Findings, Analysis and Recommendations

On this page

• Organizational Structure
  • Function
  • Form
• Systemic Reform
  • Identity
  • Governance
  • Program: The Academic Pillar
    • Size & Scope
    • Strength of Linkages
    • Impact on the Other Pillars
    • A Way Forward
  • Program: The Other Pillars
    • Military
    • Bilingualism
    • Physical Fitness
  • A New Delivery Model
    • Academics
    • Military Skills & Leadership
    • Second Language Training
    • Fitness, Health & Wellbeing
  • Cadet Chain of Responsibility
  • Conduct, Health & Wellbeing
    • Comparative Analysis
    • Discrete Analysis
    • The Way Forward
  • Infrastructure, Operations & Support

As discussed above, the Board believes that the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs) have value

1. in relation to other entry streams;
2. as compared to civilian universities; and
3. relative to foreign military academies.

This conclusion is separate, however, from the question of the inherent value – real and perceived – of Military Colleges to Canadians. Historically, the role the CMCs have played in the defence and security of Canada, and in the country’s journey towards sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic security and social stability, have rendered this obvious.

However, in recent decades, a recognition that the Military Colleges have at times been the venue for exclusion and harm, and that there has been a hidden cost to aspects of the traditional ways of operating them, has diminished their worth in the eyes of many Canadians. Coupled with negative public attention and a sense of post–Peace Dividend complacency, some have even come to question why the country needs to invest in professional military education and training in the first place, or whether the Military Colleges are the best venues for it its delivery.

Putting aside comparative value, the Board therefore also focused extensive efforts on examining the current utility of the Military Colleges as institutions unto themselves, by undertaking a discrete analysis of seven thematic areas. Through this process, the Board identified a series of key levers where pressure can and should be exerted in order to result in the changes required to ensure that Canada’s Military Colleges deliver exceptional value for Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

Back to top

Organizational Structure

Function

In the context of Madame Arbour’s findings in the Independent External Comprehensive Review and the mandate given to the Canadian Military Colleges Review Board (CMCRB), the first issue before the Board, as discussed at the outset, is whether, in their current state, the CMCs are so out of step with society and so broken that they are irredeemable, and therefore require major structural change or even closure. Or whether, despite any shortcomings that may endure, the CMCs as currently structured remain “the best way to form and educate tomorrow’s military leaders.”

The Board believes the latter: Canada’s Military Colleges remain an important vehicle through which to develop this nation’s leaders of tomorrow. As will be discussed in more detail below, the evidence shows that while misconduct in all its forms continues to occur at the Military Colleges, the CMCs are largely the place where, not the reason why, it happens. Moreover, to the extent that issues of misconduct arise, they are not disproportionate to the incidence rate elsewhere in Canadian society, particularly at similarly sized residential civilian universities with a similar-age peer group.

Furthermore, the CMCs are, at their core, functioning organizations that generate well-educated, well-trained, bilingual and physically fit officers for the CAF and for Canada. Removing their degree-granting function and outsourcing the formative education of Naval and Officer Cadets (N/OCdts) to civilian universities would amount to dissolving organizations that play an important strategic and social function in Canada which cannot be fulfilled by any other institution, and that serve as an important complement to the Direct Entry Officer Plan and the Regular Officer Training Plan - Civilian University entry streams.

This does not mean that the CMCs are as effective, relevant, healthy or fit-for-purpose as the nation requires them to be. Major elements of the program, culture, and physical and psychosocial infrastructure at the CMCs are problematic and, among other outcomes, permit or foster negative, inappropriate or unacceptable behaviour. These issues must continue to be addressed. The Board is encouraged by the fact that both Military Colleges have proven themselves willing, able and determined to do so.

For example, demonstrable efforts to positively evolve the culture of the CMCs – such as the establishment of a “Chair, Cultural Evolution” position at Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario (RMC) and the establishment of a “Specialist in Resources and Training on Sexual Violence and Promoting a Positive Culture” at Royal Military College in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec (RMC Saint-Jean) – have prompted observable change at the CMCs, in keeping with global best practice, impacting everything from policies and procedures to management practices. Key initiatives have been developed, are taking root and are being tracked, from the creation of the Athena Network supporting women and the Agora LGBTQ2+ support group to the establishment of the Indigenous Knowledge and Learning Group. These need to be given a chance to yield greater dividends.

Overall, given their comprehensive influence as places of work, study and personal life, the CMCs have an outsized ability to shape N/OCdts. This presents challenges, but also huge opportunities. The CMCs offer an effective instrument to bring meaningful change to the CAF, through the training and education of a new generation of officers who will be exemplars of the Profession of Arms as they move into leadership positions within the institution. Thus, to the extent that the CAF is committed to making positive change, this change can find its origins in the Military Colleges.

However, this also means that the CAF and the CMCs have an even greater responsibility towards these vulnerable and impressionable young adults, particularly because as representatives of the CAF, expectations of N/OCdts are high regarding reputation and conduct, and scrutiny is intense. The Board is persuaded that the CMCs can rise to this occasion, but a genuine commitment is required from the Government of Canada and the leadership of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to support them in this work.

Dismantling the CMCs at this stage and dispersing the N/OCdts to civilian universities would not solve the challenges identified above. Rather, this would simply shift them to other institutions that are perhaps less equipped to help foster the character, behaviour and attitudes needed to advance positive culture evolution in the CAF.

It should also be noted that due to their design, their funding model and their academic human resource considerations, removing the undergraduate degree programs from the CMCs would effectively cause the collapse of the graduate and research programs. Ultimately, the CMCs would thus cease to be institutes of higher learning. The impact of this – while outside of the scope of this Board’s focus – should not be underestimated. In complementarity with the work of Defence Research and Development Canada, the CMCs play a critical role in producing timely and relevant defence and security research that is highly valued, both by the Department of National Defence (DND)/CAF and by international partners and NATO Allies. A loss of this capacity would have serious negative practical and reputational consequences for Canada, and pose challenges to the country’s ability to meet its defence and security objectives.

Back to top

Form

Once it had determined that the CMCs should retain their degree-granting function, the Board identified ten factors that play a significant role in ensuring the health, quality, viability, credibility and relevance of the institutions:

• Identity;
• Governance;
• Cost;
• Culture;
• Military Training;
• Academic Education;
• Bilingualism;
• Health, Fitness & Wellbeing;
• Recruitment; and
• Diversity & Inclusion.

It then assessed the six organizational models discussed above (and detailed in Annex 3) against each of these factors, using a question-based five-point scale. It further considered whether a new model would improve the status quo and/or introduce other consequences.

Through this process (detailed further in Annex 5), the Board determined that the Integrated Model, which most closely aligns with the current structure of the CMCs, remains the right fit for Canada in the current domestic and geopolitical context. Under this model, the form of the Canadian Military Colleges should appear very similar going forward to what it has looked like in past decades, particularly at RMC. Specifically:

• Both Colleges should continue to offer military training alongside an accredited academic education, through which N/OCdts earn a degree.
• No new body or mechanism should be created to deliver the academic elements of the program (be it an external service provider or a new DND/CAF-run academic Defence & Security university).
• Responsible fiscal management should guide program delivery, but cost-cutting and efficiencies should not be the primary drivers for change.

In sum, while meaningful reform is needed in how the program is governed and delivered (as discussed below), the function and form of the CMCs will not appear significantly different.

Recommendation #1

Maintain the Canadian Military Colleges as undergraduate degree-granting institutions. Continue to train and educate Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges through an Integrated Model.

Back to top

Systemic Reform

The Board’s recommendation to maintain the CMCs as undergraduate degree-granting institutions via an Integrated Model is premised on the assumption that retaining the existing organizational structure is accompanied by substantive change in several areas. The Board has focused on a systems-centric approach to understanding and solving the existing issues, and the systemic reforms that are proposed aim to address the underlying problems that have plagued the Military Colleges, not simply treat the symptoms.

The findings, analysis and recommendations laid out herein are designed to identify the problematic issues, articulate why they are of concern, and propose the action needed to address them.

Collectively, these reforms should yield impactful, sustainable and positive change for the CMCs, helping to crystallize their value proposition, sharpen their clarity of purpose, reinforce their culture evolution efforts and shield them from the need for constant cycles of scrutiny.

Back to top

Identity

The foundational issue undermining the CMCs at this juncture is the absence of a clear identity. The ramifications of this uncertainty – stemming from a contested understanding of their purpose – are numerous, and are the source of many of the attendant challenges facing the Military Colleges.

To some, the CMCs are military units defined by their mandate to develop N/OCdts as leaders in the Profession of Arms who are preparing for careers in warfighting and conflict management. They want to “put the M(ilitary) back into RMC” and speak of the overemphasis on academic coursework as a distraction from time that could be spent honing the military skills, gaining the practical knowledge and developing the physical fitness needed to produce excellent officers.

To others, the CMCs are first and foremost institutions of higher learning whose primary purpose is to educate university students who may ultimately serve as officers in the Canadian Armed Forces. Demands regarding drill and deportment are seen as a nuisance, and time spent playing sports, undertaking adventure training or learning about risk management is not viewed as relevant to developing the critical thinking abilities, judgment or cognitive function needed to produce smart and thoughtful citizens.

Most, however, hold a more nuanced view that adapts elements of both extremes to see the Military Colleges as places that should be responsible for all of the above, with a mandate to develop N/OCdts as both leaders and scholars – as currently reflected by the 4-Pillar model. In principle, this seems wise. In practice, it is failing.

Over time, to support this balance, three distinct, sometimes contradictory, institutional identities have emerged. Specifically, the CMCs have simultaneously become military units, federal public service institutions, and provincially chartered universities. Each identity carries its own culture and values, which do not necessarily align with one another, and each has its own stakeholders with distinct interests, divergent expectations and differing objectives. This recipe gives rise to chronic problems and ongoing tensions.

For example, for prospective N/OCdts who are leaving secondary school and seeking to join the CAF as officers, attending the CMCs provides a subsidized pathway to a university education. But it also requires commitment to joining the military and becoming part of the Profession of Arms, and as members of the CAF they are subject to terms and requirements of employment even while studying that are not applicable to students at civilian universities. It is therefore troublesome that many N/OCdts are unclear about whether they are attending a military academy where they can expect to learn leadership and military skills or whether they are post-secondary students who can expect an undergraduate education identical to that being delivered at a civilian institution. This uncertainty has longer-term ramifications, as the expectations of N/OCdts while they attend the CMCs have a critical impact on their recruiting, retention and satisfaction as CAF members.^{Footnote 21}

Meanwhile, academic faculty are full-time, indeterminate public servants, whose terms of employment are governed by the policies of the Treasury Board of Canada, but they have also come to expect employment conditions and authorities that are aligned with civilian academic institutions. This creates significant friction, particularly in relation to the issue of institutional autonomy, which is the capacity of the institution to administer its own affairs, including its academic programming and the deployment of its financial resources, without external interference. Institutional autonomy is a fundamental characteristic of civilian universities in Canada, and the academic faculty and staff at the CMCs therefore expect the same.^{Footnote 22} However, unlike civilian universities, the CMCs are federal institutions and have been established as military units empowered to grant degrees. They are inherently and purposefully not autonomous from the CAF or the Government of Canada, and therefore the entire concept of institutional autonomy is inapplicable by design.

Unlike institutional autonomy, academic freedom – as defined in sources such as provincial legislation^{Footnote 23} and international guidelines^{Footnote 24} – is a fundamental characteristic of both civilian universities and the Canadian Military Colleges. However, over the years the concept of academic freedom has been invoked to advocate for decision-making independence for academics at the CMCs in a way that has created ongoing tensions within the institutions, particularly given that the military leadership has struggled to understand its own scope of authority or to effectively exercise its management rights.

In the context of the CMCs, wherein the role of an academic education is to serve the Canadian Armed Forces, it is squarely within the purview of DND/CAF to determine what degrees and programs should be offered and how to allocate financial and human resources accordingly. Doing so is neither an infringement on academic freedom nor inconsistent with the nature of the CMCs and the degree of autonomy they enjoy.^{Footnote 25}

Moreover, some members of the Academic Wing – comprising the faculty and staff who deliver the academic program – have struggled to understand that academics are intended to form but one part of the N/OCdts’ experience at the CMCs and have steadily placed increasing and unrealistic demands on their time. This combination of factors leads to persistent strain between many of the faculty members and management, as well as between the civilian and military sides of the institution, which negatively pervades the environment at the CMCs and consumes significant energy and attention.

For its part, the military often appears uncomfortable working alongside its public service colleagues, issuing directives in lieu of engaging in dialogue and taking unhelpfully rigid approaches to uncontroversial issues. Moreover, the CAF has paid little attention to the CMCs in past decades, with the Army, Navy and Air Force having largely abdicated any active role in the evolution or development of the Military Colleges in a sustained or systematic way. This has sent mixed messages to the academic faculty, who have been given limited guidance and guardrails in terms of vision, direction and boundaries, but who feel reprimanded when they are seen to stray off course.

As a result of each group developing differing diagnoses and devising differing solutions to what they think the problems are, the CMCs have become mired in convoluted governance structures, unclear authorities and ballooning programs, many of which deliver costly yet ineffective outcomes at the expense of the N/OCdts and the CAF more broadly. Ultimately, there is no sense of shared vision regarding the fundamental role and purpose of the Military Colleges.

So what are they? The Board believes that the CMCs are first and foremost military institutions, whose raison d’être is to develop exceptional leaders for the Canadian Armed Forces. Their programs must be laser-focused and resolutely committed to being relevant and responsive to the needs and demands of the CAF. DND/CAF senior leaders must be prepared to align allocated fiscal and human resources in support of this renewed focus.

A critical element of this officer development process is the acquisition of a rich and reputable academic education, the quality and credibility of which should continue to be reflected by earning a nationally recognized, provincially regulated undergraduate degree. But despite their use of the tagline, the CMCs are not “Universities with a Difference” or even “Universities that make a difference.” They are military academies.

To this end, more weight, attention and resources must be given to the other elements that also make up an integral part of the N/OCdt’s journey at these institutions. This includes language training, military skills, leadership development, and overall fitness, health and wellbeing, as will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this Report.

Canada has more than a hundred universities, none of which can fully respond to the specific needs associated with the mission and mandate of the CAF. What Canada does not need from the CMCs is for them to be civilian university equivalents that simply add fitness, language and military training requirements into packed academic schedules that have little specific nexus to the CAF.

What Canada does need – even more so in the highly contested, adversarial geopolitical space in which this country now operates – and what only the CAF can provide, are world-class institutions focused on defence and security, underpinned by the values, ethics and judgment that are fostered by exposure to the liberal arts, and dedicated to educating and training leaders in the Profession of Arms. It has only two of these, and they must be leveraged to their maximum potential.

Increasing the number of graduates is one way of doing so. In addition to reasons of costs and academic efficiency, enlarging the N/OCdt Corps will help create a critical mass of individuals every year who are going through dedicated foundational military education and training, with a specific focus on the defence and security needs of the country.

Another important avenue for maximizing the impact of the CMCs is to raise their profile and stature within the national psyche and around the world. Too few Canadians know about the Military Colleges, and many of those who do are aware of them solely through the lens of critical reports and media coverage. Globally, Canada’s Military Colleges are well respected, but they do not have a distinct brand that elevates them to the echelons of certain other institutions. The CMCs should be a source of pride for Canadians, and should be better leveraged as a source of national power for the country.

While this must start with appropriately resourcing their programs, increasing investment in their infrastructure and ensuring ongoing support for their operations and maintenance - none of which are easy to justify absent a strong value proposition - it must also be accompanied by a major overhaul in the branding and marketing of the Colleges. At present, recruitment efforts are lacklustre and untargeted, and completely misaligned with the calendars of civilian universities, meaning that N/OCdts often receive admission offers from civilian universities long before they hear from the CMCs, which disincentivizes many from choosing the Colleges in the first place. The CMC websites are disorganized, hard to navigate and distinct from one another in structure, content and look-and-feel, rendering them ineffective as communications and public affairs tools. And promotional materials have lost focus on the military identity and specific value proposition of the Colleges, negatively impacting their ability to inspire, excite and draw in a new generation of talent who could be motivated to join the CAF.

“Branding and marketing” has a concrete impact on the quantity and quality of applicants, the credibility of the institutions and the ability of the CAF and the CMCs to demonstrate to Canadians what they do and why it matters. It is critical for all Canadians to see themselves reflected in the composition of the CAF and to see a role for themselves within the CMCs.

Some key changes are therefore needed: new elements of a recruitment strategy should be developed and implemented by the CAF to more effectively compete for talent across the country, including by taking into account the dates at which civilian universities make acceptance offers; exemptions are needed from Government of Canada standards to build more user-friendly, harmonized and organized Military College websites, which serve as the main point of entry into the CMCs for potential applicants and interested Canadians; more tailored outreach is needed to connect with young people and their families who might not otherwise be familiar with the CMCs and what they offer; and new promotional materials must be developed that better reflect the identity, programs and value proposition of the CMCs.

Alongside these changes, elevating the stature of the Canadian Military Colleges also requires that RMC Saint-Jean’s standing vis-à-vis RMC be equalized. While both CMCs are part of a proud military tradition in Canada and are seen as distinct yet complementary counterparts, differences in size, budget, history and leadership rank have effectively relegated RMC Saint-Jean to the role of “younger sibling,” with less clout and a lower national profile than RMC. Standardizing the nomenclature used to refer to the Colleges will be an important way to reflect RMC Saint-Jean’s equal status. Currently, the Colleges are formally known as the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean). Colloquially, the College in Kingston is known as the Royal Military College or RMC, whereas the College in Saint-Jean is known simply as Saint-Jean or CMR Saint-Jean. In both instances, this terminology perpetuates the idea that the College in Kingston is the central military academy in Canada, and that the college in Saint-Jean is merely an add-on to the main institution.

The Board therefore considered whether to rename the institutions entirely, in order to equalize the two Colleges, better reflect the role and purpose of the CMCs, and bring them in line with the names of comparable institutions around the world. It contemplated dropping the words “College,” given the university-level education the CMCs provide, and “Royal” from the names, given a desire to modernize and nationalize the institutions. Ultimately, the Board rejected such changes as unwarranted, unnecessarily polarizing, and potentially confusing.

Instead, to help underscore the fact that Canada has two unique military colleges of which the country should be proud, in two distinct locations, with historical linkages to each of our Official Language communities, the Board believes that the names of the CMCs should be modified as follows:

• Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston (RMC Kingston)
• Collège militaire royal du Canada, Kingston (CMR Kingston)

and

• Royal Military College of Canada, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (RMC Saint-Jean)
• Collège militaire royal du Canada, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (CMR Saint-Jean)

The Board also considered whether to propose upgrading the rank of the Commandant at RMC Saint-Jean to Brigadier-General in order to help increase the profile of RMC Saint-Jean within the CAF and within Canada, to better project its value to Canadians, and to establish greater equality between RMC Saint-Jean and RMC. The Board believes this could be appropriate, when certain conditions are met, as discussed further below.

An increase in the number of degrees offered at RMC Saint-Jean from one to three, as also proposed and discussed below, would further serve to elevate the stature of the College.

Overall, the shift in mindset and approach that is needed to reaffirm the primary identity and value-add of the CMCs as military institutions will require greater assertiveness on the part of the military leadership at the Colleges and full support from the academic leadership. It will also require acknowledgement by the academic faculty and staff that academics – while of high calibre – exist in service of the military’s needs, not independently from them. Lastly, it will require much greater attention to, engagement with and investment in the CMCs on the part of the Canadian Armed Forces, which has long abdicated responsibility in this space.

Recommendation #2

Revise governance structures, authorities, activities, programs and training to reflect the fact that the Canadian Military Colleges are first and foremost military institutions responsible for training and educating officers as members of the Profession of Arms.

Recommendation #3

Amend the Ministerial Organizational Orders to change the name of the Royal Military College of Canada to “Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston” (RMC Kingston) and the name of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) to “Royal Military College of Canada, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu” (RMC Saint-Jean).

Recommendation #4

Update all branding and marketing materials and all public affairs and communications products to align with the changes proposed in this Report and to support a revised recruitment strategy.

Back to top

Governance

The mission of the CMCs is to provide N/OCdts and officers with the education and training they need for a career in the Canadian Armed Forces. Under the National Defence Act, the CMCs are governed and administered in the manner prescribed by the Minister of National Defence, who has established the institutions via Ministerial Organization Orders^{Footnote 26} as units of the Canadian Armed Forces and assigned them to the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). The Minister has also determined that Canada’s Military Colleges should have the status of universities.^{Footnote 27}

As higher education in Canada is a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, Ontario and Quebec were required to enact legislation establishing both RMC and RMC Saint-Jean as universities. The Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act was passed in 1959 by the Province of Ontario, and the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Act was passed in 1985 by the Province of Quebec. RMC Saint-Jean lost its status when it was closed in 1995, but regained it, along with the right to grant degrees, in 2021. Despite running a CÉGEP program, RMC Saint-Jean does not have authority to grant CÉGEP diplomas, and it has entered into a contract with CÉGEP Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu^{Footnote 28} to award the diplôme d’études collégiales.

These Constitutional realities have had far-reaching, often negative impacts on the CMCs. In particular, the way in which governance models have been set up at the Colleges – to grapple with the fact that the CMCs are federally run military institutions into which provincially regulated elements are embedded – is leading to significant, systemic, widespread and chronic problems, as well as undermining the clear sense of identity and purpose that is fundamental to their value-add, as discussed above.

Currently, the governance framework, prescribed inter alia by the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges (QR Canmilcols)^{Footnote 29} looks like this:

Within this model, the Minister of National Defence is designated as the Chancellor and President of both CMCs, but is equipped with no specific Terms of Reference. The heads of the CMCs are the two Commandants, who are designated in the QRCanMilCols as the Vice-Chancellors of their respective institutions and who chair the Senate in the absence of the Chancellor. The two Commandants have full command of their organizations and are responsible for their effective operation, including achieving mission objectives, managing resources and fostering a healthy workplace environment.

However, the Commandants are not fully autonomous. They report to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, who in turn reports to the Chief of Military Personnel, who in turn reports to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Commandants thus sit squarely within the military chain of command and are subordinate to CDA, which sets the training standards, allocates financial resources to the CMCs and serves as the training authority responsible for CAF-common training and education.

Notwithstanding this, the chain of command does not have exclusive authority over the Military Colleges; the Deputy Minister of National Defence holds specific authorities that directly impact the CMCs, the most significant relating to financial resource allocations, infrastructure management and civilian human resource management.

Notionally, the Minister is supported by two Boards of Governors which submit annual reports regarding the activities of both the CMCs and the Boards themselves. Effectively, however, the Boards of Governors – which have undergone a series of changes over their lifespans – function purely as advisory bodies to the Commandants and to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy.

Within the CMCs, the Principal (known as the Academic Director at RMC Saint-Jean) serves as the academic head of the College and reports to the Commandant, with a mandate to manage the interface between the military culture of the CAF and the institutional culture of a civilian university. The Principal further functions as the academic advisor to both the Commandant and the Commander of CDA, and is also considered a “senior academic” of the Department of National Defence.

This framework gives rise to significant problems for the CMCs. It is unnecessarily complex, poorly defined and extremely confusing, even to actors within its system. It remains founded in an instrument (QR CanMilCols) that is decades out of date, and it has been stretched sideways to fit into a civilian mould that does not reflect the particular needs, functions or objectives of a military institution.

What is particularly frustrating is that these observations reflect the same findings made by previous reviews; both the 2017 Special Staff Assistance Visit (SSAV)^{Footnote 30} and the 2017 Office of the Auditor General (OAG) Report^{Footnote 31} proposed substantive amendments to the CMC governance model, yet few of their relevant recommendations have been implemented.

This Board thus finds itself back in the same space, proposing a new approach to governance and a series of concrete revisions – particularly in relation to the existence, roles, responsibilities and authorities of the Chancellor, Board of Governors and Principals, but also in relation to the appointment, tenure and career advancement of the Commandant and the Director of Cadets.

Chancellor/President

Beyond conferring degrees at convocation, successive Ministers of National Defence irrespective of political stripe have had little substantive engagement with the CMCs in their role as Chancellor and President. Without defined Terms of Reference, the expected roles and obligations of the Chancellor and President are unclear, and this lack of clarity gives rise to further confusion from other actors within the CMC governance structure regarding how and when to interface appropriately with the Minister.

It also hampers the ability of the CMCs to accomplish some of their key activities. For example, in a civilian university, the Chancellor serves as a titular or ceremonial head of the institution, and by statute presides over convocation ceremonies, confers degrees and acts as an ambassador in advancing institutional interests. The President typically serves as Chief Executive Officer, providing leadership, management and oversight. None of these functions – which are as integral to the functioning of the CMCs as to civilian universities – are easily achieved under a construct wherein the Minister of National Defence of Canada serves as the Chancellor and President of the country’s Military Colleges. In reality, competing demands on the Minister’s time preclude his/her ability to undertake these functions in an effective and sustained way, and yet occupying the position precludes others from taking up the mantle. This enduring challenge – common across political lines since the establishment of the Boards of Governors – was addressed in the 1993 Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges,^{Footnote 32} which recommended that the Minister of National Defence should be considered a "Visitor" and that each College should elect its own Chancellor, based on recommendations from the Board of Governors.

This Board shares a similar perspective; the current designation of the Minister of National Defence as Chancellor and President contributes significantly to confusion and ineffectiveness vis-à-vis the governance of the CMCs and stands as an impediment to allowing a person better suited for the role (by virtue of position) to take on these roles, particularly in terms of actually leading the institution by serving as an advocate/champion for each College.

Board of Governors

Importing the concept of a Board of Governors from the civilian university context into DND/CAF has also brought significant confusion and uncertainty to the CMCs (although the underlying intent of this approach, in terms of trying to introduce greater accountability to the Military Colleges, is laudable). While in a civilian context the Board of Governors has the authority to approve the institutional strategic plan and budget, to select the President, to evaluate the President’s performance and to oversee remuneration, the Boards of Governors of the CMCs have no such authority. They play no role in civilian hiring, in performance assessment or remuneration of the Commandant or Principal, in financial matters, or in adopting the strategic plans of the Colleges. In fact, they have no actual power. Conversely, they play a limited, albeit important advisory role to the Commandants, the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy and the Minister (as Chancellor and President). A comparison of the roles and responsibilities of the CMC Boards of Governors compared to Canadian civilian universities is presented at Annex 6.

Calling these two groups of distinguished people “Boards of Governors” is therefore misleading. Instead, they are de facto Advisory Committees and should be referred to as such. As they have no actual or meaningful relationship with the Minister, and their role is to advise and make recommendations to the Commandants and the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, their Terms of Reference should further reflect these facts.

Senate

The function of the Senate is to grant degrees and honorary degrees, and the Colleges have empowered a number of Senate Standing Committees, as part of Academic governance, to ensure that the quality of those degrees is of the highest standard. However over time, lack of clarity and misunderstandings regarding this function have caused consternation and confusion.

While it is up to the Senate to ensure that all academic programs are appropriately constituted in order to meet the applicable university degree requirements, it is up to the CMCs to establish and periodically review/amend the list of programs offered at the Colleges in light of institutional priorities, with the Commandant holding authority to allocate resources and set priorities in relation to academic programs. Indeed, it is within the power and authority of the federally regulated and federally run CMCs to establish and make changes to the list of academic programs at the Military Colleges, not the Senate – a misunderstanding that was recently perpetuated via the amendments approved to QRCanMilCols Chapter 2, Part VI: paras 2.50 (2) and 2.56 (2) pursuant to the November 2021^{Footnote 33} exchange of correspondence between the Minister and the Commandant of RMC. More specifically, the assertion that the Senate is the “final authority for all academic matters” should be qualified. As such, the Board believes that a further amendment to the QRCanMilCols is required to clarify the Senate’s actual authority and reassert the primacy of the CMCs in making determinations regarding the academic programs at the Military Colleges.

Commandant

The Commandants of the CMCs are the leaders of the Military Colleges. In this regard, their roles are akin to those of a President and Vice-Chancellor in a civilian university; consistent with the findings of the 2017 OAG Report, the Board sees the Commandants as the preeminent institutional leaders of large and complex organizations who ultimately hold responsibility and authority for the training, education and wellbeing of the N/OCdts. It is appropriate, therefore, that they be identified as such, by designating them as the President and Vice-Chancellor of the Colleges. The effect of this would not only help clarify what they do and the position they occupy within the institution, but would further help underscore the fact that the CMCs are military institutions, led by military officers, for military purposes. This designation will also firmly establish the Commandant as Chair of the Senate, and as the executive head and the formal representative of the institution. Having the Commandant in this role is key to creating a shared vision for Canada’s Military Colleges.

Such a designation must be accompanied by changes to the tenure of the Commandants. At present, the length of time in position has varied among incumbents, but on average has lasted no more than two years, as the office holders regularly depart for promotion or reassignment.

It is not realistic to expect that a leader can help effect the changes that are required in the CMCs, or provide the degree of stability needed at the top to ensure the ongoing health and success of the institutions, if they are given only two years to do so. Significantly more time is required in the position to establish baseline knowledge, build trust, foster relationships and develop networks, in support of the overall mandate of the Colleges. These observations are not new; the high turnover of senior military personnel has been highlighted multiple times in previous reports as a critical impediment to effective governance at the CMCs and reiterated repeatedly during this Board’s Listening Sessions by military staff and academic faculty members. In response, the Report of the RMC Board of Governors by the Withers’ Study Group^{Footnote 34} recommended a tenure of five years, while the SSAV recommended a minimum tenure of three years, but noted that a four-to-five-year tenure would be optimal.^{Footnote 35} The Board recommends that the CAF extend the appointments of the Commandants to a minimum of four years and develop innovative human resource practices to break the cycle of two-year appointments.

Given that the Military Colleges are unique national institutions with a global profile, responsible for a subset of particularly vulnerable members of the CAF, exposed to regular public scrutiny, and responsible for foundational leadership training within the Profession of Arms, the Board also believes that it is appropriate that the Commandant be a General Officer/Flag Officer. While other organizations within the CAF of similar size are led by officers at the rank of Colonel/Captain(N) and below, it is the Board’s view that this speaks more to the leadership talent within the CAF (wherein even junior officers hold positions with spans of responsibility that far outstrip any comparable position within a civilian context) than to the import of those organizations.^{Footnote 36} Furthermore, the distinct features and functions of the CMCs allow for their distinct treatment.

Nevertheless, the Board accepts that the role, responsibilities, level of risk and budget that the Commandant of RMC Saint-Jean currently manages are better aligned with the rank of Colonel/Captain(N) than with the rank of Brigadier-General. Therefore, despite the Board’s views regarding the importance of ensuring equality between the two Colleges and increased stature for RMC Saint-Jean, it is comfortable in accepting that an upgrade to the rank of the Commandant should happen only in due time and in step with the proposals found elsewhere in this Report to grow the size of the N/OCdt body and increase the program offerings at RMC Saint-Jean.

When this occurs, the position of Director of Cadets at RMC Saint-Jean should correspondingly be upgraded from a Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander to a Colonel/Captain (Navy), premised on the same rationale. This follows the logic employed in the Special Staff Assistance Visit Report regarding its recommendation to upgrade the position of Director of Cadets at RMC from a Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander to a Colonel/Captain(N).

Aside from the question of rank, not every officer is necessarily the right fit for leading the Military Colleges. Selecting Commandants with the right skills, competencies, character and knowledge for this unique role will be critical to ensuring the overall outcomes that this Board is seeking to achieve. Leading a military unit within which an academic institution is embedded presents challenges that are not common across the CAF, particularly one that is responsible for educating and training some of the youngest and most at-risk members of the Profession of Arms.

Decades of experience as a CAF officer should prepare the Commandant to lead the military and public service aspects of the CMCs. Special consideration should also be given to the knowledge and skills required to run an academic institution. As most officers may not have received such exposure before this stage in their career, a newly appointed Commandant should be required to enroll in a Development Period Four Fellowship Program at a civilian university focused on understanding university governance and operations. Timely selection of the Commandant may also allow exposure to university President training programs that are available in Canada and the United States.

The Board understands that the current selection process does not lend itself to equipping future Commandants with the necessary competencies and skills and considers that access to the right training and experience is essential to enable their success. This means that the selection process must happen much earlier, in effect “deep selecting” the Commandants well ahead of their respective appointments.

At RMC, this would mean identifying the next Commandant as a Colonel/Captain(N) and sending them on their Development Period Four training with the express intent of selecting them to be the Commandant in the future. It may also require the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Minister of National Defence to exercise an “Acting While So Employed” promotion process to align timing. At RMC Saint-Jean, until changes are made to up-rank the position of Commandant to a Brigadier-General, the future Commandant should attend their Development Period Four training either prior to promotion to Colonel/Captain(N) or immediately upon promotion, to provide them the time necessary to complete four years at the helm of the institution.

Principal

There remains much confusion regarding the role of the Principal at the CMCs (known as the Academic Director at RMC Saint-Jean), largely because of an erroneous tendency to import civilian university concepts into the Military College construct. This creates tension between the Commandant and Principal positions, breeds resentment between military and academic faculty and staff, and undermines the identity of the CMCs as first and foremost military institutions.

For example, many members of the academic community at the CMCs articulated an expectation that the Principal / Academic Director should be empowered to perform the functions associated with the President (also called the Principal or Rector) of a civilian university, such as control of financial resources, control of hiring decisions and involvement in dispute resolution processes within the academic faculty. The fact that the Principal / Academic Director does not have those authorities at the CMCs, and that they are vested instead in the Commandant, was a source of consternation and frustration for many academics.

These sentiments are understandable but misplaced. In reality, the role of the Principal / Academic Director at the Military Colleges is more akin to that of a Provost and Vice-President Academic at a civilian university, and it should be re-named accordingly. This would better reflect both what the position entails and what it does not, helping to create clarity and to set more appropriate expectations.

In better aligning the title to the function of the position, thought must also be given to the way in which this position is filled. At present, the Principal at RMC is appointed through a Governor in Council (GIC) process (a process that is currently being replicated at RMC Saint-Jean), which lends it gravitas and helps ensure a high calibre of candidate. Those who have filled the roles to date have brought professional seniority, strong leadership, academic credibility and high-quality experience to the job, yielding important benefits to the CMCs. On the flip side, appointing the Principal / Academic Director via a GIC process typically results in hiring someone who may not be expecting, at this stage of their career, to report to another executive or be hierarchically subordinate to a military Commandant.

To better clarify the parameters of the position and associated expectations, both for the office-holder and for other stakeholders at the CMCs, the position of Principal should be re-designated as Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research. It should also be made a GIC appointment to attract the right talent and appropriate experience level for this position – with the clear caveat that the Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research will be working with, and subordinate to, the Commandant. Representatives from both DND and the CAF should serve on the Appointment Committees, with the Commandants of the respective Colleges best suited to serve as the CAF Representative on the Committee.

Director of Cadets

A key figure in the lives of the N/OCdts and a lynchpin in the success of their military training experience is the Director of Cadets. This role thus requires the right person for the right length of time. Two years in position, which has become the general norm, is insufficient. In line with the arguments made for extending the tenure of the Commandant, the Board believes that a longer tenure is also required for the Director of Cadets. This will create greater institutional stability, deepen trust with N/OCdts, and provide more time to implement change and see initiatives through.

Given that the driving argument behind longer tenure is both a need for stability and the ability to oversee and implement effective change management, it is also important that the terms of the Commandant, the Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research and the Director of Cadets be staggered, so as to avoid a situation in which all three are arriving or departing in the same year. This will further enhance the positive experiences of the N/OCdts during their three-to-four-year journeys at the Colleges, as they will be able to build more enduring and trusting relationships with the key individuals who have an impact on their daily lives. While there are various combinations and permutations that can achieve the desired effect, the Board views it as critical that the three positions be managed together in this regard.

Extending the length of tenure for the Director of Cadets should in no way preclude career advancement for the incumbent; a posting at the Colleges should be viewed as an asset and the timing of promotion opportunities should be aligned accordingly.

In sum, the temptation to turn towards civilian universities for inspiration in respect of CMC governance frameworks must be resisted unless it makes specific sense to do so. When efforts to make the Military Colleges align with the civilian model have a clear purpose tied to their institutional identity as a military unit responsible for training and educating members of the Profession of Arms, then those should continue. When such efforts confuse or undermine this identity and purpose, they need to be revised.

Recommendation #5

Remove the Minister of National Defence from the position of Chancellor and President of the two Canadian Military Colleges. Amend the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

Recommendation #6

Appoint an eminent Canadian to the ceremonial role of Chancellor of the two Canadian Military Colleges. Amend the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

Recommendation #7

Re-designate the Board of Governors at each Military College as an Advisory Committee that advises and makes recommendations to the Commandant. Update the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

Recommendation #8

Clarify the parameters of the Senate’s authority and stipulate that the responsibility to allocate resources and set priorities in relation to academic programs at the Military Colleges lies with the Commandant. Update the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

Recommendation #9

Designate the Commandants as the “President and Vice-Chancellor" of their respective Military Colleges, vested with appropriate authorities and responsibilities. Amend the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

Recommendation #10

Establish the tenure of the Commandant at each Military College for a minimum of four years.

Recommendation #11

“Deep select” the Commandant for each Military College and use a Developmental Period Four Fellowship Program and/or University President Training Program to expose them to university governance and operations.

Recommendation #12

Re-designate the Principal at each Military College as the Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research and appoint them, via a Governor-in-Council process, as the most senior academic officer of their respective Colleges, reporting to the Commandant. Amend the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

Recommendation #13

Establish the tenure of the Director of Cadets for a minimum of three years.

Back to top

Program: The Academic Pillar

The Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges (ROTP CMC) is a fully residential four-year (or five-year) program comprising academics, military training, physical fitness and bilingualism. It is this 4-Pillar program, described above, that differentiates the Military Colleges from civilian universities, and thus it is this program that is at the core of the CMC’s value proposition. Without a strong, distinct and rationalized Military College program that goes beyond the academic courses all other officers receive through their civilian university education, the additional costs of running the CMCs are not justifiable and the entire raison d’être of the Military Colleges is called into question.

To date, the CMCs have relied on the 4-Pillar model as the value-add for the Colleges. In reality, however, the Academic Pillar has functioned as the lodestone around which the other Pillars take a lesser role. As such, while a detailed examination of these four Pillars led the Board to conclude that the model addresses the right substantive areas, the Board also found that

1. the program in its current form is flawed, and has contributed to a growing disconnect between the CMCs and the Profession of Arms; and
2. the Academic Pillar merits particular attention because of the impact it has had on the overall evolution and success of the Canadian Military Colleges.

On that front, the CMCs benefit from a cadre of well-respected, high-calibre and actively engaged academic faculty and staff who develop and deliver a wide range of top-quality programs and courses. They are committed to excellence, enthusiastic about education and research, and genuinely interested in the success of the N/OCdts, who, in turn, hold them in high regard.

In recent years – in response to growing opportunities, fresh ideas and evolving trends – faculty and staff have created new programs, identified new degrees, pursued new areas of study and added new personnel. This has been exciting for the institution and very well received by the N/OCdts. Unfortunately, while each of these initiatives may have been positive in isolation, the collective result has been costly growth - in terms of money, human resources and time – that increasingly runs at cross-purposes with the broader objectives of the Military Colleges. These costs are now too big to ignore, too difficult to justify and too entrenched to be solved with superficial fixes. An examination of the current size and scope of the academic program, its linkages to the mandate and mission of the CAF, and its impact on the other Pillars of the ROTP CMC reveal that meaningful reform to this Pillar is required.

Back to top

Size & Scope

The starting point for these problems is the size of the academic program and the scope of its offerings, particularly as compared to the size of the student body. At present, RMC has three Faculties (Social Sciences and Humanities, Engineering, and Sciences), with fourteen Departments that offer 44 undergraduate programs (22 in English and 22 in French). The academic faculty includes 189 indeterminate University Teacher (UT) positions plus 39 military faculty positions, and is supplemented with additional term and sessional instructors, though not all UT or military faculty positions are filled at all times. RMC typically has around 1,100 N/OCdts who are part of the ROTP and an additional 3,000 post-graduate, part-time, and other students. RMC Saint-Jean has two Faculties (Social Sciences and Sciences), runs three Departments (Language, Science, and Humanities and Social Sciences) in addition to Professional Military Education, and provides one university-level program in International Studies. RMC Saint-Jean employs 40 faculty and teaching staff for a student body of 350 (including university and CÉGEP offerings). Academic salaries are not the only driver of costs at the Military Colleges, but they are significant.

The program offerings at the Military Colleges also extend across a variety of disciplines, and while this breadth of options is popular with the N/OCdts, it is not necessary to meet the needs of the CAF; the CAF is largely agnostic to the nature of the undergraduate degree earned, and with only a very few exceptions, almost all degrees and programs are acceptable for almost all occupations. Although Canada is not alone in offering a wider variety of degrees and programs (with countries such as Japan and Germany taking a similar approach), this differs from many foreign military academies, which offer more tailored degrees with clear thematic ties to the Profession of Arms and the requirements of their Armed Forces.

The wide range of types of degrees and programs offered at the Military Colleges further gives rise to the creation of a high number of courses. Due to this volume of courses and programs, compared to the number of N/OCdts, many of them are seriously undersubscribed. For example, the Mathematics, English Culture & Communications, French Culture & Communications and Economics programs have all failed to graduate more than fifteen participants in any one of the last five years yet have consistently been supported by over forty academic faculty members. Many courses consequently suffer the same fate, compounded by the duplication of course offerings to fulfill bilingualism imperatives, resulting in classes with as few as three N/OCdts. Despite a recent decision to impose a minimum threshold for running a course (now set at three N/OCdts per class), class sizes remain significantly lower than in civilian universities and the overall number of course offerings remains vastly out of sync with national averages. This contributes to an associated issue, which is the very low ratio of N/OCdts to faculty; at both CMCs this figure stands at 8:1 which far outweighs the average of 21:1 for comparable Canadian civilian universities, as detailed above (see Figures 6 and 7).

Another factor driving up the number of course offerings, while concurrently imposing additional demands on the time of the N/OCdts, is the 16-credit Core Curriculum. As noted above, this series of required courses represents the minimum content that N/OCdts must acquire as part of their degrees, in two thematic areas

1. Math and Sciences, and
2. Canadian History, Language and Culture, Political Science, International Relations and Leadership and Ethics.

The Core Curriculum amounts to a significant portion of the approximately 40-credit Social Sciences & Humanities degree and turns Engineering into a 48–51-credit degree program that requires a minor in Social Sciences & Humanities. It also requires significant human resources to deliver. While the Core Curriculum provides an excellent academic foundation for CMC graduates, when taking into consideration the reality that it is only one component of the ROTP CMC program, it takes up too much of the N/OCdts’ time and constitutes “too much of a good thing.”

The fact that RMC Saint-Jean runs a Collège d’enseignement général et professionnel (CÉGEP) program also contributes to the expansive size and scope of the CMCs. This two-year college-level program (equivalent to Grade 12 and First Year university in the rest of Canada) is a unique feature of Quebec’s higher education system and is normally provided at nominal cost to residents of Quebec by the Government of Quebec. Because the federal government has no authority unto itself to offer the program, it is contracted out by RMC Saint-Jean to the CÉGEP de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu for support and accreditation. Moreover, running a second program alongside university-level education programs means that a high number of Education Specialist (EDS) public service positions must also be funded. Additionally, because those N/OCdts who go into CÉGEP do so at the ages of 16 and 17, there are additional downstream costs for the government in terms of pension and salary dollars due to how young these individuals are when they become employees of the Canadian Armed Forces.

A smaller but impactful issue is the degree of variance between the academic calendars at the two Colleges. Due to the fact that RMC Saint-Jean is constrained by the provincially set CÉGEP calendar, it has limited flexibility with scheduling, which in turn makes it difficult to coordinate its timings with the CAF and with RMC in relation to everything from course timetables to special events and exams. More specifically, the CÉGEP academic term is 16 weeks, including exam weeks, whereas Quebec and Ontario universities have 15-week academic terms, including exams. While this may seem inconsequential, the discrepancy has a profound effect on the possibilities for the movement of N/OCdts between Colleges in order to leverage different course offerings, language learning opportunities and interchange possibilities.

For example, N/OCdts at RMC Saint-Jean must return earlier than those at RMC, resulting in less summer training time, especially military training time, and that further eliminates many possibilities for synergies around things like distance learning and virtual classes. As a result, there is a high degree of duplication in course offerings and materials between the Colleges that could otherwise be reduced.

The cumulative effect of all of these factors is to drive up costs; at present, the Canadian Military Colleges are 1.6 times (RMC) and 4 times (RMC Saint-Jean) more expensive than comparable civilian universities, when adjusted for non-academic activities.^{Footnote 37} While the calibre, professionalism and overall quality of academics at the Military Colleges is unassailable, it far surpasses industry standards in relation to class size, student-to-professor ratio and quantity of offerings and cannot be justified against the baseline objective of delivering a credible undergraduate university degree.

Back to top

Strength of Linkages

Another problem facing the academic program is its tenuous relationship with the defence and security mandate of the CAF. Academic faculty and staff are cognizant of the mission of the CMCs, and they often seek ways to incorporate officer development and leadership skills formally and informally into their programs. This manifests in myriad ways, from the development of courses that directly support CAF operations (e.g. CCE409 Combustion and Explosives Engineering) and the establishment of course reading lists that stimulate relevant reflections and discussions (e.g. ENE331 World Literature: Crisis and Conflict) to the inclusion of experiential elements within courses that build practical officership skills. Such efforts are laudable and valuable. They are appreciated by the N/OCdts and reflect the care with which the faculty members typically engage with the student body.

However, these approaches are limited and ad hoc. They are not standardized or easily replicable, they are not tethered to specific learning outcomes and they are not systematically measured. Moreover, beyond these efforts, there are no explicit links between the Academic Pillar and the overarching objectives of the CMC’s professional military education and officer development, rendering the relationship negligible at best. To be clear, this is not a failing of any individual, and it does not reflect on character, capability or professionalism. Rather, it is a reflection of a flaw in the way the system was originally designed and has evolved over decades.

The vast assortment of programs noted above dilutes focus and clarity, with the CMCs being neither Liberal Arts schools nor Engineering or Technical schools. Although there is strength in some aspects of this mix, the lack of a clear identity as a military academy makes it difficult for the academic program as a whole to anchor itself to a clear vision or sense of common institutional purpose.

Back to top

Impact on the Other Pillars

In addition to resource concerns, the amount of time required to fulfill the requirements of the academic program at the CMCs creates significant issues regarding its impact on other key elements of the Military College experience, severely hampering the ability of N/OCdts to invest sufficient energy into anything else. Any “extra” hours are found in the early mornings or late evenings, which effectively relegates all non-academic activities to the margins of the workday and to weekends. This in turn creates undue stress, negatively impacts sleep and sends a clear message regarding the prioritization of academics at the expense of language learning, military skills training, fitness, health and wellbeing, and leadership development.

Back to top

A Way Forward

In short, the proliferation of programs and courses offered at the Military Colleges, coupled with the high number of academic faculty and staff currently employed to deliver those activities – particularly in relation to the overall number of N/OCdts, and in part given the lack of harmonized schedules between the Colleges – has driven up staffing levels and the associated support and operating costs to problematic levels. Coupled with the lack of clear connection between academics and the CAF’s defence and security mandate, an over-prioritization of academic studies at the expense of other important program elements, and the availability of alternative models that can effectively develop strong officers, the Academic Pillar as currently configured is too expansive and too expensive to support.

The Board accepts that the Military Colleges are unique institutions that require significant investment. Whether the costs are more or less than those of civilian institutions is only one of the factors the Board has taken into consideration in assessing the value proposition of the Colleges. However, it is critical that public money be well spent. In this regard, costs must not only be reasonable, but they must also be directly tied to the raison d’être of the Military Colleges and must directly support the objectives of the organization that they exist to serve.

Accordingly, and in line with common management practice in government and across academia, there is a need to redeploy existing financial and human resources from within the academic program towards higher-priority items, to streamline offerings and to strengthen linkages to the requirements of the Profession of Arms.

Several groups of interconnected reforms are needed to accomplish this. In developing this list, the Board has considered various approaches taken by other military academies, together with innovations in the civilian university context.

Firstly, it makes no sense that the one undergraduate degree offered at the Military Colleges that is specifically tied to the military identity of the institutions – the Bachelor of Military Arts and Science – is not available to N/OCdts.^{Footnote 38} Going forward, this degree should be added to the offerings within the ROTP CMC, to bring the total to four degrees:

• A Bachelor of Arts
• A Bachelor of Science
• A Bachelor of Military Arts & Science
• A Bachelor of Engineering

The first three degrees would be offered at RMC Saint-Jean, and all four would be offered at RMC.

Secondly, the number of programs and courses offered by the Canadian Military Colleges needs to be significantly reduced. All programs that have neither accepted nor graduated more than 15 N/OCdts at least once in the last five years should be eliminated, and more reductions should be undertaken in line with the intent to significantly streamline offerings that are undersubscribed. Alongside this, a commensurate reduction in the number of University Teacher (UT) positions at RMC should occur. At both Colleges, a minimum 15:1 student-to-faculty ratio should be implemented. In this way, the CMCs would transition from having a N/OCdt-to-faculty ratio that is one-third of the comparable average, to two-thirds of the comparable civilian university average. This would maintain small class sizes and personal connections between faculty and students, but also take into account the requirement to improve the financial efficiency of these institutions.

Thirdly, the number of N/OCdts must also be increased at both Colleges, to reduce costs per N/OCdt, maximize resources and effectively leverage the CMCs for the benefit of the CAF. In total, the number of N/OCdts should be increased to a minimum of 1,850 (or increased in line with limits imposed by the CAF regarding its ability to absorb and train new officers), to be distributed between the two Colleges.

The Board considered two permutations regarding the appropriate distribution of this growth. The first would see the number of N/OCdts at RMC increase from 1,000 to 1,500, with the number of N/OCdts at RMC Saint-Jean increasing from 100 to 350. This option could require building additional residences in Kingston. The second permutation would see the number of N/OCdts at RMC increase from 1,000 to 1,200, while the number of N/OCdts at RMC Saint-Jean would increase from 100 to 650. Taking into account a number of factors – the current infrastructure at both Colleges, the existing number of faculty, the respective areas of expertise resident at each College, the opportunities to create greater equality between the Colleges, the importance of avoiding the gender segregation that would arise if RMC Saint-Jean focused exclusively on Liberal Arts and RMC focused exclusively on Science & Technology, and the proposed changes to the degree offerings – the Board is of the view that the second option should be pursued.

Nevertheless, the Board is conscious that such changes could create unintended consequences, particularly in relation to the presence of the Osside Institute at RMC Saint-Jean, and must be considered among factors such as infrastructure, logistical feasibility, program delivery considerations and existing contractual requirements. Thus, the Board believes that the Canadian Defence Academy and the CMCs themselves are ultimately best placed to make final determinations regarding allocation of growth between the two Colleges.

Fourthly, the Core Curriculum should be eliminated. Its purpose is valid and important, and it is laudable to provide a balanced education that includes arts and science to all N/OCdts regardless of their field of study, with a view to instilling values and ethics, developing solid judgment and critical thinking abilities, establishing a strong foundation of relevant knowledge and building effective writing skills. But the intensive staff complement and significant cost required to deliver it make the Core Curriculum difficult to rationalize. This is particularly true given the availability of alternative mechanisms for achieving similar outcomes.

Fifthly, the CÉGEP program at RMC Saint-Jean should be eliminated. Over the past five years, it has cost between $2.2 million and $3.5 million annually^{Footnote 39} to pay the CÉGEP de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (CSJR) for support and accreditation of the RMC Saint-Jean program, since the Military College does not have authority to deliver this program, which includes approximately $500,000 to accredit and administer these programs. In addition, it pays approximately $1.5 million in salary dollars to the education services staff at RMC Saint-Jean to deliver the courses under the CÉGEP program, meaning that in total, the Government of Canada pays over $5 million a year to offer a program that is within provincial jurisdiction and that is already offered at only nominal cost to all residents of Quebec. These expenditures are indefensible, particularly in the absence of any compelling rationale for running a CÉGEP at a Military College.

In advancing the recommendation to eliminate the CÉGEP program, the Board has considered concerns raised during consultations regarding the potential impact of this loss to RMC Saint-Jean. These include fears that it will undermine recruiting efforts in Quebec and decrease Quebecers’s interest in attending the CMCs, diminish the status of RMC Saint-Jean, hurt efforts to maintain a strong Francophone presence in the CAF and lead to the eventual closure of the institution. Most of these arguments are speculative, though some raise valid considerations. Nevertheless, all can be effectively managed and mitigated.

For example, the argument that the CÉGEP program at RMC Saint-Jean is a primary driver of recruitment in Quebec is not borne out by the facts, and the notion that the CAF must maintain the program in order to meet recruiting targets in Quebec is flawed. Nonetheless, should the CAF determine that eliminating the CÉGEP program is negatively impacting traditional sources of recruits in Quebec, various alternatives are available to offset this – particularly via new, targeted strategies. For instance, the CAF could enroll interested CÉGEP students in the Primary Reserve Force for periods of military training during the summer months, until those students have completed either one or two years of CÉGEP, and then enroll them as Regular Force officers under a paid education program. Alternatively, CÉGEP students could be enrolled under the ROTP Civ U program and attend civilian CÉGEPs at no cost to the Government of Canada, entering into the CMCs after the completion of their first or second year of study. In all cases, CAF recruiting efforts are likely to be more impactful when they can be concentrated on the 48 CÉGEPs and approximately 60 private colleges in Quebec, rather than being spread more broadly across the 521 secondary schools in the province. These are but a few options for a revised approach to ensuring suitable recruitment from residents of Quebec into the CAF.

The concern that removal of the CÉGEP program will diminish the status of RMC Saint-Jean may have been convincing unto itself, but the fact that this Board is proposing to rename the institution, to upgrade the rank of its Commandant in due time, to triple the number of degrees it offers and to increase the number of N/OCdts it educates and trains should offset any such qualms. Indeed, eliminating the CÉGEP at RMC Saint-Jean would allow 250 spots to be re-allocated to university-level N/OCdts, creating a baseline of 350 N/OCdts in the ROTP CMC at RMC Saint-Jean, separate from any additional growth. Taken together, this suite of changes will reassert and reinforce the value of RMC Saint-Jean as an important national institution, an important part of Quebec’s higher education landscape, and an important conduit for drawing Francophone Canadians into the CAF, notwithstanding the elimination of CÉGEP.

It should be noted that while the Board’s recommendation to eliminate CÉGEP is premised primarily on misgivings related to costs, it is further concerned that running this program dilutes the focus of the College and presents unnecessary risk. Although the inherent nature of the Military Colleges means that their key constituency will be young people, there is a significant difference between the maturity, life experience, level of judgment and brain development of an 18-year-old versus a 16-year-old. Many of the issues currently facing the CMCs, which underpin this Board’s mandate, stem from the particularities of young adults living, studying and working together. Including more minors in this already challenging mix through the presence of the CÉGEP adds a heightened level of risk and responsibility which brings no added value to the CMCs, and for no discernible reason.

In short, there is no convincing reason for Canada’s Military Colleges to be in the business of running a CÉGEP. Eliminating this program would allow RMC Saint-Jean to reinforce its identity as a military institution, re-orient towards its real purpose in supporting university-level academic elements of the ROTP CMC, and redirect funds towards the activities that better serve its raison d’être – including proposed new university degree programs.

Lastly, the program offerings and schedules should be fully harmonized between both Colleges, something that should be significantly facilitated by changes to the degree programs themselves. When coupled with increased reliance on educational technology and distance learning opportunities, these changes will further allow the Colleges to minimize the duplication of courses due to bilingualism requirements and to increase access to second language learning opportunities for N/OCdts.

In addition, because people attend the Military Colleges for a variety of reasons, including the strong desire to serve in the military as quickly as possible, the CMCs may wish to consider offering a three-year, 30-credit general degree alongside a four-year, 40-credit degree (or the equivalent, for those coming out the Quebec system). This has traditionally been precluded by the CMCs, in order to maintain the integrity of the 4-Pillar ROTP structure. However, it is commonly found at civilian universities, is currently available at RMC to non-ROTP CMC candidates, and has been acceptable in meeting the requirements of other entry streams. Provided that all other graduation and commissioning requirements are met in relation to language training, military skills & leadership, and health, fitness & wellbeing, this accelerated degree program could be a useful way of meeting the organizational needs of the CAF while catering to individual desires, by providing an optional pathway to matriculation that is shorter than the current four-year model.

Recommendation #14

Streamline the academic offerings at the Canadian Military Colleges to offer four undergraduate degrees within the Regular Officer Training Plan: a Bachelor of Arts (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); a Bachelor of Science (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); and a Bachelor of Engineering (at RMC).

Recommendation #15

Establish a minimum 15:1 student-to-faculty ratio at both Canadian Military Colleges within five years.

Recommendation #16

Increase the number of Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges to a minimum of 1,850 within five years.

Recommendation #17

Eliminate the Core Curriculum at the Canadian Military Colleges.

Recommendation #18

Eliminate the Collège d’enseignement général et professionnel program at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and all associated teaching and administrative positions.

Recommendation #19

Harmonize the academic calendars between the Royal Military College of Canada and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and align them with the reconfigured Military Skills & Leadership strand proposed in Recommendation #22.

Back to top

Program: The Other Pillars

Military

The Board’s observations, coupled with findings in previous reports, information gleaned from the Listening Sessions with N/OCdts, and the results of the 2023 and 2024 CMC Student Experience Survey and the 2024 Graduate Experience Survey, all reveal chronic levels of deep dissatisfaction with military training at the CMCs. Indeed, the general perception of the Military Pillar is that it is, at best, an inconvenience, and at worst, a waste of time. This is highly troubling given that this Pillar is the primary differentiator between the CMCs and civilian universities. It is clear that major change is required to military training at the CMCs to support their value proposition.

The CMCs still do not have well-defined objectives or activities relating to the Military Pillar, and while the Board recognizes that RMC Saint-Jean has a more developed program than RMC (including the Enhanced Military Program offered from Second to Fourth Year that includes workshops and two leadership field training activities), even this falls well short of expectations. Overall, the Military Pillar is missing defined standards, measurement criteria and clear structure, and is far from matching the breadth and quality of the training and development offered by partners and allies around the world. In this regard, a key area of concern for the Board is the minimal amount of time dedicated to military skills and leadership activities, especially at RMC. One two-hour session per week and one weekend per month are insufficient to meet expectations in terms of the quantity and quality of such training at a national institution dedicated to this goal.

The First Year Orientation Program (FYOP) exemplifies many of these problems. Serving as the introductory program for incoming N/OCdts, FYOP is ostensibly but not explicitly intended to help them transition out of civilian life into their new roles as members of the Profession of Arms. Deeply ingrained in the CMC culture, FYOP stands as a cornerstone of the military training regime. It culminates in the Obstacle Course and Badging Parades, which are both important and long-standing traditions at the Colleges and are critical to forming a sense of belonging and identity for incoming N/OCdts.

Under the rubric of developing teamwork skills, building esprit de corps and honing leadership abilities, FYOP consists of a mix of orientation and military training activities that take place on campus over 24 hours a day, seven days a week, lasting from 20 days at RMC Saint-Jean to 29 days at RMC. The activities range from cleaning barracks and preparing for inspections to physical training activities, small group leadership training and team-building exercises. The practice of sleep deprivation also features as a program element at RMC – where N/OCdts are limited to 6.5 hours of sleep a night, with a view to purposefully creating challenging conditions in which to undertake these various activities – while at RMC Saint-Jean N/OCdts are allowed 7.5 hours a night, a difference that adds up significantly over three-plus weeks.

Each set of activities has some inherent value, but there is no program standard for the FYOP, which means that there is no articulated objective or expected outcome, no clarity regarding the purpose behind structure and approach, and no guidance on how to deliver it, which can contribute to abuses of authority. Basic inconsistencies between the two Colleges result in wide variations between the experiences of N/OCdts. Ultimately, a lack of clear rationale for the program itself makes it difficult to justify the heavy physical toll, emotional stress and psychological burden that FYOP places on these newest members of the CAF.

Back to top

Bilingualism

Currently, all N/OCdts at the CMCs must achieve the federal government second language proficiency level of BBB for commissioning into the CAF. It takes an average of 1,680 hours of instruction^{Footnote 40} to go from a Government of Canada “XXX” language profile to the BBB standard,^{Footnote 41} and the CMCs are currently able to offer only about 650 total hours of instruction; daily second language training courses amount to (up to) approximately six hours/week during the academic terms and approximately eight weeks during an intensive summer term of second language training (SOLET). A second SOLET is offered to some of those who need it, but participation is limited by the number of available spots – primarily at the Canadian Forces Language School (Asticou) and at Canadian Forces Base Valcartier – in competition with other organizations within the CAF. While RMC requires a BBB level of second language proficiency for academic convocation, RMC Saint-Jean does not, due to decisions taken by the respective Senates – an issue that merits revision as work towards harmonizing the two Colleges moves forward.

Second language training benefits from a complement of engaged instructors in both Official Languages, who take a holistic approach to language training and support a variety of experiential learning opportunities for the N/OCdts, including volunteering in the community and related activities. Coupled with small class sizes of approximately 10 N/OCdts, which is of particular value in the context of language acquisition, the second language training at the CMCs has delivered effective results for the CMCs and the CAF; when following the full 4-Year ROTP CMC pre-COVID, almost 95% of N/OCdts at RMC achieved their BBB levels. At RMC Saint-Jean, the figure was closer to 99%. Although these percentages declined as a result of COVID and more limited in-person instruction hours, overall the numbers are stabilizing once again, and the second language training can be viewed as a continued success.

Back to top

Physical Fitness

Under the auspices of the Physical Fitness Pillar, the CMCs offer well-developed physical education courses, delivered in a professional manner by a dedicated and competent staff comprising Public Servants and Personnel Support Program employees of the Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services organization. The physical education courses provide training in individual fitness activities, group fitness activities and military-related fitness training and also offer training in the foundations of health and fitness. Additional programs on nutrition, sleep management, stress management, addiction prevention and control, and anger management, as well as a variety of other health-related programs, all of which are of value to the development of N/OCdts, are available on an optional basis. Physical fitness classes are delivered as mandatory, non-credit courses.

However, the benefits of this Pillar have been undermined by the way in which it has been used. By reducing the concept of fitness to the CMC-specific Physical Performance Test (PPT) – which requires N/OCdts to pass one PPT in First or Second Year and one PPT in Third or Fourth Year in order to meet commissioning standards and even, at RMC, to earn a degree – the CMCs missed an opportunity to approach health and wellbeing more holistically. Moreover, they created a standard that exists nowhere else in the CAF, which uses the annual Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) Test as the baseline.

The PPT has been controversial since its inception at the CMCs, and the Board shares associated concerns. Arguments that it is necessary to motivate the N/OCdts to get fit are unfounded, while concerns that the PPT plays a role in gender-based shaming and hyper-competitiveness are convincing. The PPT serves as a proxy for masculinity that is used to determine social standing. This leads to a system where N/OCdts are being denigrated not because they are not masculine enough (since this is no longer socially acceptable), but rather because they are not fit enough (which is socially palatable) thus achieving the same effects in terms of exclusion and power. In this way, the PPT has contributed to overall problems around misconduct, and has undermined the many other positive efforts to improve the culture at the CMCs.

The PPT was removed as a commissioning requirement effective 11 August 2024 and replaced with the FORCE Test, a decision this Board applauds. However, the PPT continues as a compulsory activity at the CMCs.

Back to top

A New Delivery Model

Due to the significant over-emphasis on academics at the expense of the other Pillars, as well as a lack of vision for the purpose and objectives of military training and leadership development – among other issues detailed above – it is clear that an entirely new delivery model is needed at the CMCs.

Building on the proposed reforms to the Academic Pillar, the Board believes that the ROTP CMC 4-Pillar model itself should be restructured in favour of a new integrated leadership development program for officers. This program would rely on the same foundational elements, but it would conceive, organize and deliver them in a way that better serves the requirements of the Profession of Arms and the needs of the CAF. The 4 Pillars would evolve into the Integrated Officer Development Program (IODP), comprising four complementary and interwoven strands: Academics, Military Skills & Leadership, Second Language Training, and Fitness, Health & Wellbeing – all of which would be accredited elements of ROTP CMC that would count towards earning a degree.

Back to top

Academics

The Academic strand should be delivered within the parameters described above; this new structure would free up the ROTP CMC schedule, reduce the overall burden on the N/OCdts and provide time in the schedule to undertake the language training, military skills, leadership and wellness activities described below, which are the key differentiators for the Military Colleges.

These activities should also be accredited, serving to recognize and validate their importance to the value proposition of the Colleges. Ultimately this would allow the N/OCdts to earn 16 credits towards their graduation requirements through non-academic course work – an approach that is already taken by a number of civilian universities that provide academic credit for military training.^{Footnote 42}

Back to top

Military Skills & Leadership

Preliminary efforts are underway at the Canadian Defence Academy and within the two Colleges to conduct an ROTP CMC Program Review, to better define the program standard, and to develop an associated Qualification Standard and Training Plan. The September 2024 draft of the RMC Military Pillar Training Plan reflects progress towards a comprehensive, multi-year military training program that is designed to provide relevant, timely and professional military training as a part of the ROTP CMC. But the fact that each Military College is developing its own training plan is concerning and runs the risk of creating two distinct approaches. CDA should play a stronger role in defining the program standard and harmonizing most aspects of the military training plan.

Furthermore, military training should have a greater focus on leading the Profession of Arms, leading CAF operations and leading human performance, taking into account best practice from allies and partners regarding the value of elements like adventure training, experiential learning and field exercises in developing judgment, building skills, improving relationships with self and others, understanding fear and managing risk.

This should take the form of a new 3-year “Military Skills & Leadership” (MSL) strand that provides standardized, sequenced and substantive military training across both Colleges. The MSL should reflect the CAF’s broader approach to culture evolution, receive academic credit, be aligned with the CAF character and competency framework,^{Footnote 43} use policies, procedures and tools that are common in the CAF and employ a mix of theory, application/practice and experiential learning.

As outlined in Figure 9, the Military Skills & Leadership strand would include allocated time every week during the academic terms in Second to Fourth Year, and be anchored by three dedicated intensive sessions that occur at the beginning, middle and end of that period. Specifically, the MSL would begin with a one-month-long Foundations session in Second Year to introduce N/OCdts to the leadership essentials that will underpin their journey at the CMC and throughout their careers. This session would include completion of the Obstacle Course. Subsequently, the two-week Consolidation session would occur prior to the start of classes in Third Year, and would focus on preparing N/OCdts for their roles as Cadet Section Leaders within a revised Cadet Chain of Responsibility (discussed below). Lastly, after a compressed Winter Academic Term in Fourth Year, the N/OCdts would close out their CMC experience with the month-long Capstone session, prior to convocation and commissioning activities.

To take into account provincial variations between Quebec and the rest of Canada in relation to the CÉGEP requirements, the proposed Integrated Officer Development Program is deliberately structured to ensure that First Year at the CMCs will be fully dedicated to academic study, language acquisition, fitness, health and wellbeing, and facilitating the transition from civilian to military life, but will not touch upon Military Skills & Leadership. This means that the CÉGEP graduates joining the CMCs will not be disadvantaged in any way vis-à-vis other entrants in relation to the MSL strand.

While this is a workable solution, RMC Saint-Jean should nevertheless consider seeking a provincial ministerial exemption from the requirement in Quebec that only students with a CÉGEP diploma can be admitted into an undergraduate program in that province (however, exceptions can be made if an applicant is at least 21 years of age and has acceptable experience and academic potential). This would permit Quebec CÉGEP students to begin university studies at RMC Saint-Jean after their first year of CÉGEP, thus better aligning their CMC journey with that of the Grade 12 graduates coming into the Colleges from the rest of Canada.

Examples abound of the type of military skills and leadership training that should form the body of the MSL strand (from its three anchor sessions to its weekly offerings), and the CMCs can turn to multiple sources for inspiration – from Sandhurst in the United Kingdom to Karlberg in Sweden to the CAF’s own Osside Institute, which provides professional development programs for senior non-commissioned members of the CAF. Indeed, the Osside Institute’s recently reviewed and revised Intermediate Leadership Qualification course would be of great value to the Canadian Defence Academy and the CMCs as they build the Military Skills & Leadership strand. They should draw heavily upon its instructional material, in keeping with broader best practice regarding CAF culture evolution and adapted to the specific audience of N/OCdts, in order to design, develop and implement a new Military Skills & Leadership strand at the Military Colleges.

This will require dedicated staff, and as the 4-Pillar construct evolves into an Integrated Officer Development Program, the profile of the people needed to deliver it must also evolve. Similar to the approach used at the Osside Institute, a combination of military and civilian instructors should be engaged to expose N/OCdts to a rich mix of theoretical and practical experience and expertise. In particular, the MSL strand will need to be supported by the creation of approximately 15 civilian instructor positions at RMC and approximately 5 civilian instructor positions at RMC Saint-Jean. On the military side, staff can be sourced by converting military faculty positions to military instructor positions, including leadership to run the program, as proposed in Figure 10.

Unfortunately, the key military leadership positions that will be responsible for the MSL tend to be laden with administrative demands, which seriously undermines the ability of the officers and senior non-commissioned officers filling those roles to lead and mentor the N/OCdts.

Leaders at the Squadron level, including the Squadron Commanders and Squadron Warrant Officers, play a particularly pivotal role in this leadership development process, and yet they are significantly overburdened with administrative tasks. Due to the importance of their role in the lives of the N/OCdts, this has an outsized negative impact on the experiences of those young people at the CMCs. Going forward, the military members who are posted into these leadership positions should be focused on leading, supporting, mentoring and coaching the N/OCdts rather than on dealing with administration. Accordingly, additional administrative support in the form of approximately 16 new permanent administrative support staff CR4 positions at the Squadron level will be required to enable this (i.e., one CR4 position per Squadron).

The Board notes that this recommendation was also included in the 2017 SSAV report and that administrative support positions were added at the CMCs in response to those recommendations. Although the impact was positive and helped resolve the issue, the Salary Wage Envelope allocation was not baseline funded to the Military Colleges and the in-year financial allocation was restricted in subsequent years. As a result, the situation has reverted to that which existed previously.

A new approach to orientation is also needed within the Military Skills & Leadership strand. Specifically, the First Year Orientation Program should be replaced by an entirely reconfigured annual Orientation Week that runs in First and Second Year and is specifically designed to help new N/OCdts transition into life within the Profession of Arms and to support the objectives and expected outcomes of the Integrated Officer Development Program. The Obstacle Course and Badging Parade are important elements of the N/OCdt experience, with a clear rationale, and should continue to have a place within that process, but the rest of the FYOP in its current form should be dismantled.

In particular, all practices of sleep deprivation should be abandoned. Sleep deprivation creates undue stress, undermines wellbeing, gives rise to injury and compounds pre-existing problems, particularly given the intense physical and mental demands already being placed on new N/OCdts through the orientation process. It also results in N/OCdts regularly sleeping through their classes – a reality that was repeatedly raised during Listening Sessions, was widely acknowledged by faculty and staff, and was almost seen as a rite of passage by many within the CMC community.

While sleep deprivation training can be valuable for military members training for conflict, it otherwise has no value outside of specific, time-bound, clearly articulated parameters, and it is counterproductive and antithetical to the key messages and behaviours the CMCs are trying to instill regarding fitness, health and wellbeing. Moreover, the CMCs have failed to provide any clear rationale for depriving the N/OCdts of healthy levels of sleep during FYOP, making it difficult to understand what the practice is intended to achieve beyond a general sense of hardship.

Back to top

Second Language Training

The Board fully endorses the value of bilingualism as a touchstone of the ROTP CMC and a cornerstone of Canada’s national identity. Forming bilingual N/OCdts who can function in both Official Languages, who are steeped in the traditions of Canada’s two official language communities and who are able to connect across cultural lines yields a number of concrete benefits. Not only does language acquisition foster communication, but it also deepens trust between colleagues, increases the credibility of leaders who can better connect with their troops, and helps improve cognitive abilities. It also costs much less to provide second language training (SLT) to N/OCdts at this stage in their careers than it does to pull Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels out of leadership or staff positions years down the line, at a much higher salary, for months of dedicated training to make them eligible for promotion. The benefits of a bilingual military force were highlighted during the Board’s engagements, both in terms of cultural sensitivity and operational advantage. It is thus imperative that Canada’s Military Colleges, which service a fully bilingual military, create the foundation for bilingualism among the officer cadre in Canada.

Despite the significance of bilingualism, and the fact that the N/OCdts’ careers depend upon successful attainment of the BBB language profile as a commissioning requirement, the approach taken to second language training within the current ROTP schedule – where it has taken a back seat to academic coursework – does not reflect its importance. While this has not hindered the ability of a significant proportion of N/OCdts to achieve their BBB level, it has come at a cost; the Board heard extensively from N/OCdts during the Listening Sessions about the high levels of stress created by treating second language training as an afterthought vis-à-vis the academic calendar, and jamming it into an already full schedule without providing any academic credit for this work.

While the second language training is well developed at both CMCs and strongly supported by a qualified and dedicated group of instructors, the time spent on learning a second language is not sufficiently valued by the system. To mitigate this, the hours invested in second language training should be accredited and count towards completion of a degree within the ROTP CMC. Furthermore, enrichment opportunities should be offered in the summers for all those who require them, and these hours should also be accredited; it is easier to get from “XXX” to BBB in fewer than 1,680 hours when language instruction is spread out over more time (as this is typically a better way for most learners to acquire language),^{Footnote 44} and encouraging learners to participate in activities in their second language by offering a selection of interesting experiential learning opportunities also facilitates this process.

With Bill C-13, the Act for the Substantive Equality of Canada’s Official Languages, coming into force in 2025, the value of a bilingual officer corps will increase. The minimum second language proficiency requirements for bilingual positions involving supervision of employees occupying positions in bilingual regions will be increased from BBB to CBC, which will mean that Majors in service trades are expected to need a CBC profile, and members of the CAF who are responsible for public servants in bilingual regions are expected to be bilingual earlier in their careers. Therefore, additional effort should be expended by the CMCs to assist N/OCdts who aspire to improve their second language ability beyond the BBB minimum requirement. Providing access to ongoing language training, on an optional basis, should be included in the ROTP CMC.

Back to top

Fitness, Health & Wellbeing

A high standard of physical fitness is and should remain important for all members of the CAF. At issue is how best to support this objective, and how best to measure it.

On the first point, rather than being based upon the Physical Performance Test (PPT) as before, the Physical Fitness Pillar should be expanded into a Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strand that receives one academic credit for a 3-hour/week training block. It would be run predominantly by Personnel Support Programs staff and should build upon some aspects of the current Physical Fitness Pillar: for example, by continuing to encourage intramural sports activities and expanding the program, although eliminating the mandatory requirement to participate. Additional offerings should be established to address issues like healthy attitudes and behaviours regarding nutrition, sleep, stress, and substance use – including addictions awareness and anger management. More broadly, it should focus on personal growth and self-improvement, as well as on providing skills for leaders who will need to understand these issues for their subordinates. It should also continue to address the particular needs of members of the Profession of Arms, such as combatives and waterborne training.

On the second point, the CAF defines the minimum physical fitness standard as the Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) Test, and the Board believes that if this standard is good enough for the rest of the CAF, it should be good enough for the CMCs. Additionally, the CAF has recently removed any consideration of FORCE Test completion or FORCE Test results from the Selection Board promotion review process. Moreover, during the transition from the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System to the Performance and Competency Evaluation (PaCE) system, the CAF removed the requirement to monitor annual completion of the FORCE Test from the performance appraisal system. Therefore, while completion of the FORCE Test is required for substantive promotion to the next rank level, its removal from PaCE indicates that the CAF does not use fitness testing to measure the performance or potential of its members.

The CMCs should follow this approach; since the initial justification for the Physical Performance Test stems from the requirement in the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges (QR CanMilCols) to prepare N/OCdts for service in the CAF by “developing a high standard of physical fitness,” it may be time for the CAF to amend the QR CanMilCols and remove this requirement, while clarifying expectations related to the required standard of fitness.

In line with this, and notwithstanding the elimination of the PPT as a commissioning requirement, the Board believes that many outdated views will persist if the PPT remains as a mandatory activity at the CMCs. These include the notions that PPT standards are more challenging for men, that women have it easier (particularly in reaching the 400 and 450 Clubs), and that women are less fit (because of their significantly greater failure rates). Such enduring stereotypes perpetuate harm and run counter to the culture evolution goals to which the CMCs aspire. Therefore, the PPT should be eliminated as a mandatory activity at the CMCs.

In sum, a new model that integrates Academics, Military Skills & Leadership, Second Language Training and Fitness, Health & Wellbeing could be structured in a variety of ways to deliver the desired features and outcome. The Board has invested considerable time in developing one such option. The proposed framework (included at Annex 7) is designed to respond to the shortcomings of the current approach, meet the objectives of building a world-class professional military education and training program, and yield the associated outcomes required by the CAF in terms of the character, capabilities, skills and knowledge of its officers. In this way, the implementation of this new integrated model, together with the other recommendations that follow, should support the creation of a compelling officer development program that helps crystallize the value proposition of Canada’s Military Colleges, that provides important clarity to faculty, staff and N/OCdts, and that reinforces the relevance and utility of the CMCs to the CAF.

Recommendation #20

Establish and publish the Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges Program Standard.

Recommendation #21

Design, develop and implement the Integrated Officer Development Program.

Recommendation #22

Design, develop, implement and accredit the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

Recommendation #23

Create new civilian instructor positions at both the Royal Military College of Canada and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean to support the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

Recommendation #24

Reduce military faculty positions at both Military Colleges and their associated Advanced Training List positions and reallocate those positions to support the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

Recommendation #25

Increase the baseline Salary Wage Envelope allocation to the Canadian Military Colleges to create and fund permanent administrative support staff positions to support the Squadron leadership teams. Allocate one administrative support staff position per Squadron.

Recommendation #26

Design, develop, implement and accredit a revised Second Language Training strand.

Recommendation #27

Offer optional, ongoing second language training to Naval and Officer Cadets who have attained the BBB commissioning requirement.

Recommendation #28

Design, develop, implement and accredit a revised Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strand.

Recommendation #29

Eliminate the Physical Performance Test as a mandatory activity at the Canadian Military Colleges.

Recommendation #30

Establish the Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) Test as the physical fitness standard for the Regular Officer Training Plan – Canadian Military Colleges.

Back to top

Cadet Chain of Responsibility

In the Independent External Comprehensive Review (IECR), Madame Arbour recommended the elimination of the Cadet Wing responsibility and authority command structure due to concerns regarding a range of interconnected systemic issues, from the co-ed nature of the dormitories at the Colleges to misalignment between espoused leadership ideals and actual institutional attitudes and requirements. The Board considered these extensively in its assessment of whether the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR) could be sufficiently remediated to deliver a benefit for N/OCdts, without perpetuating harm, or should indeed be eliminated, even if the other changes proposed in this Report are implemented.

In theory, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR) provides a valuable opportunity for N/OCdts to experience the demands of leadership, perhaps for the first time. In practice, it has largely become a tool for the CMCs to function within their allocated resources by relying on N/OCdts to carry out administrative tasks under the guise of leadership training. Perhaps most problematically, as noted by Madame Arbour, it places some N/OCdts into positions of inappropriate power over their peers.

In its current state and structure (as outlined in Annex 8), the CCOR is cumbersome, lacks sufficient oversight and mentorship support, has poorly defined learning objectives and is highly variable in terms of experience. For the CMCs to derive benefit from and mitigate risk associated with the CCOR, the Colleges must be focused on its primary purpose, which is to offer experiential leadership opportunities to the N/OCdts. While the Board sees value in maintaining elements of the CCOR, it should be overhauled to ensure that it serves this purpose.

More specifically, the raison d’être of the CCOR needs to be re-affirmed as providing direct experience to N/OCdts in leading people, thus allowing them to practise leadership without causing harm to others, culminating in a practicum experience in which they will lead and administer approximately five to eight other N/OCdts as Cadet Section Leaders. Within this, this Board accepts that administration, paperwork, event management and communications activities may be part of such leadership training, but not that they are its purpose. The CCOR should not be primarily used to fulfill administrative functions at the CMCs that are created by gaps in resourcing. It is perfectly acceptable for N/OCdts to fill secondary duty positions, a practice that is common across the CAF, but these requirements should not form a part of the CCOR. In addition, the use of student government positions may be required to allow sports teams, the school yearbook or the band to operate, but these activities do not replace the purposeful learning activities provided by direct leadership of subordinates and they should not be considered CCOR positions.

To achieve this renewed approach, the Board envisages three key changes to the CCOR: eliminate the Cadet Wing Headquarters and Division-level Cadet Chain of Responsibility positions at RMC (Figure 11); introduce an obligation to complete a Cadet Section Leader position in order to meet commissioning requirements; and establish optional leadership opportunities at the Flight and Squadron level for those N/OCdts who have the desire and capacity to take on them on.

In implementing this new structure, a rigorous process should be established to select the N/OCdts who will serve as Cadet Section Leaders for the First Year Cadets, given the additional challenges inherent in leading this younger cohort. These Cadet Section Leaders should receive additional training on how to provide a supportive, respectful and healthy environment as the First Years begin their careers in uniform, adapt to service in the CAF, live away from home for the first time and adjust to adulthood.

The existing mentorship program at the CMCs should also be strengthened in support of the restructured CCOR. All Cadet Section Leaders should be mentored by their respective Squadron Warrant Officers, while all Cadet Flight Leaders and Cadet Squadron Leaders should be mentored by their respective Squadron Commanders. This mentorship should include daily supervision of performance, ongoing coaching and regular feedback.

To this end, military leadership at the CMCs needs to be addressed. Over the years, there have been repeated calls in previous reports to improve the quality of such leadership at the CMCs, with a special focus on the Squadron Commander and Squadron Warrant Officer positions.

The Board observed that there are a range of leadership capabilities, styles and approaches among those who are posted into these positions at the CMCs, giving rise to inconsistent and widely varying experiences for N/OCdts. The Board also noted that these staff leadership positions are increasingly difficult to fill, particularly as the CAF navigates this period of personnel shortages, largely in response to a perception that the CAF (specifically the occupation authorities and career managers) does not value the experience related to staff positions at the CMCs. While the Chief of Military Personnel has allocated additional points for a posting to the Training Wing at the CMCs in the annual Selection Board selection criteria, no other incentives appear to have been established to attract top talent to serve in direct leadership positions at Canada’s Military Colleges.

The Board endorses IECR Recommendation 23, which proposes that the CAF equip all training schools with the best possible people and instructors, and understands that the CMCs will be included in the CAF efforts to address this recommendation. The possibility of establishing incentives to promote postings to the training and education system is viewed with optimism. There are, however, additional specific initiatives that should be put in place at the CMCs.

One way to incentivize a posting to the CMCs, especially for junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers in direct leadership roles, is to provide specialized training prior to their service as a Squadron Commander or a Squadron Warrant Officer. More specifically, the CMCs should create an “Advanced Leader Development Program” (ALDP) to train the Squadron-level leadership and incentivize CAF members to seek out this employment opportunity. The ALDP would be a post-graduate leadership program specifically designed to train Squadron Commanders and Squadron Warrant Officers, comprising a mix of academic classes, military training, language training and practical experience. In particular, it would include specific training on how to support N/OCdts in their journey through the Military Skills & Leadership (MSL) strand. The ALDP would be offered under the competitive process for selection into post-graduate training programs, and would include one year of study and two years of obligatory service at the CMCs, in order to provide stability for all parties.

Ultimately, learning the skills necessary to lead N/OCdts and to teach the MSL strand would strengthen overall leadership development at the CMCs. Granting a professional Master’s degree in leadership development for those who already hold an undergraduate degree, or granting credits towards an undergraduate degree for those who do not, would further offer short and long-term career benefits to participants, thus helping attract high-quality staff to the CMCs. Access to second language training as a core component of the program would also increase the bilingualism of staff at the CMCs, providing participants with additional career advancement benefits.

The initial focus of the Advanced Leader Development Program should be on training the Squadron-level leadership teams. This means establishing a program for eight Captains and eight Warrant Officers to feed the proposed 16 Captain and 16 Warrant Officer leadership positions at the two CMCs. To facilitate rapid implementation of this program and demonstrate the significance of these leadership positions, the 16 military positions at both Military Colleges that are required to create this program should be sourced from the existing CMC military faculty and the associated Advanced Training List (ATL) positions (Figure 12). The CAF can then determine whether the value of the military faculty is sufficient to invest in and re-establish those 16 additional positions in the Colleges and their associated ATL positions. At a later stage, the ALDP could be expanded to offer training to Division-level leadership positions, or even to all of the Training Wing – which is responsible for the N/OCdts’ military training, including officership, physical fitness and drill. This would require more offsets to generate the ATL credits, unless more positions were added.

A final element of the concerns noted by Madame Arbour regarding the Cadet Chain of Responsibility, as reflected in IECR Recommendation 28 and in the mandate of the CMCRB, relates to the risk of abuse of authority within this peer leadership model. The Board shares those concerns. No matter how smart, developed or capable they might be as individuals, N/OCdts are still too immature and too inexperienced to be in positions of power over one another. Moreover, not only can leadership experience be gained in multiple ways that do not require the leader to exercise power over the follower, but true leadership actually manifests through strength of character, not through the accrual of power. Perhaps counterintuitively, conferring authority can be unduly limiting to the leadership development and growth of the N/OCdts, and the risks associated with inappropriate or harmful exercises of such authority vis-à-vis other N/OCdts far outweigh any positive learnings.

Accordingly, the Board believes that no N/OCdt should have disciplinary authority over another N/OCdt. This would align with the best practice adopted by the many foreign military academies this Board examined for whom peer leadership is a common feature but who do not vest their Cadets with disciplinary authority. In situations where corrective measures may be required or loss of privileges should be imposed, they should be administered by the Squadron Commander, supported by the Squadron Warrant Officer, following appropriate processes.

If the purpose of the CCOR is reconceived and its structure revised accordingly, the Board believes that it can become an effective mechanism through which to support the leadership development of N/OCdts. Moreover, the significant changes recommended below should serve to mitigate the potential for harm noted in the IECR, and thus help justify the continued use of the CCOR – in its revised form – as an important tool within the ROTP CMC.

Recommendation #31

Reduce the Cadet Chain of Responsibility at both Canadian Military Colleges to three types of positions: Cadet Squadron Leaders, Cadet Flight Leaders and Cadet Section Leaders.

Recommendation #32

Establish as a commissioning requirement that all Third Year Naval and Officer Cadets complete a session as a Cadet Section Leader.

Recommendation #33

Establish and incentivize optional leadership opportunities for Fourth Year Naval and Officer Cadets to fill Cadet Flight Leader and Cadet Squadron Leader positions.

Recommendation #34

Eliminate the Cadet Wing HQ and Division positions at the Royal Military College of Canada. Retain positions such as administrative roles and team captains but remove them from the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and eliminate their use as a graduation requirement.

Recommendation #35

Design, develop and implement the Advanced Leader Development Program to better prepare the Training Wing staff to support the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and to incentivize postings to the Canadian Military Colleges for Captains and Warrant Officers.

Recommendation #36

Reduce Military Faculty positions and their associated Advanced Training List positions and reallocate those positions to the Advanced Leadership Development Program to support the leadership development of the Naval and Officer Cadets and provide greater mentorship to the Cadet Chain of Responsibility.

Recommendation #37

Ensure that the Military Skills & Leadership strand equips Naval and Officer Cadets to be successful as Cadet Section Leaders.

Recommendation #38

Remove from the Cadet Chain of Responsibility all authority – and all appearance of authority – to impose corrective measures or loss of privileges, in order to ensure that no Naval and Officer Cadet has disciplinary authority, real or perceived, over another Naval and Officer Cadet.

Back to top

Conduct, Health & Wellbeing

The experience of being an N/OCdt at the CMCs is more similar to being a member of the CAF than to being a civilian university student, and therefore N/OCdts are directly impacted by the CAF’s ability to keep pace with the changing nature of society. Historically, the CAF has been resistant to change, often undertaking necessary reform only in response to significant external pressure. This dynamic has played out on issues ranging from the full integration of women into the military to the harms caused by the Somalia Affair and has continued in relation to the CAF’s struggle to provide a workplace free from all forms of misconduct, particularly sexual misconduct.

Most recently, the Independent External Comprehensive Review has served as a catalyst for change in the CAF. In response to its findings and recommendations, the CAF has taken, and continues to take, meaningful action, as reflected in the Status Reports of the External Monitor. The Board has observed both a commitment to change and evidence of change – within the CAF and at the CMCs – extending not only to issues of conduct and culture but more broadly to diversity, equity and inclusion, decolonization, and reconciliation. This is a source of optimism. It is also important context for the work of the CMCRB; this Board has made the deliberate choice to limit its recommendations on Conduct, Health and Wellbeing to only those elements that are specific to the CMCs and that are not being addressed via other mechanisms and initiatives currently underway within the CAF.

Notwithstanding positive progress that has occurred, misconduct and harmful behaviour continues in multiple forms at the Military Colleges. This manifests, among other ways, in discriminatory attitudes and actions based on race, gender, sexual orientation, religion and physical ability. Survey data reflects ongoing instances at both Colleges of harassment and discrimination, racism, abuses of authority, hazing and bullying, in addition to sexual misconduct.

Other data sources corroborate this evidence. The Board heard from a number of individuals who shared deeply personal experiences – often with the hope of preventing further harm – and received these testimonies with appreciation and care; these stories have allowed the Board to develop a fuller understanding of the ways in which people have been deeply affected by harmful, traumatizing and negative experiences at the Canadian Military Colleges. These direct engagements further allowed the Board to deepen its insights into power structures within the CAF and the CMCs, to understand better their impact on behaviours and attitudes, and to propose ways in which to create meaningful systemic change.

Against this background, it is important to note that the prevalence of sexual misconduct at the CMCs is largely consistent with what is happening at civilian universities.^{Footnote 45} This reflects the reality that there continue to exist attitudes and behaviours within Canadian society writ large that give rise to harm, manifesting in various forms and in various places. Indeed, the Military Colleges draw from Canadian society; they reflect the views, experiences, ideas and comportment of the people who are there at any given time.

At both civilian universities and the CMCs, most incidences of sexual assault and unwanted sexualized behaviour occur on campus, with residential campuses reporting higher incidences of sexual misconduct than commuter schools or those with off-campus housing. However Canadian female students living “off campus with roommates” were as likely to report they had experienced sexual assault (17.4%) as were students living in campus housing.^{Footnote 46} These data points tell us something about the conditions under which misconduct arises, and are particularly noteworthy in the context of the CMCs, given that the Colleges require all ROTP students to live on campus throughout their program.

More broadly, it can be expected that changes in the attitudes and behaviours of Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges will evolve alongside such changes within society at large, as that is the source from which N/OCdts are drawn. At present, the student body at the CMCs is more diverse than at any other point in history and reflects the demographic makeup of Canada better than ever before. These N/OCdts hold views that are informed by broader societal change, and not only do they not condone misconduct, they are increasingly apt to speak up against it. In this way, the most impactful change at the CMCs is driven by the N/OCdts themselves. At the same time, positive progress is fragile and faces backlash. Moreover, the reality is that instances of misconduct continue, and, in some cases, are egregious enough that they have driven N/OCdts out of the CAF. This is indicative of the need for continued work with respect to both prevention and response.

In order to determine what actions are required to stop misconduct, change negative attitudes, foster a healthy environment and mitigate harm, the Board first sought to establish what prevention and response tools are already available and what gaps persist. To this end, the Board undertook both a comparative and a discrete analysis of the prevention and response policy frameworks at the CMCs.

Back to top

Comparative Analysis

The Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) (ADM (RS)) assessed the existing policy framework at the CMCs surrounding sexual assault prevention and response – as compared to the relevant policy and legal requirements in Quebec, Ontario and the federal government, as well as in relation to benchmarks established at Queen’s University, Nipissing University, Bishop’s University, the University of Quebec in Abitibi-Temiscamingue (UQAT) and the United States Naval Academy – to determine whether any gaps existed between the policy/legal tools employed by provincial and federal governments and other comparable institutions and those employed by the CMCs.

This ADM (RS) review revealed the existence and application of an extensive series of DND/CAF policies, directives and programs. Together with federal legislation (the Employment Equity Act, the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Canadian Labour Code), these are translated into DND/CAF-specific documents via a series of Department Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) and unit orders. They are further brought to life through a variety of programs designed to prevent misconduct and to respond effectively when it occurs. In this respect, the CMC framework aligns extensively with the other provincial and federal comparators.

However, some important gaps exist. In particular, the following thematic areas are not fully or appropriately addressed at one or both of the CMCs within extant policy frameworks:

• Articulation of the rights that affected persons have to legal or other representation.
• Description of the appeal process with respect to decisions made following an investigation.
• Prohibition of irrelevant questions during an investigation.
• Requirement to collect data related to the number of times N/OCdts use supports and services relating to sexual violence.
• Identification of the safety measures that are in place to counter sexual violence, including infrastructure adjustments to secure premises.
• Requirement for the Military Colleges to submit annual reports to the Canadian Defence Academy on the number and types of complaints.
• Establishment of measures to protect and keep confidential the personal information of involved persons.
• Improvement of online accessibility to relevant documentation.
• Consideration of how to organize and oversee social activities.

Back to top

Discrete Analysis

Prevention

While a wide variety of policies are in place to prevent misconduct in the military, the Board focused its attention on the specific tools that help inculcate new members into the Profession of Arms and inform them of the requirements and expectations for personal and professional conduct immediately upon enrollment.

This process begins within the first week of service in the CAF during the Basic Military Officer Qualification course at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School, which includes information sessions on the CAF Ethos and on professional conduct. These sessions, along with a continued focus on personal and professional conduct during BMOQ, are designed to inform new recruits of their rights and obligations as members of the CAF.

Naval and Officer Cadets are further exposed to key concepts as part of the Building Our Future training program at the CMCs. Designed by the Sexual Misconduct Support and Resource Centre (SMSRC) and Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC), this four-year program is centred on the critical themes of consent, barriers to consent, healthy relationships, receiving disclosure of incidences of sexual misconduct, stress management, bystander intervention training, and how to respond to situations as an effective leader. While Building Our Future training continues to be refined and would benefit from a more knowledgeable and credible instructor cadre, the Board recognizes the value of this program within the prevention toolkit for N/OCdts at the CMCs.

The CMCs also offer a series of training sessions regarding expected behaviours and available resources for individuals affected by misconduct. Additionally, the CMCs have recently established two new positions to support prevention work on campus at the Colleges: a Chair of Cultural Evolution (RMC) and a Specialist in Resources and Training on Sexual Violence and Promoting a Positive Culture (RMC Saint-Jean). Both directly support the N/OCdts and advise the CMC leadership teams on systemic issues.

The CAF also operates support and advocacy groups for communities that have historically been marginalized within the CAF and at the CMCs, including Defence Advisory Groups for the designated equity seeking groups and local support organizations, such as the Athena Network^{Footnote 47} for women and the Agora Network^{Footnote 48} for members of the LGBTQ2+ community.

In sum, there exists a robust suite of tools in place to help prevent misconduct within the CMCs. Notwithstanding this, N/OCdts have repeatedly indicated that many of the teachings are repetitive, feel pointless and are maladapted to the specifics of the Military College environment. In particular, many N/OCdts feel that the current training fails to take into account their needs and characteristics as modern young adults. While the CMCs are working hard to better tailor new programs like Building Our Future to this audience, a degree of cynicism, indifference and disengagement persists, resulting in outcomes that are antithetical to the desired objectives of such training. These issues have, over time, contributed to shortcomings in the effectiveness of education and training tools to fully eliminate harmful behaviours.

Response

Until such time as all harmful conduct has been prevented and eradicated, response mechanisms will still be required, not only to support affected persons and hold perpetrators accountable, but also to deter future misconduct.

Many such mechanisms already exist at the CMCs; in an environment comprised mainly of young people, who may be away from home for the first time, are adapting to life in the military and are learning how to behave as members of the Profession of Arms, a broad network of support services has been established. The chain of command serves as the primary source of response to support affected persons (similar to the rest of the CAF) and is supported by a rotating duty staff that provides a 24/7 presence on campus and is accessible to all N/OCdts. N/OCdts can also access peer-based support through the Sentinel program and the Professional Conduct Advisors (fellow N/OCdts trained in these roles), as well as faith-based support through the CMC chaplaincy, including access to 24/7 in-person crisis intervention support.

Recognizing that victims may not seek support from the chain of command for highly personal issues, anonymous mental health support services are also available to N/OCdts through the 24/7 Member Assistance Program and through in-person local CAF mental health support services. N/OCdts also have 24/7 access to the Sexual Misconduct Support and Resource Centre crisis hotline, and local agreements have been established to provide N/OCdts with access to community-based sexual assault support services, including a 24/7 support hotline and emergency civilian medical care. A proliferation of informational posters, located on campus in dormitories, washrooms and near dining areas also provide quick reference for the N/OCdts regarding available resources.

In terms of technological support resources, all CAF members have access to the Respect in the CAF mobile app delivered by the Sexual Misconduct Support and Resource Centre, which serves as a repository of resources, guides, and contact information. The app can be used to help access support services, to help CAF members support those who have been affected by sexual misconduct, and to ensure that CAF members are informed about policies and procedures within the organization. RMC Saint-Jean also has a dedicated mobile app that includes contact information to access sexual harassment, discrimination and violence support services.

In instances where an individual has been affected by sexual misconduct, and that individual has come forward to report an incident, the CMCs have established immediate steps (“interim measures”) that can be taken by the chain of command or the supervisor/manager to provide support in advance of the requirement for initiation or completion of an investigation. These interim measures are designed to ensure safety and provide options to support affected persons while the judicial or administrative systems follow their prescribed processes, which in some cases can take well over a year, during which both the alleged offender and the affected person may be living on-campus. However, the Board is equally conscious that the presumption of innocence must be respected, which means that an alleged offender cannot be treated like a guilty party in the absence of a conviction or determination via the appropriate process. The Board therefore supports the interim measures approach that the CMCs have taken to navigate this fine line, but would nonetheless encourage the Colleges to explore opportunities to increase transparency through greater communication with affected individuals, as appropriate.

In terms of such processes, incidences of misconduct that meet the threshold for legal action may be addressed by the military police or civilian police services, for disposition through either the military or civilian legal systems. Based on the recommendations of the Independent External Comprehensive Review, the CAF has committed to transfer the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute criminal code sexual offences to the civilian criminal justice system. Other Code of Service Discipline offences may be dealt with by the military justice system, including Court Martial. Issues that contravene the Code of Service Discipline but are considered minor in nature may also be dealt with through the use of Summary Proceedings, a mechanism that is unique to the military justice system.

The CAF may also apply workplace remedial measures to identify and correct performance or conduct deficiencies that do not meet the threshold for legal prosecution. Applied by the chain of command, the remedial measures program is designed to remedy conduct or performance that fails to meet the required professional standards but does not constitute a service offence. Remedial measures may be applied concurrently to legal proceedings.

Certain cases of performance or conduct deficiencies can require an assessment of whether the individual should remain a member of the Profession of Arms. In extreme cases, or cases of repeated issues with no improvement, the chain of command may recommend or decide that an individual should be released from the CAF.

Currently, the Commandants have release authority for N/OCdts who fail to meet the performance requirements of the ROTP CMC, but they do not have authority to release N/OCdts who have conduct issues, no matter how significant. As such, a Commandant can release from the CAF a N/OCdt who fails the CMCs’ academic, fitness, military training, or second language requirements, but not one who has committed an offence, including sexual misconduct, as that authority has been assigned to the Director of Military Career Administration by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

In sum, the Board believes that the range of support services that are available at the CMCs provide a comprehensive foundation for a robust and effective response framework. However, it is also complex and can be challenging for junior members of the CAF to navigate. Moreover, the Board heard that confidence in the chain of command to respond appropriately to misconduct and to handle complaints in an expeditious, respectful or effective manner is low.^{Footnote 49} Indeed, the drawback of the legal veil of confidentiality that must surround certain processes to ensure fairness can paradoxically give rise to erroneous perceptions that “nothing is being done,” which in turn breeds cynicism, anger and frustration. Increasing opportunities for follow-up with affected individuals, as appropriate, demonstrates compassion and can help offset this.

It is clear that not only must justice be done, but it must also be seen to be done. This imperative factored significantly into the Board’s perspective on how best to move forward with building trust, evolving culture, improving communication and establishing a healthy environment at Canada’s Military Colleges.

Back to top

The Way Forward

Based on the current state of the prevention and response framework at the CMCs, three main lines of effort are required to help the Colleges continue to build an inclusive and diverse community, characterized by a healthy environment free from harassment, discrimination, sexual misconduct and violence: strengthening existing mechanisms, increasing trust in and engagement with these mechanisms, and filling gaps where no mechanisms exist but should.

To inform its thinking on how best to address these challenges, the Board undertook a detailed examination of best practice within Canada and around the world, via site visits to foreign military academies and Canadian civilian universities, as well as through a literature review.

Strengthening Existing Mechanisms

The review by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) was valuable in assessing the existing prevention and response framework, and in determining that it is comparatively robust. It did not assess the effectiveness of this framework, however. A more extensive analysis is required in order to measure whether the policies and procedures in place are effective in helping prevent and respond to misconduct. In keeping with best practice, as reflected by the approach taken at several civilian universities and government organizations, this analysis should be undertaken by experts in the field. Examples of this include the Canadian Centre for Legal Innovation in Sexual Assault Response (CCLISAR), which has conducted assessments such as the Independent Review of Bishop’s University’s Practices and Policies Related to Sexualized Violence and the Sexual Violence Prevention and Response Framework at Queen’s University.

Another way to strengthen existing prevention and response mechanisms is to harmonize them. In particular, all relevant policies, procedures, programs and practices should be the same at both Colleges, differing only when required to align with different provincial legislative requirements. This will ensure greater clarity and will standardize expectations, engendering clearer communication between leadership and N/OCdts, improving understanding by the N/OCdts regarding available resources and reporting mechanisms, and facilitating the movement of N/OCdts between Colleges, given that they will be well versed in what is expected of them regardless of where they are studying. Harmonization must extend to the support resources available at both Colleges (as discussed further below) – from training to personnel to events – in order to facilitate equality, efficiency and effectiveness.

Additionally, despite the presence of 24/7 rotating duty staff, some N/OCdts reported an inability to access these individuals when the need arose. Ensuring that all N/OCdts know when and how to access duty officers is essential, and to this end more effective and transparent communication between the Colleges and the Cadets would be beneficial. Moreover, it is imperative that the duty staff have a high level of credibility and trust with the N/OCdt community, so that the individuals who may need support feel comfortable in seeking it out.

Lastly, both new and existing policies, procedures, programs and practices at the CMCs should undergo a holistic Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) to ensure that they are fully considered, responsive, inclusive, tailored and sensitive to all N/OCdts, and that they are contributing, and seen to be contributing, to a shared vision for the Colleges as places that are free from harm and where all members feel safe and secure at all times.

Increasing Trust in and Engagement with Existing Mechanisms

As noted above, it is not merely the absence of response mechanisms that is concerning but the lack of trust in and engagement with those that do exist. Solving this requires that N/OCdts see and believe that the authority figures they rely on are vested with the appropriate tools and powers to address the problems the N/OCdts are facing. At present, the inability of the Commandants to release N/OCdts from the CMCs for conduct issues undermines this belief.

Under the current rules, it is the Director of Military Career Administration who holds this authority – someone with no presence on campus and whom the N/OCdts do not know. This approach creates a reasonable system of checks and balances, which in part serves to prevent Commandants from taking this significant decision unilaterally and from being, or being viewed to be, unduly influenced by proximity to the issue and/or influenced by personal bias against the individual in question. However, it also fosters the sense that the Commandants are not sufficiently empowered to enforce appropriate conduct, and undermines the credibility of the system in the eyes of the N/OCdts.

Outside of this context, the rationale for vesting the Director of Military Career Administration with this authority makes sense, and it helps ensure an equitable application of release authorities for misconduct across the CAF. But it is also time-consuming and burdensome, and it hampers the ability of the chain of command to respond in a rapid and transparent manner to significant issues of misconduct at the CMCs.

To balance these two imperatives, the Board considers that the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy should be designated as the appropriate level of release authority for misconduct at the CMCs. This change in the position vested with the release authority should help ensure that broad perspective and objectivity are maintained when making release decisions, while also enhancing the system’s actual ability to respond to misconduct independently, fairly and expeditiously.

Filling Gaps

New mechanisms and new approaches are also needed to help build a respectful and supportive campus culture marked by positive behaviour and healthy spaces.

This starts with training. Although the CMCs already have many such initiatives in place, most are perceived by the N/OCdts as redundant, performative and ineffective. The fact that most training is delivered by members of the chain of command or other N/OCdts, who typically lack specific subject-matter expertise, compounds this problem. As such, the training offerings at the CMCs – including bystander intervention, discussion on the role of alcohol and drugs in sexual assaults, and instruction on reporting and response mechanisms – should be wholly modernized and fully enmeshed within both the Military Skills & Leadership strand and the Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strand (as appropriate), within the proposed new Integrated Officer Development Program (IODP). Moreover, given the sensitivity of and the nuance required when addressing issues such as racism, homophobia, healthy sexuality, toxic masculinity and relationship with self, training should be delivered by subject-matter experts who are respected and seen as credible by the N/OCdts.

Efforts must also be taken to provide a safe environment, particularly for women and vulnerable populations, including as related to living facilities. On this issue, while N/OCdts and leadership/management had conflicting views on the adequacy of available support resources (particularly after hours and on weekends), and while many foreign partners and allies diverge on this point (taking a more hands-off approach to the lives of their Cadets outside of education and training hours), greater consideration is needed regarding institutional, structural and cultural factors that may put women and vulnerable populations at more or less risk while living on campus at the CMCs.

In support of the above imperatives, there is a need for dedicated on-campus support in the form of new Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centres (HSWRC) to be established at each College. These should be led by civilian directors and should be mandated to prevent and respond to harmful behaviour through a balance of focused education, targeted interventions, comprehensive response and compassionate advocacy in order to promote professionalism, respect and trust. In particular, the Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centres should do the following:

• Support the delivery of the Military Skills & Leadership and the Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strands of the Integrated Officer Development Program, by
  • providing training to N/OCdts, including the Building Our Future program and bystander intervention, in alignment with the Integrated Officer Development Program learning outcomes;
  • supporting the professionalization of the instructor cadre and other support staff (such as Duty Officers), including through the delivery of “train the trainer” programs; and
  • developing relevant educational materials.
• Facilitate access for N/OCdts to CAF support services addressing sexual misconduct, mental health, anti-racism, addictions, conflict management, etc., including by integrating and coordinating resources offered by the Sexual Misconduct Support Resource Centre, the Integrated Conflict and Complaint Management (ICCM) program, the Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC) and the Canadian Forces Health Services.
• Train, manage, mentor and coach a contingent of peer-elected N/OCdt Advocates who provide direct support to N/OCdts in need.
• Develop insights and advice and produce recommendations to inform the decision making of CMC leadership in relation to the Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centre mandate.
• Undertake on-campus awareness-raising and harm-prevention activities.
• Collaborate with stakeholders to implement and enforce adequate safety and security measures.

Appropriate human and financial resources will be required to establish and run successful and sustainable Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centres. Taking into consideration existing resources that are currently spread around different teams at both Colleges and that should be consolidated, the Board expects that the new Centres will need to be staffed with approximately ten full-time employees distributed between the two Colleges with comparable positions/titles. These employees should hold functional expertise in fields that respond to the mandate of the HSWRCs.

These objectives should be further advanced by transforming the positions of Professional Conduct Advisors into a contingent of peer-elected N/OCdt Advocates, who will serve as ambassadors of positive and respectful culture and as on-the-ground support for individual N/OCdts in interfacing with the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and CMC leadership, including on issues that require immediate attention.

In line with the guiding principles of centralized policy and program development and decentralized support, the HSWRCs should have a physical footprint at both Colleges that is easily and discreetly accessible to N/OCdts, including during off-hours (i.e., evenings and weekends).

Another way to offset the harm that arises around sexism, toxic masculinity and misogyny and all of their attendant parts, is to address the associated issue of the preponderance of men in the Military College environment. To this end, the Board applauds the CAF’s stated goal of increasing the percentage of women in the Profession of Arms to 25% by 2026 and recognizes that the CMCs already play a notable role in growing the number of women joining the Canadian Armed Forces, as highlighted in an earlier section of this Report. While there are a number of ways to mitigate the negative impacts of this imbalance, these initiatives do not address the underlying issue of having disproportionately more men at the CMCs.

Sustained change will require a tipping point in terms of gender parity. Recent efforts by the CAF to address this have yielded success, and in 2024 the CMCs notably attracted 25% women to their ranks. Building on this momentum, the Board believes that setting the realistic yet intermediate target of 33% women N/OCdts over ten years to ensure greater gender parity at both Military Colleges will help build a healthier, safer, more welcoming environment that better reflects Canadian society. The Board acknowledges that full gender parity is unlikely and that efforts to emulate the percentage of women at civilian universities fails to account for the current realities in the CAF or the state of militaries across the world. Over time, and in response to a mix of concerted recruiting efforts, ongoing broader institutional culture evolution and specific changes proposed in this Report, the intent is to help set conditions within which more women are interested in joining the CAF and enrolling in the CMCs and are met with an environment in which to thrive when they do.

Overall, the Board is confident about the possibilities for progress and positive change at the CMCs. However, some concerning obstacles still stand in the way of realizing their full potential. Women remain significantly more likely to have suffered negative experiences at the CMCs than men. They strongly view misconduct as more present and problematic than men do, and they have more negative perceptions about the Colleges’ handling of instances of misconduct, highlighting that a lack of timely and transparent institutional response is often more traumatizing than the initial incident itself. Overall, the lived experiences of women continue to differ significantly than those of men at Canada’s Military Colleges. This needs to change.

In this vein, all members of the CMC community must recognize and validate the experiences of their fellow N/OCdts, must actively contribute to a positive culture, and must hold themselves to account in support of these efforts. Action must match rhetoric in fact and in perception. The recommendations proposed below represent significant steps towards that end.

Recommendation #39

Amend the policy framework at the Canadian Military Colleges to address gaps identified by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) in its Advisory on Sexual Violence Prevention at Canadian Military Colleges.

Recommendation #40

Mandate experts in the field of sexual misconduct prevention and response to assess the effectiveness and impact of the policies and procedures of the Canadian Military Colleges.

Recommendation #41

Assign release authority for Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy for the following release items:

• 5d - Not advantageously employable – conduct deficiency
• 5f - Unsuitable for further service – conduct deficiency

Recommendation #42

Establish a Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centre at each Military College, staffed by professionals with a wide range of relevant expertise and sufficiently resourced to deliver on its mandate to provide prevention and response support to the Canadian Military Colleges seven days a week.

Recommendation #43

Increase the percentage of female Naval and Officer Cadets at the CMCs to 33% by 2035.

Back to top

Infrastructure, Operations & Support

As symbols of national pride, power and prestige which help project an image of the Canadian Armed Forces to Canadians and to the world, the state of infrastructure and maintenance at the CMCs matters. Thanks to its unique and successful partnership with the Corporation Fort Saint-Jean (Corpo St-Jean) – a community-based non-profit in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu entrusted with the responsibility of running operations and maintenance on the campus – RMC Saint-Jean reflects the best of what Canada’s professional educational and training institution should be. Notwithstanding challenges it faces vis-à-vis funding for its major capital projects (such as the arena and pool), attractive buildings, well-maintained grounds, modern facilities and secure sites all help highlight the historic value of the campus, demonstrate a high standard of care towards the Naval and Officer Cadets, and reflect global best practice in terms of psycho-social infrastructure.

More specifically, due to the nature of the contract in place between Corpo St-Jean and RMC Saint-Jean – which is financially significant but yields great value – the College benefits from timely, high-quality support from a dedicated local company that is deeply invested in the success and wellbeing of the institution. RMC Saint-Jean does not have to compete with other service units in the St-Jean Garrison area to address real property maintenance or repairs for its 33 assets because it has dedicated access to this private, third-party facility manager.

Conversely, at RMC, through little fault of its own, the state of physical infrastructure leaves much to be desired, creating a harmful psychosocial environment for N/OCdts and negatively impacting Canada’s image and reputation. Although chronic underinvestment in time, money and attention has harmed both Colleges, the impact is particularly noteworthy and noticeable at RMC, creating an unacceptable divergence in standards between the two Colleges. This is due in large part to the different operations and support model for servicing Kingston. Unlike in Saint-Jean, RMC is supported by the Real Property Operations Group Detachment (RP Ops) for CFB Kingston, which provides all infrastructure support to both the Military College and all other units at CFB Kingston. This means that in-year facility maintenance and minor repairs work orders for RMC – from cutting the grass, removing snow and cleaning windows, to fixing broken toilets and repairing heating and cooling systems are triaged by RP Ops against all other demands at CFB Kingston.

As a result, RMC’s 55 real property assets, many of which have heritage designation, have been plagued by a history of significant deferred maintenance, creating all sorts of problems, from more breakdowns and growing costs to increased future liability and chronic challenges for users.

RMC is also dealing with the impacts of significant funding shortfalls for RP Ops for the 2024-2025 fiscal year, resulting in a 50% reduction in maintenance and repair funding at CFB Kingston. For example, at the time of writing this Report, RMC had been informed that only emergency facilities repairs – such as no heat in winter, power outages, no running water, flooding, sewer backup or smoking electrical outlets – would receive service. Consequently, repairs such as restoring laundry facilities, fixing broken sinks, patching holes in walls and removing bird feces from balconies will not even be considered for action until after April 2025 at the earliest.

In addition to an ongoing lack of resources, the roots of this problem are also linked to issues of responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities. The Deputy Minister of National Defence is responsible for all infrastructure maintenance and construction for DND/CAF. Since 2016, this responsibility has been consolidated and executed through the Associate Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and Environment) and subordinate units and detachments across Canada, made up of a blend of civilian public servants and CAF members. In this construct, neither the Chief of the Defence Staff, nor the Service Commanders, nor the Canadian Defence Academy, nor the Canadian Military Colleges have any authorities for real property management, construction, or associated financial expenditures.

Major capital construction and minor new construction projects at the CMCs follow the standard Department of National Defence processes that compete for funding, project approval and project support with all other DND/CAF construction demands. As such, demands for dormitories, libraries or arenas at the CMCs must contend against aircraft hangars, jetties and barracks for soldiers, across the country, for prioritization. It is not surprising that, in this context, investments in the CMCs do not fare well against demands to support operational requirements, especially within the constraints of systemic underfunding of defence infrastructure requirements writ large.

The Department of National Defence has acknowledged some of the aforementioned issues, with the 2022/2023 Departmental Results Report recognizing the systemic underfunding of real property, for example. This is only a first step, however. In a context where significant funding shortfalls persist, a vicious cycle has taken hold wherein the impact of DND’s investment in maintenance and repair continually decreases, while costs and demands continually increase. This in turn creates a situation in which the existing infrastructure portfolio cannot be maintained, leading to an acceleration of asset deterioration. Urgent action is needed now.

The CMCs are an appropriate place to start; under a construct in which investment in the Military Colleges competes against operational demands, the CMCs will never win. But if the CMCs are viewed as having a defence and security purpose unto themselves, which serve Canadians and directly advance the interests of the CAF, then dedicated investment in the Military Colleges will not only support these professional military training and education institutions, but will also help to fulfill the social contract between the country and the N/OCdts who choose and are mandated to serve it.

This requires greater overall investment in Canada’s Military Colleges, which would provide timely opportunities to increase defence spending towards 2% of GDP on expenditures within the Canadian economy that will have a direct positive impact on the quality of life for CAF members. It also requires a new funding paradigm to address the CMCs specifically. Lastly, it requires a different operations and maintenance model for RMC, akin to that which exists at RMC Saint-Jean, to ensure that support is outsourced and the needs of RMC prioritized. This would lead to the privatization of some public service jobs but would significantly raise the quality of life at RMC and, importantly, render it on par with RMC Saint-Jean in terms of infrastructure, operations and maintenance, and site security.

Overarching all of this, a reset in attitude and expectations is required regarding the value of Canada’s built heritage and the importance of architectural excellence and quality design at the CMCs. Such a shift would bring Canada in line with countries like Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom, which place great significance on the quality and attractiveness of their campuses.

For too long, the Government of Canada and DND/CAF have accepted mediocrity. This has resulted in infrastructure additions to the campuses in recent decades that are incongruent with the broader historical look-and-feel of the CMCs, renovations that are approached piecemeal rather than holistically, and an acceptance of operations and maintenance standards that leave the Colleges looking tired and unkempt, particularly at RMC. This, in turn, has undermined the health and wellbeing of the N/OCdts, hindered Canada’s ability to leverage the CMCs to project national power, and eroded Canadians’ pride in these institutions.

Going forward, any new buildings, infrastructure additions, renovations or upgrades should be held to the highest standards, and the long-term value of building and maintaining beautiful and inspiring campuses, in their historical style, should become a central consideration.

Overall, a recalibrated approach will be instrumental in recognizing the CMCs as prestigious institutions of national esteem, as befitting a G7 country, and in attaching importance to the experience of those who attend them.

Recommendation #44

Establish a dedicated funding framework for major capital projects, minor construction, and maintenance and repair to support training and education establishments in the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Canadian Military Colleges.

Recommendation #45

Increase baseline funding for major capital projects, minor construction, and maintenance and repair at the Canadian Military Colleges.

Recommendation #46

Establish a dedicated facilities management contract at the Royal Military College of Canada, similar to that which exists at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean.

Back to top

Back to top