoebolaviruses are also Security Sensitive Biological Agents (SSBA).

Containment requirements

Containment Level 4 facilities, equipment, and operational practices outlined in the Canadian Biosafety Standard for work involving infectious or potentially infectious materials, animals, or cultures are required.

The Biosafety Guidelines for Laboratories Handling Specimens from Patients Under Investigation for Ebola Virus Disease are to be followed.

Note that there are additional security requirements, such as obtaining a Human Pathogens and Toxins Act Security Clearance, for work involving SSBAs.

Protective clothing

The applicable Containment Level 4 requirements for personal protective equipment and clothing outlined in the Canadian Biosafety Standard are to be followed. The use of a positive-pressure suit or use of a Class III biological safety cabinet (BSC) line is required for all work with RG4 pathogens.

Note: A local risk assessment will identify the appropriate hand, foot, head, body, eye/face, and respiratory protection, and the personal protective equipment requirements for the containment zone must be documented.  

Other precautions

For Containment Level 4: All activities involving open vessels of regulated materials are to be performed in a certified biological safety cabinet (BSC) or other appropriate primary containment device. Centrifugation of infected materials must be carried out in closed containers placed in sealed safety cups, or in rotors that are unloaded in a biological safety cabinet. The integrity of positive pressure suits must be routinely checked for leaks. The use of needles, syringes, and other sharp objects are to be strictly limited. Open wounds, cuts, scratches, and grazes are to be covered with waterproof dressings. Additional precautions must be considered with work involving animal activities.

Section VIII: Handling and storage

Spills

In laboratories that work with non-diagnostic samples, (i.e., concentrated cultures, etc.), the spill area should be evacuated and secured. Aerosols must be allowed to settle for a minimum of 30 minutes. Spills of potentially contaminated material are to be covered with absorbent paper-based material (e.g., paper towels), liberally covered with an effective disinfectant (e.g., 0.5% hypochlorite solution), and left to soak for at least 15 minutes before being wiped up^{Footnote 49}. Following the removal of the initial material, the disinfection process is to be repeated. For spills outside of a biological safety cabinet (BSC), air supply to positive-pressure suits must be ensured. Positive-pressure suits that have been in contact with the regulated materials must be completely decontaminated by following procedures for gross decontamination of a positive-pressure suit. Plastics should be transferred to a dishpan, which should be moved to the BSC. Spills of potentially contaminated material are to be covered with absorbent paper-based material (e.g., paper towels), liberally covered with an effective disinfectant (e.g., 5% MicroChem), and left to soak for at least 5 minutes before being wiped up. Following the removal of the initial material, the disinfection process is to be repeated. After disinfection, inform the appropriate internal authority (e.g., containment zone supervisor, BSO) of the incident.

Disposal

All materials/substances that have come in contact with the regulated materials must be completely decontaminated before they are removed from the containment zone. This can be achieved by using decontamination technologies and processes that have been demonstrated to be effective against the regulated materials, such as chemical disinfectants, autoclaving, irradiation, incineration, an effluent treatment system, or gaseous decontamination (Canadian Biosafety Handbook).

Storage

Containment Level 4: The applicable Containment Level 4 requirements for storage outlined in the Canadian Biosafety Standard are to be followed. Pathogens, toxins, and other regulated materials are to be stored inside the containment zone.

An inventory of RG3 and RG4 pathogens, and SSBA toxins in long-term storage, is to be maintained and should include:

• specific identification of the regulated materials
• a mechanism that allows for the detection of a missing or stolen sample in a timely manner

Section IX: Regulatory and other information

Canadian regulatory information

Controlled activities with orthoebolaviruses require a Pathogen and Toxin licence issued by the PHAC. Orthoebolaviruses are non-indigenous terrestrial animal pathogens in Canada; therefore, importation of orthoebolaviruses requires an import permit under the authority of the Health of Animals Regulations (HAR), issued by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

Note that there are additional security requirements, such as obtaining a Human Pathogens and Toxins Act Security Clearance, for work involving SSBAs.

The following is a non-exhaustive list of applicable designations, regulations, or legislations:

• Human Pathogens and Toxins Act and Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations
• Quarantine Act
• Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act and Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations
• National notifiable disease (human) (Viral hemorrhagic fever)
• Non-Indigenous Animal Pathogen or OIE-listed disease (please contact the Canadian Food Inspection Agency)

Last file update

June, 2026

Prepared by

Centre for Biosecurity, Public Health Agency of Canada.

Disclaimer

The scientific information, opinions, and recommendations contained in this Pathogen Safety Data Sheet have been developed based on or compiled from trusted sources available at the time of publication. Newly discovered hazards are frequent and this information may not be completely up to date. The Government of Canada accepts no responsibility for the accuracy, sufficiency, or reliability or for any loss or injury resulting from the use of the information.

Persons in Canada are responsible for complying with the relevant laws, including regulations, directives and standards applicable to the import, transport, and use of pathogens and toxins in Canada set by relevant regulatory authorities, including the Public Health Agency of Canada, Health Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Environment and Climate Change Canada, and Transport Canada. The risk classification and related regulatory requirements referenced in this Pathogen Safety Data Sheet, such as those found in the Canadian Biosafety Standard, may be incomplete and are specific to the Canadian context. Other jurisdictions will have their own requirements.

Copyright © Public Health Agency of Canada, 2026, Canada

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