Introduction

The Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada was established in 1876 for the purpose of imparting a comprehensive education in all branches of military tactics, fortification, engineering and general scientific knowledge, in subjects connected with, and necessary to, a thorough knowledge of the military profession. It offered a new and independent way for a young nation to train its officers – particularly technical officers for the Canadian Army.

The Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) opened in 1952 to help increase the presence of Francophones in the Canadian Armed Forces Officer Corps.Footnote 1 Subsequently, the Royal Roads Military College (RRMC) was established in 1968 (after originating in 1942 as His Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Royal Roads and then evolving into the Royal Canadian Naval College).

In 1995, the Government of Canada closed both RMC Saint-Jean and RRMC. Although it divested the RRMC site in Victoria, B.C. (now Royal Roads University), it retained the RMC Saint-Jean location and forged a partnership with the community-based Corporation Fort St-Jean to maintain the site. RMC Saint-Jean was re-opened in 2007 to provide a preparatory year for aspiring officers joining the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) from the Quebec school system. RMC Saint-Jean returned to university status in 2021.

Consequently, Canada has two Military Colleges: the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Collectively, these are known as the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs). They share the responsibility to “educate and train cadets and commissioned officers for a career of effective service in the Canadian Forces” and are vested with the powers to grant university degrees in support of this role. At present, the CMCs graduate approximately 280 Naval and Officer Cadets (N/OCdts) annually and provide one of the principal commissioning streams for officers in the CAF.

The majorityFootnote 2 of N/OCdts attend the four-or-five-year Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges (ROTP CMC) (which is structured around four distinct Pillars: academic education, physical fitness, military training and development, and bilingualism), the successful completion of which leads to earning an undergraduate degree and meeting the commissioning requirements to become an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces.Footnote 3

In her 2022 Independent External Comprehensive Review (IECR),Footnote 4 the Honourable Louise Arbour raised concerns about a problematic culture in the CMCs, including harassment and sexual misconduct, particularly with respect to its impact on female N/OCdts. She recommended that a Review Board be established to assess the benefits, disadvantages and costs – both to the Canadian Armed Forces and to Canada – of continuing to educate N/OCdts at the Military Colleges. She further recommended that the review focus on the comparative quality of education, socialization and military training in the Military College environment, and assess the different models for delivering university-level and military leadership training. She also emphasized the need to determine whether the peer leadership structure upon which the Canadian Military Colleges base their military training (known as the Cadet Chain of Responsibility [CCoR]) should be modified or discontinued, and whether Canada’s Military Colleges should remain undergraduate degree-granting institutions.

Pursuant to these recommendations, the Canadian Military Colleges Review Board (“the Review Board,” “the Board,” “this Board,” or “the CMCRB”) was established on December 6, 2023 and convened on January 15, 2024 to begin its 12-month mandate. (See Annex 1 – Terms of Reference and Annex 2 – Composition of the Board.)

In her reflections on the value of the CMCs to the CAF and to Canada, particularly in relation to any harm they might cause, Madame Arbour asserted that the “entire raison-d’être of the military colleges must rest on the assumption that it is the best way to form and educate tomorrow’s military leaders.” It is the validity of this assumption that lies at the heart of the mandate given to the Canadian Military College Review Board, and it is this issue that the Board has sought to address.

The Board began this process by answering the threshold question of whether Canada’s Military Colleges are so riven with issues of misconduct as to render them irremediable (thus warranting their dismantlement or closure), or whether, despite any flaws in the current structure, program, operation or culture of these institutions, they can be improved and are worth preserving.

The Board concluded that, although problems persist at the CMCs, they are not fatal to the institutions; the findings of the Independent External Comprehensive Review have led to serious introspection and concrete changes by the CAF and the CMCs, and significant efforts are already underway to acknowledge and address outstanding deficiencies at the Military Colleges. The CMCs of thirty, fifteen, or even five years ago are not the CMCs of today and, with further evolution, they offer the potential to provide great value to the CAF and enduring benefit to Canada.

Canada’s Military Colleges are symbols of national power and should be symbols of national prestige and national pride. They are critical vehicles for recruiting, training and educating the number of officers needed annually by the CAF and for fulfilling specific occupations the military needs in order to function. They are institutions of social mobility that have the capacity to transform lives and help contribute to the economic success of the nation. They can be catalysts for important cultural evolution within the Canadian Armed Forces and within Canadian society, and they reflect Canada’s stature and professionalism to its citizens, partners and allies. As such, the Board believes that Canada’s Military Colleges should remain degree-granting institutions, with a mandate to educate and train N/OCdts to become members of the Profession of Arms.

At the same time, the Board acknowledges that the CMCs have also been the source and site of deeply harmful, traumatizing and negative experiences for certain N/OCdts over decades. The Board holds the weight of the stories that have been shared in the process of this work with great care and concern. Harmful conduct, such as racism, discrimination, sexual assault and misogyny, may not be prevalent at Canada’s Military Colleges, but it is nevertheless present. More must be done to create a healthy culture and inclusive experience for all. The challenge before the CMCs is how to honour the past and draw strength from tradition while acknowledging negative historical legacies, redressing their profound impact and promoting positive change.

Multiple, substantial reforms will be required to realize the value of the Canadian Military Colleges as world-class institutions of excellence that remain relevant to the security and defence of Canada; to mitigate against and respond to future harm; and to ensure that these institutions survive and thrive. These reforms will demand the full commitment of the Military Colleges themselves, as well as sustained attention from the senior leadership of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, alongside increased investment from the government.

The two CMCs are not starting from the same place in this journey. RMC has a significantly longer history than RMC Saint-Jean, and a different one. RMC Saint-Jean has escaped many of the pitfalls into which RMC has fallen over past decades, but it has its own unique challenges. Each College has its respective strengths and weaknesses. The Board recognizes that some of the analysis and observations in this Report do not apply to both institutions in the same way, and that in some instances they may feel irrelevant or unjust. The Board has nevertheless made a deliberate choice to look at both Colleges through a single lens with the intention of holding them both to the same high standards.

In addition to the IECR, previous ReportsFootnote 5 and recommendations have addressed similar issues to those identified and examined by this Board. It is the Board’s estimation that, had the Department of National Defence (DND)/CAF undertaken timely implementation of the guidance found in those documents, many such issues could have been solved. However, they have demonstrated a pattern of ignoring, stalling, underfunding or otherwise delaying necessary action, which has led to ongoing challenges and, in turn, to more scrutiny of the CMCs.

This has been exhausting and demoralizing for all involved. No one person or organization is to blame; these are complex and systemic problems, and many of the key individuals being held responsible and accountable for change do not have the authority or the tools to effect it. Indeed, in many cases, the continued successes of the CMCs can be attributed to the sheer tenacity and commitment of many individual leaders, faculty members and staff, whose professionalism, dedication to the N/OCdts and hard work have been the decisive factors between likely failure and tenuous progress.

Going forward, the health, success and credibility of the CMCs will require effective implementation of the CMCRB’s recommendations, within a clear timeframe, guided by an accountability framework and overseen by an organization with the appropriate authorities to enforce progress. To facilitate and simplify this task, the Board has reviewed all outstanding recommendations stemming from previous Reports. Those that continue to be valid have been incorporated into this Report. As such, this CMCRB Report should stand as the operative analysis of the current state of Canada’s Military Colleges, and the only source of recommendations specific to the CMCs to be implemented.

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